- •Intended Audience
- •1.1 Financing the Firm
- •1.2Public and Private Sources of Capital
- •1.3The Environment forRaising Capital in the United States
- •Investment Banks
- •1.4Raising Capital in International Markets
- •1.5MajorFinancial Markets outside the United States
- •1.6Trends in Raising Capital
- •Innovative Instruments
- •2.1Bank Loans
- •2.2Leases
- •2.3Commercial Paper
- •2.4Corporate Bonds
- •2.5More Exotic Securities
- •2.6Raising Debt Capital in the Euromarkets
- •2.7Primary and Secondary Markets forDebt
- •2.8Bond Prices, Yields to Maturity, and Bond Market Conventions
- •2.9Summary and Conclusions
- •3.1Types of Equity Securities
- •Volume of Financing with Different Equity Instruments
- •3.2Who Owns u.S. Equities?
- •3.3The Globalization of Equity Markets
- •3.4Secondary Markets forEquity
- •International Secondary Markets for Equity
- •3.5Equity Market Informational Efficiency and Capital Allocation
- •3.7The Decision to Issue Shares Publicly
- •3.8Stock Returns Associated with ipOs of Common Equity
- •Ipo Underpricing of u.S. Stocks
- •4.1Portfolio Weights
- •4.2Portfolio Returns
- •4.3Expected Portfolio Returns
- •4.4Variances and Standard Deviations
- •4.5Covariances and Correlations
- •4.6Variances of Portfolios and Covariances between Portfolios
- •Variances for Two-Stock Portfolios
- •4.7The Mean-Standard Deviation Diagram
- •4.8Interpreting the Covariance as a Marginal Variance
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orSelling Short the Position in
- •Increasing a Stock Position Financed by Reducing orShorting a Position in a
- •4.9Finding the Minimum Variance Portfolio
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Two Stocks
- •Identifying the Minimum Variance Portfolio of Many Stocks
- •Investment Applications of Mean-Variance Analysis and the capm
- •5.2The Essentials of Mean-Variance Analysis
- •5.3The Efficient Frontierand Two-Fund Separation
- •5.4The Tangency Portfolio and Optimal Investment
- •Identification of the Tangency Portfolio
- •5.5Finding the Efficient Frontierof Risky Assets
- •5.6How Useful Is Mean-Variance Analysis forFinding
- •5.8The Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Implications for Optimal Investment
- •5.9Estimating Betas, Risk-Free Returns, Risk Premiums,
- •Improving the Beta Estimated from Regression
- •Identifying the Market Portfolio
- •5.10Empirical Tests of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
- •Is the Value-Weighted Market Index Mean-Variance Efficient?
- •Interpreting the capm’s Empirical Shortcomings
- •5.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •6.1The Market Model:The First FactorModel
- •6.2The Principle of Diversification
- •Insurance Analogies to Factor Risk and Firm-Specific Risk
- •6.3MultifactorModels
- •Interpreting Common Factors
- •6.5FactorBetas
- •6.6Using FactorModels to Compute Covariances and Variances
- •6.7FactorModels and Tracking Portfolios
- •6.8Pure FactorPortfolios
- •6.9Tracking and Arbitrage
- •6.10No Arbitrage and Pricing: The Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •Verifying the Existence of Arbitrage
- •Violations of the aptEquation fora Small Set of Stocks Do Not Imply Arbitrage.
- •Violations of the aptEquation by Large Numbers of Stocks Imply Arbitrage.
- •6.11Estimating FactorRisk Premiums and FactorBetas
- •6.12Empirical Tests of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory
- •6.13 Summary and Conclusions
- •7.1Examples of Derivatives
- •7.2The Basics of Derivatives Pricing
- •7.3Binomial Pricing Models
- •7.4Multiperiod Binomial Valuation
- •7.5Valuation Techniques in the Financial Services Industry
- •7.6Market Frictions and Lessons from the Fate of Long-Term
- •7.7Summary and Conclusions
- •8.1ADescription of Options and Options Markets
- •8.2Option Expiration
- •8.3Put-Call Parity
- •Insured Portfolio
- •8.4Binomial Valuation of European Options
- •8.5Binomial Valuation of American Options
- •Valuing American Options on Dividend-Paying Stocks
- •8.6Black-Scholes Valuation
- •8.7Estimating Volatility
- •Volatility
- •8.8Black-Scholes Price Sensitivity to Stock Price, Volatility,
- •Interest Rates, and Expiration Time
- •8.9Valuing Options on More Complex Assets
- •Implied volatility
- •8.11 Summary and Conclusions
- •9.1 Cash Flows ofReal Assets
- •9.2Using Discount Rates to Obtain Present Values
- •Value Additivity and Present Values of Cash Flow Streams
- •Inflation
- •9.3Summary and Conclusions
- •10.1Cash Flows
- •10.2Net Present Value
- •Implications of Value Additivity When Evaluating Mutually Exclusive Projects.
