- •Intended Audience
- •1.1 Financing the Firm
- •1.2Public and Private Sources of Capital
- •1.3The Environment forRaising Capital in the United States
- •Investment Banks
- •1.4Raising Capital in International Markets
- •1.5MajorFinancial Markets outside the United States
- •1.6Trends in Raising Capital
- •Innovative Instruments
- •2.1Bank Loans
- •2.2Leases
- •2.3Commercial Paper
- •2.4Corporate Bonds
- •2.5More Exotic Securities
- •2.6Raising Debt Capital in the Euromarkets
- •2.7Primary and Secondary Markets forDebt
- •2.8Bond Prices, Yields to Maturity, and Bond Market Conventions
- •2.9Summary and Conclusions
- •3.1Types of Equity Securities
- •Volume of Financing with Different Equity Instruments
- •3.2Who Owns u.S. Equities?
- •3.3The Globalization of Equity Markets
- •3.4Secondary Markets forEquity
- •International Secondary Markets for Equity
- •3.5Equity Market Informational Efficiency and Capital Allocation
- •3.7The Decision to Issue Shares Publicly
- •3.8Stock Returns Associated with ipOs of Common Equity
- •Ipo Underpricing of u.S. Stocks
- •4.1Portfolio Weights
- •4.2Portfolio Returns
- •4.3Expected Portfolio Returns
- •4.4Variances and Standard Deviations
- •4.5Covariances and Correlations
- •4.6Variances of Portfolios and Covariances between Portfolios
- •Variances for Two-Stock Portfolios
- •4.7The Mean-Standard Deviation Diagram
- •4.8Interpreting the Covariance as a Marginal Variance
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orSelling Short the Position in
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orShorting a Position in a
- •4.9Finding the Minimum Variance Portfolio
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Two Stocks
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Many Stocks
- •Investment Applications of Mean-Variance Analysis and the capm
- •5.2The Essentials of Mean-Variance Analysis
- •5.3The Efficient Frontierand Two-Fund Separation
- •5.4The Tangency Portfolio and Optimal Investment
- •Identification of the Tangency Portfolio
- •5.5Finding the Efficient Frontierof Risky Assets
- •5.6How Useful Is Mean-Variance Analysis forFinding
- •5.8The Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Implications for Optimal Investment
- •5.9Estimating Betas, Risk-Free Returns, Risk Premiums,
- •Improving the Beta Estimated from Regression
- •Identifying the Market Portfolio
- •5.10Empirical Tests of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Is the Value-Weighted Market Index Mean-Variance Efficient?
- •Interpreting the capm’s Empirical Shortcomings
- •5.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •6.1The Market Model:The First FactorModel
- •6.2The Principle of Diversification
- •Insurance Analogies to Factor Risk and Firm-Specific Risk
- •6.3MultifactorModels
- •Interpreting Common Factors
- •6.5FactorBetas
- •6.6Using FactorModels to Compute Covariances and Variances
- •6.7FactorModels and Tracking Portfolios
- •6.8Pure FactorPortfolios
- •6.9Tracking and Arbitrage
- •6.10No Arbitrage and Pricing: The Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •Verifying the Existence of Arbitrage
- •Violations of the aptEquation fora Small Set of Stocks Do Not Imply Arbitrage.
- •Violations of the aptEquation by Large Numbers of Stocks Imply Arbitrage.
- •6.11Estimating FactorRisk Premiums and FactorBetas
- •6.12Empirical Tests of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •6.13 Summary and Conclusions
- •7.1Examples of Derivatives
- •7.2The Basics of Derivatives Pricing
- •7.3Binomial Pricing Models
- •7.4Multiperiod Binomial Valuation
- •7.5Valuation Techniques in the Financial Services Industry
- •7.6Market Frictions and Lessons from the Fate of Long-Term
- •7.7Summary and Conclusions
- •8.1ADescription of Options and Options Markets
- •8.2Option Expiration
- •8.3Put-Call Parity
- •Insured Portfolio
- •8.4Binomial Valuation of European Options
- •8.5Binomial Valuation of American Options
- •Valuing American Options on Dividend-Paying Stocks
- •8.6Black-Scholes Valuation
- •8.7Estimating Volatility
- •Volatility
- •8.8Black-Scholes Price Sensitivity to Stock Price, Volatility,
- •Interest Rates, and Expiration Time
- •8.9Valuing Options on More Complex Assets
- •Implied volatility
- •8.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •9.1 Cash Flows ofReal Assets
- •9.2Using Discount Rates to Obtain Present Values
- •Value Additivity and Present Values of Cash Flow Streams
- •Inflation
- •9.3Summary and Conclusions
- •10.1Cash Flows
- •10.2Net Present Value
- •Implications of Value Additivity When Evaluating Mutually Exclusive Projects.
