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allotted time, specified task, and the fact that the dictator had to restore the previously standing political-legal order that had authorized the dictatorship. Sovereign dictatorship, as encouraged by both modern absolutist and revolutionary political practices, is unlimited in its parameters and may, and likely will, proceed to establish a completely new order as a result of its exercise.3
Schmitt identifies the Roman dictatorships of Caesar and Sulla as “sovereign,” because they used emergency powers to change the constitutional order of Rome for their own personal political agendas. However, it was not until the development of the modern notion of sovereignty that individuals like Cromwell and Bonaparte or political bodies like those of revolutionary France could use military force and claims to represent the whole or the “real” people to abrogate an old order and institute a new one. As unlimited as the means available to a Roman dictator within his commission to address an emergency such as a rebellion, war, or famine were, there was a strict boundary in his requirement to return the polity to a situation of status quo ante. In other words, commissarial dictatorship must seek to “make itself superfluous.”4 Sovereign dictatorship, on the other hand, seeks to perpetuate itself, even if it uses its power under the pretense of merely “temporary” circumstances.
I will not recapitulate the details of Schmitt’s account of how commissarial dictatorship gives way to sovereign dictatorship, or even transmutes into it. What is more pertinent here is Schmitt’s understanding of why he takes up such a project at this point in the early twentieth century. There are obvious reasons of historical context: In the new political order of the Weimar Republic, first Reichsprasident¨ Friedrich Ebert made extensive use of emergency powers at the time of the composition of Dictatorship to address right-wing and communist rebellion as well as an overwhelming economic crisis.5 However, there are broader world historical motivations at issue for Schmitt as well.
According to Schmitt, liberals, to the extent that they pay attention to the concept at all, completely misapprehend dictatorship. What Schmitt
3 On Schmitt’s appropriation of the etymological-theoretical distinction of “commissarial” and “sovereign” from Jean Bodin, and a general discussion of the thesis, see George Schwab, The Challenge of The Exception: An Introduction to the Political Ideas of Carl Schmitt between 1921 and 1936 (Westport, 1989), 30–1.
4D, xvi.
5See Frederick Mundell Watkins, The Failure of Constitutional Emergency Powers under the German Republic (Cambridge, 1939); Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in Modern Democracies (Princeton, 1948); and Hans Boldt, “Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, Its Historical and Political Implications,” in Anthony Nicholls and Erich Matthias, eds., German Democracy and the Triumph of Hitler (London, 1971), 42–63.
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calls the “bourgeois political literature” either ignores the concept of dictatorship altogether or treats it as a slogan to be used against its opponents.6 Liberals have completely forgotten its classical meaning and associate the idea and institution solely with “sovereign” dictatorship: “a distinction is no longer maintained between dictatorship and Caesarism, and the essential determination of the concept is marginalized . . . dictatorship’s commissarial character.”7 Liberals deem a dictator to be any single individual, often democratically acclaimed, ruling through a centralized administration with little political constraint, and they equate dictatorship unreflectively with authoritarianism, Caesarism, Bonapartism, military government, and even the Papacy.8 This inattention and misapprehension rules out an important resource for constitutionalists, liberal or conservative, in the present time of crisis and allows dictatorship to be misused by those who would put it to less than “classical” ends.
Schmitt is alarmed that the concept of dictatorship seems to be taken seriously only by the communists with their doctrine of the “dictatorship of the proletariat.”9 The communists have the concept partially right in classical terms, according to Schmitt, for they recognize its purely technical and temporary characteristics: The dictatorship of the proletariat is “the means for the implementation of the transition to the communists’ final goal.”10 The revolutionary seizure of the state by the proletariat is not “definitive” for the communists, according to their ideology, but rather “transitional.”11 Schmitt notes that one might then see the communist theory of dictatorship as simply a modern incarnation of the classical institution. But this obscures the truly fundamental transformation of the essence of the classical concept: The communist institution employs temporary means to create a new situation, the classical institution employed them to restore a previously existing one.12
This difference has important ramifications for the question of just how limited a dictatorship can be if it is legitimated and bound by a future situation as opposed to being legitimated by a previously existing one. The communist dictatorship represents for Schmitt the culmination of the modern historical trend toward totally unrestrained political action: The radical orientation of modern politics is driven by a fervor to bring about some future good, whose qualities are so vague as to justify unbounded means in the achievement
6 |
D, xi–xii. |
7 |
Ibid., xiii. |
8 |
Ibid. |
9 |
Ibid. |
10 |
Ibid., xiv. |
11 |
Ibid. |
12For an excellent analysis of dictatorship in Marx and Engels, see Peter Baehr, Caesar and the Fading of the Roman World: A Study in Republicanism and Caesarism (London, 1998), 131ff.
