1. Three Approaches to Meaning

1. Just think of the concept of representamen in Peirce, which is already a sign and not a pure signifier.

2. Referential semantics is a deliberately generic term referring to all those theories which are based in some way on notions of reference and truth.

3. There are innumerable works in English, beginning with the anthology edited by Rorty (1967).

4. There are certain differences on this point within the analytic camp; one cannot talk of an anti-psychological approach in the case of philosophers like Quine or Grice. However, in general terms, one can say that cognitive aspects of meaning are not the cen­tral concern of the analytic philosophers.

5. This is the principle of compositionality formulated by Frege ([1892a] 1952), ac­cording to which the meaning of complex expressions is determined by the meaning of the simpler ones within them. On the basis of this principle, it can be established that the meaning of an expression depends on its contribution to the meaning of the sentence which it is part of.

6. The concept of model is used here in a quite different way to the meaning it usually has in a scientific context. Model-theoretic semantics sets out to assign to each expression in language a given interpretation which can be seen as a model of that expres­sion. No version of model-theoretic semantics effectively interprets a language in relation to the world; at most it illustrates a kind of model, making use of set theory and showing how it is possible to systematically correlate expressions and sets of objects (elements and sets). The function of correlation (interpretation) and the domain of base objects are called "models." For example, if a noun is correlated to an element and a predicate is correlated to a set of elements, the sentence which is formed by correlating the noun and the predicate will be considered true if and only if the element correlated to the noun belongs to the set correlated to the predicate.

7. VS. Kaplan 1977.

8. Kripke never actually explains this point hilly, but the most widely accepted in­terpretation ol his position points in this direction,

9. In the history ol semiolic thought the idea was certainly not a new one. ( loiisider, in particular, the Stoic model if. Males 195).

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10. In these cases the overall truth value of a statement like John believes that Mary loves him does not depend on the truth or falsity of the completive Mary loves him, which is an opaque context. John may believe to be true what is in reality false, but as die state­ment regards the beliefs of John, it is only the truth of these that determines the truth conditions of the sentence. In other words, the truth value of statements which occur in an opaque context does not contribute to determining the truth value of the sentence of which they are part.

11. The term possible world comes from Leibniz.

12. See, among others, the works of Barbara Partee (1979, 1982, 1989), Emmon Bach (1989), Lauri Karttunen, and Stanley Peters.

13. According to Chomsky, not all syntactic differences involve a semantic differ­ence, while Montague believes that all syntactic differences have a corresponding semantic difference.

14. Other model theories do not use the concept of possible worlds. Of these, it is worth noting the situational semantics of Barwise and Perry (1983); they use the notion of situation, which corresponds approximately to a limited portion of the actual world. The main difference lies in the inherently partial nature of situations compared to the complete­ness of possible worlds.

15. For a discussion of this point, see, for example, Partee 1982.

16. It has been observed that the definition of intensional isomorphism is too pow­erful, given that any difference in the form of expressions makes synonymy impossible. The mother of my mother and my grandmother could not be considered synonymous because their inrernal structure is different. Carnap resolved this problem by considering some syn­tactic differences inessential. In order to be able to distinguish between inessential and essential differences, it is necessary to reduce linguistic expressions to their normal form, a kind of underlying form which reveals the structural identity even of expressions which have a superficially different form. This approach is very similar to the one adopted in generative grammar, where identical deep structures are assigned to expressions which have superficially different surface forms. From this point of view, one could regard the level of deep structure in generative terms as the level at which intensional isomorphism corre­sponds to synonymy.

17. Generative semantics was based on a program theoretically very close to the idea of intensional isomorphism, that of providing a representation such that identity and dif­ference in linguistic form could predict identity and difference in meaning.

18. Montague argued that propositions are sets of possible worlds, properties are sets of individuals which possess that property, and individuals are the set of all the sets which have that individual among their members.

19. For a discussion of this point, see Bonomi 1987 and Marconi 1981.

20. Bonomi, for example, is extremely critical about this issue and, paraphrasing an observation by Lewis according to which a semantics without truth conditions is not se­mantics, states that "semantics without an adequate treatment of the lexicon is not seman­tics" (Bonomi 1987: 69; my translation).

21. For example, cf. Bach 1989.

22. Cf, for example, the Prague School, the theory of M. A. K. Halliday, linguistic argument theory (cf. Anscombre and Ducrot 1983), besides of course Grice's theory of implicature.

23. Note that here we are talking about resemblance and not identity; this introduces the idea of a gradual and graded dimension of resemblances and differences which is im­possible in model-theoretic semantics, whose notions are caregorial and discrete. I will not immediately go into the need for shaded and non-categorial notions in the treatment of the semantics of natural languages, seeing that half of this book is devoted to a discussion of this problem.

