- •Intended Audience
- •1.1 Financing the Firm
- •1.2Public and Private Sources of Capital
- •1.3The Environment forRaising Capital in the United States
- •Investment Banks
- •1.4Raising Capital in International Markets
- •1.5MajorFinancial Markets outside the United States
- •1.6Trends in Raising Capital
- •Innovative Instruments
- •2.1Bank Loans
- •2.2Leases
- •2.3Commercial Paper
- •2.4Corporate Bonds
- •2.5More Exotic Securities
- •2.6Raising Debt Capital in the Euromarkets
- •2.7Primary and Secondary Markets forDebt
- •2.8Bond Prices, Yields to Maturity, and Bond Market Conventions
- •2.9Summary and Conclusions
- •3.1Types of Equity Securities
- •Volume of Financing with Different Equity Instruments
- •3.2Who Owns u.S. Equities?
- •3.3The Globalization of Equity Markets
- •3.4Secondary Markets forEquity
- •International Secondary Markets for Equity
- •3.5Equity Market Informational Efficiency and Capital Allocation
- •3.7The Decision to Issue Shares Publicly
- •3.8Stock Returns Associated with ipOs of Common Equity
- •Ipo Underpricing of u.S. Stocks
- •4.1Portfolio Weights
- •4.2Portfolio Returns
- •4.3Expected Portfolio Returns
- •4.4Variances and Standard Deviations
- •4.5Covariances and Correlations
- •4.6Variances of Portfolios and Covariances between Portfolios
- •Variances for Two-Stock Portfolios
- •4.7The Mean-Standard Deviation Diagram
- •4.8Interpreting the Covariance as a Marginal Variance
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orSelling Short the Position in
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orShorting a Position in a
- •4.9Finding the Minimum Variance Portfolio
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Two Stocks
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Many Stocks
- •Investment Applications of Mean-Variance Analysis and the capm
- •5.2The Essentials of Mean-Variance Analysis
- •5.3The Efficient Frontierand Two-Fund Separation
- •5.4The Tangency Portfolio and Optimal Investment
- •Identification of the Tangency Portfolio
- •5.5Finding the Efficient Frontierof Risky Assets
- •5.6How Useful Is Mean-Variance Analysis forFinding
- •5.8The Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Implications for Optimal Investment
- •5.9Estimating Betas, Risk-Free Returns, Risk Premiums,
- •Improving the Beta Estimated from Regression
- •Identifying the Market Portfolio
- •5.10Empirical Tests of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Is the Value-Weighted Market Index Mean-Variance Efficient?
- •Interpreting the capm’s Empirical Shortcomings
- •5.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •6.1The Market Model:The First FactorModel
- •6.2The Principle of Diversification
- •Insurance Analogies to Factor Risk and Firm-Specific Risk
- •6.3MultifactorModels
- •Interpreting Common Factors
- •6.5FactorBetas
- •6.6Using FactorModels to Compute Covariances and Variances
- •6.7FactorModels and Tracking Portfolios
- •6.8Pure FactorPortfolios
- •6.9Tracking and Arbitrage
- •6.10No Arbitrage and Pricing: The Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •Verifying the Existence of Arbitrage
- •Violations of the aptEquation fora Small Set of Stocks Do Not Imply Arbitrage.
- •Violations of the aptEquation by Large Numbers of Stocks Imply Arbitrage.