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of the end. Schmitt distrusts the general historical development by which the concepts of sovereignty, increasingly popular sovereignty, and emergency action are merged, culminating in the theorists of the French Revolution, such as Mably and Sieyes`. In Schmitt’s view, they advocate a sovereign dictatorship that destroys an old order and creates a new one not on the authority of a specific constitutional arrangement or legal charge, but rather as the agent of a vague entity such as the “people.”13
In the conclusion of Dictatorship, Schmitt returns to the communist use of the term dictatorship, for he clearly sees the communists as the heirs of the French Revolution: a radical elite that (a) will use violent means, (b) in step with supposedly world-historical processes, (c) according to the sanction of an anointed populace to which it can never really be held accountable. Schmitt writes,
The concept of dictatorship . . . as taken up in the presentations of Marx and Engels was realized at first as only a generally requisite political slogan . . . But the succeeding tradition . . . infused a clear conception of 1793 into the year 1848, and indeed not only as the sum of political experience and methods. As the concept developed in systematic relationship to the philosophy of the nineteenth century and in political relationship with the experience of world war a particular impression must remain. . . . Viewed from a general state theory, dictatorship by a proletariat identified with the people as the overcoming of an economic condition, in which the state “dies out,” presupposes a sovereign dictatorship, as it underlies the theory and practice of the National Convention. Engels, in his speech to the Communist Union in March 1850 demanded that its practice be the same as that of “France 1793.” That is also valid for the theory of the state which posits the transition to statelessness.14
In other words, the dangerous spirit of France in 1793, a spirit of sovereign dictatorship in the name of a newly sovereign people, a spirit that culminates for Schmitt only in domestic terror and continental war, was radicalized in the revolutions of 1848. Now it is embodied by the new Soviet power to Germany’s east and by the German revolutionary organizations that, at the very moment that Schmitt wrote Dictatorship, were attempting to seize the German state.
The tone of Schmitt’s conclusion differs significantly enough from that of the preface and the body of the work such that we can detect a subtle yet distinct change in his strategy. Schmitt’s preface seemed to suggest that his goal was: (1) to make up for the scholarly deficiency in the “bourgeois literature” on the subject of dictatorship; (2) to render it possible to deem the communist use of the term dictatorship “sovereign” in
13 D, 145. |
14 Ibid., 205. |
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essence, and hence somehow illegitimate; and (3) to offer a more legitimate, constitutional, “commissarial” alternative with which the new republic might tackle the barrage of emergencies with which it was assaulted. Again, the communists understand the classical notion of dictatorship but tamper with it so as to eliminate the kinds of legal constitutional orders that require such an institution for their preservation. Liberals ignore or mischaracterize it and thus aid and abet the communists and their designs. However, Schmitt intimates toward the close of Dictatorship that perhaps what should confront the sovereign notion of dictatorship, touted by domestic and foreign revolutionaries, is not a notion of commissarial dictatorship at all, but perhaps a counter-theory of sovereign dictatorship. Since both absolutism and mass democracy arise out of the same historical movement, Schmitt suggests, gently and furtively, that perhaps a radicalized notion of sovereignty derived from absolute monarchy should meet the radicalized notion of sovereignty derived from the French Revolution.15
Schmitt intimates that, due to the trajectory of modern history, the conjunction of emergency powers and mass socio-political movements as embodied in the revolutionary/counterrevolutionary moments of 1832 and 1848 ought not to be severed. A revival of the notion of commissarial emergency powers would enact such a divorce. Additionally, the return of powerful social groups threatening the state in the form of working-class movements ought to be met by a political response new and yet akin to the way that the absolute monarchs had earlier neutralized or destroyed aristocratic and religious groups. Finally, the populist Soviet state that can be directed to do almost anything by an all-powerful, unaccountable, historically legitimated elite should be engaged by a similarly defined German state directed by a charismatically, and plebiscitarily, legitimated president. These are conclusions implicitly suggested, not explicitly argued, in the closing pages of Dictatorship.