Notes to Pages 16-24

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24. The kind of truth which we refer to in natural language and its treatment in linguistics and semiotics will be discussed in section 1.4.3.

25. Course in General Linguistics ([1906-1911] 1983), henceforth referred to as CGL.

26. "The word has not only a meaning but also—above all—a value. And that is something quite different" (CGL: 114; my italics). "In a sign, what matters more than any idea or sound associated with it is what other sounds surround it" {CGL: 118, my italics). Here, although there is a claim for the priority of the differential aspect of value, a com­ponent of the signification relation, that is, reference to concepts, still seems to be present.

27. In particular, cf. Bally 1909 and 1932.

28. Cf. De Mauro 1965, Godel 1957.

29. Naturally, a similar problem also arises in terms of diachronic identity.

30. In particular, the oppositional component has an indispensable role in the repre­sentation of grammatical elements and closed sets such as prepositions or grammatical morphemes.

31. Associative relations were subsequently more commonly called paradigmatic re­lations. I will use the two terms without distinction.

32. According to Saussure, the site of associative relations lies in the brain, and such relations are part of the intetior store that constitutes language in each individual.

33. Saussure's example of the first kind of affinity is that between enseignement and armement or changement, because of the presence of the same suffix. An affinity of mean­ing is present in enseignement, education, and instruction, and a phonic affinity in enseigne­ment and justement. It is interesting to note that recent studies of the mental lexicon find that all these critetia are drawn on; the associaive criteria also find confirmation in empiri­cal data deriving from studies of errors and slips, which may be based on mix-ups due to morphological, semantic, or phonological affinities. On slips as interference between two simultaneously present words, see also Meringer and Mayer 1895.

34. On this point, cf. Eco 1984: 114.

35. For a detailed description, cf. Lyons 1977 and Cruse 1986.

36. In logical terms, the relation of hyponymy is defined as inclusion in a class, even if this definition presents the same problematic aspects already noted for the distinction between extension and intension. A more neutral definition from this point of view could be that of unilateral implication.

37. This is also the idea that undetlies natural taxonomies of kind and specific differ­ence, usually represented by tree diagtams and binary branching.

38. See the data on the vertical organization of categories detailed in section 4.2.

39. Cf., for example, Baldinger 1980 and Gauger 1972.

40. Cf. E. Clark 1992. She argues for the existence of a pragmatic principle of contrast and shows how this governs lexical usage. The choice of a term is normally interpreted, on the basis of pragmatic implicature, as being contrastively motivated. The structuralist as­sumption that different forms contrast different meanings is transposed here onto a prag­matic plane as an interprerative principle of speakers.

41. Cf. Greimas 1966.

42. Semantic oppositions seem to be acquired very precociously; indeed, the process is completed at around the age of three.

43. In the many distinctions proposed to classify semantic oppositions, it is gener­ally customary to distinguish between gradable oppositions {hot/cold, big/large) which are also called antonymous relations, and non-gradable or complementary relations (such as true/false, alinc/dcad, and so on). There are also converse pairs which presuppose an asym­metrical relation such as father/son, husband/wife, before/after. For a detailed treatment, sec-Lyons 1977 and ('ruse 1986.

44. In fact, there !■• .1 iiuihci level beyond ib.и (ii physical miasuremiml namely visual perception and its relation to linguistic structure. The lad 1I1.11 the color spectrum

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Notes to Pages 25-28

has a precisely definable physical structure still does not tell us whether our perception and categorization of that spectrum is determined by the linguistic structure we possess (the thesis of linguistic relativism) or whether there are perceptual constants independent of language, linked to the psychophysiological constitution of our visual apparatus (the thesis currently sustained by cognitive research, cf. Berlin and Kay 1969).

45. At the beginning of the thirteenth century this conceptual field was covered by three terms, wisheit, kunst, and list, while a century later the lexical field had been trans­formed into wisheit, kunst, and wizzen. All of these terms also exist in modern German {Weisheit, Kunst, List, Wissen), but their reciprocal relations are different in comparison to either thirteenth- or fourteenth-century German.

46. According to Lyons (1977), the reality which Trier speaks of would seem to cor­respond to the substance of Hjelmslevian content. It seems to me rather to correspond to the concept of matter, in that it is a pre-linguistic, still-unstructured continuum. What seems to be missing in Triers analysis is the articulation of the substance of content as a level of organization which linguistic form imposes on the unstructured continuum.

