- •Intended Audience
- •1.1 Financing the Firm
- •1.2Public and Private Sources of Capital
- •1.3The Environment forRaising Capital in the United States
- •Investment Banks
- •1.4Raising Capital in International Markets
- •1.5MajorFinancial Markets outside the United States
- •1.6Trends in Raising Capital
- •Innovative Instruments
- •2.1Bank Loans
- •2.2Leases
- •2.3Commercial Paper
- •2.4Corporate Bonds
- •2.5More Exotic Securities
- •2.6Raising Debt Capital in the Euromarkets
- •2.7Primary and Secondary Markets forDebt
- •2.8Bond Prices, Yields to Maturity, and Bond Market Conventions
- •2.9Summary and Conclusions
- •3.1Types of Equity Securities
- •Volume of Financing with Different Equity Instruments
- •3.2Who Owns u.S. Equities?
- •3.3The Globalization of Equity Markets
- •3.4Secondary Markets forEquity
- •International Secondary Markets for Equity
- •3.5Equity Market Informational Efficiency and Capital Allocation
- •3.7The Decision to Issue Shares Publicly
- •3.8Stock Returns Associated with ipOs of Common Equity
- •Ipo Underpricing of u.S. Stocks
- •4.1Portfolio Weights
- •4.2Portfolio Returns
- •4.3Expected Portfolio Returns
- •4.4Variances and Standard Deviations
- •4.5Covariances and Correlations
- •4.6Variances of Portfolios and Covariances between Portfolios
- •Variances for Two-Stock Portfolios
- •4.7The Mean-Standard Deviation Diagram
- •4.8Interpreting the Covariance as a Marginal Variance
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orSelling Short the Position in
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orShorting a Position in a
- •4.9Finding the Minimum Variance Portfolio
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Two Stocks
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Many Stocks
- •Investment Applications of Mean-Variance Analysis and the capm
- •5.2The Essentials of Mean-Variance Analysis
- •5.3The Efficient Frontierand Two-Fund Separation
- •5.4The Tangency Portfolio and Optimal Investment
- •Identification of the Tangency Portfolio
- •5.5Finding the Efficient Frontierof Risky Assets
- •5.6How Useful Is Mean-Variance Analysis forFinding
- •5.8The Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Implications for Optimal Investment
- •5.9Estimating Betas, Risk-Free Returns, Risk Premiums,
- •Improving the Beta Estimated from Regression
- •Identifying the Market Portfolio
- •5.10Empirical Tests of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Is the Value-Weighted Market Index Mean-Variance Efficient?
- •Interpreting the capm’s Empirical Shortcomings
- •5.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •6.1The Market Model:The First FactorModel
- •6.2The Principle of Diversification
- •Insurance Analogies to Factor Risk and Firm-Specific Risk
- •6.3MultifactorModels
- •Interpreting Common Factors
- •6.5FactorBetas
- •6.6Using FactorModels to Compute Covariances and Variances
- •6.7FactorModels and Tracking Portfolios
- •6.8Pure FactorPortfolios
- •6.9Tracking and Arbitrage
- •6.10No Arbitrage and Pricing: The Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •Verifying the Existence of Arbitrage
- •Violations of the aptEquation fora Small Set of Stocks Do Not Imply Arbitrage.
- •Violations of the aptEquation by Large Numbers of Stocks Imply Arbitrage.
- •6.11Estimating FactorRisk Premiums and FactorBetas
- •6.12Empirical Tests of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •6.13 Summary and Conclusions
- •7.1Examples of Derivatives
- •7.2The Basics of Derivatives Pricing
- •7.3Binomial Pricing Models
- •7.4Multiperiod Binomial Valuation
- •7.5Valuation Techniques in the Financial Services Industry
- •7.6Market Frictions and Lessons from the Fate of Long-Term
- •7.7Summary and Conclusions
- •8.1ADescription of Options and Options Markets
- •8.2Option Expiration
- •8.3Put-Call Parity
- •Insured Portfolio
- •8.4Binomial Valuation of European Options
- •8.5Binomial Valuation of American Options
- •Valuing American Options on Dividend-Paying Stocks
- •8.6Black-Scholes Valuation
- •8.7Estimating Volatility
- •Volatility
- •8.8Black-Scholes Price Sensitivity to Stock Price, Volatility,
- •Interest Rates, and Expiration Time
- •8.9Valuing Options on More Complex Assets
- •Implied volatility
- •8.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •9.1 Cash Flows ofReal Assets
- •9.2Using Discount Rates to Obtain Present Values
- •Value Additivity and Present Values of Cash Flow Streams
- •Inflation
- •9.3Summary and Conclusions
- •10.1Cash Flows
- •10.2Net Present Value
- •Implications of Value Additivity When Evaluating Mutually Exclusive Projects.
