- •Intended Audience
- •1.1 Financing the Firm
- •1.2Public and Private Sources of Capital
- •1.3The Environment forRaising Capital in the United States
- •Investment Banks
- •1.4Raising Capital in International Markets
- •1.5MajorFinancial Markets outside the United States
- •1.6Trends in Raising Capital
- •Innovative Instruments
- •2.1Bank Loans
- •2.2Leases
- •2.3Commercial Paper
- •2.4Corporate Bonds
- •2.5More Exotic Securities
- •2.6Raising Debt Capital in the Euromarkets
- •2.7Primary and Secondary Markets forDebt
- •2.8Bond Prices, Yields to Maturity, and Bond Market Conventions
- •2.9Summary and Conclusions
- •3.1Types of Equity Securities
- •Volume of Financing with Different Equity Instruments
- •3.2Who Owns u.S. Equities?
- •3.3The Globalization of Equity Markets
- •3.4Secondary Markets forEquity
- •International Secondary Markets for Equity
- •3.5Equity Market Informational Efficiency and Capital Allocation
- •3.7The Decision to Issue Shares Publicly
- •3.8Stock Returns Associated with ipOs of Common Equity
- •Ipo Underpricing of u.S. Stocks
- •4.1Portfolio Weights
- •4.2Portfolio Returns
- •4.3Expected Portfolio Returns
- •4.4Variances and Standard Deviations
- •4.5Covariances and Correlations
- •4.6Variances of Portfolios and Covariances between Portfolios
- •Variances for Two-Stock Portfolios
- •4.7The Mean-Standard Deviation Diagram
- •4.8Interpreting the Covariance as a Marginal Variance
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orSelling Short the Position in
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orShorting a Position in a
- •4.9Finding the Minimum Variance Portfolio
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Two Stocks
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Many Stocks
- •Investment Applications of Mean-Variance Analysis and the capm
- •5.2The Essentials of Mean-Variance Analysis
- •5.3The Efficient Frontierand Two-Fund Separation
- •5.4The Tangency Portfolio and Optimal Investment
- •Identification of the Tangency Portfolio
- •5.5Finding the Efficient Frontierof Risky Assets
- •5.6How Useful Is Mean-Variance Analysis forFinding
- •5.8The Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Implications for Optimal Investment
- •5.9Estimating Betas, Risk-Free Returns, Risk Premiums,
- •Improving the Beta Estimated from Regression
- •Identifying the Market Portfolio
- •5.10Empirical Tests of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Is the Value-Weighted Market Index Mean-Variance Efficient?
- •Interpreting the capm’s Empirical Shortcomings
- •5.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •6.1The Market Model:The First FactorModel
- •6.2The Principle of Diversification
- •Insurance Analogies to Factor Risk and Firm-Specific Risk
- •6.3MultifactorModels
- •Interpreting Common Factors
- •6.5FactorBetas
- •6.6Using FactorModels to Compute Covariances and Variances
- •6.7FactorModels and Tracking Portfolios
- •6.8Pure FactorPortfolios
- •6.9Tracking and Arbitrage
- •6.10No Arbitrage and Pricing: The Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •Verifying the Existence of Arbitrage
- •Violations of the aptEquation fora Small Set of Stocks Do Not Imply Arbitrage.
- •Violations of the aptEquation by Large Numbers of Stocks Imply Arbitrage.
- •6.11Estimating FactorRisk Premiums and FactorBetas
- •6.12Empirical Tests of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •6.13 Summary and Conclusions
- •7.1Examples of Derivatives
- •7.2The Basics of Derivatives Pricing
- •7.3Binomial Pricing Models
- •7.4Multiperiod Binomial Valuation
- •7.5Valuation Techniques in the Financial Services Industry
- •7.6Market Frictions and Lessons from the Fate of Long-Term
- •7.7Summary and Conclusions
- •8.1ADescription of Options and Options Markets
- •8.2Option Expiration
- •8.3Put-Call Parity
- •Insured Portfolio
- •8.4Binomial Valuation of European Options
- •8.5Binomial Valuation of American Options
- •Valuing American Options on Dividend-Paying Stocks
- •8.6Black-Scholes Valuation
- •8.7Estimating Volatility
- •Volatility
- •8.8Black-Scholes Price Sensitivity to Stock Price, Volatility,
- •Interest Rates, and Expiration Time
- •8.9Valuing Options on More Complex Assets
- •Implied volatility
- •8.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •9.1 Cash Flows ofReal Assets
- •9.2Using Discount Rates to Obtain Present Values
- •Value Additivity and Present Values of Cash Flow Streams
- •Inflation
- •9.3Summary and Conclusions
- •10.1Cash Flows
- •10.2Net Present Value
- •Implications of Value Additivity When Evaluating Mutually Exclusive Projects.