- •10.3Economic Value Added (eva)
- •10.5Evaluating Real Investments with the Internal Rate of Return
- •Intuition for the irrMethod
- •10.7 Summary and Conclusions
- •10A.1Term Structure Varieties
- •10A.2Spot Rates, Annuity Rates, and ParRates
- •11.1Tracking Portfolios and Real Asset Valuation
- •Implementing the Tracking Portfolio Approach
- •11.2The Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Method
- •11.3The Effect of Leverage on Comparisons
- •11.4Implementing the Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate Formula with
- •11.5Pitfalls in Using the Comparison Method
- •11.6Estimating Beta from Scenarios: The Certainty Equivalent Method
- •Identifying the Certainty Equivalent from Models of Risk and Return
- •11.7Obtaining Certainty Equivalents with Risk-Free Scenarios
- •Implementing the Risk-Free Scenario Method in a Multiperiod Setting
- •11.8Computing Certainty Equivalents from Prices in Financial Markets
- •11.9Summary and Conclusions
- •11A.1Estimation Errorand Denominator-Based Biases in Present Value
- •11A.2Geometric versus Arithmetic Means and the Compounding-Based Bias
- •12.2Valuing Strategic Options with the Real Options Methodology
- •Valuing a Mine with No Strategic Options
- •Valuing a Mine with an Abandonment Option
- •Valuing Vacant Land
- •Valuing the Option to Delay the Start of a Manufacturing Project
- •Valuing the Option to Expand Capacity
- •Valuing Flexibility in Production Technology: The Advantage of Being Different
- •12.3The Ratio Comparison Approach
- •12.4The Competitive Analysis Approach
- •12.5When to Use the Different Approaches
- •Valuing Asset Classes versus Specific Assets
- •12.6Summary and Conclusions
- •13.1Corporate Taxes and the Evaluation of Equity-Financed
- •Identifying the Unlevered Cost of Capital
- •13.2The Adjusted Present Value Method
- •Valuing a Business with the wacc Method When a Debt Tax Shield Exists
- •Investments
- •IsWrong
- •Valuing Cash Flow to Equity Holders
- •13.5Summary and Conclusions
- •14.1The Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •IsFalse
- •14.2How an Individual InvestorCan “Undo” a Firm’s Capital
- •14.3How Risky Debt Affects the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •14.4How Corporate Taxes Affect the Capital Structure Choice
- •14.6Taxes and Preferred Stock
- •14.7Taxes and Municipal Bonds
- •14.8The Effect of Inflation on the Tax Gain from Leverage
- •14.10Are There Tax Advantages to Leasing?
- •14.11Summary and Conclusions
- •15.1How Much of u.S. Corporate Earnings Is Distributed to Shareholders?Aggregate Share Repurchases and Dividends
- •15.2Distribution Policy in Frictionless Markets
- •15.3The Effect of Taxes and Transaction Costs on Distribution Policy
- •15.4How Dividend Policy Affects Expected Stock Returns
- •15.5How Dividend Taxes Affect Financing and Investment Choices
- •15.6Personal Taxes, Payout Policy, and Capital Structure
- •15.7Summary and Conclusions
- •16.1Bankruptcy
- •16.3How Chapter11 Bankruptcy Mitigates Debt Holder–Equity HolderIncentive Problems
- •16.4How Can Firms Minimize Debt Holder–Equity Holder
- •Incentive Problems?
- •17.1The StakeholderTheory of Capital Structure
- •17.2The Benefits of Financial Distress with Committed Stakeholders
- •17.3Capital Structure and Competitive Strategy
- •17.4Dynamic Capital Structure Considerations
- •17.6 Summary and Conclusions
- •18.1The Separation of Ownership and Control
- •18.2Management Shareholdings and Market Value
- •18.3How Management Control Distorts Investment Decisions
- •18.4Capital Structure and Managerial Control
- •Investment Strategy?
