TOPIC 6
Ukraine between World Wars
Part I: Soviet Ukraine in the interwar period (1920-41)
As a result of World War I and the revolution Ukrainian territories were divided among four states. Bukovyna was attached to Romania. Transcarpathia was joined to the new Czechoslovak Republic. Poland got Galicia and western Volhynia. The lands east of the Polish border formed Soviet Ukraine.
The territories under Bolshevik control were formally organized as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. That was a tactical response to the rising Ukrainian nationalism. By declaring the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic the Bolsheviks wanted to show that they respected Ukrainians’ national rights. In such a way they planed to diminish the influence of Ukraine’s nationalistic forces. The city of Kharkiv was made the capital of Ukraine. (It remained Ukraine’s main city until 1934, when Kyiv became capital again).
On Dec. 30, 1922, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – a federation of Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Transcaucasian republic (Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaidzhan) – was proclaimed.1 Soviet republics were formally independent but in reality they were under full control of a highly centralized political organization – the Communist Party apparatus. All orders from Moscow were compulsory for all “sovereign” republics.
NEP
The major task facing the Bolsheviks after the war was to rebuild the economy. The policy of “War Communism” – based on nationalization of all enterprises, forced labor, state redistribution of goods, and the forcible requisition of food – caused economic chaos. In 1921, industrial production in the Ukrainian lands was only one tenth of the prewar figure, and trains ran just once a week between the major cities. The forcible requisition of extra food and the prohibition of trade did not stimulate peasants to produce food beyond their needs. They did not sow much grain. Thus, when draught came in 1921 it caused a famine that killed over a million of peasants in Ukraine and the Volga region in Russia.
Dissatisfied with Bolshevik agrarian policy peasants rebelled in many regions of Ukraine and some areas of Russia. Even the marines of the Kronshtadt fortress, the cradle of the Bolshevik revolution, staged an uprising. Faced with such problems Vladimir Lenin in March 1921 at the Tenth Party Congress introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP), which denationalized small-scale industry and trade and replaced grain requisitions with a fixed tax that enabled the peasant to sell the surplus of food on the free market. The policy of creating collective farms was also abandoned. The results were quite good. By 1927, the Ukrainian economy had recovered to the prewar level.
Ukrainization
In 1923 the Bolsheviks announced the policy of indigenization, or korenizatsiia (“putting down roots”). As the name implies the Bolsheviks wanted to ‘put down roots’ (вкоренитись) in all Soviet republics. The policy had three major tasks: 1) promotion of native languages in all spheres of life; 2) fostering of national cultures; 3) recruitment of the party and government cadres from the indigenous (local) populations (to bind them to the Soviet regime). The Ukrainian version of this policy was called Ukrainization. By korenizatsiia the Bolsheviks attempted to disarm the forces of nationalism in Soviet republics. The new Communist regime tried to show that in contrast to Tsarist Russia it respected the cultures of the non-Russians in the USSR.
In Ukraine, this program started a decade of rapid cultural flourishing. Enrollments in Ukrainian-language schools and the publication of Ukrainian-language books increased dramatically. Government officials who could not speak Ukrainian were forced to attend language courses. A lot of various Ukrainian cultural organizations were established.
The results of Ukrainization were really impressive. Whereas in 1922 only 20% of government business was conducted in Ukrainian, by 1927 the figure rose to 70%. In 1923 only 35% of government employees and 23% of party members were Ukrainian. By 1926-27 the respective percentages rose to 54% and 52%. In 1929, over 80% of schools and 30% of universities offered instruction in Ukrainian only. By 1930, nearly 80% of all books published were in Ukrainian, and by 1931 nearly 90% of all newspapers were in Ukrainian.2 Before the revolution, when Ukrainian schools and the press were practically nonexistent, Ukrainophiles could only have dreamt of such conditions.
The Communists widely used their achievements in cultural policy for domestic and international propaganda. It was effective. Many Ukrainian political emigrants decided to return to Ukraine (M. Hrushevsky and others). Thousands of West Ukrainians also moved to Soviet Ukraine from Poland. (Latter, in the 1930s, they were repressed).
The purpose of Ukrainization was to implant Soviet power. But there was a side effect of this policy. Ukrainians started to hear their previously persecuted national language in schools and in the workplace. Forbidden under the tsarist regime courses on Ukrainian history were now taught in schools and universities. A national revival began in Ukraine.