- •10.3Economic Value Added (eva)
- •10.5Evaluating Real Investments with the Internal Rate of Return
- •Intuition for the irrMethod
- •10.7 Summary and Conclusions
- •10A.1Term Structure Varieties
- •10A.2Spot Rates, Annuity Rates, and ParRates
- •11.1Tracking Portfolios and Real Asset Valuation
- •Implementing the Tracking Portfolio Approach
- •11.2The Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Method
- •11.3The Effect of Leverage on Comparisons
- •11.4Implementing the Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Formula with
- •11.5Pitfalls in Using the Comparison Method
- •11.6Estimating Beta from Scenarios: The Certainty Equivalent Method
- •Identifying the Certainty Equivalent from Models of Risk and Return
- •11.7Obtaining Certainty Equivalents with Risk-Free Scenarios
- •Implementing the Risk-Free Scenario Method in a Multiperiod Setting
- •11.8Computing Certainty Equivalents from Prices in Financial Markets
- •11.9Summary and Conclusions
- •11A.1Estimation Errorand Denominator-Based Biases in Present Value
- •11A.2Geometric versus Arithmetic Means and the Compounding-Based Bias
- •12.2Valuing Strategic Options with the Real Options Methodology
- •Valuing a Mine with No Strategic Options
- •Valuing a Mine with an Abandonment Option
- •Valuing Vacant Land
- •Valuing the Option to Delay the Start of a Manufacturing Project
- •Valuing the Option to Expand Capacity
- •Valuing Flexibility in Production Technology: The Advantage of Being Different
- •12.3The Ratio Comparison Approach
- •12.4The Competitive Analysis Approach
- •12.5When to Use the Different Approaches
- •Valuing Asset Classes versus Specific Assets
- •12.6Summary and Conclusions
- •13.1Corporate Taxes and the Evaluation of Equity-Financed
- •Identifying the Unlevered Cost of Capital
- •13.2The Adjusted Present Value Method
- •Valuing a Business with the wacc Method When a Debt Tax Shield Exists
- •Investments
- •IsWrong
- •Valuing Cash Flow to Equity Holders
- •13.5Summary and Conclusions
- •14.1The Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •IsFalse
- •14.2How an Individual InvestorCan “Undo” a Firm’s Capital
- •14.3How Risky Debt Affects the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •14.4How Corporate Taxes Affect the Capital Structure Choice
- •14.6Taxes and Preferred Stock
- •14.7Taxes and Municipal Bonds
- •14.8The Effect of Inflation on the Tax Gain from Leverage
- •14.10Are There Tax Advantages to Leasing?
- •14.11Summary and Conclusions
- •15.1How Much of u.S. Corporate Earnings Is Distributed to Shareholders?Aggregate Share Repurchases and Dividends
- •15.2Distribution Policy in Frictionless Markets
- •15.3The Effect of Taxes and Transaction Costs on Distribution Policy
- •15.4How Dividend Policy Affects Expected Stock Returns
- •15.5How Dividend Taxes Affect Financing and Investment Choices
- •15.6Personal Taxes, Payout Policy, and Capital Structure
- •15.7Summary and Conclusions
- •16.1Bankruptcy
- •16.3How Chapter11 Bankruptcy Mitigates Debt Holder–Equity HolderIncentive Problems
- •16.4How Can Firms Minimize Debt Holder–Equity Holder
- •Incentive Problems?