- •18.5Executive Compensation
- •Is Executive Pay Closely Tied to Performance?
- •Is Executive Compensation Tied to Relative Performance?
- •19.1Management Incentives When Managers Have BetterInformation
- •19.2Earnings Manipulation
- •Incentives to Increase or Decrease Accounting Earnings
- •19.4The Information Content of Dividend and Share Repurchase
- •19.5The Information Content of the Debt-Equity Choice
- •19.6Empirical Evidence
- •19.7Summary and Conclusions
- •20.1AHistory of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.2Types of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.3 Recent Trends in TakeoverActivity
- •20.4Sources of TakeoverGains
- •Is an Acquisition Required to Realize Tax Gains, Operating Synergies,
- •Incentive Gains, or Diversification?
- •20.5The Disadvantages of Mergers and Acquisitions
- •20.7Empirical Evidence on the Gains from Leveraged Buyouts (lbOs)
- •20.8 Valuing Acquisitions
- •Valuing Synergies
- •20.9Financing Acquisitions
- •Information Effects from the Financing of a Merger or an Acquisition
- •20.10Bidding Strategies in Hostile Takeovers
- •20.11Management Defenses
- •20.12Summary and Conclusions
- •21.1Risk Management and the Modigliani-MillerTheorem
- •Implications of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Hedging
- •21.2Why Do Firms Hedge?
- •21.4How Should Companies Organize TheirHedging Activities?
- •21.8Foreign Exchange Risk Management
- •Indonesia
- •21.9Which Firms Hedge? The Empirical Evidence
- •21.10Summary and Conclusions
- •22.1Measuring Risk Exposure
- •Volatility as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •Value at Risk as a Measure of Risk Exposure
- •22.2Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •Value at
- •22.3Hedging Short-Term Commitments with Maturity-Matched
- •22.4Hedging and Convenience Yields
- •22.5Hedging Long-Dated Commitments with Short-Maturing FuturesorForward Contracts
- •Intuition for Hedging with a Maturity Mismatch in the Presence of a Constant Convenience Yield
- •22.6Hedging with Swaps
- •22.7Hedging with Options
- •22.8Factor-Based Hedging
- •Instruments
- •22.10Minimum Variance Portfolios and Mean-Variance Analysis
- •22.11Summary and Conclusions
- •23Risk Management
- •23.2Duration
- •23.4Immunization
- •Immunization Using dv01
- •Immunization and Large Changes in Interest Rates
- •23.5Convexity
- •23.6Interest Rate Hedging When the Term Structure Is Not Flat
- •23.7Summary and Conclusions
- •Interest Rate
- •Interest Rate
13.1Corporate Taxes and the Evaluation of Equity-Financed
Capital Expenditures
The starting point for both the APVand the WACC approaches is the determination of
the unlevered cash flows of the firm or project that is being evaluated, defined first in
Chapter 9. Until we get to Chapter 15, we will assume that the unlevered cash flows,
that is, the after-tax cash flows generated directly by the real assets of the project or
firm, are unaffected by the amount of debt financing the firm uses. Because of this
assumption, we can compute the unlevered cash flow as the after-tax cash flows of the
project or firm under the assumption the project or firm is financed entirely with equity
(hence, the term “unlevered”). Having estimated the future unlevered cash flows of the
project or firm in this manner, we then need to estimate the appropriate cost of capi-
tal or discount rate for these cash flows.
The Cost of Capital
Distinguishing the Unlevered Cost of Capital from the WACC.For an all-equity-
financed, or “unlevered” firm, the appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate for a project’s
future cash flow when the cash flow has the same risk as the overall firm is the firm’s
cost of capital. This required rate of return on the firm’s assets is the same as the
2
The final cost was $100 million.
3
Personal taxes are discussed in Chapters 14 and 15.
4The analysis of debt capacity is discussed in Parts IVand V.