By the 1930s the Kremlin understood that korenizatisiia did not contribute to the unity of the state as it developed different national identities in the USSR. The Soviet dictator Iosif Stalin decided to use the old experience of Tsarist Russia and strengthen his totalitarian empire through the promotion of a single culture. Such a culture was to be common to all Soviet nations. The only common culture was Russian. So, since the 1930s till the end of the 1980s the Soviet nations had been experiencing a favorable promotion of Russian culture at the expense of their own. Russification in all republics reached gigantic proportions. The study of national histories, languages, and literatures was severely limited. The communist government tried to create a new people – the “Soviet people”, and Russian culture was to serve as the basis for the development of this people. That explains why national cultures and languages in the Soviet Union had not been paid proper attention since the 1930s.
As a result of such a policy Ukraine gradually became heavily Russified and the level of national consciousness significantly dropped.
Industrialization
When the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917 they believed that they started a revolution which would soon spread all over the world. Thus all nations were expected to build a new communist society together. By the end of the 1920s it became apparent that the world revolution would not happen. The party declared a new course aimed at “building socialism in a single country.” The Soviet leadership wanted to create a powerful industrial base which would enable the USSR to survive in a hostile capitalist environment. A strong industrial base was also a necessary condition for creating an efficient army. Some historians believe that the major aim of industrialization was militarization. The NEP helped the Soviet Union reach the pre-war industrial level. But it was clear that the communist state was lagging far behind major capitalist countries. New radical reforms were needed to show the world the advantages of a new socialist society, to prove that the revolution with its numerous sacrifices did not happen in vain.
The Soviet government under the leadership of Stalin, who by 1928 had assumed almost dictatorial power, decided to build a powerful industry in a few years at the expense of the Soviet people. The NEP policy was curtailed as it was unable to solve this problem. All factories and plants were proclaimed the “people’s property” and came under state control. A strictly centralized planned economy was introduced. The workers were exploited harshly. They had to work long hours and got very low salaries. The labor discipline was very strict. If a worker was late for work for three times he could be accused of sabotage (‘вредительство’) and sent to the Gulag (forced labor camps system). Many workers lived in barracks.3 Food and goods were rationed (distributed through card system). Besides, millions of convicts in the Gulag worked for free.
Various propagandistic techniques were used to arouse enthusiasm among the workers. One of the most famous innovations was the so-called ‘socialist competition.’ Brigades of workers, factories, cities, and even republics competed with each other. Outstanding workers were honored as “heroes of socialist labor” and highly praised in newspapers. Many workers believed that sufferings were necessary and temporary. Stalin set the tone in his famous 1931 speech: “We are behind the leading countries by 50-100 years. We must make up this time in ten years”. Stalin also warned: “If in ten years we do not cover the distance … we will be crushed.”
There was also another thing that stimulated people to work enthusiastically. The noble aim of building the “best society in the world” united many people and gave meaning to their lives. Despite severe hardships many people really believed they were happy (mostly because of an enormous impact of propaganda) and helped each other in work. Collectives at factories and plants were like families for many workers. Stalin was interested in the formation of collectivistic mentality among Soviet people because individualistic mentality (typical of western democracies) was not good for his totalitarian regime. People with collectivistic mentality are easier to be manipulated.
The achievements of industrialization were great. Eastern Ukraine was turned onto a huge construction place. Hundreds of huge plants and factories emerged within several years. The most impressive among them were such giants as the Kharkiv tractor-building plant, the Kryvyj-Rih metallurgical plant (Криворіжсталь), the Dnieper Hydroelectric Station or Дніпрогес (which was the largest in Europe and became a symbol of industrialization), and others. In a decade a huge industrial base emerged from nowhere. The USSR as a whole rose from being the world’s fifth largest industrial power to the second, Ukraine, with a productive capacity roughly equal to that of France, became one of Europe’s most advanced industrial countries.
Industrialization had serious setbacks, however. Though the quantity of the output was impressive, its quality was low. Moreover, heavy industry was developed at the expense of light industry. Thus, the common people could not find many kinds of necessary goods in shops. Their food was rationed. The standard of living of the ordinary people was extremely low. In contrast, the living standard of high-ranking party officials was high. They lived in large apartments, received high salaries, and bought goods and food in special shops. In fact they formed a special privileged class called the apparatchiks or nomenclatura.
