Notes

1Introduction

1For a review of the range of stances that are taken and a critical discussion of debates

on this issue see Johnson (1977).

2For a discussion of this view see Byrne (1988).

3A radical version of this kind of rejection of the sociological enterprise in relation to religion as it is usually understood is that of relativism. For example, Winch (1964) reprinted in Wilson (1970).

Largely founded upon an interpretation of the philosophy of Wittgenstein, this view denies that it is possible to evaluate the claims of any system of religious thought in terms of universally applicable concepts and categories. If religious or spiritual entities are claimed by the external observer to be unreal, for example, the response of these theorists is to say that the concept of ‘reality’ used in such a statement is one which takes its sense and meaning from a particular mode of discourse, probably a scientific or at least a secular one. The claims concerning the reality of spiritual entities in particular religious systems, on the other hand, each utilise notions of ‘reality’ which take their sense and meaning within that particular context within which scientific notions of reality have no meaning and are illegitimately applied.

There are many problems with such an attempt to relativise thoroughly all belief systems and render them immune from treatment by a generalising social science but two interrelated ones are particularly serious. Both stem from the exaggeration of the distinctness of different modes of discourse. If there is a fundamental unity among human beings, does this not mean that despite great cultural differences we all share certain fundamental and universal cognitive traits, such that there are universal conceptions and meanings?

The first type of criticism stemming from such a claim is that if it were not so it would be impossible for us to even understand what other peoples’ beliefs actually were or to translate their statements into our own language. This implies the paradox that if Winch et al. were correct, it would be impossible to know that they were correct. (See the relevant contributions to Wilson (1970) for a fuller discussion along these lines and in particular those of Lukes and Hollis.)

The second type of criticism is that belief systems are not as self-contained and insulated from one another as Winch’s view would seem to imply. There is a considerable overlap between different systems of religious belief and between religious belief and other systems of ideas. Even within a particular system of religious belief there are different schools of thought, interpretations and understandings (Hill, 1973, p. 11). The fact that a particular school of thought may well replace and supersede an earlier one poses insurmountable problems for Winch since it entails the rejection by the new of the old. To be consistent, Winch would have to argue that it is just as illegitimate for a religious tradition of thought to reject past beliefs as incorrect or

Notes 277

false as it is for social science to do so. But this would be to deny the possibility of change and development in a system of beliefs. Gellner puts it this way:

either the Christians were wrong or the pagans were; either the Reformation Church was wrong or the Reformers were in supposing it to be wrong; either those addicted to superstition were wrong or the rationalists were wrong …. One way or another, someone must be wrong!

(Gellner, 1974, p. 142)

In other words, it is misleading to postulate the existence of radically distinct modes of discourse with no point of contact between them. In a sense, all human discourse constitutes a unity despite the different concerns it may have, the different concepts it may use and the different linguistic conventions and usages which govern it.

4Much the same is advocated by Smart (1973) who uses the term ‘bracketed realism’

to designate the stance of bracketing alongside the question of the reality of gods and religious entities while acknowledging their reality for believers and the consequently real effects upon their lives.

5It might better be termed ‘methodological agnosticism’ since ‘methodological atheism’ seems to imply, as Towler (1974, p. 2) has pointed out, that for the purposes of sociological investigation and as a working hypothesis, if not in any absolute sense, religious claims

are assumed to be false. ‘Methodological agnosticism’, on the other hand, would imply that no view need be assumed one way or the other on the matter.

6Similarly, Turner (1991b) accuses Bellah of ducking the issue of the truth claims of religion with his notion of ‘symbolic realism’ in an attempt to place religion in an inviolable position as a reality sui generis. This is, Turner argues, one solution among others to the crisis of religion, rooted back in the nineteenth century, in which religion

appeared to be necessary but false.

7For a recent contribution to the debate over whether Buddhism is or is not theistic, see Orru and Wang (1992). They challenge the contention that Buddhism is not theistic since it holds that in order to reach nirvana one has to overcome death conceived in the form of Mara, the god of death. For this and other reasons, concepts of the supramundane are central to Buddhist teaching, according to Orru and Wang. On the other hand, it does not make a very clear distinction between sacred and profane. This basis of Durkheim’s definition of religion, then, is not particularly applicable to Buddhism, ironically, and he would have done better to stick to the

criterion of belief in the supramundane or supernatural.