Thus, Schmitt grapples with the dilemma that the concept of dictatorship is being pulled radically leftward by the success of Bolshevism and the vacuum that liberals have created with respect to constitutional dictatorship on their side of the spectrum. Liberals, those who are most concerned with constitutionalism in the contemporary world, have forsaken
15On the relationship between the theory of sovereignty during the French Revolution and Schmitt’s own (D, 203–4), see Stefan Breuer, “Nationalstaat und pouvoir constituant bei Sieyes` und Carl Schmitt,” Archiv fur¨ Rechtsund Sozialphilosophie LXX (1984), 175–96; and Pasquale Pasquino, “Die Lehre vom pouvoir constituant bei Abbe Sieyes` und Carl Schmitt: Ein Beitrag zur Untersuchung der
Grundlagen der modernen Demokratietheorie,” in Helmut Quaritsch, ed., Complexio Oppositorum:
¨
Uber Carl Schmitt (Berlin, 1988), 48–62. I would argue that Schmitt is trying to re-absolutize the revolutionary concept of popular sovereignty as much as appropriate it.
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this constitutionally crucial institution and allowed it to be abducted and reprogrammed by their enemies on the left. Communists are pressing for emergency, populist constitutional change with various versions of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Liberals are neither able nor willing to defend a viable theory and practice of dictatorship in its classical sense even in the midst of such crisis-ridden times. They refuse to resort to the timeand task-specific temporary measures necessitated by the same economic and political crises that the left uses as occasion and justification to overhaul centuries-old dynasties and new republican constitutional systems.16
As we examine Schmitt’s developing theory of dictatorship in the next section, I argue that Schmitt seeks to push liberal constitutionalism definitively aside as politically ineffectual and obstructionist in the face of the leftist appropriation of dictatorship. To do so, he develops a rightwing Caesarism to combat the vitality of what he sees as the left-wing Caesarism of Bolshevism, a counternotion of dictatorship that is as substantive, all-encompassing, misleadingly “temporary” yet just as constitutionally abrogating as that of the communists. Schmitt effectively argues that since the liberal imagination can do no more than conflate dictatorship with Caesarism, this conflation is exactly what the liberals deserve, and Schmitt will be the one to give it to them.
In his next book, Political Theology, Schmitt espouses a notion of sovereignty embodied in the Reichsprasident¨ , who is not encumbered by constitutional restraints but only the demands of a political exception. The president, as the personal embodiment of the popular will that can not be procedurally ascertained in a time of crisis, has the democratically charismatic authority to act – unconstitutionally or even anticonstitutionally, with all the force and legitimacy of that originary popular will.17 Schmitt advances the very fusing of popular sovereignty and emergency powers that he showed to be potentially abusive in Dictatorship.
16 Schmitt protests too much. He makes it sound as if his case for dictatorship against liberalism is more difficult than it actually is, as his prescriptions conform with a powerful sociological reality: Schmitt’s call for Caesarism was likely to be received warmly by a Weimar bourgeoisie that was no longer so readily inclined toward liberalism. See the devastating analysis of Schmitt, his intellectual circle, and the German bourgeoisie by Siegfried Kracauer: “Revolt of the Middle Classes” (1931), in Kracauer, The Mass Ornament: Weimar Essays, trans. and ed. Thomas Y. Levin (Cambridge, 1995), 107–28.
17Space constraints do not permit a discussion of the significance of Schmitt’s continued engagement with Max Weber’s political and legal sociology on this topic. The most extensive and incisive discussion of Caesarism and charisma in Weber is Baehr, Caesar and the Fading of the Roman World, chap. 4.
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COMMISSARIAL OR CAESARIST DICTATORSHIP?