Europe and especially the USA profited greatly from Soviet industrialization. In 1931, for example, the USSR purchased 30 percent of the world export of machinery and equipment for plants and factories; in 1932 – almost 50 percent. Some historians blame the West that its greed for money helped raise the “communist monster.” Thanks to industrialization the USSR turned from a country that imports machinery into a country that produces machinery. In the 1930s the Soviet Union became one of a few countries capable of producing any kind of industrial goods.
Collectivization and the famine of 1932-33
The ambitious industrialization program required a lot of money. Stalin decided to get them mostly by exploiting the peasantry. With this aim the program of collectivization was designed. Soviet plans for industrial expansion were based on the assumption that the state would be able to buy grain cheaply from the peasants. Stalin planned to sell grain abroad to finance industrialization. But the prices the state offered – often as little as one-eighth of the market price – were considered too low by the peasants and they refused to sell their grain. Infuriated by this “sabotage,” Stalin decided to put the peasants under total control through collectivization and squeeze grain from them practically free of charge.
Wholesale collectivization began in 1929. Realizing that the wealthier peasants (kulaks in Russian or kurkuls in Ukrainian) would resist collectivization most bitterly, Stalin decided to liquidate them as a class. By liquidating the kulaks Stalin also planned to deprive the peasants of their leaders and weaken their resistance. Hundreds of thousands of kulaks were deprived of their property and deported to forced labor camps in Siberia. As the kulaks were crushed, Stalin launched his attack on the peasantry as a whole.
The famine that occurred in 1932-33 was for the Ukrainians what the Holocaust was to the Jews. It cast a dark shadow on the methods and achievements of the Soviet system. The central fact about the famine is that it did not have to happen. It was completely artificial. The harvest of 1932 was only 12% below the 1926-30 average. In 1932 many trains loaded with grain crossed the state border as usual.
Many historians believe that Stalin made famine to put down mass resistance to collectivization. To break the peasants’ will he raised Ukraine’s grain delivery quotas by 44% and sent armed activists to villages to confiscate foodstuff. In fact, all grain after 1932 harvest and all remaining food supplies were taken from the peasants. Even those already swollen from malnutrition were not allowed to keep their foodstuff. In fact, if a person did not appear to be starving, he was suspected of hiding food. The government needed grain not foodstuff (vegetables, honey, nuts, dried fruits, etc). In fact, it collected the foodstuff only to punish the villagers. The result was a famine in 1932-33 and a loss of lives estimated as high as three to seven million4 – a manmade demographic catastrophe unprecedented in peacetime. Lacking bread, peasants ate pets, rats, frogs, earthworms, bark, and leaves. There were numerous cases of cannibalism. Whole regions died out. Special police forces were placed on the Ukrainian-Russian border and shot the peasants who tried to cross the border. The traditional Ukrainian village was essentially destroyed. The peasants’ will and the spirit of individualism were broken. In fact, they were turned into serfs. They did not have the right to leave their villages without permission. They worked almost for free. They lost interest in the land and in the results of their labor. The Holodomor (the name of the famine of 1932-33) imbued the peasants with fear, political apathy, and passiveness. The village could not oppose the regime anymore. By the end of 1935 almost all peasants were collectivized.
Ukrainian historians in general consider the famine of 1932-33 as genocide (killing a group of people because of their nationality) against the Ukrainian people. Russian historians refuse to recognize it as an act of genocide because the 1932-33 famine killed not only millions in Ukraine but also 1,5 million in Kazakhstan (38% of its population) and over a million in some regions of Russia (the Volga region, the Northern Caucasus Territory, the Kuban region, the Don region, Western Siberia, etc). Russian historians stress the fact that many Ukrainian (not Russian) communist activists actively participated in food requisitions in villages that caused a lot of deaths. Not only Ukrainians died on Ukrainian territory, many thousands of Germans (the descendants of the colonists brought here by Catherine II), Jews, Russians, Tatars, and other nationalities also perished in Ukraine in 1932-33. Russian historians say that if most productive peasants had lived in Siberia they would have been suffered more than Ukrainian peasants. In their opinion Stalin used the famine as a tool to force the peasants to cooperate with the regime and he was indifferent to their nationality.
Another reason for Russia’s reluctance to recognize the famine as genocide is fear that in this case it might entail the question of responsibility and, therefore, compensation. Some Ukrainian politicians say that since Russia proclaimed itself the legal successor of the Soviet Union it is responsible for the Holodomor and must compensate Ukraine for the losses. The Russian ambassador Viktor Chernomyrdin advised Ukraine to turn to Georgia for compensations, since Stalin was a Georgian.
