Is held that it is immaterial that there is no binding contract

of service.^ But where the enticement is for a competitive

purpose, that is, whore defendant entices the servant at will

of plaintiff to leave plaintiff's employment and enter defend-

ant's, the decisions are in conflict.^

As to who is a servant within the meaning of this doctrine

there is some conflict. In a leading English case it was held

that enticing away an actress was actionable,^ while in an

American case this was held non-actionable. "^ In most juris-

dictions, however, this narrower question has ceased to be of

Importance in view of the broader doctrine concerning the

liability for inducing breach of contract.

The doctrine that it is actionable to induce a servant to com-

mit a breach of a contract of service has been generalized into

the more comprehensive doctrine that it is actionable to induce

actress was induced to quit the employment of a theatre manager. It was

held that defendant was liable to the employer. Coleridge, J., dissented,

maintaining that the sole liability rested upon the Statute of Laborers

(23 Edw. III.), and that the actress was not a servant within the mean-

ing of that statute.

^ Caughey v. Smith, supra ; Lawyer v. Fritcher, 130 N. Y. 239.

2 Winsinore i'. Greenbank, Willes, 577; Hutcheson v. Peck, 5 Johns.

(N. Y.) 196; Hadley v. Heywood, 121 Mass. 236. • The action of a hus-

band is not, however, solely for loss of service, but includes the loss of

consortium as well.

8 Caughey v. Smith, supra.

4 Evans v. Walton, L. R. 2 C. P. 615; Ball v. Bruce, 21 111. 161 ; Noice

r. Brown, 39 N. J. L. 569.

5 Salter v. Howard, 43 Ga. 601 (actionable) ; Campbell v. Cooper, 34

N. H. 49 (non-actionable). See next section.

В« Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216.

' Bourlier Bros. v. Macauley, 91 Ky. 135.

372 LIABILITY OF THIRD PEKSON

any contractor to commit a breach of his contract,^ although

some cases have held that this generalization is unsound. ^

All jurisdictions agree that it is actionable to procure a

breach of contract by the employment of intrinsically un-

lawful means, as force or fraud ; ^ and this is so even if the

contract be an unenforceable one. ^

В§ 299. Procuring discharge or non-employment of servant.

It is also actionable to induce or persuade a master to dis-

charge his servant with whom he has a binding contract of

service,^ except in tliose jurisdictions which refuse to recog-

nize the general rule that it is actionable to procure a breach

of contract by more ])ersuasion. *^ Even in those jurisdictions

It is actionable if unlawful means are used as force, intimida-

tion, or fraud. "

Is it actionable to induce or persuade a master to discharge

a servant-at-will, that is a servant who may be discharged

without committing a breach of contract ? It has recently

been held in England, overruling prior cases, that it is not

unless unlawful means are used to produce the discharge. ^

But the general American doctrine seems to be otherwise, and

to ])rocced upon the theory that intentionally causing damage

to the servant by inducing his discharge is actionable unless

it can be justified. ^

^ Lumley v. Gye, siipTn ; Bowen r. Ilall, 6 Q. B. Div. 333; Temperton

V. Russell, isiKB, 1 Q. B. 715; Walker v. Croiiiii, 107 Mass. 555; IMorau

V. Dunphy (Mass.), 59 N. E. 125; Angle v. Chicago, &c. Ry., 151 U. S.

1 ; Jones r. Stanly, 7G N. C. 355.

2 Ashley v. Dixon, 18 N. Y. 430; Chambers v. Baldwin, 91 Ky. 121;

Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 578; Glencoe Land, &c. Co. v. Commission

Co., 138 Mo. 439.

8 Ibid. ; Aldridge v. Stuyvesant, 1 Hall (X. Y.), 210.

4 Benton v. Pratt, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 385; Rice v. Manley, 66 N. Y. 82.

6 Chipley v. Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206.

' Note 2, supra.

' Supra. See Shoe Co. v. Saxey, 131 Mo. 212; Wick China Co. v.

Brown, 104 Pa. St. 449.

8 Allen r. Flood, 1898, A. C. 1. See also National Protective Ass'n

t;. Cuinming, 53 N. Y. App. Div. 227.

В» Plant V. Woods, 176 Mass. 492: Curran v. Galen, 152 N. Y. 33.

FOR TORTS. 373

" In view of the series of decisions by this court, we can-

not admit a doubt that maliciously and without justifiable

cause to induce a third person to end his employment of the

plaintiff, whether the inducement be false slanders or success-

ful persuasion, is an actionable tort. ... In the case of a

contract of employment, even when the employment is at will,

the fact that the employer is free from liability for discharg-