8.}.I. The positive component: Scenes and prototypes

The concept of scene proposed by Fillmore has notable conceptual affinities with the second meaning that I proposed for prototype, namely the typical token of a certain entity, event, or situation. Just as the prototype of chair refers to the typi­cal and most common chair, so the scene can be seen as the typical context of a given action: the scene activated by write represents the standard context of appli­cation of the term, its typical case, in which a human subject traces onto a surface (typically a sheet of paper) words and sentences, making use of a specific object like a pen or a pencil for this action. Clearly, it is also possible to write with a pin on the vertical surface of a wall, but expression of this requires, like all non-typical tokens, additional specifications. Generally, what holds for the prototype holds for the scene: in the absence of further information, the term activates its typical context of use or, if one prefers, the typical context constitutes the back­ground that allows understanding of the meaning and regulation of its use. In the cases of both the prototype applied to entities and the scene applied to complex actions or events, it is possible to distinguish between essential and typical com­ponents, even though this distinction is not always explicitly rendered in the mod­els developed thus far (for example, Fillmore's frame semantics almost always lim­its itself to representing essential properties).

The difference between scene and frame on the one hand, and prototype on the other is essentially terminological and largely derives from the different kinds of entity that have been referred to by these terms in the various disciplines that have used them. The literature on prototypes refers primarily to concrete objects- natural kinds and artifacts—because these entities are best suited to con

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trolled experiments on categorization processes. At the level of linguistic applica­tion, this led, at least initially, to a semantics that was almost exclusively nominal. Subsequent models, in particular Fillmore's frame semantics, dealt prevalently with the representation of verbs and corresponding complex actions, following a tradition that stems from the idea of the valency of predicates. This field of inves­tigation explains why scene 2xA frame, rather than prototype, are the terms adopted, given that the representation of verbs does not so much require typical properties as a characteristic action schema for a given sequence. The opposition, however, is more of point of view than of substance; just as we can say that the typical chair is the one characterized by a certain set of properties, so too the typical action of writing is the schema of certain roles and the sequence of actions that we nor­mally associate with this term, and which the concept of scene attempts to cap­ture. The affinities become more evident if, instead of concrete object terms, we consider terms like orphan, mother, divorce, restaurant, and so on, whose semantic representation involves reference to a complex scene, as we shall see in section 8.3.3. What the prototype and the scene have in common is the same intui­tion about the nature of meaning, to be precise, the one that I have proposed to call regularity of context: each term activates and refers to its own standard con­text of reference, whether that is the token of a typical referential entity (in the case of concrete objects) or a typical situation, understood as a dynamic action schema.

Fillmore's slogan (1976b: 84) "meanings are relativized to scenes" is equivalent to the affirmation, in the terms that I have proposed, that each word is always indexed to a standard context of reference, which constitutes the indispensable background for interpretation and use. The link between lexical meaning and scenario (or standard context) is twofold and presupposes two readings: the con­text or typical scene is the ground on which the conventionality of lexical mean­ing rests (in the direction context —» word) and, conversely, each term activates the relative scene or context of reference (word —> context).

Fillmore proposes the example of the commercial sales event. The prototypi­cal cognitive scene consists of a person who comes into possession of some form of goods from another person through an agreement which involves a transfer of money from the first person to the second. The scene thus includes four entities: buyer, seller, goods, and money, as can be seen in diagram 15. This scene represents the deep conceptual level presupposed in the understanding of the single terms that form part of the same linguistic frame (such as buy, sell, pay, spend, cost, etc.), and that are projected on it. Observe, for example, the frame of buy indicated in diagram 16: the ringed element indicates the part of the scene put into focus by the verb, numbers 1 and 2 indicate the grammatical relations of subject and object, and the external elements are the optional complements that can be expressed through the prepositions indicated.

The distinction between the deep conceptual level of the scene and the lin­guistic one of the frame can also productively account for particular semantic

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------------------------------- commercial exchange ------------------------------

В

(goods)

А С

(Buyer) (Seller)

D

(money)

Diagram 16

phenomena such as relations of synonymy and semantic opposition. Fillmore de­velops this point by examining the relations between terms belonging to the same scene, for example, the converse terms sell and buy, which display a superimposi-tion of meaning. I would like to suggest that the analysis can also be extended to terms that do not belong to the same scene. Let's take as an example the case of get. Unlike buy, its representation does not involve any concept of exchange, just the transfer of something. Get can be represented by the schema in diagram 17, which has just three roles. In English, however, the two verbs are fully inter­changeable in certain contexts:

8a. Did you get the newspaper today? 8b. Did you buy the newspaper today?

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9a. I forgot to get the bread. 9b. I forgot to buy the bread.

In order to explain the systematic nature of these substitutions it is not enough to say that the context determines the selection of certain features; in fact, it is the regularity of the selection process that is interesting in these cases. What ensures that in these contexts get is systematically interpreted as a synonym of buy? It seems to me that the regularity of the substitution can easily be explained by referring to the underlying schematic structure: get is interpreted here against the background of the scene of the commercial sales event that underlies buy and thus activates that part of the frame present in buy but not in get, that is, the compo­nent of "exchange" instead of the pure "transfer." The activation of this frame modifies the meaning of get and allows a synonymous substitution.

The articulation of a deep conceptual level displays the experiential (and in this sense also realistic) characteristic of semantic representations of this kind: words are understood only if they are projected on the complex background of our experience of the world, which means that the semantics of language is insepara­ble from a "semantics" of the world and our experience of it. This reveals the intrinsically encyclopedic nature of the model, which involves much more than the quantity of information included. From a purely quantitative point of view, the schema of the commercial exchange proposed by Fillmore may appear rather "flimsy," because it includes only those roles essential to the definition of the con­cept, leaving out, for example, typical elements that are more closely connected to the cultural connotations. The encyclopedic nature of the model can also be seen in its format, which is semiotically "mixed" and not reducible just to linguistic properties; the frequent and characteristic use of figures, diagrams, and iconic rep­resentations within frame semantics and many other models developed in the field of cognitivism is significant from this point of view.

I----------------;---------------------------------- s^et --------------------------------------------------1

с

(source)

I )iagnun 17

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