- •10.3Economic Value Added (eva)
- •10.5Evaluating Real Investments with the Internal Rate of Return
- •Intuition for the irrMethod
- •10.7 Summary and Conclusions
- •10A.1Term Structure Varieties
- •10A.2Spot Rates, Annuity Rates, and ParRates
- •11.1Tracking Portfolios and Real Asset Valuation
- •Implementing the Tracking Portfolio Approach
- •11.2The Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Method
- •11.3The Effect of Leverage on Comparisons
- •11.4Implementing the Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Formula with
- •11.5Pitfalls in Using the Comparison Method
- •11.6Estimating Beta from Scenarios: The Certainty Equivalent Method
- •Identifying the Certainty Equivalent from Models of Risk and Return
- •11.7Obtaining Certainty Equivalents with Risk-Free Scenarios
- •Implementing the Risk-Free Scenario Method in a Multiperiod Setting
- •11.8Computing Certainty Equivalents from Prices in Financial Markets
- •11.9Summary and Conclusions
- •11A.1Estimation Errorand Denominator-Based Biases in Present Value
- •11A.2Geometric versus Arithmetic Means and the Compounding-Based Bias
- •12.2Valuing Strategic Options with the Real Options Methodology
- •Valuing a Mine with No Strategic Options
- •Valuing a Mine with an Abandonment Option
- •Valuing Vacant Land
- •Valuing the Option to Delay the Start of a Manufacturing Project
- •Valuing the Option to Expand Capacity
- •Valuing Flexibility in Production Technology: The Advantage of Being Different
- •12.3The Ratio Comparison Approach
- •12.4The Competitive Analysis Approach
- •12.5When to Use the Different Approaches
- •Valuing Asset Classes versus Specific Assets
- •12.6Summary and Conclusions
- •13.1Corporate Taxes and the Evaluation of Equity-Financed
- •Identifying the Unlevered Cost of Capital
- •13.2The Adjusted Present Value Method
- •Valuing a Business with the wacc Method When a Debt Tax Shield Exists
- •Investments
- •IsWrong
- •Valuing Cash Flow to Equity Holders
- •13.5Summary and Conclusions
- •14.1The Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •IsFalse
- •14.2How an Individual InvestorCan “Undo” a Firm’s Capital
- •14.3How Risky Debt Affects the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •14.4How Corporate Taxes Affect the Capital Structure Choice
- •14.6Taxes and Preferred Stock
- •14.7Taxes and Municipal Bonds
- •14.8The Effect of Inflation on the Tax Gain from Leverage
- •14.10Are There Tax Advantages to Leasing?
- •14.11Summary and Conclusions
- •15.1How Much of u.S. Corporate Earnings Is Distributed to Shareholders?Aggregate Share Repurchases and Dividends
- •15.2Distribution Policy in Frictionless Markets
- •15.3The Effect of Taxes and Transaction Costs on Distribution Policy
- •15.4How Dividend Policy Affects Expected Stock Returns
- •15.5How Dividend Taxes Affect Financing and Investment Choices
- •15.6Personal Taxes, Payout Policy, and Capital Structure
- •15.7Summary and Conclusions
- •16.1Bankruptcy
- •16.3How Chapter11 Bankruptcy Mitigates Debt Holder–Equity HolderIncentive Problems
- •16.4How Can Firms Minimize Debt Holder–Equity Holder
- •Incentive Problems?
