- •Irony or a greater wealth of humor or imagery, or more dramatic power.
- •In the ideal State which is constructed by Socrates. The first care
- •Inconsistency which is obvious to us. For there is a judgment of after
- •Is still worth asking," because the investigation shows that we can
- •In the introduction only, Polemarchus drops at the end of the first
- •In the first book we have more of the real Socrates, such as he is
- •In his sleep for fear, and he is filled with dark forebodings. But
- •I say, any similar liability to fault or defect, and does every art
- •Interest of the body?
- •If you change, change openly and let there be no deception. For I
- •Very true.
- •Idea that they are going to have any benefit or enjoyment themselves,
- •I do not think that I misapprehend your meaning, Thrasymachus, I replied;
- •Injustice the defect of the soul?
- •In the service of the king of Lydia; there was a great storm, and
- •Instantly he became invisible to the rest of the company and they
- •I was going to say something in answer to Glaucon, when Adeimantus,
- •Vice may be had in abundance without trouble; the way is smooth and
- •In either case should we mind about concealment? And even if there
- •Injustice or praised justice except with a view to the glories, honours,
- •Very true.
- •In request, and nurses wet and dry, tirewomen and barbers, as well
- •I entirely agree with you, he said; in my opinion those stories are
- •Iambic verses occur --or of the house of Pelops, or of the Trojan
- •I entirely agree, be said, in these principles, and promise to make
- •Is that the good man will not consider death terrible to any other
- •I would he even with thee, if I had only the power, or his insubordination
- •Inconsistent passions, meanness, not untainted by avarice, combined
- •I understand, he said.
- •If then we adhere to our original notion and bear in mind that our
- •Is overtaken by illness or love or drink, or has met with any other
- •Inform him that in our State such as he are not permitted to exist;
- •Very true, he replied.
- •Images wherever they are found, not slighting them either in small
- •In the days of Asclepius; and this I infer from the circumstance that
- •In anything from his usual regimen, and so dying hard, by the help
- •I mean this: When a carpenter is ill he asks the physician for a rough
- •In his life if he were deprived of his occupation?
- •Impediment to the application of the mind t in carpentering and the
- •Intemperate subjects, whose lives were of no use either to themselves
- •I will, if I can. Let me however note that in the same question you
- •Infer the crimes of others as he might their bodily diseases from
- •In him, having no taste of any sort of learning or enquiry or thought
- •I suppose that you mean houses, he replied.
- •I think, he said, that there is no need to impose laws about them
- •In which the citizens are forbidden under pain of death to alter the
- •It is the knowledge of the guardians, he replied, and found among
- •Influences which would prepare them to take the dye of the laws in
- •In all these modes of speaking the same person is denoted.
- •I proceeded to ask: When two things, a greater and less, are called
- •Very true.
- •Verified?
- •I perhaps ought to have said before in the proper place. The part
- •I should rather expect, I said, that several of our proposals, if
- •In saying that men and women, whose natures are so entirely different,
- •Is a hindrance to him?-would not these be the sort of differences
- •Very true.
- •I should like to ask you a question.
- •I mean, I replied, that our rulers will find a considerable dose of
- •In some mysterious, unknown place, as they should be.
- •I was saying, will be forbidden to inter-marry. This, however, is
- •I hardly like even to mention the little meannesses of which they
- •I approve.
- •In the first place, that he is of the golden race?
- •In what respect do you mean?
- •It ought to be, he replied.
- •I agree, he said, that our citizens should thus deal with their Hellenic
- •I was only going to ask whether, if we have discovered them, we are
- •Very true, he said.
- •I am sure that you will admit a proposition which I am about to make.
- •I will begin by placing faculties in a class by themselves: they are
- •Is to know the nature of being?
- •In the first place, as we began by observing, the nature of the philosopher
- •Impossible.
- •Is to have a full and perfect participation of being?
- •In a court of law, or a theatre, or a camp, or in any other popular
- •Impossible.
- •Into a sanctuary, take a leap out of their trades into philosophy;
- •Is there any champion of justice at whose side they may fight and
- •Virtue --such a man ruling in a city which bears the same image, they
- •I think that they will be less angry.
- •Very true.
- •I understand, he replied, and give my assent, and accept your arrangement.
- •Imagine once more, I said, such an one coming suddenly out of the
- •Very true.
- •Instruments in binding up the State.
- •Into our former scheme?
- •Invariable, indivisible, --what would they answer?
- •I agree, he said.
- •Very true.
- •In every action of their lives and in every branch of knowledge come
- •In houses such as we were describing, which are common to all, and
- •Injustice, as Thrasymachus advises, or in accordance with the conclusions
- •Incapable of carrying on any war. Either they arm the multitude, and
- •In their old age end as paupers; of the stingers come all the criminal
- •Very true.
