- •Intended Audience
- •1.1 Financing the Firm
- •1.2Public and Private Sources of Capital
- •1.3The Environment forRaising Capital in the United States
- •Investment Banks
- •1.4Raising Capital in International Markets
- •1.5MajorFinancial Markets outside the United States
- •1.6Trends in Raising Capital
- •Innovative Instruments
- •2.1Bank Loans
- •2.2Leases
- •2.3Commercial Paper
- •2.4Corporate Bonds
- •2.5More Exotic Securities
- •2.6Raising Debt Capital in the Euromarkets
- •2.7Primary and Secondary Markets forDebt
- •2.8Bond Prices, Yields to Maturity, and Bond Market Conventions
- •2.9Summary and Conclusions
- •3.1Types of Equity Securities
- •Volume of Financing with Different Equity Instruments
- •3.2Who Owns u.S. Equities?
- •3.3The Globalization of Equity Markets
- •3.4Secondary Markets forEquity
- •International Secondary Markets for Equity
- •3.5Equity Market Informational Efficiency and Capital Allocation
- •3.7The Decision to Issue Shares Publicly
- •3.8Stock Returns Associated with ipOs of Common Equity
- •Ipo Underpricing of u.S. Stocks
- •4.1Portfolio Weights
- •4.2Portfolio Returns
- •4.3Expected Portfolio Returns
- •4.4Variances and Standard Deviations
- •4.5Covariances and Correlations
- •4.6Variances of Portfolios and Covariances between Portfolios
- •Variances for Two-Stock Portfolios
- •4.7The Mean-Standard Deviation Diagram
- •4.8Interpreting the Covariance as a Marginal Variance
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orSelling Short the Position in
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orShorting a Position in a
- •4.9Finding the Minimum Variance Portfolio
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Two Stocks
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Many Stocks
- •Investment Applications of Mean-Variance Analysis and the capm
- •5.2The Essentials of Mean-Variance Analysis
- •5.3The Efficient Frontierand Two-Fund Separation
- •5.4The Tangency Portfolio and Optimal Investment
- •Identification of the Tangency Portfolio
- •5.5Finding the Efficient Frontierof Risky Assets
- •5.6How Useful Is Mean-Variance Analysis forFinding
- •5.8The Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Implications for Optimal Investment
- •5.9Estimating Betas, Risk-Free Returns, Risk Premiums,
- •Improving the Beta Estimated from Regression
- •Identifying the Market Portfolio
- •5.10Empirical Tests of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Is the Value-Weighted Market Index Mean-Variance Efficient?
- •Interpreting the capm’s Empirical Shortcomings
- •5.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •6.1The Market Model:The First FactorModel
- •6.2The Principle of Diversification
- •Insurance Analogies to Factor Risk and Firm-Specific Risk
- •6.3MultifactorModels
- •Interpreting Common Factors
- •6.5FactorBetas
- •6.6Using FactorModels to Compute Covariances and Variances
- •6.7FactorModels and Tracking Portfolios
- •6.8Pure FactorPortfolios
- •6.9Tracking and Arbitrage
- •6.10No Arbitrage and Pricing: The Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •Verifying the Existence of Arbitrage
- •Violations of the aptEquation fora Small Set of Stocks Do Not Imply Arbitrage.
- •Violations of the aptEquation by Large Numbers of Stocks Imply Arbitrage.
- •6.11Estimating FactorRisk Premiums and FactorBetas
- •6.12Empirical Tests of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •6.13 Summary and Conclusions
- •7.1Examples of Derivatives
- •7.2The Basics of Derivatives Pricing
- •7.3Binomial Pricing Models
- •7.4Multiperiod Binomial Valuation
- •7.5Valuation Techniques in the Financial Services Industry
- •7.6Market Frictions and Lessons from the Fate of Long-Term
- •7.7Summary and Conclusions
- •8.1ADescription of Options and Options Markets
- •8.2Option Expiration
- •8.3Put-Call Parity
- •Insured Portfolio
- •8.4Binomial Valuation of European Options
- •8.5Binomial Valuation of American Options
- •Valuing American Options on Dividend-Paying Stocks
- •8.6Black-Scholes Valuation
- •8.7Estimating Volatility
- •Volatility
- •8.8Black-Scholes Price Sensitivity to Stock Price, Volatility,
- •Interest Rates, and Expiration Time
- •8.9Valuing Options on More Complex Assets
- •Implied volatility
- •8.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •9.1 Cash Flows ofReal Assets
- •9.2Using Discount Rates to Obtain Present Values
- •Value Additivity and Present Values of Cash Flow Streams
- •Inflation
- •9.3Summary and Conclusions
- •10.1Cash Flows
- •10.2Net Present Value
- •Implications of Value Additivity When Evaluating Mutually Exclusive Projects.
