Ing the plaintiff does not carry with it immunity to the de-

fendant who has controlled the employer's action to the plain-

tiff's harm." i

Wliat is here said of inducing an employer to discharge a

servant-at-will is also applicable to cases where an employer

of labor is induced not to engage the services of plaintiff at

all. 2 In neither case is the employer guilty of any breach of

an obligation ; the wrong, if any, is that of the defendant in

Interfering with the plaintiff's occupation or means of liveli-

hood.

В§ 300. Summary of law as to interference with contractual rela-

tions.

It will be observed that there are two different views enter-

tained as to the basis of liability for interference with contract

relations.

(1) The first is that there is no tort unless either (a) the

act induced is itself unlawful, namely, the breach of a binding

contract, or (^) the means used to induce the act are unlaw-

ful ; 3 And two jurisdictions admit only the second test in

any case (except possibly the enticement of servants from

their masters).* What constitutes unlawful means, and,

particularly, what constitutes intimidation or coercion, cannot

be regarded as settled. ^ (2) The second doctrine is that it is

1 Holmes, C. J., in Moran v. Dunphy (Mass.), 59 N. E. 125.

2 Blumenthal v. Shaw, 77 Fed. Rep. 954.

8 Allen V. Flood, 1898, A. C. 1.

* Chambers v. Baldwin, 91 Ky. 121; Bourlier Brothers i;. Macauley,

91 Ky. 135; Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 578.

5 Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92 ; O'Neil v. Behanua, 182 Pa. St.

236; :\Iackall v. Ratchford, 82 Fed. Rep. 41.

374 LIABILITY OF TIIIKD TERSON FOR TORTS.

an actionable tort to inflict intentional damage upon the plain-

tiff by inducing another to break a contract with him, or to

terminate one without breach, or not to enter into one, unless

there be a lawful excuse or justification for so doing. ^ What

constitutes lawful excuse or justification cannot be regarded

as settled.2

1 Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555; Moran v. Dunphy (Mass.), 59

N. E. 125; Chipley v. Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206; Graham v. St. Charles Ry.,

47 La. An. 214, 1(356.

2 Vegelahu v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92 ; Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83

Fed. Rep. 912. See 37 Am. Law Reg. n. s. p. 273.

APPENDIX.

NEW YORK FACTORS ACT, 1830.

L. 1830, c. 179.

An Act for the Amendment of the Laiv Relative to Principals and

Factors or Agents.

В§ 1. A person in whose name any merchandise shall be shipped,

shall be deemed the true owner thereof, so far as to entitle the

consignee of such m.erchandise to a lien thereon,

1. For any money advanced, or negotiable security given by

such consignee, to or for the use of the person in whose name

such shipment is made ; and,

2. For any money or negotiable security received by the per-

son in whose name such shipment is made, to or for the use of

such consignee.

В§ 2. Such lien does not exist where the consignee has notice by

the bill of lading or otherwise, when or before money is advanced

or security is given by liim, or when or before such money or se-

curity is received by the person in whose name the shipment is

made, that such person is not the actual and bona fide owner

thereof.^

В§ 3. Every factor or other agent, intrusted with the possession

of any bill of lading, custom-house permit, or warehouse-keeper's

receipt for the delivery of any such merchandise, and every such

factor or agent not having the documentary evidence of title, who

shall be intrusted with the possession of any merchandise for the

purpose of sale, or as a security for any advances to be made or

obtained thereon, shall be deemed to be the true owner thereof,

so far as to give validity to any contract made by such agent with