- •Very true.
- •Vain conceits shut the gate of the king's fastness; and they will
- •Very true, he said.
- •Into his head; and, if he is emulous of any one who is a warrior,
- •In relation to each other.
- •Inevitably.
- •Very true.
- •Is making promises in public and also in private! liberating debtors,
- •If he is to rule, I suppose that he cannot help himself.
- •I can imagine him.
- •I should not wonder.
- •I imagine, I said, at the next step in his progress, that there will
- •Very true, I said. But imagine one of these owners, the master say
- •In less real being will be less truly and surely satisfied, and will
- •Is no division, the several parts are just, and do each of them their
- •Into one.
- •If he be right, it is profitable for this creature to feast the multitudinous
- •In their hearts a guardian and ruler like our own, and when this is
- •If you please.
- •Is said, Homer was greatly neglected by him and others in his own
- •In like manner the poet with his words and phrases may be said to
- •It will make a great difference whether he is seen or not.
- •In the way of that which at the moment is most required.
- •Inconceivable greatness.
- •Into the upper world, but the mouth, instead of admitting them, gave
- •In this world dedicated himself from the first to sound philosophy,
- •In the arts; and far away among the last who chose, the soul of the
- •Is immortal and able to endure every sort of good and every sort of
- •In any form. Direct permission requests to classics@classics.Mit.Edu.
In the first place, as we began by observing, the nature of the philosopher
has to be ascertained. We must come to an understanding about him,
and, when we have done so, then, if I am not mistaken, we shall also
acknowledge that such an union of qualities is possible, and that
those in whom they are united, and those only, should be rulers in
the State.
What do you mean?
Let us suppose that philosophical minds always love knowledge of a
sort which shows them the eternal nature not varying from generation
and corruption.
Agreed.
And further, I said, let us agree that they are lovers of all true
being; there is no part whether greater or less, or more or less honourable,
which they are willing to renounce; as we said before of the lover
and the man of ambition.
True.
And if they are to be what we were describing, is there not another
quality which they should also possess?
What quality?
Truthfulness: they will never intentionally receive into their mind
falsehood, which is their detestation, and they will love the truth.
Yes, that may be safely affirmed of them.
'May be,' my friend, I replied, is not the word; say rather 'must
be affirmed:' for he whose nature is amorous of anything cannot help
loving all that belongs or is akin to the object of his affections.
Right, he said.
And is there anything more akin to wisdom than truth?
How can there be?
Can the same nature be a lover of wisdom and a lover of falsehood?
Never.
The true lover of learning then must from his earliest youth, as far
as in him lies, desire all truth?
Assuredly.
But then again, as we know by experience, he whose desires are strong
in one direction will have them weaker in others; they will be like
a stream which has been drawn off into another channel.
True.
He whose desires are drawn towards knowledge in every form will be
absorbed in the pleasures of the soul, and will hardly feel bodily
pleasure --I mean, if he be a true philosopher and not a sham one.
That is most certain.
Such an one is sure to be temperate and the reverse of covetous; for
the motives which make another man desirous of having and spending,
have no place in his character.
Very true.
Another criterion of the philosophical nature has also to be considered.
What is that?
There should be no secret corner of illiberality; nothing can more
antagonistic than meanness to a soul which is ever longing after the
whole of things both divine and human.
Most true, he replied.
Then how can he who has magnificence of mind and is the spectator
of all time and all existence, think much of human life?
He cannot.
Or can such an one account death fearful?
No indeed.
Then the cowardly and mean nature has no part in true philosophy?
Certainly not.
Or again: can he who is harmoniously constituted, who is not covetous
or mean, or a boaster, or a coward-can he, I say, ever be unjust or
hard in his dealings?
Impossible.
Then you will soon observe whether a man is just and gentle, or rude
and unsociable; these are the signs which distinguish even in youth
the philosophical nature from the unphilosophical.
True.
There is another point which should be remarked.
What point?
Whether he has or has not a pleasure in learning; for no one will
love that which gives him pain, and in which after much toil he makes
little progress.
Certainly not.
And again, if he is forgetful and retains nothing of what he learns,
will he not be an empty vessel?
That is certain.
Labouring in vain, he must end in hating himself and his fruitless
occupation? Yes.
Then a soul which forgets cannot be ranked among genuine philosophic
natures; we must insist that the philosopher should have a good memory?
Certainly.
And once more, the inharmonious and unseemly nature can only tend
to disproportion?
Undoubtedly.
And do you consider truth to be akin to proportion or to disproportion?
To proportion.
Then, besides other qualities, we must try to find a naturally well-proportioned
and gracious mind, which will move spontaneously towards the true
being of everything.
Certainly.
Well, and do not all these qualities, which we have been enumerating,
go together, and are they not, in a manner, necessary to a soul, which