47. Besides the work of Trier, that of Porzig (1934) also deserves mention. He was the other great theorist of semantic fields, interested above all in the syntagmatic relations which form a kind of series of micro-fields (see, for example, the relation between bite and teeth, blond and hair, climb and mountain). These privileged relations were to be treated in generative linguistics as selective restrictions linked to the representation of each single term. For each single lexical entry there is a specification of the possibilities of combination with other lexemes. Porzig attempted to treat these relations generally, even though these semantics restrictions are naturally extremely varied and heterogeneous: alongside very gen­eral terms like do or good there are many highly specific ones like fry or rancid. Porzigs approach was to treat these phenomena as progressive generalizations in linguistic use. All terms thus have an initial concrete and specific meaning which is then applied to wider contexts through successive extensions. Extension is based on processes of generalization and abstraction, that is, basic mechanisms of metaphoric extension. Leaving to one side possible judgements of this approach, it is interesting to note how it questions the assump­tion of the arbitrariness of the sign, given that in this perspective metaphoric extension is motivated by a general principle of extension from the concrete to the abstract. This is a very similar position to the one advanced by Lakoff and Johnson 1980.

48. Cf, in particular, Fillmore 1985 and Fillmore and Atkins 1992.

49. The characteristics of the contrastive aspect of frames and their similarities and differences with semantic fields will be examined more closely in section 8.3.2.

50. There are a great variety of positions: alongside radically critical views like that of Lakoff (1987), there are also those who, like Jackendoff, explicitly acknowledge a conti­nuity with the Chomskian generative tradition.

51. Certainly, as far as semantics is concerned, this assumption has not had much of a follow-up because the study of meaning has never formed a central part of Chomskian research. Nevertheless, the cognitive assumption at the heart of cognitive semantics lies well within the Chomskian tradition.

52. This is the path taken by, among others, Fillmore, Lakoff, and Rosch. For a review of generative semantics, see Cinque 1979.

53. It is impossible to list everyone working in this field; some of the most well-known are Lakoff, Talmy, Fillmore, Jackendoff, Langacker, Fauconnier, Johnson-Laird, and Winograd, but this list is merely indicative and in no way comprehensive.

54. The following chapter is dedicated to a discussion of this point.

55. Naturally there are divergent positions regarding the specific treatment of each of these points.

56. In the eighties, there was considerable discussion about the compatibility of model-theoretic semantics and cognitive semantics. In 1982, Barbara Partce suggested two

Notes to Pages 30—35

247

possible responses: the separatist and the common goal positions. According to the separa­tist position, which is very similar to Fillmore's, the two versions of semantics have different aims, assumptions, and validity criteria. The common goal position, on the other hand, regards cognitive semantics and truth-functional semantics as parts of a common enter­prise, even though, as Partee herself admits, it is not easy to see how this common ground is to be established. Within the composite panorama of cognitive semantics today, there are various different positions, ranging from the radical criticism of Lakoff (1988, 1987), Wilks (1988), and Winograd and Flores (1986) to much less extreme positions like those of Johnson-Laird (1983) and Fauconnier (1985). Both of the latter, for example, presuppose an intermediate cognitive and mental level between world states and linguistic expressions. This approach is compatible with the outcome of some recent work in formal semantics such as the theory of discourse representation (TDR) by Hans Kamp (1982). For a more detailed discussion, see Santambrogio and Violi (1988), and in general all the articles found in Eco, Santambrogio, and Violi (1988).

57. In particular, cf. Jackendoff 1983, 1987, 1991, 1992; Talmy 1983, 1988a; Langacker 1987, 1991.

58. I am thinking here above all of Fillmore and to some extent of Lakoff.

59. Cf. Eco 1976 and 1984. For a discussion of the concept of encyclopedia in the semiotics of Eco, cf. Violi 1992. The issue will in any case be discussed in chapter 7.

60. For a recent version of these positions, see Rastier 1987, 1991.

61. In particular, cf. Fillmore 1976a and 1976b.

62. Cf. also Clark and Chase 1972.

63. According to Marr, there are three distinct levels of representation of visual infor­mation, which range from the retinal apparatus to the final information codified in our spatial understanding. The first level (primal sketch) is responsible for the identification of the boundaries and edges of elements and their groupings. The second level (2V2 sketch), not yet three-dimensional but already possessing depth, organizes space into regions; finally, in the third level (3D model) the complete, three-dimensional representation of the object occurs.