8For a number of recent attempts to define religion in this general vein see the contributions to Platvoet and Molendijk (1999), in particular Cox, Hanegraaff, Platvoet and Snoek. Cox speaks of a ‘non-falsifiable alternate reality’ (p. 272), Hanegraaff of a ‘meta-empirical framework of meaning’ (p. 371), Platvoet of postulated ‘or metaempirical, non-verifiable/ non falsifiable, or supernatural’ beings (p. 262) and Snoek of ‘a second (dimension or layer of) reality besides the empirically verifiable one’ (p. 327).

3Strictly speaking, this is zoomorphism rather than anthropomorphism. We often attribute animal characteristics to things which are not animals rather than human characteristics. A closely related notion which Guthrie distinguishes from

278 Notes

anthropomorphism is animism which is the tendency to perceive inanimate objects as in some respects animate but not necessarily with specifically human characteristics. Animism is also an important factor in religion as well as anthropomorphism, according to Guthrie.

4See also Boyer (1994).

3Magic

1See, for example Heelas (1996, York (1995) and Hanegraaff (1996). O’Keefe (1982) in particular considers magic to be universal in human societies. This conclusion he derives from his very novel theory of magic as the means by which the individual protects him or herself from the pressures of society expressed in the form of religion which come to suffocate individuality. For O’Keefe magic derives from religion, reversing the almost taken-for-granted sequence that Frazer, Freud and others postulated. It expropriates religious symbolism and modifies it in ways which suspend the normal frameworks of understanding in order to facilitate the redefinition of experience. O’Keefe’s study is a synthesis of Durkheimian, Freudian and other insights which stand too far outside the parameters of the debates discussed in the present chapter to include in any more substantial way than in the form of a note.

4Religion and emotion

1Useful summaries and critical discussions of the emotionalists can be found in Morris (1987, Chapter 4, pp. 141–51) and Preus (1987, Chapter 9).

2Otto and those who follow him such as Eliade (1969) claim that experience of the numinous is prior to, more fundamental than and independent of any belief or conceptual understanding of the experience. However this experience is interpreted, according to Otto, and whatever beliefs are derived from it, the experience itself is of something specifically religious which is prior to belief. The problem with this notion is that in order to identify the experience as religious, one cannot but have reference to some idea of what constitutes the religious, namely some belief or theory. Religious

experience is thus constituted by religious concepts and beliefs (Proudfoot, 1985).

3For introductory discussions of Freud (and Jung), see Morris (1987, Chapter 4, pp. 151–81), Clarke and Byrne (1993, Chapter 8), Preus (1987, Chapter 9) and Thrower (1999, Chapter 7, pp. 143–57). For more extensive discussion of Freud on religion, see Alston (1964) and Philp (1974) and for an extension of his ideas Rizzuto (1979). A good general introductory discussion of Jung can be found in Storr (1973). For

Jung’s work on religion, see Hostie (1957).

4The anthropologist Vic Turner has adopted this approach in much of his work. See for example ‘Symbols in Ndembu Ritual’, in Max Gluckman (1964) and ‘Ritual

Symbolism among the Ndembu’, in Fortes and Dieterlen (1965).

5Some of the evidence is usefully summarised in Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle (1997). See also Harrington and Whiting (1972) and for a cross-cultural study which finds

2For similar instances in Sri Lankan Buddhism, see Obeyesekere (1968) and Gombrich (1971).

Notes 279

3Although the other-worldliness of Buddhism generally can sometimes be overstated. Silber reminds us that this is often the case in his assessment of this aspect of Buddhism:

The opposition to mortification, the assumption of the perfectibility of man in the here and now, the tension between nirvana and karma, and between renunciation and worldly involvement, as well as the ambiguous attitude to kingship and social order, all indicate that Buddhism entails a certain tolerance, and even an affirmation, of worldliness alongside its systematic cultivation of renunciation.

(1995, p. 63)

6Religion and ideology: Karl Marx

1Good general discussions of the Marxist approach to religion can be found in Clarke and Byrne (1993, Chapter 6), Morris (1987, Chapter 1, pp. 23–50), O’Toole (1984, Chapter 3, pp. 63–75), Plamenatz (1975, Chapter 9), Preus (1987, Chapter 9) and Thrower (1999, Chapter 8, pp. 161–82). For more extensive discussion, see McKown (1975).

7 The coming of the millennium

1 Excluded from the discussion here are millennial sects such as the Seventh Day Adventists which are a somewhat different phenomenon and which do not have the characteristics of the rather more ephemeral and temporary movements which are the concern of this chapter.