- •6.11Estimating FactorRisk Premiums and FactorBetas
- •6.12Empirical Tests of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •6.13 Summary and Conclusions
- •7.1Examples of Derivatives
- •7.2The Basics of Derivatives Pricing
- •7.3Binomial Pricing Models
- •7.4Multiperiod Binomial Valuation
- •7.5Valuation Techniques in the Financial Services Industry
- •7.6Market Frictions and Lessons from the Fate of Long-Term
- •7.7Summary and Conclusions
- •8.1ADescription of Options and Options Markets
- •8.2Option Expiration
- •8.3Put-Call Parity
- •Insured Portfolio
- •8.4Binomial Valuation of European Options
- •8.5Binomial Valuation of American Options
- •Valuing American Options on Dividend-Paying Stocks
- •8.6Black-Scholes Valuation
- •8.7Estimating Volatility
- •Volatility
- •8.8Black-Scholes Price Sensitivity to Stock Price, Volatility,
- •Interest Rates, and Expiration Time
- •8.9Valuing Options on More Complex Assets
- •Implied volatility
- •8.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •9.1 Cash Flows ofReal Assets
- •9.2Using Discount Rates to Obtain Present Values
- •Value Additivity and Present Values of Cash Flow Streams
- •Inflation
- •9.3Summary and Conclusions
- •10.1Cash Flows
- •10.2Net Present Value
- •Implications of Value Additivity When Evaluating Mutually Exclusive Projects.
- •10.3Economic Value Added (eva)
- •10.5Evaluating Real Investments with the Internal Rate of Return
- •Intuition for the irrMethod
- •10.7 Summary and Conclusions
- •10A.1Term Structure Varieties
- •10A.2Spot Rates, Annuity Rates, and ParRates
- •11.1Tracking Portfolios and Real Asset Valuation
- •Implementing the Tracking Portfolio Approach
- •11.2The Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Method
- •11.3The Effect of Leverage on Comparisons
- •11.4Implementing the Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Formula with
- •11.5Pitfalls in Using the Comparison Method
- •11.6Estimating Beta from Scenarios: The Certainty Equivalent Method
- •Identifying the Certainty Equivalent from Models of Risk and Return
- •11.7Obtaining Certainty Equivalents with Risk-Free Scenarios
- •Implementing the Risk-Free Scenario Method in a Multiperiod Setting
- •11.8Computing Certainty Equivalents from Prices in Financial Markets
- •11.9Summary and Conclusions
- •11A.1Estimation Errorand Denominator-Based Biases in Present Value
- •11A.2Geometric versus Arithmetic Means and the Compounding-Based Bias
- •12.2Valuing Strategic Options with the Real Options Methodology
- •Valuing a Mine with No Strategic Options
- •Valuing a Mine with an Abandonment Option
- •Valuing Vacant Land
- •Valuing the Option to Delay the Start of a Manufacturing Project
- •Valuing the Option to Expand Capacity
- •Valuing Flexibility in Production Technology: The Advantage of Being Different
- •12.3The Ratio Comparison Approach
- •12.4The Competitive Analysis Approach
- •12.5When to Use the Different Approaches
- •Valuing Asset Classes versus Specific Assets
- •12.6Summary and Conclusions
- •13.1Corporate Taxes and the Evaluation of Equity-Financed
- •Identifying the Unlevered Cost of Capital
- •13.2The Adjusted Present Value Method
- •Valuing a Business with the wacc Method When a Debt Tax Shield Exists
- •Investments
- •IsWrong
- •Valuing Cash Flow to Equity Holders
- •13.5Summary and Conclusions
- •14.1The Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •IsFalse
- •14.2How an Individual InvestorCan “Undo” a Firm’s Capital
- •14.3How Risky Debt Affects the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •14.4How Corporate Taxes Affect the Capital Structure Choice
- •14.6Taxes and Preferred Stock
- •14.7Taxes and Municipal Bonds
- •14.8The Effect of Inflation on the Tax Gain from Leverage
- •14.10Are There Tax Advantages to Leasing?
- •14.11Summary and Conclusions
- •15.1How Much of u.S. Corporate Earnings Is Distributed to Shareholders?Aggregate Share Repurchases and Dividends
- •15.2Distribution Policy in Frictionless Markets
- •15.3The Effect of Taxes and Transaction Costs on Distribution Policy
- •15.4How Dividend Policy Affects Expected Stock Returns
- •15.5How Dividend Taxes Affect Financing and Investment Choices
- •15.6Personal Taxes, Payout Policy, and Capital Structure
- •15.7Summary and Conclusions
- •16.1Bankruptcy
- •16.3How Chapter11 Bankruptcy Mitigates Debt Holder–Equity HolderIncentive Problems
- •16.4How Can Firms Minimize Debt Holder–Equity Holder
- •Incentive Problems?