- •10.3Economic Value Added (eva)
- •10.5Evaluating Real Investments with the Internal Rate of Return
- •Intuition for the irrMethod
- •10.7 Summary and Conclusions
- •10A.1Term Structure Varieties
- •10A.2Spot Rates, Annuity Rates, and ParRates
- •11.1Tracking Portfolios and Real Asset Valuation
- •Implementing the Tracking Portfolio Approach
- •11.2The Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Method
- •11.3The Effect of Leverage on Comparisons
- •11.4Implementing the Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Formula with
- •11.5Pitfalls in Using the Comparison Method
- •11.6Estimating Beta from Scenarios: The Certainty Equivalent Method
- •Identifying the Certainty Equivalent from Models of Risk and Return
- •11.7Obtaining Certainty Equivalents with Risk-Free Scenarios
- •Implementing the Risk-Free Scenario Method in a Multiperiod Setting
- •11.8Computing Certainty Equivalents from Prices in Financial Markets
- •11.9Summary and Conclusions
- •11A.1Estimation Errorand Denominator-Based Biases in Present Value
- •11A.2Geometric versus Arithmetic Means and the Compounding-Based Bias
- •12.2Valuing Strategic Options with the Real Options Methodology
- •Valuing a Mine with No Strategic Options
- •Valuing a Mine with an Abandonment Option
- •Valuing Vacant Land
- •Valuing the Option to Delay the Start of a Manufacturing Project
- •Valuing the Option to Expand Capacity
- •Valuing Flexibility in Production Technology: The Advantage of Being Different
- •12.3The Ratio Comparison Approach
- •12.4The Competitive Analysis Approach
- •12.5When to Use the Different Approaches
- •Valuing Asset Classes versus Specific Assets
- •12.6Summary and Conclusions
- •13.1Corporate Taxes and the Evaluation of Equity-Financed
- •Identifying the Unlevered Cost of Capital
- •13.2The Adjusted Present Value Method
- •Valuing a Business with the wacc Method When a Debt Tax Shield Exists
- •Investments
- •IsWrong
- •Valuing Cash Flow to Equity Holders
- •13.5Summary and Conclusions
- •14.1The Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •IsFalse
- •14.2How an Individual InvestorCan “Undo” a Firm’s Capital
- •14.3How Risky Debt Affects the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •14.4How Corporate Taxes Affect the Capital Structure Choice
- •14.6Taxes and Preferred Stock
- •14.7Taxes and Municipal Bonds
- •14.8The Effect of Inflation on the Tax Gain from Leverage
- •14.10Are There Tax Advantages to Leasing?
- •14.11Summary and Conclusions
- •15.1How Much of u.S. Corporate Earnings Is Distributed to Shareholders?Aggregate Share Repurchases and Dividends
- •15.2Distribution Policy in Frictionless Markets
- •15.3The Effect of Taxes and Transaction Costs on Distribution Policy
- •15.4How Dividend Policy Affects Expected Stock Returns
- •15.5How Dividend Taxes Affect Financing and Investment Choices
- •15.6Personal Taxes, Payout Policy, and Capital Structure
- •15.7Summary and Conclusions
- •16.1Bankruptcy
- •16.3How Chapter11 Bankruptcy Mitigates Debt Holder–Equity HolderIncentive Problems
- •16.4How Can Firms Minimize Debt Holder–Equity Holder
- •Incentive Problems?
- •17.1The StakeholderTheory of Capital Structure
- •17.2The Benefits of Financial Distress with Committed Stakeholders
- •17.3Capital Structure and Competitive Strategy
- •17.4Dynamic Capital Structure Considerations
- •17.6 Summary and Conclusions
- •18.1The Separation of Ownership and Control
- •18.2Management Shareholdings and Market Value
- •18.3How Management Control Distorts Investment Decisions
- •18.4Capital Structure and Managerial Control
- •Investment Strategy?