Russian historians suggest that their Ukrainian colleagues should prove with facts that Ukrainians died because of their nationality and that “the Holodomor was engineered for this very purpose.” They stress the fact that the communist leadership was international and that neither Russian nor Ukrainian archives have party instructions to use famine for killing Ukrainians. Statistics says that in contrast to the Ukrainian village the mortality rate in Ukrainian cities in 1932-33 was usual. It was the place of living (city or village) and not nationality that defined people’s chances for survival. Some historians come to conclusion that the Holodomor was aimed not at the Ukrainians as a nation but rather at the villagers. Russia proposed to create an international commission to investigate the famine of 1932-33.
Foreign scholars’ views on the problem also differ. German historian Stefan Merl and his British colleague Robert Service, for example, stated that the very fact of famine in Ukraine in 1932-33 does not prove that an act of genocide took place. On the other hand, such historians as Robert Conquest (Great Britain), James Mace (USA), and Andrea Graziosi (Italy) declared that genocide really occurred. Their opponents stress the strong connections between these three historians and the Ukrainian Diaspora. In 2003 the UN General Assembly recognized the fact of horrible famine in Ukraine, but it refused to regard it as genocide. A similar resolution was issued by UNESCO on November 1, 2007.
The question of genocide is highly politicized in Ukraine. President Victor Yushchenko urged the parliament to recognize the famine as an act of genocide against the Ukrainians. Some analysts say that in such a way he wanted to discredit his political rivals (who are mostly pro-Russian). In 2006 the Ukrainian parliament rather reluctantly recognized the famine as an act of genocide but not against ethnic Ukrainians, as Yushchenko wanted, but against all peoples living in Ukraine (Russians, Jews, Poles, Tatars, etc). Thus, the concept of genocide in its Ukrainian variant became very vague. Nowadays Yushchenko wants to introduce criminal punishment for those who refuse to regard the famine as an act of genocide.
The topic of Ukrainian famine of 1932-33 had been taboo in the Soviet Union for decades. The official Soviet propaganda claimed that it never existed and was “invented” by “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists” in emigration for political aims. The fact of the famine was officially recognized during Gorbachev’s perestroika in the late 1980s.
Repressions
Repressions as a whole are typical trait of a totalitarian regime. In fact, it could not exist without them. One of the major aims of repressions of the Stalinist regime was to create an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty. (When a person lives in fear he is much easier to control). Even high governmental positions did not guarantee safety. The majority of high-ranking party officials in Moscow as well as in all other Soviet republics were repressed. For example, of 1966 deputies of the USSR Supreme Council 1931 were repressed in the middle of the 1930s. Of 66 members of Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine 55 were repressed. Of 11 members of Ukrainian Politburo5 10 were repressed. In 1938 all the Ukrainian government (17 ministers) were arrested and shot. The Prime Minister (P. Liubchenko) committed suicide. In general, 37% of Ukrainian Communists (170,000) were repressed. By the late 1930s, the limited self-government that Ukrainians (and other non-Russians in their republics) had possessed earlier was almost totally destroyed.
A lot of intellectuals (because they could think critically and understand the nature of the regime) in all republics were repressed. Many ordinary Soviet citizens perished in prisons or were shot. Millions political prisoners worked in the Gulag in extremely difficult conditions. In the Soviet Union nobody could feel secure and many people could not trust each other (there were millions of informants). Under such conditions the forming of any kind of opposition was impossible. Thus, through repressions, Stalin consolidated his rule in the USSR.
One of the main targets of repressions in Ukraine was the old Ukrainian intelligentsia, especially those who had been associated with the national governments and non-Bolshevik parties of 1917-20 and who were prominent in areas of culture and scholarship. After fabricating “secret anti-Soviet organizations,” the NKVD (political police) forced its victims, by means of physical and psychological torture, to admit membership in them. Victims were usually asked two questions “Who recruited you?” and “Whom did you recruit?” Then under physical tortures or threats to repress close relatives they usually pointed at any people they knew. Writers, historians, philosophers, editors, and many other intellectuals were accused of spying or terrorism and then shot or sent to labor camps in Siberia. In all, some four-fifths of the Ukrainian cultural elite was repressed in the course of the 1930s. The Ukrainian Autocephalous (Independent) Orthodox Church was banned and many of its priests were sent to prisons. Practically all Ukrainian kobzari (folk musicians and singers of patriotic songs) were invited to a congress, then arrested and shot. By eradicating Ukrainian religious and cultural differences Stalin planned to make his empire more unified. The same policy was conducted in other Soviet republics.