- •10.3Economic Value Added (eva)
- •10.5Evaluating Real Investments with the Internal Rate of Return
- •Intuition for the irrMethod
- •10.7 Summary and Conclusions
- •10A.1Term Structure Varieties
- •10A.2Spot Rates, Annuity Rates, and ParRates
- •11.1Tracking Portfolios and Real Asset Valuation
- •Implementing the Tracking Portfolio Approach
- •11.2The Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Method
- •11.3The Effect of Leverage on Comparisons
- •11.4Implementing the Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Formula with
- •11.5Pitfalls in Using the Comparison Method
- •11.6Estimating Beta from Scenarios: The Certainty Equivalent Method
- •Identifying the Certainty Equivalent from Models of Risk and Return
- •11.7Obtaining Certainty Equivalents with Risk-Free Scenarios
- •Implementing the Risk-Free Scenario Method in a Multiperiod Setting
- •11.8Computing Certainty Equivalents from Prices in Financial Markets
- •11.9Summary and Conclusions
- •11A.1Estimation Errorand Denominator-Based Biases in Present Value
- •11A.2Geometric versus Arithmetic Means and the Compounding-Based Bias
- •12.2Valuing Strategic Options with the Real Options Methodology
- •Valuing a Mine with No Strategic Options
- •Valuing a Mine with an Abandonment Option
- •Valuing Vacant Land
- •Valuing the Option to Delay the Start of a Manufacturing Project
- •Valuing the Option to Expand Capacity
- •Valuing Flexibility in Production Technology: The Advantage of Being Different
- •12.3The Ratio Comparison Approach
- •12.4The Competitive Analysis Approach
- •12.5When to Use the Different Approaches
- •Valuing Asset Classes versus Specific Assets
- •12.6Summary and Conclusions
- •13.1Corporate Taxes and the Evaluation of Equity-Financed
- •Identifying the Unlevered Cost of Capital
- •13.2The Adjusted Present Value Method
- •Valuing a Business with the wacc Method When a Debt Tax Shield Exists
- •Investments
- •IsWrong
- •Valuing Cash Flow to Equity Holders
- •13.5Summary and Conclusions
- •14.1The Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •IsFalse
- •14.2How an Individual InvestorCan “Undo” a Firm’s Capital
- •14.3How Risky Debt Affects the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •14.4How Corporate Taxes Affect the Capital Structure Choice
- •14.6Taxes and Preferred Stock
- •14.7Taxes and Municipal Bonds
- •14.8The Effect of Inflation on the Tax Gain from Leverage
- •14.10Are There Tax Advantages to Leasing?
- •14.11Summary and Conclusions
- •15.1How Much of u.S. Corporate Earnings Is Distributed to Shareholders?Aggregate Share Repurchases and Dividends
- •15.2Distribution Policy in Frictionless Markets
- •15.3The Effect of Taxes and Transaction Costs on Distribution Policy
- •15.4How Dividend Policy Affects Expected Stock Returns
- •15.5How Dividend Taxes Affect Financing and Investment Choices
- •15.6Personal Taxes, Payout Policy, and Capital Structure
- •15.7Summary and Conclusions
- •16.1Bankruptcy
- •16.3How Chapter11 Bankruptcy Mitigates Debt Holder–Equity HolderIncentive Problems
- •16.4How Can Firms Minimize Debt Holder–Equity Holder
- •Incentive Problems?
- •17.1The StakeholderTheory of Capital Structure
- •17.2The Benefits of Financial Distress with Committed Stakeholders
- •17.3Capital Structure and Competitive Strategy
- •17.4Dynamic Capital Structure Considerations
- •17.6 Summary and Conclusions
- •18.1The Separation of Ownership and Control
- •18.2Management Shareholdings and Market Value
- •18.3How Management Control Distorts Investment Decisions
- •18.4Capital Structure and Managerial Control
- •Investment Strategy?
- •18.5Executive Compensation
- •Is Executive Pay Closely Tied to Performance?
- •Is Executive Compensation Tied to Relative Performance?