- •17.1The StakeholderTheory of Capital Structure
- •17.2The Benefits of Financial Distress with Committed Stakeholders
- •17.3Capital Structure and Competitive Strategy
- •17.4Dynamic Capital Structure Considerations
- •17.6 Summary and Conclusions
- •18.1The Separation of Ownership and Control
- •18.2Management Shareholdings and Market Value
- •18.3How Management Control Distorts Investment Decisions
- •18.4Capital Structure and Managerial Control
- •Investment Strategy?
- •18.5Executive Compensation
- •Is Executive Pay Closely Tied to Performance?
- •Is Executive Compensation Tied to Relative Performance?
- •19.1Management Incentives When Managers Have BetterInformation
- •19.2Earnings Manipulation
- •Incentives to Increase or Decrease Accounting Earnings
- •19.4The Information Content of Dividend and Share Repurchase
- •19.5The Information Content of the Debt-Equity Choice
- •19.6Empirical Evidence
- •19.7Summary and Conclusions
- •20.1AHistory of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.2Types of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.3 Recent Trends in TakeoverActivity
- •20.4Sources of TakeoverGains
- •Is an Acquisition Required to Realize Tax Gains, Operating Synergies,
- •Incentive Gains, or Diversification?
- •20.5The Disadvantages of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.7Empirical Evidence on the Gains from Leveraged Buyouts (lbOs)
- •20.8 Valuing Acquisitions
- •Valuing Synergies
- •20.9Financing Acquisitions
- •Information Effects from the Financing of a Merger or an Acquisition
- •20.10Bidding Strategies in Hostile Takeovers
- •20.11Management Defenses
- •20.12Summary and Conclusions
- •21.1Risk Management and the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •Implications of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Hedging
- •21.2Why Do Firms Hedge?
- •21.4How Should Companies Organize TheirHedging Activities?
- •21.8Foreign Exchange Risk Management
- •Indonesia
- •21.9Which Firms Hedge? The Empirical Evidence
- •21.10Summary and Conclusions
- •22.1Measuring Risk Exposure
- •Volatility as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •Value at Risk as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •22.2Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •Value at
- •22.3Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •22.4Hedging and Convenience Yields
- •22.5Hedging Long-Dated Commitments with Short-Maturing FuturesorForward Contracts
- •Intuition for Hedging with a Maturity Mismatch in the Presence of a Constant Convenience Yield
- •22.6Hedging with Swaps
- •22.7Hedging with Options
- •22.8Factor-Based Hedging
- •Instruments
- •22.10Minimum Variance Portfolios and Mean-Variance Analysis
- •22.11Summary and Conclusions
- •23Risk Management
- •23.2Duration
- •23.4Immunization
- •Immunization Using dv01
- •Immunization and Large Changes in Interest Rates
- •23.5Convexity
- •23.6Interest Rate Hedging When the Term Structure Is Not Flat
- •23.7Summary and Conclusions
- •Interest Rate
- •Interest Rate
IsWrong
Anna Kramer, a recent Wharton graduate, is evaluating a project for Unitron that is virtually risk-
less and returns 12 percent per year.Given that the risk-free borrowing rate is currently at 10
percent, she recommends to her supervisor that the company undertake the project because
14Alternatively,
we could have a) used a formula that substitutes the risk-premiums of levered and
unlevered assets for betas in equation (13.7) to unlever the equity expected returns associated with the
comparison firms’equity betas, or b) used the Modigliani-Miller adjusted cost of capital formula to
unlever the comparable firms’WACCs, as computed from equation (13.8) with the risk-free rate as the
input for the cost of debt. These two approaches give the same answer as the procedure described in the
text, although it is important to recognize that both equation (13.1) and the adjusted cost-of-capital
formula assume risk-free debt. Hence, if any portion of the estimation does not use the risk-free rate for
the cost of debt, it will appear as if the methods are providing different answers, when they are simply
being applied incorrectly.
15If
we were using the APVmethod, we would use the unlevered cost of capital, estimated from the
comparison firms, to obtain the value of the unlevered assets of Marriott’s restaurant division by
discounting its unlevered future cash flows. We would then add the present value of the restaurant
division’s debt tax shield to obtain the value of the restaurant division’s assets.