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Chapter 13
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463
expected rate of return on the unlevered firm’s equity, as described in Chapter 11. In
the presence of corporate tax deductions for interest payments, we need to be concerned
with two costs of capital. The unlevered cost of capital,denoted r,is the expected
UA
return on the equity of the firm if the firm is financed entirely with equity. Because
there is no debt tax shield for a firm that is financed entirely with equity, and because
the two sides of the balance sheet “balance,” the unlevered cost of capital is also the
required rate of return on the firm’s unlevered assets. The weighted average cost of
capitalor WACCis a weighted average of the after-tax expected return paid by the firm
on its debt and equity. In the absence of a debt tax shield, debt subsidy, or other mar-
ket frictions that favor one form of financing over another, the WACCis the expected
return of the firm’s assets. In this case, the WACC and the unlevered cost of capital
are the same. However, we need to distinguish the two cost of capital concepts when-
ever there is a debt tax shield.
Note that the expected return paid by the firm to its equity holders is the same as
the expected return received by the equity holders. This point—that the expected rate
of return the firm pays for the use of the capital is the same as the expected rate of
return the investor receives for providing the capital—is not true, in general. When a
third party, such as the government taxing authority, favors one form of financing over
another, the cost of the favored form of financing will differ from the expected return
to investors. For example, the tax deductibility of interest implies that the cost of debt
financing to a corporation (as measured by the after-tax return paid by the corporation)
may be less than the rate of return on a firm’s debt received by the firm’s debt hold-
ers. Because of this, the WACC differs from unlevered cost of capital when there is a
debt tax shield.
Why It Is Important to Calculate the Unlevered Cost of Capital fora Levered
Firm.If, as is generally assumed, cash flow horizon does not affect the discount rate,
then valuing an equity-financed project that is a scale replication of a comparison all-
equity firm is straightforward. In this case, the project is a miniaturized version of the
comparison firm’s equity, implying that the project’s cost of capital is the expected rate
of return on the comparison firm’s equity. Chapter 11 described a variety of techniques
for estimating this expected rate of return. For example, measuring the comparison
firm’s market beta and using this beta in the CAPM risk-expected return formula is one
way to generate the project’s cost of capital.
However, the inclusion of debt financing complicates this analysis. To value an all-
equity-financed project when the comparison firm has debt financing, it is necessary to
calculate the required rate of return on the comparison firm’s equity in the hypotheti-
cal case of a comparison firm that is all equity financed. Moreover, when the project
adds to the ability of the firm adopting the project to take on tax-advantaged debt, it
is necessary to understand how shifting the comparison firm’s debt affects the risk of
the comparison firm’s equity. While Chapter 11 studied this issue in the absence of
taxes, a real-world application of the valuation techniques developed in this text
requires us to account for the effect of taxes.
The Risk of the Components of the Firm’s Balance Sheet with Tax-Deductible Debt Interest
Afinancial manager who employs either the WACC or the APVmethod needs to under-
stand how debt financing and taxes affect the risks of various components of the firm’s
balance sheet. To develop this understanding we return to the simplified balance sheet of
Chapter 11. Exhibit 13.1, which mirrors Exhibit 11.3, Chapter 11’s balance sheet exhibit,
-
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941 Titman: FinancialIII. Valuing Real Assets
13. Corporate Taxes and
© The McGraw
941 HillMarkets and Corporate
the Impact of Financing on
Companies, 2002
Strategy, Second Edition
Real Asset Valuation
464 |
Part IIIValuing Real Assets |
-
EXHIBIT13.1
Balance Sheet fora Firm with Leverage When Debt Interest Is
Corporate Tax Deductible
-
Assets
Liabilities and Equity
-
Debt Tax Shield (TX)
TD
Debt
D
c
Unlevered Assets (UA)
D ETD
Equity
E
c
presents the two sides of the balance sheet of a firm for which there is a corporate tax
deduction for debt interest payments, but no personal taxes. Exhibit 13.1 illustrates that
typically, the assets of the firm contain two components, one associated directly with the
firm’s operations and the other an indirect asset associated with a financing subsidy. The
former component, the unlevered assets (UA), is defined as the present value of the
unlevered cash flows; the other component, the debt tax shield (TX), is the present value
of the financing subsidy (that is, the present value of the debt-interest deduction for all
corporate profits taxes: federal, state, and city). The more debt the firm has, the big-
ger this tax shield. Note that the two sides of the balance sheet must add up to the same
number—that is, balance—implying that the value of the unlevered assets can be viewed
as the sum of the debt and equity, D E,less the value of the debt tax shield.5
Viewing the assets of the firm with value Aas a portfolio of unlevered assets with
value UAand debt tax shields with value TXimplies that the beta (or expected return)
of the assets is the portfolio-weighted average of the betas (or expected returns) of the
unlevered assets and debt tax shields; that is
-
UATX
(13.1a)
AD EUAD ETX
and
-
UATX
r r r
(13.1b)
AD EUAD ETX
where
beta risk of the unlevered assets
UA
beta risk of the debt tax shield
TX
rexpected return of the unlevered assets
UA
rexpected return of the debt tax shield
TX
Static Perpetual Risk-Free Debt.Let Tdenote the effective corporate tax rate.