- •17.1The StakeholderTheory of Capital Structure
- •17.2The Benefits of Financial Distress with Committed Stakeholders
- •17.3Capital Structure and Competitive Strategy
- •17.4Dynamic Capital Structure Considerations
- •17.6 Summary and Conclusions
- •18.1The Separation of Ownership and Control
- •18.2Management Shareholdings and Market Value
- •18.3How Management Control Distorts Investment Decisions
- •18.4Capital Structure and Managerial Control
- •Investment Strategy?
- •18.5Executive Compensation
- •Is Executive Pay Closely Tied to Performance?
- •Is Executive Compensation Tied to Relative Performance?
- •19.1Management Incentives When Managers Have BetterInformation
- •19.2Earnings Manipulation
- •Incentives to Increase or Decrease Accounting Earnings
- •19.4The Information Content of Dividend and Share Repurchase
- •19.5The Information Content of the Debt-Equity Choice
- •19.6Empirical Evidence
- •19.7Summary and Conclusions
- •20.1AHistory of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.2Types of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.3 Recent Trends in TakeoverActivity
- •20.4Sources of TakeoverGains
- •Is an Acquisition Required to Realize Tax Gains, Operating Synergies,
- •Incentive Gains, or Diversification?
- •20.5The Disadvantages of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.7Empirical Evidence on the Gains from Leveraged Buyouts (lbOs)
- •20.8 Valuing Acquisitions
- •Valuing Synergies
- •20.9Financing Acquisitions
- •Information Effects from the Financing of a Merger or an Acquisition
- •20.10Bidding Strategies in Hostile Takeovers
- •20.11Management Defenses
- •20.12Summary and Conclusions
- •21.1Risk Management and the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •Implications of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Hedging
- •21.2Why Do Firms Hedge?
- •21.4How Should Companies Organize TheirHedging Activities?
- •21.8Foreign Exchange Risk Management
- •Indonesia
- •21.9Which Firms Hedge? The Empirical Evidence
- •21.10Summary and Conclusions
- •22.1Measuring Risk Exposure
- •Volatility as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •Value at Risk as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •22.2Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •Value at
- •22.3Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •22.4Hedging and Convenience Yields
- •22.5Hedging Long-Dated Commitments with Short-Maturing FuturesorForward Contracts
- •Intuition for Hedging with a Maturity Mismatch in the Presence of a Constant Convenience Yield
- •22.6Hedging with Swaps
- •22.7Hedging with Options
- •22.8Factor-Based Hedging
- •Instruments
- •22.10Minimum Variance Portfolios and Mean-Variance Analysis
- •22.11Summary and Conclusions
- •23Risk Management
- •23.2Duration
- •23.4Immunization
- •Immunization Using dv01
- •Immunization and Large Changes in Interest Rates
- •23.5Convexity
- •23.6Interest Rate Hedging When the Term Structure Is Not Flat
- •23.7Summary and Conclusions
- •Interest Rate
- •Interest Rate
15.4How Dividend Policy Affects Expected Stock Returns
We have asserted that share repurchases provide a better method of distributing cash
than dividends because most investors prefer capital gains income to an equivalent
dividend taxed at a higher rate. Stocks with higher dividend yields, to compensate
investors for their tax disadvantage, should thus offer higher expected returns than
similar stocks with lower dividend yields. Firms with higher dividend yields, but
equivalent cash flows, should then have lower values, reflecting the higher rates that
apply to their cash flows.
Researchers have taken two approaches to evaluate the effect of dividend yield on
expected stock returns. The first approach measures stock returns around the date that
the stock trades ex-dividend. Recall from Chapter 8 that the ex-dividend date(or the
ex-date) is the first date on which purchasers of new shares will not be entitled to
receive the forthcoming dividend. For example, a dividend paid on February 15 may
have an ex-dividend date of February 5, which means that purchasers of stock on and
after February 5 will not receive the dividend. Since investors who purchase the stock
before the ex-dividend date (February 4 or earlier in this example) receive the dividend
while those who purchase stock on or after this date do not, the decline in the stock
price on the ex-dividend date provides a measure of how much the market values the
dividend. The second approach measures how dividend yield affects expected returns
cross-sectionally.
