Evaluations of Khmelnytsky

Polish historians usually give negative assessments of Khmelnytsky’s activity. S. Bukowietska, for example, blamed the hetman for initiating a bloody civil war, in which a “brother fought against a brother” (since Ukrainian Cossacks fought against Polonaized Ukrainian szlahta). She called the hetman a “primitive drunkard” (because of his habit of excessive drinking), who “destroyed the liberties his people enjoyed.” Another Polish historian J. Friedberg said that Ukrainian Cossacks were ruled by greed in the war and that they used the slogan of protecting the Orthodox religion only to cover their real egoistic intentions. In his opinion, the Cossack leaders wanted “a heaven on earth for themselves,” where peasants would be their serfs. Many Polish historians consider Khmelnytsky as traitor, who by starting a civil war and by concluding unions with Poland’s enemies betrayed his motherland – the Rzeczpospolita.

Jewish historians blame Khmelnytsky for initiation of pogroms and massacres of the Jewish people. They call him the instigator of the first genocidal catastrophe or first ‘holocaust’ in the history of the Jews. They generally give a very negative assessment of the Cossacks as rude and cruel people.

Contemporary Russian historians (as did their tsarist and Soviet colleagues) praise Khmelnytsky for the Pereyaslav Agreement which initiated the unification of Ukraine and Russia. Russian historians have tried to prove that the only aim of the Khmelnytsky uprising was the overwhelming desire of the Ukrainians to be “reunited” with their “older brothers” – the Russians. Most Russian politicians support this theory as it suits Russia’s political aims well. In general, Russian historians say that the Old Rus People or Древнерусский народ (Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians) was artificially separated by the Tatar-Mongols in the 13^th century; then later in the 17^th century hetman Khmelnytsky “fulfilled the desire of the Ukrainians to be reunited” with their powerful brothers. Thus, Ukrainians and Russians should live together as they in fact have common roots and can be considered two branches of the same people. Present-day Ukrainian historians severely criticize this theory as it undermines Ukraine’s historical foundation for independence. Many Ukrainian historians think that it would have been better if the hetman had refrained from the union with Moscow.

The Treaty of Hadiach and the Ruin

Khmelnytsky’s successor, Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky, broke with Moscow and in 1658 concluded the Treaty of Hadyach with Poland.

By that time part of Ukrainian starshyna had seen that Moscow’s real intentions were to gradually turn Ukraine into an ordinary Russian province. They, who were raised under Polish constitutional political system and who used to enjoy the wide political rights and freedoms, understood the despotic character of Russia’s political system. Colonel Ivan Bohun, for example, said that he would never be a Russian kholop (slave); that Russians were slaves by nature, and that they did not understand the concept of freedom. Even boyars (highest aristocrats) in Moscow called themselves the tsar’s kholops.⁷ The Ukrainian starshyna decided that it would be better to deal with the elected Polish monarch, whose political rights were limited by constitution, than to deal with the tsar, who was an absolute ruler and whose power was despotic in nature. The starshyna was also disgusted by the low cultural level of Russians, their rude behavior and traditions, intolerance and religious fanaticism.

The exhausted Poland was ready to make significant concessions to the Cossacks in order to preserve the unity of the state. The result of these intentions was the so-called Treaty of Hadyach.

According to the treaty, Rzeczpospolita was to be transformed into a confederation of three equal partners: Poles, Ukrainians, and Lithuanians. The Ukrainian principality⁸ was to have wide autonomy and its own army. Polish troops, Jews and Jesuits (members of a notorious Catholic religious order) were to be prohibited from entering the Ukrainian principality. The Cossack starshyna was to be equalized with the Polish nobility.

As might be expected Russia’s reaction to the treaty was sharply negative. A huge Muscovite army of about 100 000, led by Prince Aleksey Trubetskoy, invaded Ukraine. Vyhovsky with his Polish and Tatar allies met the Russians near Konotop. In June 1659, the tsar’s troops suffered one of their worst defeats ever. The Russian historian Sergey Soloviev described its effect: “Tsar Aleksey Mikhailovich came out to the people dressed in black and panic seized Moscow… There were rumors that the tsar intended to leave for Yaroslav beyond the Volga and that Vyhovsky was expected to advance directly on Moscow”.

The hetman, however, could not take advantage of his brilliant victory. The Zaporozhian otaman Ivan Sirko decided to use the opportunity to invade the Crimea to get booty since the Tatar army was fighting together with Vyhovsky against the Muscovites. As the result of Sirko’s actions the Tatar cavalry abandoned Vyhovsky’s army and moved to the Crimea to defend their lands. Several Cossack colonels inspired by Russia also rebelled that led to a civil war. Faced with such difficulties Vyhovsky resigned in September 1659 and fled to Poland.

The majority of Ukrainian population did not understand Vyhovsky’s plans. The Zaporozhian Cossacks did not even try to listen to Vyhovsky’s envoys, who were sent to acquaint the Sich with the Hadyach Treaty. The envoys were just killed when they tried to speak. Many Ukrainians thought that Vyhovsky “sold Ukraine to Poland.” Peasants and poor Cossacks simply did not trust the hetman. Vyhovsky’s made several serious mistakes in his social policy. He did not take into consideration the common people. All his policy was aimed at improving the position of the starshyna at the expense of the commoners. The hetman planned to build an aristocratic republic modeled after Poland. The starshyna wanted to be a new szlachta in that republic, it wanted to own lands and exploit the masses. The masses who had liberated themselves from serfdom did not want to hear about any kind of a union with Poland. Polish rule for them meant the returning of serfdom.

With Vyhovsky, Ukraine began a rapid descent into a prolonged state of chaos that contemporaries called “the Ruin” („Руїна”). This period is characterized by cruel civil war with several hetmans fighting each other and inviting Tatars, Poles, Turks, and Muscovites for help. The foreign powers tried to place different groups of starshyna against each other and in such a way to keep Ukrainians from uniting. The situation did not stabilize until 1686, when Russia concluded the so-called “eternal peace” with Poland, according to which Ukraine finally was divided between the two countries along the Dnieper River.⁹ As a result of the war, Ukraine (especially the Right Bank) was virtually devastated. The Right Bank lost about 70 percent of the population. The Left Bank lost about 50 percent.