c
Exhibit 13.1 has the firm’s debt tax shield expressed as
-
TX TD
(13.2)
c
and thus
-
UAD ETD
(13.3)
c
The values for TXand UAboth in Exhibit 13.1 and in equations (13.2) and (13.3) are
developed in a model by Hamada (1972). If the firm issues default-free perpetual debt
(that is, debt that never matures) with aggregate face amount of Dand interest payments
5More generally, TXcan be viewed as the present value of anydebt financing subsidy.
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III. Valuing Real Assets |
13. Corporate Taxes and |
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Markets and Corporate |
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the Impact of Financing on |
Companies, 2002 |
Strategy, Second Edition |
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Real Asset Valuation |
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Chapter 13
Corporate Taxes and the Impact of Financing on Real Asset Valuation
465
equal to the risk-free rate, each interest payment of Drsaves TDrin taxes in the
fcf
year it is paid. The present value of the tax savings from the interest payments (see
Chapter 9 for the formula for the present value of a perpetuity) is
TDr
c f
TD
c r
f
The same present value is also achieved when the risk-free rate changes over time and
the firm rolls over one-period risk-free debt.
The Hamada model assumes that the tax shield is riskless and thus, each period’s
tax deduction arising from an interest payment should be discounted back to date 0 at
the risk-free rate. This implies that the beta of the debt tax shield in the Hamada model
is zero. Using this observation, and substituting equations (13.2) and (13.3) into equa-
tion (13.1a) yields
-
D ET D
(13.4)
c
AD EUA
In the typical case where the beta of the unlevered assets of the firm, ,is positive,
UA
equation (13.4) states that the beta of the combination of the unlevered assets and the
debt tax shield assets, ,must decline with an increase in leverage to reflect the
A
addition of the risk-free tax savings. To see this, note that the portfolio weight on ,
UA
D ETDT DD
c c
,which equals 1 ,declines as the leverage ratio
D ED ED E
increases, reflecting the fact that risk-free debt tax shields constitute a larger propor-
tion of the firm’s assets as leverage increases.
The key assumptions that lead to this result are: (1) The debt is perpetual; in other
words, it is either a perpetuity or consists of rolled over short-term debt positions.
(2)The debt is default-free and pays the risk-free rate. (3) The face value of the debt
and the tax rate do not change over time. The third assumption distinguishes the
Hamada model from other models that will be discussed later in this chapter.
Equity Betas and Asset Betas.Equity betas are also affected by taxes. Chapter 11
indicated that (assuming risk-free debt) the equity beta is
-
D
1
(13.5)
EEA
Substituting the right-hand side of equation (13.4) for in equation (13.5) gives
A
DD ETD
1 c
EED EUA
With a little simplification, this equation, which is based on the Hamada model,
becomes
D
1 (1T) (13.6)
EcEUA
Assuming that does not change with leverage,6equation (13.6) states that, for a given
UA
debt increase, the beta of the firm’s equity increases less the larger is the corporate tax
rate, and increases the most when there are no taxes. Reversing this equation also allows
us to identify from ,which is often a necessary step when using the discounted
UAE
cash flow method for valuation when debt tax shields exist.
6Chapters 16–19 discuss situations where this may not be the case.
-
Grinblatt
945 Titman: FinancialIII. Valuing Real Assets
13. Corporate Taxes and
© The McGraw
945 HillMarkets and Corporate
the Impact of Financing on
Companies, 2002
Strategy, Second Edition
Real Asset Valuation
466Part IIIValuing Real Assets