- •17.1The StakeholderTheory of Capital Structure
- •17.2The Benefits of Financial Distress with Committed Stakeholders
- •17.3Capital Structure and Competitive Strategy
- •17.4Dynamic Capital Structure Considerations
- •17.6 Summary and Conclusions
- •18.1The Separation of Ownership and Control
- •18.2Management Shareholdings and Market Value
- •18.3How Management Control Distorts Investment Decisions
- •18.4Capital Structure and Managerial Control
- •Investment Strategy?
- •18.5Executive Compensation
- •Is Executive Pay Closely Tied to Performance?
- •Is Executive Compensation Tied to Relative Performance?
- •19.1Management Incentives When Managers Have BetterInformation
- •19.2Earnings Manipulation
- •Incentives to Increase or Decrease Accounting Earnings
- •19.4The Information Content of Dividend and Share Repurchase
- •19.5The Information Content of the Debt-Equity Choice
- •19.6Empirical Evidence
- •19.7Summary and Conclusions
- •20.1AHistory of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.2Types of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.3 Recent Trends in TakeoverActivity
- •20.4Sources of TakeoverGains
- •Is an Acquisition Required to Realize Tax Gains, Operating Synergies,
- •Incentive Gains, or Diversification?
- •20.5The Disadvantages of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.7Empirical Evidence on the Gains from Leveraged Buyouts (lbOs)
- •20.8 Valuing Acquisitions
- •Valuing Synergies
- •20.9Financing Acquisitions
- •Information Effects from the Financing of a Merger or an Acquisition
- •20.10Bidding Strategies in Hostile Takeovers
- •20.11Management Defenses
- •20.12Summary and Conclusions
- •21.1Risk Management and the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •Implications of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Hedging
- •21.2Why Do Firms Hedge?
- •21.4How Should Companies Organize TheirHedging Activities?
- •21.8Foreign Exchange Risk Management
- •Indonesia
- •21.9Which Firms Hedge? The Empirical Evidence
- •21.10Summary and Conclusions
- •22.1Measuring Risk Exposure
- •Volatility as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •Value at Risk as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •22.2Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •Value at
- •22.3Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •22.4Hedging and Convenience Yields
- •22.5Hedging Long-Dated Commitments with Short-Maturing FuturesorForward Contracts
- •Intuition for Hedging with a Maturity Mismatch in the Presence of a Constant Convenience Yield
- •22.6Hedging with Swaps
- •22.7Hedging with Options
- •22.8Factor-Based Hedging
- •Instruments
- •22.10Minimum Variance Portfolios and Mean-Variance Analysis
- •22.11Summary and Conclusions
- •23Risk Management
- •23.2Duration
- •23.4Immunization
- •Immunization Using dv01
- •Immunization and Large Changes in Interest Rates
- •23.5Convexity
- •23.6Interest Rate Hedging When the Term Structure Is Not Flat
- •23.7Summary and Conclusions
- •Interest Rate
- •Interest Rate
14.8The Effect of Inflation on the Tax Gain from Leverage
Recall that the last part of equation (14.5b) had an expression for the yearly savings
associated with increased leverage. Note that rD[(1 T) (1 T)(1 T)], the
DDcE
tax gain, increases as the interest rate on corporate debt increases. Although interest
rates for corporate borrowers can change for a number of reasons, the most notable
cause is a change in the expected rate of inflation. If investors expect inflation to be
high, nominal borrowing costs will also be high, reflecting the decreased purchasing
power of the dollars used to repay the loans.
Fisher’s (1930) well-known theory of interest rate changes postulates a one-to-one
relation between interest rates and expected inflation; that is, if inflation is expected to
be one percentage point higher, the nominal interest rate also increases by approxi-
mately one percentage point.11This suggests that an increase in inflation increases the
tax gain associated with leverage for firms that will be able to use the interest tax deduc-
tions. Higher rates of inflation imply higher nominal borrowing costs which, in turn,
create higher tax deductions. Example 14.8 illustrates how increases in inflation can
reduce taxable income and hence reduce taxes.
Example 14.8:The Effect of Inflation on Prodist’s Corporate Taxes
Prodist (see Exhibit 14.5) has a large amount of taxable income.It raised $140 million with
12 percent notes.Show the impact of a 4 percent increase in inflation, assuming that this
increases the rate on the notes to 16 percent and that the inflation-adjusted cash flows are
unchanged.