One of the central aims of Schmitt’s Weimar work is to justify sovereign dictatorial powers for the Reichsprasident¨ of the Republic. Does Schmitt’s formulation of presidential sovereign dictatorship conform with Caesarism? If the latter concept can be understood in terms of a single leader who claims to represent an entire people as a result of plebiscite, who maintains his authority through powerful military authority and extensive bureaucratic machinery, then the answer is, as this section demonstrates, yes.18
The first sentence of Political Theology, published the year after Dictatorship, signals Schmitt’s endorsement of something much closer to sovereign than commissarial dictatorship: “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception” (Souveran¨ ist, wer uber¨ den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet).19 Schmitt celebrates the very merging of the normal and exceptional moments that in Dictatorship he analyzed as a politically pathological element of sovereign dictatorship. He even encourages it with the ambiguous use of the preposition “on” (uber¨ ), which belies the distinction that he himself acknowledges in the earlier book between, on the one hand, the body that decides that an exceptional situation exists (in the Roman case, the Senate through the consuls) and, on the other, the person appointed by that body to decide what to do in the concrete particulars of the emergency, the dictator himself. The two separate decisions, one taking place in the moment of normalcy, the other in the moment of exception, are lumped together and then hidden behind the ostensible directness of Schmitt’s opening statement in Political Theology. Indeed, further on in the work Schmitt explicitly and deliberately conflates the two decisions: The sovereign “decides whether there is an extreme emergency as well as what must be done to eliminate it.”20
There is also no attempt in Political Theology to prescribe what fundamental time- (or task-) related limits might be imposed on a sovereign’s action in the exceptional situation; Schmitt suggests that this is, in fact, impossible because an exception “cannot be circumscribed factually and made to conform to a preformed law . . . The preconditions as well as the content of a jurisdictional competence in such a case must necessarily be unlimited.”21 Rather than restoring a previous order in an emergency, the emergency
18I draw somewhat loosely on the more refined tracing of Bonapartism and Caesarism to fascism by Luisa Mangoni, “Per una definizione del fascismo: I concetti di bonapartismo e cesarismo,” Italia Contemporanea 31 (1979), 17–52.
19Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Theory of Sovereignty (1922), trans. George Schwab (Cambridge, 1986), 5, hereafter PT; German references correspond to Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveranit¨ at¨ (Munchen,¨ 1934), here 11.
20 PT, 7 (emphasis added). |
21 Ibid., 6–7. |
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actor is the order itself made dramatically manifest by a crisis: “It is precisely the exception that makes relevant the subject of sovereignty, that is, the whole question of sovereignty.”22 According to the commissarial notion of dictatorship, the dictator was free to do whatever was necessary in the particular exceptional moment to address an unforeseen crisis that is identified by a different and regular institution. And the dictator was bound as a “precondition” to return the government to that law within a specific period of time. Schmitt occludes these crucial distinctions in the second more famous work and expands the unlimitedness of dictatorship by renouncing the very characteristics of the classical model he only recently admired as well as those of the liberal constitutionalism he now consistently derides: “If measures undertaken in an exception could be circumscribed by mutual control, by imposing a time limit, or finally, as in the liberal constitutional procedure governing a state of siege, by enumerating extraordinary powers, the question of sovereignty would then be considered less significant.”23 Indeed, his use of the term “sovereign” implies some kind of lawmaking or lawgiving power that could change the previous order or even create a new one.
The conclusion that one is compelled to draw from Political Theology is that a regime with institutional diversity, with a constitutionally enumerated “division and mutual control of competences”24 – or what is more generally known as separation of powers – inevitably paralyzes a state in the face of an exception because it obscures who is sovereign, who must decide and act at that moment.25 According to Schmitt’s formulation, in all cases of emergency it would seem necessary to have recourse to a unitary institution with a monopoly on decisions so that no such confusion or conflict occurs. Thus, in violation of the main principles of classical dictatorship, normalcy and exception are collapsed, and ordinary rule of law and constitutional structure are dangerously encroached upon by exceptional absolutism.
22Ibid.
23In Dictatorship Schmitt observes that the military state of siege is the closest thing to commissarial dictatorship allowed by liberal theory, but even this is conflated with sovereign dictatorship (D, xiv). Schmitt distinguishes between dictatorship and a military state of siege most extensively in “Diktatur und Belagerungszustand: Eine staatsrechtliche Studie,” Zeitschrift fur¨ die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 38 (1917), 138–61. For an excellent discussion of the essay, see Peter C. Caldwell, Popular Sovereignty and the Crisis of German Constitutional Law: The Theory and Practice of Weimar Constitutionalism (Durham, 1997), 54–8. Caldwell’s interpretation of this essay suggests that Schmitt turned to the notion of commissarial dictatorship after it became clear that the state of siege had been irrevocably linked with dictatorship in a sovereign sense. As I argue above, Schmitt abandons commissarial dictatorship as well once he realizes that it too can no longer be extricated from “sovereign” connotations. Schmitt’s own capitulation to sovereign dictatorship hence serves to radicalize his theory from conservatism to fascism. Also, PT, 12.