64. At the level of corporeal representation, one can hypothesize that components like the opposition between tension/distension may be found; this is a central opposition for both the musical faculty and body movements, and is also very important for the level of the linguistic faculty most directly linked to the expression of emotions and affective states. The identification of the affective component in spoken language takes place above all at the level of intonation, a level traversed by phoric tensivity, that is, by the contrast between tension and distension and the relative phoric attributions. This is also a central problem in semiotic thinking (see the whole of Fonagy's work, in particular Fonagy 1983). Semiotics identifies tensivity and phoria as the two fundamental concepts constituting "the set of preconditions for the emergence of signification" (cf. Pezzini 1994: 154; my translation). Note that the semiotic approach, when talking about "preconditions of signification," also alludes to a not directly conceptual or conceptualized level, which is in fact the same as Jackendoff s hypothesis regarding the level of corporeal representation.

65. On this point, cf. above all Talmy 1983, 1988a, 1996; Jackendoff 1987, [992; Landau and Jackendoff 1993.

66. The objectivist ontology which underlies model-theoretic semantics is thus sub­stituted by a constructivist approach: the world is not given as such but is the result ol a construction both at the level of perception and of conceptual categorization. This position does not preclude the existence of objective qualitative structures, which are not necessarily physical, in the perceived world. This is consistent with what is sustained in the ecological approach to perception ol "Gibson (1979) and in the model of Marr (1982). For a general discussion of these issues, which also covers the role ol abstractive categorization processes, cf. Lakoff 1987.

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Notes to Pages 36-48

67. Discussion of this point always refers exclusively to the visual components of representation. Fot aspects of non-visual perception (tactile, gustatory, and olfactory per­ception), research is a long way behind and data are not yet available in any quantity.

68. This still linguistically determined, more surface aspect has been seen by some as a limitation of Fillmore's case theory (cf. Petitot 1985).

69. Here too it would be interesting to render explicit the references to the philo­sophic tradition, in particular the relation between image schemata and the notion of tran­scendental schematism in Kant.

70. Cf. also Sweetser 1990 and the catastrophe-theoretic semantics inspired by the theories of Rene Thom (Petitot 1985, 1992; Wildgen 1981, 1982).

71. Cf. Gruber 1976, Anderson 1971.

72. Cf. Violi 1991.

73. One cannot generalize in absolute terms; for example, this certainly cannot be said of the work of Fillmore.

74. For discussion and criticism on this point, cf. Violi 1996a.

75. For a discussion of the universalist and relativist issue in cognitive semantics, cf. Lakoff 1987, chapter 18.

76. Cf. Thom 1988; Petitot 1990, 1992; Brandt 1992, 1994, 1995, and Wildgen 1982.

77. On this point, cf. Geeraerts 1988a.

78. Cf. Chafe and Nichols 1986.

79. See, for example, the entry for "truth" in the Dictionary of Greimas and Courtes (1979): "It is worth emphasizing that the 'true' is situated within discourse, because it is made true by discourse itself, that is, it excludes any relation with (or validation from) an external referent" (my translation).

80. Obviously, cold indicates a property which is relative, and so the objectivity of It is cold is only apparent, because an enunciating subject is always presupposed. In other words, one could say that It is cold is a function with two variables, f(x,y), in the same way that I am cold is (I am indebted to Ivan Fonagy for this observation). There still remains the fact that the two formulations are very different from the point of view of the meaning conveyed. In terms of enunciation theory the difference is captured through the concept of enunciated enunciation.

81. On the basis of this assumption, it is possible to give an account of the continual semantic "adjustment" occurring in linguistic use: very often the terms which we use are not entirely appropriate, and in a model-theoretic semantic perspective this would modify the truth values of the utterance in which they appear. For example, if one held out a pencil and said Here's a pen!, the sentence would be logically false but "pragmatically" true as a response to a request for a pen.

82. From this point of view the concept of the cognitive dimension is situated at a different level from the intralinguistic dimension and the extralinguistic dimension: in prin­ciple, there are no theoretical reasons why the cognitive point of view cannot apply both to intra- and extralinguistic analysis. In practice, however, both structural and philosophi­cal semantics have in their own different ways "expelled" the conceptual dimension.

83. From a developmental point of view, one could hypothesize that linguistic com­munication is a more perfected and evolved form of ostensive-inferential communication, unique to the human species.

84. By this I am in no way claiming that lexical meanings can vary indefinitely ac­cording to each context of use (or experience). On the contrary, linguistic meanings relate to the structured and regular dimension of our experiences, according to an idea very simi­lar to that of habit in Pierce. This issue will be developed in chapter 8.

85. A similar position is also adopted by Wierzbicka (1972), which I will return to later.

86. For an analysis of verbs ol movement, see also Violi 1996b.

87. Another area is expressions concerning spatiality. See Violi 1991.

Notes to Pages 48-60

249

88. See in particular the work of Marconi (1997). There will be further discussion of this point in 7.5.4.