Introduction
The European Union has an increasing impact on a wide variety of public and private actors within and beyond its borders. Therefore a focus on European integration is essential. Given the EU’s influence on domestic and international contexts, an analytical and academic understanding of its functioning is imperative.
The discipline is built in such way to provide students with an advanced academic, theory-based understanding of the policies, the institutions and the socio-economic processes in the European Union.
The discipline offers a common core of themes on the essential features of European Integration. The discipline program is particularly oriented towards providing an academic, theory-based understanding of the policies, the institutions and the socio-economic processes in the European Union. The presentation of factual and practical knowledge on EU institutions and policies is important but does not constitute the essence of the discipline. The discipline emphasizes the importance of theoretical and conceptual tools to interpret and analyze aspects of European integration. The discipline program offers detailed analysis on the EU, its institutions and its working practices, all of which are presented within a clear scientific framework.
The purpose of the discipline studying is forming of theoretical knowledge on essence, features of functioning and tendency of development of European integration processes.
Subject of the discipline is institutions and policies of the EU.
Tasks of the discipline are:
to study concepts and criteria of expansion of European integration;
to form the system of knowledge on essence, basic directions and stages of European integration;
to determine the stages of development and mechanisms of realization of European integration;
to learn methods of analysis of European integration;
to study sources of European integration, bases and structure;
to determine structure and principles of functioning of supranational system of the EU;
to study essence of common policies of the EU;
to learn features of horizontal policies of the EU;
to study EU policies in the different sectors of economy;
to analyze directions and mechanism of realization industrial and agricultural policies of the EU;
to study principles of foreign policy of the EU and strategy of development of relationships with nearby countries.
Structure of the discipline:
Content module I. Basic factors and institutes of the EU. Essence of common policies of the EU
Theme 1. Sources of European integration. Bases and structure of the EU
Theme 2. Supranational system of the EU: structure and principles of functioning
Theme 3. Essence of the EU common policies
Theme 4. Horizontal policies of the EU
Theme 5. Common policies of the EU in different sectors of economy
Content module II. Industrial and agricultural policy of the EU as basic sectoral policies
Theme 6. Industrial policy of the EU
Theme 7. Agricultural policy of the EU
Content module III. External relations development strategy of the EU
Theme 8. Foreign policy of the EU
Theme 9. The EU strategy of external relations development
After learning the discipline you will be able:
to define factors, directions and problems of development of European integration;
to familiarize with fundamental institutes and directions of activities of the EU;
to estimate certain mechanisms and instruments of common policies of the EU;
to define directions of cooperation of countries of the EU and Ukraine.
PART I.
METHODICAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON PREPARATION TO PRACTICAL AND SEMINAR LESSONS
CONTENT MODULE I. BASIC FACTORS AND INSTITUTES OF THE EU. ESSENCE OF COMMON POLICIES OF THE EU
Theme 1. Sources of European integration. Bases and structure of the EU
Plan:
1.1. Essence of European integration
1.2. Concept and maintenance of the EU
1.3. General structure of the EU
1.4. Aims, principles and powers of the EU
Keywords: factors, pre-conditions, EU legislation, structure, spheres of co-operation, supranational institutes, principles of European integration, powers of the EU.
Literature: 1, 2, 3, 5.
Question and task:
1. Forces of creation and development of the EU.
2. Basic stages of development of the EU.
3. Concept and essence of the EU.
4. «Three pillars» of the European Union.
5. Organizational structure of the EU.
6. Principles and directions of activity of the EU.
7. Primary purposes and tasks of the EU.
8. Powers of the EU in decision of tasks of development.
Case Studies:
Case 1 – Finland and the Eurocrisis
In the historic heart of Helsinki, leviathan cruise ships can be glimpsed across the harbour ready for their next trip. Just two hours across the Gulf of Finland is Tallinn in Estonia. Continue due south and a weary traveler will eventually reach Athens. If Greece is the awkward customer among southern Europe’s debtor nations, Finland is the stroppy partner among northern creditor nations. It has insisted on special terms on its contributions to euro-zone bail-outs since mid-2011 by getting collateral on its lending. Government ministers eschew high-flown rhetoric about European unity: the foreign minister recently caused a kerfuffle by saying that Finland has contingency plans for a break-up of the euro.
From one perspective, it is hard to see why Finland is being so obstreperous. The country thrived for the best part of a decade after it joined the single currency in 1999. And although it suffered in the recession of 2008-09 it has since made a robust recovery. Unemployment has come down from a peak of 8.7% in early 2010, to 7.5%. Helsinki’s markets are thronged with shoppers and retail sales across the country have been perky. The recovery has been sustained by strong consumer spending, supported by a sturdy housing market. The financial system is in decent shape.
Finland’s public finances are healthy, too, certainly compared with those elsewhere in the euro area. Of the six remaining AAA–rated countries in the 17-strong zone, it is the only one not facing the risk of a downgrade, according to Moody’s, a ratings agency. Public debt is only about 50% of GDP, much lower than Germany’s 80%, and the government is running a deficit of about 1% of GDP this year, a paltry amount compared with those being racked up in Europe’s debtor countries.