24 PT, 11. |
25 Ibid., 7. |
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In later practical political treatises that deal with emergency powers written during Weimar, such as “The Dictatorship of the Reichsprasident¨ According to Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution” (1924), The Guardian of the Constitution (1931), and Legality and Legitimacy (1932), Schmitt continues to argue that only the Reichsprasident¨ can defend the Weimar constitutional regime during a crisis.26 The “Article 48” piece of 1924 is not so obviously an endorsement of sovereign dictatorship.27 Schmitt declares that according to Article 48 “dictatorial authority” is only “lent” to the president, and he seemingly argues that the scope of that authority should remain within a commissarial rubric.28 However, after that commissarial gesture, Schmitt makes it clear that he does not want too extensive and explicit limitations on the emergency powers of the president because “it is a dangerous abuse to use the constitution to delineate all possible affairs of the heart as basic law and quasi-basic law.”29 Moreover, Schmitt’s descriptions of the source of the president’s legitimacy in preserving the constitution in “Article 48” increasingly sound as though they were mandated not by the constitutional order itself, but by something like a sovereign will that is itself prior to that order: “The dictatorship of the Reichsprasident¨ . . . is necessarily commissarial as a result of specific circumstances . . . In as much as it is allowed to act so broadly, it operates (in fact, not in its legal establishment) as the residue of the sovereign dictatorship of the National Assembly [which created the constitution].”30
At the conclusion of the essay, Schmitt recalls the framing of Article 48 at the Republic’s constitutional founding: “In the Summer of 1919 when
26 Respectively, “Die Diktatur des Reichsprasident¨ nach Art. 48 der Weimarer Verfassung” (1924), appended to subsequent editions of Dictatorship, 213–59, and thus hereafter DII; Der Huter¨ der Verfassung (Tubingen,¨ 1931), hereafter HV; and Legalitat¨ und Legitimitat¨ (1932), hereafter LL, from the reprint in Schmitt, Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsatze¨ aus den Jahren 1924–1954: Materialien zu einer Verfassungslehre
(Berlin, 1958), 263–350. An English translation of Legalitat¨ und Legitimitat¨ by Jeffrey Seitze will be published in 2004.
27In general, there is little scholarly consensus on the exact moment of Schmitt’s conversion to sovereign dictatorship: Renato Cristi, for instance, locates it already in the 1921 main text of Dictatorship, while Stanley L. Paulson dates it even after the 1924 “Article 48” essay: see Cristi, “Carl Schmitt on Sovereignty and Constituent Power,” in David Dyzenhaus, ed., Law as Politics (Durham, 1998), 179–95; and Paulson, “The Reich President and Weimar Constitutional Politics: Aspects of the Schmitt-Kelsen Dispute on the ‘Guardian of the Constitution’” (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Aug. 31–Sept. 3, 1995). Compare also Gabriel Negretto and Jose Antonio Aguilar, “Schmitt, Liberalism and Emergency Powers in Latin America,” and Oren Gross, “Rethinking the Myth of Schmitt’s ‘Norm-Exception’ Dichotomy,” in Cardozo Law Review 21, no. 5 (2000); 1825.68. I must emphasize that my interpretation of Dictatorship does not rule out the presence of a sovereign-dictatorial element in Schmitt’s 1921 book. In other words, I do not conclude that the entire thrust of Dictatorship, as Cristi charges (194), promotes only “functional” and “temporary” dictatorship. See my discussion in the previous section and Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism, 137–9.