2This accompaniment of military action by millennial expectations is, in fact, quite common in many parts of the world as Wilson’s (1975) careful and detailed comparative study shows. The early stages of culture contact and conflict during which military resistance seems feasible are often marked by prophetic and millennial backing of military resistance. When this is seen to have entirely failed, then the millennialism tends to become more thoroughly religious and the sole means of deliverance.

8Religion and solidarity: Emile Durkheim

1Useful overviews of Durkheim on religion are Clarke and Byrne (1993, Chapter 8), Morris (1987, Chapter 3, pp. 106–22), O’Toole (1984, Chapter 4), Preus (1987, Chapter 8), and Thrower (1999, Chapter 8, pp. 183–98). For an extended discussion, see Pickering (1984).

9 The birth of the gods

1 See also Swanson (1967) for an application of Durkheim’s ideas to the Protestant Reformation.

2 This is what Marx meant by alienation. Swanson, however, lists alienation as a separate cause of the decline of religion. It is not clear what Swanson means by alienation – presumably he is thinking of some kind of exclusion from social groups rather than Marx’s use of the term.

3 See, for example, Gluckman (1972). There is a very extensive literature on witchcraft. For a summary and discussion, see Hamilton (1998).

4For a fuller discussion of this theme in the emergence of the world religions, see Hamilton (1998).

280 Notes

10 Religion and soldarity: the functionalists

1The relevant articles are ‘Totemism’ and ‘Tabu’ which, together with the original article on ‘Religion and society’ are reprinted in Radcliffe-Brown (1952a, b) Structure and Function in Primitive Society. For a discussion of classical functionalism in relation to religion, see Morris (1987, Chapter 3, pp. 122–31).

3There is an extensive literature on the subject of initiation, much of which is not directly concerned with the religious nature of the rituals involved. For psychogenic approaches which emphasise male envy of female procreative powers, see Mead (1949) and Bettelheim (1954). An extensive debate has been concerned with the claim that initiation arises from the need to establish male identity and to separate the young male from the female world (Whiting et al., 1958; Young, 1962, 1965; Cohen, 1964; Whiting, 1960; Burton and Whiting, 1961; Kitahara, 1974). For a sociogenic approach which stresses political conflicts rather than social function, see

Paige and Paige (1981). For a comparative study of women’s initiation which takes an ambivalent stance regarding their social functions and their role in relations of power and domination, see Lincoln (1991).

4Turner has written much more extensively on the subject of ritual than the limited discussion here can indicate. In this body of work he developed a range of very suggestive ideas centred in particular on the liminal or transitional stage in rites de passage. In this stage a sense of community or ‘communitas’ may be generated which can provide often radical alternative bases for relationships to the established structures of society. See Turner (1974b, 1974c). For a critical discussion, see Morris (1987, pp.

252–63).

5For an appreciative assessment of Douglas’s work in the sociology of religion, see Spickard (1991).

12 Religion and rationality: Max Weber

1 See Morris (1987, Chapter 2) and O’Toole (1984, Chapter 5) for useful general discussions of Weber’s general approach to religion.

2 For an exposition and development of Weber’s conceptual categories, see Schluchter (1981, 1987).

13 The Protestant ethic debate

1The Marxist thesis that Protestantism was a product of capitalism cannot be discussed here nor the critics of Weber’s thesis, Marxist or otherwise, who have argued that the causation is the other way round to that claimed by Weber or that, given the mutual effects of one upon the other, it is the effect of capitalism upon Protestantism that is the more significant. For these points of view see Engels’ ‘The Peasant War in Germany’ (Engels, 1965), ‘Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy’ and ‘Socialism: Utopian and Scientific’ (in Marx and Engels, 1957); Kautsky (1988); Tawney (1938); Hill (1961, 1963, 1966). For a discussion and criticism

of this approach see Marshall (1980, pp. 254–9).

2I am grateful to Bryan Wilson for pointing this out in a personal communication.

Notes 281

3The essay ‘The Protestant sects and the spirit of capitalism’, in Weber (1970a).

2Greeley (1989); Chavez (1989, 1991); Firebaugh and Harley (1991).

3For a more extensive discussion of how social factors introduce market imperfections which can, nevertheless, in his view be analysed in terms of economic theory, see Sherkat (1997).

4See page 205.

5For an attempt to test some of Martin’s more general hypotheses, see Giorgi (1992).

6Stark (1996) has since altered and simplified his position on this, now holding that

both sects and cults will flourish where churches and conventional religious organisations are weak.