- •18.5Executive Compensation
- •Is Executive Pay Closely Tied to Performance?
- •Is Executive Compensation Tied to Relative Performance?
- •19.1Management Incentives When Managers Have BetterInformation
- •19.2Earnings Manipulation
- •Incentives to Increase or Decrease Accounting Earnings
- •19.4The Information Content of Dividend and Share Repurchase
- •19.5The Information Content of the Debt-Equity Choice
- •19.6Empirical Evidence
- •19.7Summary and Conclusions
- •20.1AHistory of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.2Types of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.3 Recent Trends in TakeoverActivity
- •20.4Sources of TakeoverGains
- •Is an Acquisition Required to Realize Tax Gains, Operating Synergies,
- •Incentive Gains, or Diversification?
- •20.5The Disadvantages of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.7Empirical Evidence on the Gains from Leveraged Buyouts (lbOs)
- •20.8 Valuing Acquisitions
- •Valuing Synergies
- •20.9Financing Acquisitions
- •Information Effects from the Financing of a Merger or an Acquisition
- •20.10Bidding Strategies in Hostile Takeovers
- •20.11Management Defenses
- •20.12Summary and Conclusions
- •21.1Risk Management and the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •Implications of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Hedging
- •21.2Why Do Firms Hedge?
- •21.4How Should Companies Organize TheirHedging Activities?
- •21.8Foreign Exchange Risk Management
- •Indonesia
- •21.9Which Firms Hedge? The Empirical Evidence
- •21.10Summary and Conclusions
- •22.1Measuring Risk Exposure
- •Volatility as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •Value at Risk as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •22.2Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •Value at
- •22.3Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •22.4Hedging and Convenience Yields
- •22.5Hedging Long-Dated Commitments with Short-Maturing FuturesorForward Contracts
- •Intuition for Hedging with a Maturity Mismatch in the Presence of a Constant Convenience Yield
- •22.6Hedging with Swaps
- •22.7Hedging with Options
- •22.8Factor-Based Hedging
- •Instruments
- •22.10Minimum Variance Portfolios and Mean-Variance Analysis
- •22.11Summary and Conclusions
- •23Risk Management
- •23.2Duration
- •23.4Immunization
- •Immunization Using dv01
- •Immunization and Large Changes in Interest Rates
- •23.5Convexity
- •23.6Interest Rate Hedging When the Term Structure Is Not Flat
- •23.7Summary and Conclusions
- •Interest Rate
- •Interest Rate
15.2Distribution Policy in Frictionless Markets
As we discuss later in this chapter, the dividend choice is closely related to the capi-
tal structure choice and, like the capital structure choice, is strongly influenced by mar-
ket frictions like taxes and transaction costs. Before considering how market frictions
affect dividend policy, we examine a simple case where there are no transaction costs
and no taxes, and where the dividend choice conveys no information to investors.3The
analysis of this case serves as a useful benchmark for understanding the more realistic
settings examined later. We will start with the case in which the firm knows how much
cash it would like to distribute, but has not decided whether to distribute the cash by
paying a dividend or by repurchasing shares.
3Chapter 19 examines how information considerations affect dividend policy.
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15. How Taxes Affect |
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Chapter 15
How Taxes Affect Dividends and Share Repurchases
535
EXHIBIT15.2Selected Dividend Yields and Payout Ratios, 1993 and 1999
-
1993
1999
-
Dividend Yield
Payout Ratio
Dividend Yield
Payout Ratio
Company
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
-
AT&T
2.51%
44.92%
1.73%
49.72%
Apple Computer
1.64
64.39
0
0
Boeing
2.31
27.34
1.35
22.22
Deere
2.70
92.74
2.43
85.44
Disney
0.54
18.35
0.20
8.25
Dow Chemical
4.58
110.82
2.60
57.81
General Motors
1.46
23.36
2.75
22.99
Hewlett-Packard
1.14
19.32
0.86
20.78
McDonald’s
0.74
13.82
0.48
13.54
Microsoft
0
0
0
0
Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
3.05
56.45
2.29
51.03
Philip Morris
4.67
63.91
8.00
57.32
Safeway
0
0
0
0
Texaco
4.94
65.84
3.31
84.11
Wal-Mart
0.52
12.81
0.37
16.00
Note: These ratios were calculated with data taken from COMPUSTAT.