All those who were repressed were officially called “enemies of the people”. The NKVD even had plans how many people were to be repressed within a certain time. For example, 268 950 Soviet citizens were to be repressed from August till December of 1937. Of that number 75 500 were to be executed immediately.
Part II: Western Ukraine between the Wars
Western Ukraine under Polish rule
The fate of Western Ukraine was decided at the Paris peace conference (1919). The Ukrainians made of 64% of the region’s ethnic composition, the Poles – 25%, and the Jews – 10%. At the conference Poland promised to grant the Ukrainians autonomy and respect their rights. The Entente powers accepted the Polish proposal and placed Western Ukraine under Polish jurisdiction. France, the major power in Entente, was interested in creating a strong Poland as a counterbalance to Germany. This fact explains why Western Ukraine found itself under Polish rule.
Poland did not keep its promise, however. Western Ukraine did not get autonomy. The number of Ukrainian-language secondary schools was reduced and Ukrainian was pushed out of administrative use. The old Austrian system of Ukrainian elementary schools was transformed into a bilingual one in which Polish was dominant. Ukrainian Studies departments at Lviv University, created under Austrian rule, were abolished. But in contrast to the totalitarian Bolshevik Ukraine, Western Ukraine enjoyed some political liberties under Poland. There were many Ukrainian political parties that existed legally and issued their newspapers. It was allowed to establish private schools with Ukrainian as language of instruction. The Polish parliament had a significant number of Ukrainian deputies, and even its vice-speaker was a Ukrainian. The largest and most influential Ukrainian political party was UNDO (Ukrainian National Democratic Union) which favored a compromise with the Poles. UNDO advocated constitutional democracy and independence for Ukraine. Independence was to be achieved not through revolution but through gradual reforms.
The Polish government tried to split the Ukrainian national movement. With this aim it launched a campaign to encourage Ukrainian ethnographic subgroups (Hutsuls, Lemkos, and Boikos) to view themselves as distinct peoples and not as parts of the larger Ukrainian nation. Attempts were made to develop the Lemko dialect into a separate language and Lemkos were urged to convert from Greek Catholicism to Orthodoxy in order to create a barrier between them and the Galician Ukrainians. To further undermine the Ukrainians’ national solidarity, the government also supported the remaining Russophile activists (Москвофіли). All these measures were part of the old classic Divide and Rule policy. It should be also noted that the Kremlin secretly financed the Ukrainian national movement6 (despite its anti-Communist character) with the aim to develop a Ukrainian fifth column in Poland that one day might lead to the split of Poland and incorporation of Western Ukraine into the Soviet Ukrainian republic under Moscow control.
Meanwhile, in Volhynia (which was under Russian control before WWI), Polish authorities continued their attacks on the Orthodox church, the main pillar of Ukrainian identity in the region. Thus, of the 389 Orthodox churches in Volhynia in 1914, only 51 survived in 1939. Many Volhynians were converted to Catholicism.7
The old name of “Western Galicia” was changed into “Eastern Little Poland.” Greek Catholic priests received government orders to change Ukrainian last names in church documents according to Polish samples (for example “Levytsky” was to be changed into “Lewitski”). There were numerous official attempts to describe the Ukrainians not as a different nation but as a branch of the Polish people, and the Ukrainian language, accordingly, as a Polish dialect. Trying to assimilate Ukrainians Poland planned to solve the problem of separatism.
To dissolve the predominantly Ukrainian ethnic composition of Eastern Galicia Polish authorities settled about 200,000 Polish colonists there. This enraged many Ukrainians and caused a number of serious clashes between Ukrainians and Poles.
Ukrainian nationalism
A new variety of Ukrainian nationalism emerged in the interwar period in Galicia. In the 19th century, Ukrainian nationalism was mostly of liberal type and the spread of it was quite limited. Now, in the interwar period (1920-1939) it became more radical and more widespread.
