Is now generally conceded that the principal is liable however

Innocenli he may have been personally.-* Thus, if the agent is

1 Udell V. Athorton, 7 II. & n. 172; Western Bank V. Addie, l. R. 1

Sc. & 1). Cas. 145; Kennedy r. McKay, 43 N. J. L. 288; State v. Fred-

ericks 47 N. J. L. 40!) ; Keefe v. Sholl, 181 Pa. St. 90.

2 Barwick v. En<;lish Joint Stock Bank, L. R. 2 Ex. 2.j9 ; Jeffrey v.

Bigelow, l;i Wend. (X Y.) 518; White r. Sawyer, 16 (Jray (Mass.), 586;

City Nat Bank v. Dun. 51 Fod. Rep. 160; Peebles r. Patapsco Guano

Co., 77 N. C. 233; Wolfe r. Piigii, 101 Ind. 293, 303-306.

В» Hathaway r. Johnson, 55 N. Y. 93.

* Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, L. R. 2 Ex. 250; Jeffrey >• Bige-

low, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 518; Peebles v. Patapsco Guano Co., 77 N. C. 233 ;

TORTS AND FRAUDS OF AGENT. 201

authorized to sell lands and makes false representations while

so selling them, the principal is liable to the purchaser for

damages suffered in consequence of such false representa-

tions.^ " When a principal authorizes an agent to do a cer-

tain thing, he is answerable for and bound by the acts and

representations of the agent in accomplishing that end, even

though the agent is guilty of fraud in bringing about the re-

sult. Having given such authority, the principal is responsible

for the fraudulent as well as the fair means used by the agent,

If they are in the line of accomplishing the object of the

agency." ^

In any case where the principal has in his hands the fruits

of a contract made by his agent through misrepresentation

or fraud, it is clear that tlie misrepresentation was for the

principal's benefit and he remains responsible for the con-

sequences.^ Duress stands in this respect upon the same

footing as misrepresentation.'* No principle of law seems

better settled than that a man cannot reap the fruits of his

agent's frauds without also becoming subject to the burdens

of such fraud. ^

While it is sometimes stated that in order to render the

principal liable for his agent's misrepresentations, they must

be made for the principal's benefit, it is submitted that this

is too stringent, that the true rule is that they must be

within the scope of the authority, and that the fact that

they are for the principal's benefit has merely an evidential

force in determining whether they are within the scope of

the autliority. Representations of agents outside the scope

of the authority are of course not binding upon the princi-

Haskell v. Starbird, 152 Mass. 117; Busch r. Wilcox, 82 Mich. 315, s. c.

336; Griswold r. Gebbie, 126 Pa. St. 353; Wolfe v. Pugh, 101 Ind. 293;

Rhoda V. Aniiis, 75 Me. 17 ; Smalley v. Morris, 157 Pa. St. 349.

1 Haskell r. Starbird, supra: Griswold c. Gebbie, supra.

2 Wolfe V. Pugh, supra.

3 Bennett v. Judson, 21 N. Y. 238 ; Garner v. Mangam, 93 N. Y. 642;

Krumm v. Beach, 96 N. Y. 398; Fairchild v. McMahon, 139 N. Y. 290;

Wolfe V. Pugh, 101 Ind. 293, 304.

4 Adams v. Irving Nat. Bank, 116 N. Y. 606.

5 Myerhoff v. Daniels, 173 Pa. St. 555.

^K

202 PRINCIPAL AND TUIKD PARTY.

pal.^ Wliat is now insisted upon is that they are not nec-

essarily outside of the scope of the ostensible authority merely

because they are not, in fact, for the principal's benefit.

The difference between this rule and the rule that the

fraud must be for the principal's benefit is well illustrated

in the case of the issue of fictitious bills of lading" or ficti-

tious stock certilicates by an agent authorized to issue l)ills

of lading or stock certificates.^ It is also illustrated by the

conflict of opinion in the case where a local agent of a

mercantile agency replied falsely to a subscriber concerning

the financial standing of a merchant, not to benefit the

agency but to benefit the merchant, and give him a financial

credit which his circumstances did not warrant;^ Tlie trial

court thought that the fact that the princijjal was i)ersonally