7See Black (1976) for an early discussion of this dividend puzzle.
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IV. Capital Structure |
15. How Taxes Affect |
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Companies, 2002 |
Strategy, Second Edition |
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Chapter 15
How Taxes Affect Dividends and Share Repurchases
543
Ex-Dividend Stock Price Movements
Consider Example 15.4, which assumes that a dividend is taxed at an investor’s per-
sonal income tax rate and that capital gains are not taxed at all.
Example 15.4:The Decision to Purchase Stock Before orAfterthe
Ex-Dividend Date
Trevtex Corporation plans to pay a dividend of $1 per share.Tomorrow is the ex-dividend
date, so investors who purchase the stock tomorrow will not receive the dividend.Assume
Trevtex is selling for $20.00 per share today and is expected to sell for $19.20 per share
tomorrow.Should an investor with a 33 percent marginal tax rate, who is not taxed on cap-
ital gains, purchase the stock today and receive the dividend or should the investor wait one
day and purchase it without the dividend?
Answer:The net cost per share of buying the stock with the dividend is $20 minus $1
for the dividend plus the tax the investor must pay on the imminent dividend.For an investor
with a 33 percent marginal tax rate, this net cost is $19.33 per share.Hence, purchasing
the stock ex-dividend for $19.20 per share would be preferred to purchasing the stock for
$20 per share just prior to the ex-dividend date, which has a net cost of $19.33.However,
a tax-exempt investor would prefer to purchase the stock prior to the ex-dividend date since
the net cost per share is $19 ( $20 $1).
Example 15.4 illustrates that a $1 dividend may be worth less than $1 because
of personal taxes that investors must pay on the dividends. As a result, stock prices
will drop by less than the amount of the dividend on the ex-dividend date. For
instance, the stock price would fall $0.67 after the payment of a $1.00 dividend if
the marginal investor, who would be indifferent between buying either before or after
the ex-dividend date, had a 33 percent tax rate on dividends, assuming that there is
no tax on capital gains.
Empirical Evidence on Price Drops on Ex-Dividend Dates.Elton and Gruber
(1970) examined the price movements around the ex-dividend dates of listed stocks
from April 1966 to the end of March 1967. They found that, on average, the stock price
decline was 77.7 percent of the dividend, implying that shareholders place a value of
only slightly more than $0.77 on a dividend of $1.00. The authors also found that the
percentage price drop was related to the size of the dividend. For dividends greater than
5 percent of the stock price, the price drop on the ex-dividend date exceeded, on aver-
age, 90 percent of the dividend. For the smallest dividends, however, the price drop on
the ex-dividend date was closer to 50 percent of the dividend.
Elton and Gruber interpreted the differential price drop as evidence of the investor
clientele effect. Because the marginal investor in a stock with a high dividend yield is
likely to have a low marginal tax rate, the after-tax value of the dividend should be rel-
atively close to the amount of the payout. However, the marginal buyer of a stock with
a low dividend yield is likely to have a high marginal tax rate and thus will place a
much lower value on the dividends.
Non-Tax-Based Explanations forthe Magnitudes of the Ex-Dividend Date Price
Drops.Asecond explanation for the differential price drop was suggested by Kalay
(1982). To understand this explanation, consider first the case where there are no trans-
action costs. In this case, if the stock price drop was not close to the amount of the
dividend, traders would have an opportunity to earn arbitrage profits. In Example 15.4,
traders could buy the stock at $20.00, receive the $1.00 dividend, and sell the stock the
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1100 Titman: FinancialIV. Capital Structure
15. How Taxes Affect
© The McGraw
1100 HillMarkets and Corporate
Dividends and Share
Companies, 2002
Strategy, Second Edition
Repurchases
544Part IVCapital Structure
next day for $19.20. Because the capital loss from the price drop is fully tax deductible
at the personal income tax rate for short-term traders, this transaction yields an after-
tax as well as a pretax gain. This arbitrage gain will exist as long as the price does not
drop by the full amount of the dividend.