28 |
DII, 255. |
29 Ibid., 243. |
30 |
Ibid., 241. |
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Article 48 came to be, one thing was clear: Germany found itself in a wholly abnormal crisis and therefore for the moment a one-time authority was necessary which made possible decisive action.”31 Schmitt calls for similar “abnormal” and “decisive” action, but attempts to allay the fears of those who might be concerned with the constitutional status of such action with his final sentence: “That would be no constitutional alteration.”32 In other words, he is not calling for constitution-abrogating action characteristic of sovereign dictatorship on the part of the president, but rather commissarial, constitutionally preserving action. Of course, his harkening back to the crisis in which the constitution was founded and to the preconstitutional constituting decision and not to the body of the constitution itself implies a repetition of a sovereign act of founding to save the constitution. This “rescue” may in fact entail changing the constitution as long as the preconstitutional will is not changed. Of course, Schmitt gives us no way of evaluating how a people might change their original will or demonstrate that they would prefer it not be altered at all. This strategy of justifying presidential dictatorial action on the basis of the preconstitutional sovereign will of the people and not the principles embodied within the constitution itself becomes more pronounced in his books The Guardian of the Constitution and Legality and Legitimacy, published in the wake of a second devastating economic depression and renewed widespread political unrest in the early 1930s.
Schmitt begins Guardian of 1931 in much the same way that he began his book on dictatorship exactly ten years earlier. He blames nineteenth-century liberalism for bringing a crucial constitutional institution into ill repute and he draws upon examples from classical Sparta and Rome to demonstrate the historical legitimacy of such a concept and authority. But whereas in Dictatorship the example that Schmitt is attempting to revive is commissarial dictatorship, in Guardian it is the notion of a defender of the constitution.33 Indeed, the merging of the two phenomena (emergency powers and the question of in what institution sovereignty lies) is, again, just his strategy.34
The socio-economic fracturing of society that Schmitt attributes to an uncontrolled pluralism has rendered parliament superfluous and was threatening the very existence of the state: “The development toward an economic state was encountered by a simultaneous development of parliament into a stage for the pluralist system. In that lies the cause of the constitutional entanglement as well as the necessity for establishing a remedy and
31 Ibid., 258–9. |
32 Ibid., 259. |
33HV, 7–9.
34For a detailed account of this strategy, see Ingeborg Maus, Burgerliche¨ Rechtstheorie und Faschismus: Zur sozialen Funktion und aktuellen Wirkung der Theorie Carl Schmitts (Munchen,¨ 1980), 127–31.
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countermovement.”35 However, this particular socio-economic situation that the president must address necessarily calls for activity that is substantially beyond commissarial action and restitution. In fact, it entails the wholesale redirecting of structural historical transformation on a macroeconomic, social, and political scale; a redirecting that could never be met in the time- (and task-) bound fashion of commissarial dictatorship, but that must rather be met by the constitution amending of sovereign dictatorship.36 Does Schmitt expect that he can address the wholesale reconstruction of the state society relationship that he describes in Guardian and not be perceived as simultaneously calling for the wholesale reconstruction of the Weimar constitution? No. Schmitt does not rely on the earlier example of President Ebert’s temporary economic measures in the new republic, but rather speaks in terms of much more comprehensive change.
Thus, given the scale of the necessary state control of the economy, the presupposed doling out of social transfers through military service benefits rather than universal welfare provisions, the promotion of nationalism through mass media, and the achievement of cultural conformity through bureaucratic administration, Schmitt can be said to theorize the socially transformative aspects of Caesarism to another level. The redistributive/military projects of Julius Caesar, the Jacobins, and the Bonapartes are smaller scale and qualitatively less intrusive politically than Schmitt’s reformulation of the state/society divide in his works of the early thirties. Schmitt disapproves of socially generated state intervention, whether liberal, social democratic, or Bolshevistic, but encourages state self-generated intervention characteristic of Mussolini’s Fascism.37
In specific constitutional terms, this socio-economic agenda is to be achieved by dismantling or neutralizing the separation of powers. By marginalizing the other branches of government in Guardian, Schmitt cleverly removes any checks that could limit or shape the president’s dictatorial actions in such a way as to give them any semblance of commissarial character. Schmitt admits that a working Reichstag would be an appropriate check on presidential emergency powers.38 Since such a situation of parliamentary efficacy does not obtain in the socially tumultuous conditions of
35HV, 117.
36On the radically dynamic as opposed to statically conservative character of Schmitt’s socio-economic proposals, see Maus, Burgerliche¨ Rechtstheorie und Faschismus, 109, 126; on the constitutionally abrogating ramifications of his political economy, see Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, 1992), 231–41.
37See McCormick, Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism, 194, 229–44, 279–80.
38HV, 130–1.