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of diocesan rule increasingly evident. The critical dynamic was the deluge of marital and divorce cases, which increased exponentially in sheer numbers and became ever more complex – so that, by century’s end, they were completely overwhelming diocesan and Synodal administration.14 Indeed, it is not wholly unfair to describe the final decades, marked by a gradual breakdown of ecclesiastical administration, as an incremental de-institutionalisation – a reversal of the process launched by the Petrine reforms in the early eighteenth century.

That was compounded by a sharp deterioration in Church–State relations in the years before the 1905 Revolution. One impetus was K. P. Pobedonostsev, the chief procurator (1880–1905) who engineered ‘counter-reforms’ (to dismantle the reforms of the 1860s) in an abrasive, imperious way that put a severe strain on Church–State relations.15 Matters deteriorated further with the accession of Nicholas II to the throne in 1894: to an unprecedented degree, he personally intervened in strictly spiritual matters. Partly out of conviction, partly out of his own (and others’) desire to ‘resacralise’ autocracy, Nicholas launched an inquiry into the moral and religious condition of monasteries, sought to shield ‘popular’ icon-painting from commercialisation and mass production, and personally sponsored the canonisation of a popular religious figure, Serafim Sarovskii, in 1903.16 This unprecedented intrusion offended hierarchs and did little to resacralise autocracy. Particularly ominous was the February Manifesto of 1903 (‘Plans for the Improvement of the State Order’) with hints of further concessions to religious minorities that posed a direct challenge to the Church’s privileged position. By 1905 clergy, lay activists and conservative prelates had come to demand an end to state tutelage, realisation of ‘conciliarism’ (sobornost’), even re-establishment of the patriarchate.

The clergy

The ‘clerical estate’ (dukhovnoe soslovie) that served the Church consisted of three categories: the ruling episcopate, celibate monastic clergy and married secular clergy. All underwent profound changes, some positive and some negative, that significantly recast their profile and mentalite´.

14See G. L. Freeze, ‘Matrimonial Sacrament and Profane Stories: Class, Gender, Confession and the Politics of Divorce in Late Imperial Russia’, in M. Steinberg and H. Coleman (eds.), Sacred Stories (forthcoming).

15See G. L. Freeze, The Parish Clergy in Nineteenth-Century Russia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 409–48; A. Iu. Polunov, Pod vlast’iu ober-prokurora (Moscow: Aero-XX, 1995).

16See G. L. Freeze, ‘Subversive Piety: Religion and the Political Crisis in Late Imperial Russia’, JMH 68 (1996): 308–50.

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Episcopate

The hierarchy (comprised of three descending ranks – metropolitan, archbishop and bishop) still came exclusively from the ranks of monks but exhibited substantial change in the imperial era. The total size increased steadily, rising from 26 prelates under Peter the Great to 147 by 1917, partly through the establishment of additional dioceses but mainly through the appointment of suffragan bishops to assist in larger, less manageable dioceses. There were equally striking changes in their social and education profile.17 To overcome opposition from tradition-bound Russian prelates, Peter chose prelates from Ukraine, not because of their ethnicity, but because of their superior education (often in Catholic institutions in the West), which, he presumed, would incline them to support his reforms. From the middle of the eighteenth century, however, prelates came primarily from central Russia, partly because of suspicion of Ukrainian prelates, but chiefly because of the growing network of seminaries in central dioceses (which could now supply qualified Russian candidates). The social origin of bishops also changed: whereas only half of the Petrine prelates came from the clerical estate, by the nineteenth century this quotient had climbed to more than 90 per cent. Bishops from other groups, notably the nobility, virtually disappeared. The critical factor here was education: elevation to the episcopate required a higher ecclesiastical education which was only accessible to members of the clerical estate. Indeed, most bishops held advanced degrees, published extensively and earned the sobriquet of ‘learned monks’. Education also shaped their careers prior to consecration: many served as rectors in seminaries and academies, earning their spurs as scholars and administrators, and then rising quickly – at an early age – to choice episcopal appointments. Only in the late imperial era did this career-line change, chiefly because fewer students in the elite ecclesiastical academies were willing to take monastic vows. As a result, by the early twentieth century over half of the new prelates had come from non-academic careers in the secular clergy (widowed priests who had taken monastic vows) and in missions. They too, however, were of clerical origin and held a higher academic degree.18

After consecration, an episcopal career proved highly volatile, with bishops moving rapidly up (or down) the diocesan hierarchy, as their merits and luck

17For details see Jan Plamper, ‘The Russian Orthodox Episcopate, 1721–1917: A Prosopography’, Journal of Social History 60 (2001): 5–24.

18See G. L. Freeze, ‘L’episcopato nella chiesa ortodossa russa: crisis politica e religiosa alla fine dell’ancien regime’,´ in Adalberto Marinardi (ed.), La grande vigilia (Magnano: Comunita Monastica di Bose, 1998), pp. 30–4.