7While the notion of a ‘civil religion’ is one that goes back as far as Rousseau, the most influential contemporary formulation of it is that of Bellah (1967). Bellah argued that alongside the mainstream religious traditions in the United States there exists a distinct and well-institutionalised civil religion. In the United States religious pluralism, the absence of any established church or religious tradition and the consequent relegation of religion to the private sphere meant that the legitimation of the State and of the political system had to be accomplished by the emergence of this distinct civil religion. The civil religion, however, draws upon themes common to the major religious traditions present in the society such as belief in God and the importance of God for the destiny of the community. Public ceremonial, respect for the flag, the reverence surrounding certain fundamental ‘scriptures’ such as the Declaration of Independence and the Gettysburg Address testify to the sacred character of much of public and political life. The civil religion has its own martyrs, sacred places and events, its own solemn rituals and symbols. A particular feature of the American civil religion is that the United States has a God-guided mission in human history. In the British context, a similar argument has been put forward relating to public and state ceremonials such as the coronation of a new monarch, Remembrance Day Service, and so on (Shils and Young, 1953). The clearly Durkheimian thesis of the existence of a civil religion has attracted much debate. For a telling criticism of it see Lukes (1975) who questions its underlying assumption of value consensus and the necessity for this in integrating a society and its neglect of the role of sentiments and practices constituting such a civil religion in upholding a structure of power and privilege. Turner (1991b) criticises the thesis on the grounds that it conflates prevalence with cultural dominance and confuses frequency with social effects. One cannot assume from the prominence and visibility of the symbols and rituals of the so-called civil religion that it necessarily fulfils central social functions rather than having only somewhat trivial social effects.

In the United States the notion of an American civil religion enjoyed considerable prominence in the sociology of religion throughout the 1970s but interest waned thereafter, largely due to the vagueness of the concept and an apparently inherent lack of clarity and precision. Bellah himself has of late played down the significance of the idea as a recent essay shows (1990). In this he notes that ‘the term civil religion has spread far beyond any coherent concept, or at least beyond anything I ever meant by it’ (ibid., p. 35.) He goes on to say that while the claim that there is a civil religion in America is justified, it is formal in the scarcity and abstraction of its tenets and marginal in that it has no official support in the legal and constitutional order (ibid., p. 41).

For a discussion of the career of the concept and the history of the debate concerning it in the United States, see Mathisen (1989).

282 Notes

8Such terms are in some ways preferable to ‘fundamentalist’ which in the context of

Islam can have misleading connotations.

9For a review of this debate, see Hamilton (1998).

1For a discussion of Niebuhr, see Eister (1973).

2The proliferation of terms and concepts in this area and the resulting confusion have

led Beckford (1973) to advocate abandonment altogether of the sect, denomination, church terminology. This seems a little extreme, however.

3Wallis (1976) uses a very similar approach but replaces the inclusive/exclusive dimension with a respectable/deviant dimension. This yields four types: uniquely legitimate/respectable (church); uniquely legitimate/deviant (sect); pluralistically legitimate/respectable (denomination); and pluralistically legitimate/deviant (cult).

Bruce (1996b) follows Wallis in adopting this typology.

4See also Stark (1996) for a revised statement of the model.

5For the main contributions to the question of the definition of the term ‘cult’ other

than those already mentioned, see Campbell (1977, 1982); Glock and Stark (1965); Martin (1965a); Nelson (1968); Wallis (1975).

6Stark and Bainbridge decline to discuss the question of imported groups in their

general theoretical treatment (1987) but clearly include such groups as cults in their earlier work (1985).

7For a useful discussion of continuities and contrasts with earlier sectarian movements,

see Wilson (1993).

8For a useful survey of discussions of the relationship between the NRMs and modernity, see Dawson (1998).

9Rambo’s (1993) book-length discussion of conversion, for example, is organised around a stage model similar to and stimulated by that of Lofland and Stark.

10Later they applied the role model to disaffiliation from as well as conversion to NRMs (Bromley and Shupe, 1986).

11Ullman (1982, 1989) reports that among recruits to a range of NRMs, there was a significantly higher level of emotional stress and turmoil in childhood than among a control group. In particular, the father of converts was largely absent during their childhood or was felt to be rejecting of them.

12This cult was later to hit the headlines when thirty-nine of its members committed suicide at Rancho Santa Fe, 35 miles north of San Diego, California. By then it had become known as Heaven’s Gate and its leader, Marshall Applewhite (Peep had died in 1983) had taken the name of Do.

18 Conclusion

1For an extensive review of this work, see Hamilton (1998).