Answer:The assumed inflation increases Prodist’s tax shield from $16.8 million to $22.4
million, as shown below:
Cash Flows (in $millions) Given
-
Low
High
Inflation
Inflation
Difference
-
Inflation-adjusted cash flows
$ 56.00
$ 56.00
—
Interest expense (Tax shields)
16.80
22.40
$5.6
Taxable income
39.20
33.60
$5.6
Corporate tax (34%)
13.33
11.42
$1.9
In this case, the increase in inflation of 4 percent leads to a $5.6 million increase
in tax shields for the same amount of debt. While this suggests that inflation encour-
ages higher leverage ratios, this is true only when a firm can take advantage of all of
its tax shields. By increasing the magnitude of the tax deduction for each dollar of debt,
inflation reduces the amount of debt needed to eliminate the firm’s taxable income.
Since firms have no tax incentive to borrow beyond this point, firms that previously
had little taxable income may reduce their leverage ratios when inflation increases.
11See Chapter 9.
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14. How Taxes Affect
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Part IVCapital Structure |
14.9 |
The Empirical Implications of the Analysis of Debt and Taxes |
We have suggested in this chapter that taxes play an important role in determining the
debt-equity mix of U.S. corporations. Firms that are generating substantial taxable
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) should use a substantial amount of debt
financing to take advantage of the tax deductibility of the interest payments. However,
firms with substantial amounts of other tax shields, such as depreciation deductions
and R&D expenses, are likely to have much lower EBITrelative to their values and
would thus choose lower debt-equity ratios. Hence, in a comparison across firms, there
should be a negative correlation between a firm’s nondebt tax shields and its debt ratio.
Do Firms with More Taxable Earnings Use More Debt Financing?
In reality, we do not observe a positive cross-sectional relation between EBITand debt
ratios (see, for example, Titman and Wessels (1988)). Indeed, those firms that gener-
ate the largest amount of taxable earnings tend to have the lowest debt ratios, which is
the opposite of what we might expect from the analysis in this chapter. This negative
correlation between EBITand debt-equity ratios probably arises because firms only
rarely issue new equity, which implies the following12:
-
•
Nondebt tax shields and the use of debt financing are positively correlatedbecause firms tend to finance most major capital expenditures, which generateinvestment tax credits and depreciation deductions, with debt.
•
Firms that perform poorly (that is, have low or negative EBIT) tend toaccumulate debt to meet their expenses.
The preceding observations, however, do not rule out the possibility that firms take
taxes into account when they consider whether or not to issue equity. Indeed, a study
by MacKie-Mason (1990) found that firms do consider the tax benefits when they decide
between issuing substantial amounts of either new debt or new equity. Firms that are
unable to use their interest deductions are much more likely to issue equity than debt.
In contrast, firms that have significant taxable earnings are more likely to issue debt.
In a more recent study, which calculates the effective marginal tax rates discussed
previously, Graham (1996) found that firms with high marginal tax rates are more likely
to increase leverage than firms with low marginal tax rates.
How the Tax Reform Act of 1986 Affected Capital Structure Choice
Changes in the tax code also provide a way to judge the importance of taxes. Givoly,
Hayn, Ofer, and Sarig (1992) examined how the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which
reduced the level of nondebt tax shields for most companies, affected capital structures
in the years following the tax change.13They found that corporations that lost the most
nondebt tax shields under the 1986 act increased their debt levels more than firms that
were less affected by the new tax law. This evidence provides further support to the
MacKie-Mason finding that taxes play a key role in determining the optimal capital
structure of firms.
12There
are personal tax as well as information explanations for this behavior. See Chapters 15, 17,
and 19.
13In
addition to reducing both corporate and personal income taxes, the Tax Reform Act of 1986
substantially reduced or eliminated most tax shields. Most notably, the act eliminated investment tax
credits and reduced the amount that buildings and equipment could be depreciated for tax purposes.
Grinblatt |
IV. Capital Structure |
14. How Taxes Affect |
©
The McGraw |
Markets and Corporate |
|
Financing Choices |
Companies, 2002 |
Strategy, Second Edition |
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Chapter 14
How Taxes Affect Financing Choices
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