Pic 1. Parting company
But from another perspective, Finland’s performance looks disappointing. An alternative destination from Helsinki on one of those monster cruise ships is due west to Stockholm. Unlike Finland, Sweden chose not to join the euro. Until the crisis, that made little difference. Both countries did well; if anything Finland’s performance was stronger. But over the past five years their fortunes have diverged to the detriment of Finland (see chart).
The Finns suffered a much sharper recession than the Swedes, and Finland’s recovery has been less ebullient. Moreover, the Finnish economy has stumbled of late: GDP fell by 1% in the second quarter in Finland, whereas it rose by 1.4% in Sweden. There were special reasons why the Finnish economy contracted - in effect, growth had been brought forward to the first quarter as consumers bought cars early to avoid a tax rise. But GDP is now likely to expand by about 0.5% in 2012, says Markku Kotilainen of the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. In contrast, Swedish output will expand by 1.3%, according to Robert Bergqvist of SEB, a bank.
In another telling comparison, Sweden continues to run a hefty current-account surplus (worth 7% of GDP in 2011) whereas Finland swung into deficit last year for the first time since 1993, a phenomenon noted with concern by Erkki Liikanen, the governor of the central bank. And whereas Finland’s public debt was lower than Sweden’s before the crisis, now it is higher.
Some of this reflects setbacks to Nokia, Finland’s falling mobile-phone star, whose share of Finnish GDP has shriveled to an eighth of what it was at its peak a decade ago. But there are other worries. Mainstay industries, such as wood and paper production, have also been doing badly. The Bank of Finland argues that a crucial reason why exports have been doing badly is a loss of competitiveness: unit labour costs have shot up by 20% in the past five years.
The economy’s longer-term prospects add to the gloom. In a survey of the Finnish economy published early this year, the OECD estimated that GDP would grow by just 1.7% a year between 2016 and 2030. The bills for a rapidly ageing population are coming due, as the bumper crop of babies born after the second world war retires.
The coalition government formed in mid-2011 and led by the conservative prime minister, Jyrki Katainen, has adopted measures to improve the structural budget balance by 2% of GDP in 2015. The fiscal tightening will be especially marked next year, with value-added tax on consumption rising by one percentage point. That is one reason why growth is expected to be a soggy sub-1% in 2013, according to Mr Kotilainen. But even with this dose of austerity, the ministry of finance reckons there is a “sustainability gap” of 3.5% of GDP a year that will have to be closed to put Finland’s public finances on a secure footing.
Along with further austerity, painful reforms are required. Finland needs to raise its retirement age. And as the OECD urged in its report, it needs to improve public-service productivity. The government is starting to move in the right direction with its plan to reduce the number of local authorities, which are responsible for crucial public services like health, but plenty more needs to be done.
As times turn hard at home, many Finns bristle at having to bail out what they regard as profligate euro-zone countries that have not played by the rules. Mr Katainen’s demands for collateral stem from a coalition agreement forged after the election in April 2011, which saw the eruption of the anti-bail-out True Finns, now the biggest opposition party. Even so, he is keen to present himself as a constructive negotiator rather than a troublemaker.
And despite the dislike for bail-outs, Finnish public opinion continues to favour the euro, which is also backed by both business and the unions. One reason lies in another destination that the big cruise-ships visit—nearby St Petersburg. As Teija Tiilikainen, the head of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, points out, joining the euro had a security dimension, through binding Finland more closely into Europe and so providing a bulwark against Russia (still its largest trading partner).
Finns may not be dreaming of a future outside the single currency, but their reluctance to help makes them a prime example of the “rescue fatigue” now afflicting much of northern Europe (including the Netherlands, which has an election of its own next month). That constraint is one reason why markets’ sunny mood about the euro crisis may not last far into the autumn.
Source: Northern gripes// The Economist. – 2012. - 25th August – [Electronic resource]. - http://www.economist.com/node/21560865.
Dictionary:
collateral – дополнительное обеспечение
obstreperous – беспокойный
diverge – расходиться
detriment – ущерб
surplus – прибавочный, избыточный
Questions:
What is the quantity of public debt? Compare it with Germany.
Compare Finland and Sweden in times of recession.
What Finland should worry about except the falling mobile-phone star Nokia?
What tasks set itself the coalition government formed in mid-2011 and led by the conservative prime minister, Jyrki Katainen?
What reforms yet required for Finland?
Case 2 - Germany and Greece
Wolfgang Schäuble is, in many ways, the strongest – perhaps even the last – Europhile in the German government. But open the pages of Greek newspapers and there he is, the German finance minister depicted in Nazi uniform. It is not just the inflammatory Greek press that dislikes him. The Greek president, Karolos Papoulias, lashed out at him last week: “Who is Mr Schäuble to insult Greece? Who are the Dutch? Who are the Finnish?”