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would have it. The rate of transfers steadily accelerated; under Alexander III the average tenure in a given diocese shrank to a mere 2.4 years. In theory, mobility gave prelates a broader, national perspective and a strong incentive for zealous performance. But rapid turnover also denied them a chance to develop spiritual bonds with local clergy and laity; it also generated accusations that prelates were careerists with no real interest in the spiritual needs of their flock. Tensions between prelates and priests, while hardly new or unique to Russia, increased markedly in post-reform Russia as priests and parishioners became ever more aggressive in asserting their rights and prerogatives. This challenge from below, compounded by the pressure from the secular state, made prelates increasingly protective of canons (and their prerogatives), deepening the divide within the clergy itself.

Monastic (‘black’) clergy

The monastic clergy became the object of a full-scale onslaught in the eighteenth century.19 In medieval Russia they had been the backbone of Orthodoxy, monopolising high religious culture, attracting large numbers to take vows and acquiring vast tracts of populated land. Those material assets, long a temptation for the resource-starved state, became an irresistible target for Peter the Great as he desperately searched for the wherewithal to wage the Northern War. In 1701 he therefore re-established the ‘Monastery Office’ (monastyrskii prikaz), so unpopular with churchmen in the seventeenth century, to administer monasteries and divert their revenues to the state. After Peter, policy fluctuated between retreat and renewed attack, yet always short of fateful secularisation until an abortive attempt by Peter III in 1762. Catherine at first retreated, but in 1764 carried through the long-sought secularisation. Seeking primarily to pad state coffers (but also to end the mounting unrest among the Church’s peasants), Catherine justified sequestration for liberating the Church from worldly cares so that it could focus upon its spiritual mission.20 The state not only confiscated lands and peasants: it also closed two-thirds of the monasteries and forbade the tonsure of new males and females until the existing surfeit disappeared.21 Once the surplus monks and nuns were eliminated, the Church found it difficult to attract new recruits; by the 1780s the

19For overviews see Igor Smolitsch, Russisches Monchtum:¨ Entstehung, Entwicklung und Wesen

988–1 91 7 (Wurzburg:¨ Augustinus-Verlag, 1953); P. N. Zyrianov, Russkie monastyri i monashestvo v XIX i nachale XX veka (Moscow: Verbum-M, 2002).

20See A. Zav’ialov, Vopros o tserkovnykh imeniiakh pri Imp. Ekateriny II (St Petersburg, 1900); A. I. Komissarenko, ‘Votchinnoe khoziaistvo dukhovenstva i sekuliarizatsionnaia reforma v Rossii (20–60-gg. XVIII v.), unpublished PhD dissertation, Moscow (1984).

21See RGIA, Fond 796, op. 55, g. 1774, d. 62.

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surfeit had turned into a general shortage of monks and nuns.22 As a result, by 1825 the number of monks, nuns, and novices (11,080) was less than half its size a century earlier (25,207).

By the second quarter of the nineteenth century, that crisis gave way to a renaissance of monasticism.23 Most obvious was the sheer increase in the number of monasteries, as the state approved their establishment if they had sufficient financing and, especially, if they could bolster Orthodoxy in minority areas. Hence the number of monasteries, which had fallen to 476 by 1825, climbed to nearly 1,000 by 1914; resident monks, nuns and novices rose about 8.5 times (from 11,080 to 94,629).24 New recruits came from increasingly diverse social backgrounds, especially in the case of women. No less important was the spiritual renaissance in the monastery, above all, the emergence of elderhood (starchestvo) as the quintessence of Orthodox religiosity.25

But the most remarkable feature of the monastic renaissance was the growing predominance of women. Once a minority, by the early twentieth century nuns and female novices had come to constitute a majority of the monastic clergy (77.5 per cent). This process was hardly unique to Russia, occurring as well in the contemporary West. The key factors in the Russian case included a heightened (and ascribed) sense of religiosity among women, breakdown of the patriarchal family (giving women greater autonomy and freedom of choice), the positive role of female cloisters (as hospitals, schools and homes for the elderly) and the Church’s growing recognition of women’s potential role in combatting dissent and de-christianisation.

Although monasticism was regaining its erstwhile status (and much property as well), it also elicited growing criticism. It was a favourite target of anticlericals, who accused it of harbouring indolence and gluttony, failing to perform useful worldly service, and associating with right-wing forces. Such criticism was also to be heard within the Church, especially among parish clergy, who resented the monastic monopoly of power in the episcopate and ecclesiastical schools. Even among the laity, despite the popular veneration of the monastery’s religious significance, there was mounting resentment over monastic landholding amidst the ‘land hunger’ of late Imperial Russia.

22RGIA, Fond 796, op. 63, g. 1782, d. 285, l. 4.

23For a case study, with attention to the larger context, see Scott Kenworthy, ‘The Revival of Monasticism in Modern Russia: The Trinity-Sergius Lavra, 1825–1921’, unpublished PhD dissertation, Brandeis University (2002).

24Pravoslavnaia entsiklopediia: Russkaia pravoslavnaia tserkov’ (Moscow, 1998), p. 132.

25See Robert L. Nichols, ‘The Orthodox Elder (Startsy) of Imperial Russia’, Modern Greek Studies Yearbook 1 (1985): 1–30.

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