The Miller-Modigliani Dividend Irrelevancy Theorem
In their classic article, Miller and Modigliani (1961) examined a firm that wanted to
distribute a fixed amount of cash to its shareholders either by repurchasing shares or
by paying a cash dividend. The authors assumed that the choice between these two
alternatives would affect neither the firm’s investment decisions nor its operations.
Given these assumptions, they demonstrated that, in the absence of personal taxes and
transaction costs, the choice between paying a dividend and repurchasing shares is a
matter of indifference. Shareholders are indifferent and firm values are unaffected by
which of the two methods is used. Result 15.1 summarizes the Miller-Modigliani div-
idend irrelevancy theorem.
-
Result 15.1
(The Miller-Modigliani dividend irrelevancy theorem.)Consider the choice between payinga dividend and using an equivalent amount of money to repurchase shares. Assume:
-
•
There are no tax considerations.
•
There are no transaction costs.
•
The investment, financing, and operating policies of the firm are held fixed.
Then the choice between paying dividends and repurchasing shares is a matter of indiffer-
ence to shareholders.
AProof of the Miller-Modigliani Theorem.To understand Result 15.1, consider
twosimilar equity-financed biotech firms with different dividend policies:
-
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15. How Taxes Affect
© The McGraw
1084 HillMarkets and Corporate
Dividends and Share
Companies, 2002
Strategy, Second Edition
Repurchases
536 |
Part IVCapital Structure |
-
•
One firm, Signetics, has announced that it will pay a $10 million dividend nextyear.
••
The other firm, Comgen, has announced that it will repurchase $10 million in
outstanding shares.
˜At the end of the year, the firms will each be worth the same amount, X(afterpaying dividends or repurchasing shares),which lies somewhere between $100million and $200 million, depending on industry conditions.
•
Each firm initially has 1 million shares outstanding.
These assumptions imply that a share of Signetics stock will sell for one millionth
˜˜
of Xat the end of the year; hence, if Xis $150 million, each share will be worth $150.
Calculating the year-end value of Comgen stock is slightly more complicated. Comgen
will repurchase Nshares for $10 million, implying:
-
Share price N $10 million
(15.1)
˜,its share price must satisfy:
Since the year-end value of Comgen equals X
-
˜
X
Share price
(15.2)
1 millionN
˜
For example, if Xis $150 million, then equations (15.1) and (15.2), two equa-
tions with two unknown variables, can be solved for both Nand the share price. With
˜
Xequal to $150 million, Comgen will repurchase 62,500 shares at a price of $160
per share. In this case, a tax-exempt investor who holds 100 shares of Signetics stock
receives a dividend of $1,000 ($10 dividend per share) and holds shares worth
$15,000 ($150 per share). If this same investor holds 100 shares of Comgen stock,
he receives no dividends at the end of the year. However, his shares will be worth
$16,000. In both cases, the value of the shares plus the cash dividend (for Signetics)
is the same.
Although the above example assumes that the year-end value was $150 million for
both Signetics and Comgen, the equivalence between dividends and share repurchases
holds regardless of the firms’year-end values, as long as it is the same for the two
firms. The future values of these two corporations are assumed to perfectly track each
other regardless of their dividend policies. Thus, the two firms, which differ only in
their dividend policies, should sell for the same initial price. If Signetics and Comgen
shares sell for different prices, there will be an arbitrage opportunity, as Example 15.1
illustrates.
Example 15.1:Arbitrage Opportunities That Arise When the Miller-Modigliani
Theorem Does Not Hold
Suppose that Signetics stock is currently selling at $130 a share and Comgen is selling at
$128 a share.What can an investor do to realize an arbitrage gain?
Answer:An investor who buys 100 shares of Comgen for $128 a share and sells short
100 shares of Signetics at $130 a share will realize an initial $200 cash inflow.This $200 is
free money;there will be no net cash outflow at the end of the year.