Mr Schäuble is, first and foremost, the German finance minister. As such his job is to protect the interests of the German tax-payer, from both the demands of his fellow ministers and the begging bowl held out by his European colleagues. As creditor-in-chief, one would expect him to be toughest in imposing conditions on Greece before granting a second bail-out.
But the Schäuble problem goes beyond this necessary parsimoniousness. Consistently through the crisis, Mr Schäuble has adopted the hardest positions. First it was a paper circulated by his officials calling for the creation of a budget “commissar” with the power to control the Greek budget. Then it was his open talk a Greek default, and the fact that other European countries were “better prepared” to withstand it. Most recently, he suggested that Greece should postpone its elections so that the technocratic government of Lukas Papademos has more time to implement reforms.
Many think Mr Schäuble has been deliberately pushing the Greeks into a chaotic default. Even so, why do it so overtly? Why invite the crude and simplistic accusation the modern Germany is repeating the Nazis’ jackbooted occupation of Greece? It would be so much simpler to let somebody like the Dutch finance minister, Jan Kees de Jager, do the tough talking (see my previous post) while Germany holds back. Every finance minister of a creditor country must demonstrate that he (or she) is driving a hard bargain. Mr Schäuble knows better than most the many doubts that surround even a second vast bailout of Greece. In the end, Mr de Jager’s menaces count for much less than Mr Schäuble’s; if Greece is to be cut loose the decision will be taken in Berlin, not The Hague.
The FT's Quentin Peel recently recently had an interesting piece on the reasons for Germany's rigidity: “Postwar Germany is both profoundly provincial and committed to Europe. The federal system keeps central government in check, locked into a system of coalition government that is consensual and slow-moving. Both politics and the bureaucracy are dominated by lawyers (Mr Schäuble is one) who believe passionately in the need for rules and respect for the law. It makes for a confusing mixture of compromise and inflexibility. Mixed messages emerge from the different centres of power, not least from the finance ministry and the chancellor’s office, until they can agree a common line.”
Some argue that Mr Schäuble’s very pro-Europeanism heightens his sense of betrayal by Greece, and the prospect that it could destroy the European Union’s greatest experiment in integration. There may be truth in this. But I cannot help but feel that that also something of the bad-cop routine in Mr Schäuble’s actions. He must act as if a Greek default is possible, even desirable, in order to turn the pressure on Greek politicians. If that means being portrayed as a Nazi, so be it; the alternative is to let Greek politicians think they are immune because the euro zone will never let them collapse.
Still, Mr Schäuble's claim that the euro zone is ready for a Greek default sounds implausible. Last year European politicians were bending over backwards to avoid any sort of default, lest it destabilise the whole of the euro zone. Yes, the European Central Bank’s massive liquidity programme for banks (not sovereigns) has taken the edge off the panic. The reforms being enacted in Italy and Spain have helped too.
But nobody thinks the euro zone has yet overcome the crisis. If it were otherwise, why insist on the fiction that the restructuring of private debt is “voluntary” simply to avoid triggering credit-default swaps? And surely, if Germany were serious about cutting off the Greeks it would be doing more to strengthen anti-contagion measures. On the contrary: Germany has so far resisted a proposal to strengthen the rescue fund by maintaining the temporary European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) even after the creation of permanent European Stability Mechanism due later this year.
The conundrum for the fiscal hawks is that issuing a credible threat to Greece requires issuing a credible guarantee that Italy and Spain would be protected from the consequences. But that is something that Germany will not do, for fear of reducing the reformist pressure on Italy and Spain. So through gritted teeth, Greece must be kept afloat in some manner—not at any cost, of course, but for some time yet, as long as the price is not too exorbitant. “We continue to believe that Greece can be saved. Or at least we continue to say so,” says one Eurocrat.
The difficulty in imposing discipline and reform on Greece will be familiar to any parent of recalcitrant adolescents who do not want to do their homework. Dad may shout, cajole and threat; the kid may come to hate the parent. But if the kid refuses to study, he cannot be starved, beaten or thrown on to the streets. The parent may enjoy the illusion of infinite power, but authority ultimately involves much bluff.
Source: Wolfgang's woes // The Economist. – 2012. - 20th February – [Electronic resource]. - http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2012/02/ germany-and-greece
Dictionary:
inflammatory – возбуждающее lashed out – набросился to withstand – противостоять postpone – откладывать overtly – открыто implausible – неправдоподобно |
gritted – стиснутый afloat – наплаву exorbitant – чрезмерный recalcitrant - непокорный
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Questions:
1. What positions Mr. Schäuble has adopted?
2. Why Mr. Schäuble position did displease Greece?
3. How can Mr. Schäuble avoid criticism of Greece in this situation?
4. Why Mr Schäuble's claim that the euro zone is ready for a Greek default does sound implausible?
5. What are the reasons of keeping Greece afloat?