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III. Valuing Real Assets |
13. Corporate Taxes and |
©
The McGraw |
Markets and Corporate |
|
the Impact of Financing on |
Companies, 2002 |
Strategy, Second Edition |
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Real Asset Valuation |
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Chapter 13
Corporate Taxes and the Impact of Financing on Real Asset Valuation
489
its return exceeds the cost of capital for a riskless project.Her supervisor, Harold McGovern, a
1952 Wharton graduate, thinks that the company should reject the project.He notes that Uni-
tron, which is highly levered, has a BBB debt rating and cannot borrow at the 10 percent rate
assumed in Kramer’s analysis.How can Unitron make money, he asks, if it borrows at 13 per-
cent to fund an investment that yields only 12 percent? Kramer finds it difficult to answer this
question.On the one hand, she has been taught that risk-free projects should be discounted at
the risk-free rate.However, when taking the project’s financing mix into account, the project gen-
erates negative cash flows to the firm’s equity holders.Who is right?
Answer:McGovern is correct if you believe the firm’s goal is to maximize its share price.
However, to maximize the value of the firm, as would be the case if the firm was also
beholden to bankers and other debt holders, Kramer’s point is correct.
In the last example, the cash flows from the Unitron project that accrue to the
equity holders are negative with certainty. This implies that the value to the equity hold-
ers must necessarily be negative. However, since these certain returns of the project
exceed the risk-free return, the project must create value for someone. In this example,
the project creates value for existing debt holders. The addition of a riskless project
reduced the overall risk of the firm, which in turn increases the amount that the debt
holders expect to recover in the event of default.16
Example 13.16 illustrates that it is not enough to ask whether a project generates
a value that exceeds its cost. Instead, the analyst has to ask whether the value created
accrues to the firm’s equity holders or its debt holders. In Example 13.14, where United
Technologies had no debt, the marginal WACC generated a project selection rule that
maximized share price. It is important to emphasize that the shareholders of United
Technologies would have profited even if their project had been financed with new
debt. However, when a firm is already partly financed with debt, as in Example 13.16,
discounting expected unlevered cash flows with the marginal WACC measures a value
that accrues to existing debt holders as well as equity holders.
Computing Cash Flows to Equity Holders
For the firm as a whole, cash flow to equity holdersis the pretax unlevered cash flow
less payments to debt holders less taxes. Computing a project’s incremental cash
flows to equity holders is similar to the computation of incremental real asset
cash flows described in Chapter 10. First, compute the cash flows equity holders receive
(from all of the firm’s existing projects) if the new project is not adopted; then, sub-
tract this from the cash flows to the sameshareholders, assuming that the project is
adopted. This difference is the project’s incremental cash flow to equity holders.
While it is easy to state how to compute incremental cash flows, it is not simple
to implement this computation in practice. Analysts typically avoid the complexities by
computing the cash flow to equity holders as the difference between the incremental
unlevered cash flows of the project and the after-tax interest payments associated with
the project’s debt financing. This approach is correct with non-recourse debt, also
called project financing, which is debt with claims only to the project’s cash flows.
However, it should be noted that, with non-recourse debt, the cash flows that accrue to
the equity holders from a project can never be negative and thus have option-like
16Chapter
16 will discuss this in detail. As Chapter 16 points out, the opposite is also true: For equity
holders, high-risk projects are more attractive than comparable NPVlow-risk projects when the firm’s
debt is risky.
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Grinblatt
993 Titman: FinancialIII. Valuing Real Assets
13. Corporate Taxes and
© The McGraw
993 HillMarkets and Corporate
the Impact of Financing on
Companies, 2002
Strategy, Second Edition
Real Asset Valuation
490Part IIIValuing Real Assets
properties. When a firm finances a project with corporate debt (with claims on all cor-
porate assets) one must take into account that the cash flows to equity holders can be
negative. In addition, as we will discuss in more detail in Chapter 16, the incremental
cash flows to equity holders, in this case, will also be determined by the correlation
between the new project returns and the returns on existing projects. When the corre-
lation is very low, the new project decreases the overall risk of the firm (through the
diversification effect), and thus a large portion of the value created by the project
accrues to the firm’s debt holders. When the project is very risky, and highly correlated
with existing projects, the cash flows to equity holders will often be higher, and the
implementation of the project might hurt the debt holders.