Consider next the case where there is a $0.10 per share transaction cost. In this
case, the price need not drop the full $1.00, but it must drop at least $0.90, or 90 per-
cent of the dividend, to preclude arbitrage. However, on a $0.40 dividend, the price
needs to drop only $0.30, or 75 percent of the dividend, to preclude arbitrage. Hence,
for smaller dividends, smaller price drops as a percentage of the dividend are needed
to preclude arbitrage, which is exactly what Elton and Gruber observed. Consistent with
this, if prices are set to preclude arbitrage, then returns on the ex date which include
the dividend should be independent of the amount of the dividend. This means that on
the margin, a one cent increase in the dividend should lead to a one cent increase in
the price drop. Astudy by Boyd and Jagannathan (1994) found that this was indeed
the case.
Other evidence leads us to suspect that the observed behavior of stock prices on
ex-dividend dates may have nothing to do with taxes. First, the kind of behavior
observed on the ex-dividend date in the United States seems to be an international phe-
nomenon, even where dividends are not tax disadvantaged. Frank and Jagannathan
(1998) observed that in Hong Kong, where dividends are not taxed, stock price changes
on ex-dividend dates are similar to those observed in the United States. This finding
may have been due to an inefficient share registration system, which Hong Kong fixed
in 1993, as stock price drops on ex-dividend dates since 1993 have averaged about 100
percent of the dividend. In addition, stock prices also fall by much less than the amount
of the dividend on the ex-dividend dates of stock dividends. Since stock dividends are
not taxed, one cannot use a tax-based story to explain the stock price behavior around
the time of ex-dividend dates for stock dividends.8
The Cross-Sectional Relation between Dividend Yields and Stock Returns
If a firm’s dividend policy is determined independently of its investment and operat-
ing decisions, the firm’s future cash flows also are independent of its dividend policy.
In this case, dividend policy can only affect the value of a firm by affecting the expected
returns that investors use to discount those cash flows. For example, if dividends are
taxed more heavily than capital gains, then, as noted earlier, investors must be com-
pensated for this added tax by obtaining higher pretax returns on high-dividend yield-
ing stocks. (They would not hold shares in such stocks and supply would not equal
demand if this were not true.)
Stocks with high dividend yields do, in fact, have higher returns, on average, than
stocks with low dividend yields. However, Blume (1980) documented that the rela-
tionship between returns and dividend yield is actually U-shaped. Stocks with zero div-
idend yields have substantially higher expected returns than stocks with low dividend
yields, but for stocks that do pay dividends, expected returns increase with dividend
yields. This finding is consistent with the idea that stocks with zero dividend yields are
extremely risky, but for firms that pay dividends, higher dividends require higher
expected returns because of their tax disadvantage.
8Studies by Eades, Hess and Kim (1984) and Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman (1984) document
positive returns on ex-dates for stock dividends and stock splits.
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IV. Capital Structure |
15. How Taxes Affect |
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The McGraw |
Markets and Corporate |
|
Dividends and Share |
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|
Repurchases |
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Chapter 15
How Taxes Affect Dividends and Share Repurchases
545
To test whether a return premium is associated with high-yield stocks, a number
of studies estimate cross-sectional regressions of the following general form:9
-
R a Divyld
(15.3)
j 1j2jj
where
the firm’s beta
j
Divyldthe firm’s expected dividend yield10
j
the error term.
j
The hypothesis is that , which measures the effect of dividend yield on required
2
returns, is positive to reflect the tax disadvantage of dividend payments, and that ,
1
the coefficient of beta, is positive to reflect the effect of systematic risk on returns.
Most of these studies found that the coefficient of the expected dividend yield was pos-
itive, which they interpreted as evidence favoring a tax effect.
These interpretations assume that the beta estimates used as independent variables
in the regression in equation (15.3) provide an adequate estimate of the stocks’risks.