For example, assume that both companies are going to be worth either $100 million or
$200 million next year.The Comgen shares will then be worth either $200 per share or $100
per share, depending on industry conditions.The Signetics shares will be worth either $90
per share or $190 per share, depending on the state of the economy, plus a dividend of $10
per share.Hence, the year-end value of this arbitrage portfolio is zero, regardless of the state
of the economy.
Grinblatt |
IV. Capital Structure |
15. How Taxes Affect |
©
The McGraw |
Markets and Corporate |
|
Dividends and Share |
Companies, 2002 |
Strategy, Second Edition |
|
Repurchases |
|
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Chapter 15
How Taxes Affect Dividends and Share Repurchases
537
Example 15.1 shows that if two firms are equivalent except for their dividend poli-
cies, their values should be the same in the absence of taxes and transaction costs. If
the values are not the same, smart investors can realize arbitrage profits.
Kerkorian and Chrysler
Consider the Kerkorian and Chrysler situation examined in the opening vignette to this
chapter. Exhibit 15.3 compares the effects on Kerkorian’s position under the following
alternatives:
-
•
Chrysler pays out $1 billion as a special dividend.
•
Chrysler repurchases $1 billion of its own stock.
To simplify the numbers, assume that Chrysler stock is selling at $50 per share, that the
company has 350 million shares outstanding, and that Kerkorian wishes to maintain 10 per-
cent control of the firm.
If Chrysler pays a dividend, Kerkorian receives a $100 million dividend and ends up
with shares worth $1.65 billion. If Chrysler repurchases shares, Kerkorian will sell 2 mil-
lion shares to bring his stake back to 10 percent. At a selling price of $50 per share, the
stock sale will bring Kerkorian $100 million, and his stock position will be worth $1.65
billion. Ignoring taxes and transaction costs, Kerkorian is indifferent between the two alter-
natives.4
Optimal Payout Policy in the Absence of Taxes and Transaction Costs
Let’s now consider the trade-off between distributing earnings to shareholders, either
by paying a dividend or repurchasing shares, and retaining the earnings to increase
internal investment. The previous subsections indicated that, in the absence of taxes
EXHIBIT15.3Chrysler’s Choice: Dividends orShare Repurchase
-
Before
Pay $1 Billion in
Repurchase $1 Billion
Transaction
Dividends
of Stock
(in $ millions)
(in $ millions)
(in $ millions)
-
Total assets (other than
cash)
$ 9,800
$ 9,800
$ 9,800
Cash
7,700
6,700
6,700
Equity value
$17,500
$16,500
$16,500
Dividends
$1,000
Shares outstanding
350
350
330
Stock value per share
$ 50.00
$47.14
$ 50.00
Dividends per share
$2.86
-
Kerkorian stock value
(in $ millions)
$ 1,750
$1,650
$ 1,650
-
Kerkorian dividends
(in $ millions)
$
100
-
Kerkorian’s proceeds from
selling shares
$100 ($50 2)
4Accounting considerations also may lead firms to prefer share repurchases over dividends. Compared
with dividends, share repurchases generally increase both earnings per share and return on shareholder’s
equity.
-
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1088 Titman: FinancialIV. Capital Structure
15. How Taxes Affect
© The McGraw
1088 HillMarkets and Corporate
Dividends and Share
Companies, 2002
Strategy, Second Edition
Repurchases
538Part IVCapital Structure
and transaction costs, dividends and share repurchases are equivalent. Therefore, a
distinction between the two methods of distribution at this point is unnecessary.
Result 15.2 specifies the assumptions made up to this point, along with their impli-
cations for the corporation’s choice between distributing or retaining the earnings.
-
Result 15.2
Consider the choice between paying out earnings to shareholders versus retaining the earn-ings for investment. Assume:
-
•
There are no tax considerations.
•
There are no transaction costs.
•
The choice between paying a dividend and retaining the earnings for reinvestment within the firm does not convey any information to shareholders.
Then a dividend payout will either increase or decrease firm value, depending on whether
there are positive net present value (NPV) investments that could be funded by retaining
the money within the firm. If there are no positive NPVinvestments, the money should be
paid out.
Result 15.2 restates the more fundamental point discussed in Part III of this text.
With frictionless capital markets, firms should accept all positive NPVprojects and
reject all negative ones. However, as we see below, this will not necessarily be the case
when taxes and transaction costs are present.