- •19.1Management Incentives When Managers Have BetterInformation
- •19.2Earnings Manipulation
- •Incentives to Increase or Decrease Accounting Earnings
- •19.4The Information Content of Dividend and Share Repurchase
- •19.5The Information Content of the Debt-Equity Choice
- •19.6Empirical Evidence
- •19.7Summary and Conclusions
- •20.1AHistory of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.2Types of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.3 Recent Trends in TakeoverActivity
- •20.4Sources of TakeoverGains
- •Is an Acquisition Required to Realize Tax Gains, Operating Synergies,
- •Incentive Gains, or Diversification?
- •20.5The Disadvantages of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.7Empirical Evidence on the Gains from Leveraged Buyouts (lbOs)
- •20.8 Valuing Acquisitions
- •Valuing Synergies
- •20.9Financing Acquisitions
- •Information Effects from the Financing of a Merger or an Acquisition
- •20.10Bidding Strategies in Hostile Takeovers
- •20.11Management Defenses
- •20.12Summary and Conclusions
- •21.1Risk Management and the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •Implications of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Hedging
- •21.2Why Do Firms Hedge?
- •21.4How Should Companies Organize TheirHedging Activities?
- •21.8Foreign Exchange Risk Management
- •Indonesia
- •21.9Which Firms Hedge? The Empirical Evidence
- •21.10Summary and Conclusions
- •22.1Measuring Risk Exposure
- •Volatility as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •Value at Risk as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •22.2Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •Value at
- •22.3Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •22.4Hedging and Convenience Yields
- •22.5Hedging Long-Dated Commitments with Short-Maturing FuturesorForward Contracts
- •Intuition for Hedging with a Maturity Mismatch in the Presence of a Constant Convenience Yield
- •22.6Hedging with Swaps
- •22.7Hedging with Options
- •22.8Factor-Based Hedging
- •Instruments
- •22.10Minimum Variance Portfolios and Mean-Variance Analysis
- •22.11Summary and Conclusions
- •23Risk Management
- •23.2Duration
- •23.4Immunization
- •Immunization Using dv01
- •Immunization and Large Changes in Interest Rates
- •23.5Convexity
- •23.6Interest Rate Hedging When the Term Structure Is Not Flat
- •23.7Summary and Conclusions
- •Interest Rate
- •Interest Rate
14.10Are There Tax Advantages to Leasing?
Up to this point, we have assumed that firms finance their capital assets by raising
either debt or equity capital. This section considers the tax advantages and disadvan-
tages associated with a third financing possibility: leasing the capital assets.
Operating Leases and Capital Leases
As Chapter 2 discussed, an operating leaseis an agreement to obtain the services of
an asset for a period that generally represents only a small part of the asset’s useful
life. For example, one might lease a car for three years. At the end of this period, the
lease may or may not be extended. In a financial lease(also known as a capital lease),
the lease agreement extends over most of the asset’s useful life.
The decision to enter into an operating lease generally relates to the transaction
costs associated with buying and selling the assets. For example, leasing rather than
buying a car makes sense if you need a car for only two months. Other issues relevant
to the “lease versus buy” decision include information about the resale value of an asset,
potential renegotiation problems at the end of the lease (for example, you might want
to keep the asset longer), and incentive problems (for example, you might be likely to
drive a car differently if you leased rather than bought it).
The above considerations are much less relevant for financial leases, which should
be considered more or less as a financing alternative that is equivalent to buying the
asset with borrowed funds. The major difference between buying an asset with bor-
rowed funds and leasing the equipment relates to the timing of payments, which in turn
affects the tax treatment of the two alternatives.
The After-Tax Costs of Leasing and Buying Capital Assets
In general, an organization in a low tax bracket has an incentive to lease equipment
from organizations in higher tax brackets. To understand this, consider the issues faced
by the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) when its business school moved
into a new building in 1995. Although the university did not consider the option of
leasing the building rather than buying it, examining the tax advantages of this alter-
native is instructive. We will assume that if the building is owned, it is funded with an
amortizing mortgage over the 50-year life of the building, which we assume is worth-
less after 50 years. To simplify the illustration, the amortization of the mortgage (that
is, its schedule of debt repayments) is assumed to be identical to the economic depre-
ciationof the building, the sum of the building’s loss in market value as it ages plus
the cost of maintaining the building. Because UCLAis a tax-exempt institution, cal-
culating its costs of renting versus owning the building is straightforward. Its yearly
costs of owning the building are
-
Cost of owning debt repayment interest
(14.10)
Leasing Costs in a Competitive Market.If the leasing market is competitive, the
costs of the lessor, who owns the building, must be passed on to the lessee, who rents
the building, in this case, UCLA. To calculate the cost of leasing the building, assume
that the lessor pays taxes at a rate Tand charges a lease rate that just compensates
c
for these costs, so that each year its after-tax lease revenues equal its after-tax costs.
