160; Ewart on Estoppel, pp. 83-97.

2 Kwart on Estoppel, pp. 83-97.

8 First n. B. V. Cody, 93 Ga. 127.

* rickaid V. Sears, G A. & E. 460.

BY ESTOPPEL. 65

(1) JEstoppel may he relied upon to establish the agency.

When one knowingly and without dissent permits another to

act for him in a particular transaction, or in a general course

of transactions of which the particular transaction is one, he

will be estopped from denying the agency of such other

as against one who in good faith, and in the exercise of rea-

sonable prudence, has dealt with such apparent agent relying

on such apparent authority.^ To work this estoppel it is

necessary that the party misled should be so misled by the

representations or conduct of the alleged principal ; if he is

misled by the representations of the agent, the principal will

not be estopped.^ But it is not necessary that the representa-

tion should be made to the third party directly; " it is enough

If it is made to another, and intended or expected to be com-

municated as the representations of the party making them to

the party acting on them, for him to rely and act on." ^ It

Is, of course, necessary that there should be some representa-

tion by words or conduct, in order to create the agency by

estoppel.'* Where an agent is appointed, but his authority to

do any act whatever, is contingent upon the happening of a

future event, the principal cannot be estopped to deny the

agency prior to the happening of the event, unless by conduct

on his part he leads third persons to believe that the contin-

gency has happened, or has been waived.^ So if one entrust

property to the custody of a dealer on- condition that it shall

not be sold without prior specific authorization, there is no

agency whatever, and, it seems, no misrepresentation upon

which to base an estoppel to deny the agency.^

1 Bigelow on Estoppel (5th ed.), 565; Martin v. Webb, 110 U. S. 7,

15; Travellers' Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 122 U. S. 457, 468; James v. Rus-

sell, 92 N. C. 194; Simon v. Brown, 38 Mich. 552. See /?os/, В§ 243.

- Rathbun r. Snow, 123 X. Y. 343.

3 Stevens i". Ludlum, 46 Minn. 161.

< Timpson v. Allen, 149 N. Y. 513.

5 In re Cotisort Deep Level Gold Mines, 1897, 1 Ch. 575; Rcithbun r.

Snow, 123 N.Y. 343.

8 Bijrgs V. Evans, 1894, 1 Q. B. 88. But it would seem that in such

a case there might be an estoppel to deny the dealer's ownership of the

article sold, where it is one in which he is accustomed to deal. See

5

66 FORMATION OF AGENCY

(2) Estoppel may he relied upon to establish the extent of the

agency. While this is to l)e distinguished from the estoppel

to deny the agency, the principle on which it is based is fun-

damentally the same. In the one case the defendant makes

two representations, both of which are false, namely, that A

is his aiicnt, and that A as his agent has certain authority.

If X relics, in good faith and in the exercise of ordinary

prudence, upon these representations, he may prevent the

defendant from denying either of them. In the other case

the defendant makes both representations ; but one of them,

namely, the fact of the agency, is true, while the other, namely,

the extent of the agency, is false. He is equally prevented

from denying either of them; but he is prevented from deny-

ing the one because it is true, while he is prevented from

denying the other because he has represented it to be true.^

This phase of estoppel finds its expression in the general rule

of law that one who deals with an agent within the apparent

scope of his authority is protected.'-^ " Where one, without

objection, suffers another to do acts which proceed upon the

ground of authority from him, or by his conduct adopts and

sanctions such acts after they are done, he will be bound,

although no previous authority exists, in all respects as if the

requisite power had been given in the most formal manner.