In 1920, the clandestine Ukrainian Military Organization (УВО – in Ukrainian) was founded by veterans of WWI and the civil war, headed by Colonel Ievhen Konovalets. From its very beginning the organization applied terror8 as a way of destabilizing of Polish control over the Ukrainian population. In 1929, УВО was transformed into a broader underground movement, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN).
The ideology of the OUN was based on the writings of Dmytro Dontsov (1883-1973). Dontsov’s nationalism, which came to be known as integral nationalism, proclaimed that a nation was an absolute value (‘The Nation above All’). Everything, including human lives, should be sacrificed in the name of the nation, according to this teaching. Integral nationalists called for the creation of a new type of Ukrainian, one who was unconditionally committed to the nation and to independent statehood.
According to integral nationalists, the political system of a future state would be based on the rule of one nationalist party (all other parties should be banned) under the leadership of a strong leader (вождь) with unlimited powers. The nation should be purified and consist of Ukrainians only. (‘Ukraine is for Ukrainians!’). Democratic ideas were proclaimed decadent.9 Integral nationalists paid special attention to Ukrainian history which was to be rewritten and mythologized (all negative aspects were to be silenced and the cult of heroes created) with the aim of brining up nationalistic youth. The ideological writings of such Ukrainian national leaders as Drahomanov, Franko, and Hrushevsky were condemned as too soft and “feminine.” The idea of creating a merciless super human being was widely propagated among youth.
Ukrainian integral nationalism was a typically totalitarian movement with elements of fascism. Similar movements were popular in Europe in the 1920s. Such half-fascist nationalistic movements as the Iron Guard in Romania, the Ustashi in Croatia, the Arrow Cross in Hungary, the Iron Wolves in Lithuania, and related movements in other countries were quite influential in the interwar period. Italian and German fascists gave an example of creating a powerful nationalistic state. Dontsov himself admired Hitler and Mussolini and published their speeches in his journal.
The OUN was quite intolerant to other political views except its own. In its practical activity the OUN carried out acts of terror aimed at Polish officials and those Ukrainians who favored compromise with the Poles. A popular OUN instruction stated, “A boiovyk (guerilla fighter) should unhesitatingly kill his father, brother, best friend when he receives an order and when it is necessary”. A number of high-ranking Polish politicians and liberal Ukrainians (who cooperated with the Poles) were assassinated. Hatred for OUN enemies (the Poles) was cultivated to unite the nation. Dontsov wrote, “Hatred for the enemy must be felt even if he has done nothing harmful to you”.
The OUN managed to attract widespread support among Ukrainian youth. Its stress on revolutionary action, radical solutions, and the creation of a new type of “super Ukrainians” appealed to youth who wanted to be heroes. The OUN leaders believed that using terror would help them to destabilize the situation in Poland until the government collapsed. Older generation usually condemned the terror unleashed by the OUN. Many parents criticized the OUN for the involvement of their immature and inexperienced teenagers into terrorist activity that often ended tragically. The Creek Catholic church condemned using terror as political means. Its head, metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, asked Ukrainians to stop killing people as it would bring only harm to Ukraine.10 All legal Ukrainian parties publicly denounced the terrorist activities of the OUN.
Ukrainians under Romanian Rule
Under Austrian rule, Bukovyna had been an autonomous province and Ukrainians, its largest national group, had relatively strong political representation in Vienna, extensive local self-government, and a well-developed system of Ukrainian-language education. All this was lost when the Romanians annexed the region in 1918. The Romanian government shut down all Ukrainian schools, parties, and the press and even refused to recognize the Ukrainians as a distinct nationality. Ukrainians were classified as Romanians who had forgotten their native language. Bukovyna’s autonomous status was abolished and it was turned into a Romanian province. The “Ukrainized Romanians”, the official name of the Ukrainians in Romania, were to be assimilated. Even Ukrainian surnames were changed to sound more Romanian. In 1918, Romania also took Bessarabia from Russia with a significant part of Ukrainian population. Stalin took back Bessarabia in 1940 and turned it into Soviet Moldavian Republic. In the same year Stalin attached Bukovyna to Soviet Ukraine.
Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia
In 1919 Transcarpathia voluntarily joined the newly created by the Entente Czechoslovak republic. Of all the newly states in Eastern Europe, Czechoslovakia was the most democratic. Consequently, it did not follow the openly discriminatory and assimilationist policies toward its minorities that Poland and Romania did. The Czech government allowed its population to use the language of its choice in the schools and open cultural and political organizations. Such liberalism led to the growth of Ukrainian national life in the region. The Czech government, however, planned to abolish any possibility of unification of Transcarpathian Ukrainians with Ukrainians in other lands. Prague propagated the idea that Ukrainians in Transcarpathia were a separate nation – Carpathian Rusyny. This movement was called Rusynophile and it enjoyed significant support of the government. The third Ukrainian movement in Transcarpathia was called Russophile or Moscowphile. Thus Ukrainians in Czechoslovakia had three national orientations and that suited Prague well.
Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy
In October 1938 Prague granted autonomy to Transcarpathia. A famous Ukrainian political figure and respected Greek Catholic priest, Avhustyn Voloshyn, was appointed head of the cabinet, which started a large-scale Ukrainization policy. The educational system, publications, and administration were Ukrainized. All political parties except the pro-governmental Ukrainian National Union were banned and their newspapers closed. The opposition was repressed (isolated in a special camp). In February 1939, elections were held for the regional parliament and the Ukrainophiles received the support of 86% of all voters. Some historians say that the elections results were falsified. It was not difficult under such non-democratic conditions. Meanwhile, a military organization, the Carpathian Sich, was organized and soon had about 5000 soldiers, who were mostly enthusiastic Ukrainian youth from Galicia – many of them members of the OUN.
There were pressing reasons for establishing a military force, for as Czechoslovakia slowly disintegrated, neighboring Hungary demanded the return of its former Transcarpathian lands. On 14 March 1939, the Hungarian army moved into the region. On 15 March, in a symbolic gesture, the Voloshyn government proclaimed the independent Republic of Carpatho-Ukraine11 and sent a telegram to Hitler asking him to accept the new republic as a German protectorate.12 (Voloshyn did not know that Hitler had already promised Transcarpathia to his ally and friend Admiral Horthy, the Hungarian dictator). The sejm (parliament) adopted the blue-yellow national flag, the coat of arms containing a trident, and the national anthem ‘Ukraine has not perished yet’ (Ще не вмерла Україна). Ukrainian was proclaimed the state language. Many young integral nationalists from Galicia illegally crossed the border and joined the Carpathian Sich. The Carpathian Sich showed brave but futile resistance to the outnumbered enemy. Soon the whole territory was occupied by Hungarians.
After conquering Transcarpathia the Hungarian government started Magyarization (Hungarization). All Ukrainian publications and organizations, including Prosvita, were banned. The Ukrainian language in schools was gradually replaced with Hungarian.
Brief as it was, the existence of a Ukrainian government in Carpatho-Ukraine had an impact similar to that of the Ukrainian governments in the 1917-20 period: it helped to turn much of the region’s population, especially the youth, into nationally conscious Ukrainians.
1 The number of republics gradually increased to 9 and then to 15.
2 It should be noted, however, that Ukrainian books did not dominate the republic’s book market, as three quarters of the books sold in the republic were published in Russia. Many Russian-language newspapers were also brought to Ukraine from Russia.
3 The lucky ones lived in so-called communal apartments where each family occupied a single room. Families in barracks used curtains to separate their beds from the others.
4 The most distinguished Ukrainian expert on the famine of 1932-33, historian S. Kulchytsky, calculated that the direct losses of the famine were 3,238,000. Some politicians try to exaggerate the number for political reasons.
5 Politburo is the name of the body of highest-ranking Communist officials.
6 Many Ukrainian organizations in Poland, including the Prosvita Society, private schools, publishing houses, the Ethnographic Museum, and the Shevchenko Scientific Society benefited from secret Soviet financial aid.
7 At the end of the 18th century when Volhynia became part of the Russian Empire the region was predominantly Greek Catholic. Thanks to Russia’s imperial policy Volhynia was transformed into an Orthodox region.
8 It included the burning of Polish estates; the destruction of Polish governmental buildings, railroads, and telegraph lines; and political assassinations of Poles and Ukrainians who favored cooperation with the Poles.
9 Integral nationalist believed that it was impossible to achieve independence by democratic means. Hence is their skeptical attitude to democracy.
10 ‘A person who sheds the innocent blood of his political opponent is just as much as murderer as one who does it for robbery’ (Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky).
11 Strictly against the proclamation of independence were local Slovaks, who wanted to join Slovakia, and local Hungarians, who wanted to join Hungary.
12 Protectorate means a country that is controlled and protected by a more powerful country