However, as discussed in Chapter 5, finance academics find weak support for the idea
that market betas provide a good measure of the kind of risk that investors wish to
avoid. Distinguishing between tax and risk effects is further compounded by the rela-
tion of the dividend yield to other firm characteristics that are likely to be related to
risk and expected returns. For example, Keim (1985) showed that both firms paying
no dividends and firms paying large dividends were primarily small firms. This sug-
gests that the expected dividend yield may be acting as a proxy for firm size in the
regression shown in equation (15.3). In addition to being related to firm size, dividend
yield is correlated with a firm’s expected future investment needs and its profitabil-
ity—both attributes that are likely to affect the riskiness of a firm’s stock.
-
Result 15.4
Stocks with high dividend yields are fundamentally different from stocks with low dividendyields in terms of their characteristics and their risk profiles. Therefore, it is nearly impos-sible to assess whether the relation between dividend yield and expected returns is due totaxes or risk.
Since it may be impossible to detect whether paying dividends increases a firm’s
required expected rate of return, one cannot be certain that a policy of substituting share
repurchases for dividends will have a lasting positive effect on the firm’s share price.
Although some articles by finance academics claim that dividends increase a stock’s
required rate of return, these studies are open to interpretation.
9The first study to test this specification was Brennan (1970), who concluded that there was a return
premium associated with stocks that have high dividend yields.
10The
expected dividend yield rather than the actual dividend yield must be used in these regressions
because of the information content of the dividend choice. For example, a firm that pays a high dividend
in a given year is likely to have a high return in that year because of the favorable information conveyed
by the dividend increase (which we will discuss in detail in Chapter 19). Miller and Scholes (1982)
pointed out that this information effect was ignored in the early studies on this topic, and, as a result, the
purported finding of a tax effect was spurious. However, Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1982) measured
an expected dividend yield, using information available prior to the time the returns were measured, and
found the coefficient of the expected dividend yield to be positive and statistically significant, supporting
the hypothesis of a tax-related preference for capital gains.
-
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15. How Taxes Affect
© The McGraw
1104 HillMarkets and Corporate
Dividends and Share
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Strategy, Second Edition
Repurchases
546Part IVCapital Structure
Citizens Utilities
Citizens Utilities provides an interesting case study for examining the effect of dividend
yields on prices. From 1955 until 1989, Citizens Utilities had two classes of common stock
that differed only in their dividend policy: Series Astock paid a stock dividend (which is
not taxed) and series B stock paid a cash dividend (which generates personal income tax
liabilities for shareholders). The company’s charter required the stock dividend on series A
stock to be at leastof equal value to the cash dividend on series B stock. The stock divi-
dends were, on average, about 10 percent higher than the cash dividends.
In the absence of taxes, the two stocks should trade at an average price ratio compara-
ble to their dividend ratio. Taxable investors, however, would then prefer the series Astock
which pays no taxable dividend. This suggests that the price of series Astock should exceed
1.1 times the price of the series B stock because the untaxed stock dividend paid by the
series Astock is 10 percent higher than the taxed cash dividend paid by the series B stock.
As shown by Long (1978), the price of series Astock before 1976 was somewhat less than
1.1 times that of the series B stock, but in the period examined by Poterba (1986), 1976–84,
the ratio of the prices was about equal to 1.1. This evidence suggests that investors in Cit-
izens Utilities stock prices were not influenced by their personal tax considerations. Fur-
thermore, a study by Hubbard and Michaely (1997) showed that the relationship between
the prices of the two classes of Citizens Utilities stock was largely unaffected by the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 which substantially influenced the relative value of dividends and cap-
ital gains to taxable investors.11
While dividends may have had no effect on Citizens Utilities stock prices, we cannot
generalize this finding to all firms. Since the two classes of Citizens’stock are essentially
the same, any large difference in their prices presents an opportunity for arbitrage by tax-
exempt investors. Indeed, the arbitrage argument described in Example 15.1 can be applied
to show that in the absence of transaction costs the stock prices must be identical. This
opportunity for arbitrage would not exist for other stocks, indicating that one might observe
two closely related, but not identical, stocks with different dividends providing very differ-
ent expected returns.