(Lease payment)
(1 T) debt repayment interest
(1 T)
cc
(depreciation deduction)
T
c
-
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Financing Choices
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524Part IVCapital Structure
This equation can be solved to determine the yearly lease payments that allow the les-
sor to break even in each year:
debt repayment(depreciation deduction)
T
Lease paymentc interest(14.11)
1T
c
When Is Leasing CheaperThan Buying?Earlier, we assumed for simplicity that
the mortgage has an amortization schedule for which debt repayment always equals
economic depreciation. Hence, if the building is depreciated for tax purposesat the
same rate that the mortgage amortizes—that is, the depreciation deductionalso equals
economic depreciation—the depreciation deduction and debt repayment are equal. In
this case, equation (14.11) can be rewritten as
-
Lease payment debt repayment interest
(14.12)
Acomparison of equations (14.10) and (14.12) implies that each annual lease pay-
ment equals the annual cost of owning the building in this case. This implies that a les-
sor who can take advantage of accelerated depreciation—depreciation for tax pur-
poses at a rate that initially occurs faster than economic depreciation (and accordingly,
faster than the debt repayment in the lease’s early years) would profit from the lease
payment stream given in equation (14.12). This is because, holding the sum of an undis-
counted stream of tax benefits constant, the sooner the tax benefits occur, the greater
is their present value. Hence, if the lease payments specified in equation (14.12) make
the asset purchase and attached lease a zero NPVinvestment for an investor who can-
not enjoy accelerated depreciation, the hastened tax benefits from accelerated depreci-
ation must make the same investment a positive NPVone.
Such an investor could easily afford to lower UCLA’s lease payments on the build-
ing and still turn a profit. UCLA, being tax-exempt, and thus unable to enjoy the tax
benefits from depreciating the building, would thus find it cheaper to lease from such
an investor rather than to buy the building outright. The lesson is as follows:
Result 14.8For low tax bracket investors, it is often cheaper to lease an asset than to buy it.
The tax advantage of leasing instead of buying applies not only to tax-exempt insti-
tutions, but also to any institution or corporation that is taxed at a rate less than the
full corporate tax rate. Corporations that are temporarily in a zero marginal tax bracket
often use leases for exactly this reason. Earlier, we suggested that such firms should
use a higher portion of equity financing to minimize the unused tax benefits. Abetter
solution, however, may be to lease equipment which might allow some of the tax ben-
efits, in essence, to be sold to other tax-paying corporations.
Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim (1998) find that this is indeed the case; firms
with low effective marginal tax rates use fewer operating leases than firms with high
marginal tax rates. Controlling for nontax influences, they conclude that a nontaxed
firm will have an operating lease to value ratio that is 20 percent larger than a firm
that is taxed at the highest marginal tax rate.
Given this analysis, why did UCLAbuy rather than lease its new building? In the-
ory, UCLAcan sell its new building to a taxable investor, invest the proceeds in bonds,
and lease the building back at a rate that is less than the amount it receives in interest
payments. The difference between the lease payments and the interest proceeds would
come from the tax benefits that UCLAwould in effect be selling to the lessor.
Since most of the money for the UCLAbuilding was donated, it might be difficult
to structure a deal that involved a lease. In addition, the IRS might not recognize this
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IV. Capital Structure |
14. How Taxes Affect |
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Markets and Corporate |
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Financing Choices |
Companies, 2002 |
Strategy, Second Edition |
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Chapter 14
How Taxes Affect Financing Choices
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transaction as a true leasefor tax purposes and might disallow the lessor’s tax deduc-
tions. Whether a lease is considered a true lease for tax purposes depends on the intent
of the parties. Specifically, if the IRS rules that UCLA, in effect, owns the building—
that is, it receives all the benefits and takes all the risks associated with ownership—
then the lessor’s depreciation benefits may not be allowed.
To qualify for the tax advantages of leasing, the lessor must take on some of the
risk associated with the appreciation or the depreciation of the asset being leased. As
noted earlier, however, incentive problems can arise when the lessee’s behavior affects
the asset’s value. The lessor will charge the lessee for the costs arising from these incen-
tive problems, which may offset the tax advantages of leasing.
