Soviet Partisans in Ukraine

Soon after German invasion, Communist party officials began to organize partisan units behind enemy lines. The Soviet Union organized many partisan bases in the 1920s and early 1930s in case of possible war. Then, at the end of the 1930s a new military doctrine was adopted. According to that doctrine the USSR was supposed to wage only offensive wars, thus, it did not need partisan bases anymore. As a result of the new doctrine, practically all the partisan bases were destroyed. Hence, in 1941 the Soviets started to organize the partisan movement from scratch. Consequently, partisans did not play important role in 1941. They were badly organized and the population did not support them much. An official German report stated, for example, in August 1941: “Brought by air, Russian partisans do not have any influence on local population. Ukrainians catch them and hand over to us.” As the war continued and Nazi brutalities in occupied areas became widespread, the partisan movement started to grow. In June 1942, in Moscow, the Ukrainian Partisan Command (UPC) was established, led by Tymofii Strokach, General of NKVD. The UPC trained various partisan cadres, reconnaissance and diversion groups for working in German rears. It also coordinated the activity of partisan units, supplied them with weapon and medicines, and sent specially trained officers. The leaders of partisan units had Soviet military ranks and received officers’ salaries as if they were fighting in regular troops. The largest Soviet partisan units numbered several thousand people and made long raids in German rears. The most famous partisan units were those of Alexei Fedorov, Alexander Saburov, Pavlo Vershyhora, and Sydir Kovpak. Partisans were quite active and efficient. In 1943, for example, they blew up 3688 military trains and destroyed 1469 railway bridges. Germany had to keep numerous garrisons and troops in Ukraine to repulse partisan attacks and protect communications.

Compared to Belorussia with its swampy regions, much of the open Ukrainian countryside was unsuited for partisan warfare. Thus, in Ukraine, Soviet partisans never became as significant as they were in Belorussia. In Galicia, where the OUN was well established, Soviet partisans had no popular base for their activity. Consequently, most of their operations in Ukraine were confined to parts of Volhynia and Polissia. In 1944 there were approximately 40,000 Soviet partisans in Ukraine.⁸

Ukrainians did not play the major role in Soviet partisan movement in Ukraine. Only one-third of Kovpak’s men, for example, were Ukrainians (Russians, consequently, were overrepresented) The vast majority of Ukraine’s population during the war remained politically neutral and thought more not about resistance but survival.

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (упа)

It was in Polissia and Volhynia that the first Ukrainian nationalist partisan units appeared and, surprisingly, at the outset they were not associated with OUN. As soon as the Nazi-Soviet war broke out, Taras Bulba-Borovets, a local Ukrainian activist, formed an irregular unit called “Polissian Sich”, later renamed the UPA (Ukrainska Povstanska Armiia – Ukrainian Insurgent Army), for the purpose of cleansing his region of the remnants of the Red Army. He proclaimed himself the major otaman of Ukraine and the rightful successor of Petliura.⁹ When the Germans tried to disband his unit in late 1941, he started to fight both the Germans and the Soviets. In 1942, members of both OUN-M and OUN-B also established small units in Volhynia.

In early 1943 the OUN-B forcefully incorporated almost all the units of Borovets and OUN-M into its own forces for which it now usurped the name UPA. The remnants of OUN-M and Borovets units formed another independent partisan force under the name of Ukrainian People’s Revolutionary Army (Українська Народна Революційна Армія) and continued fighting till the end of 1943, when Taras Bulba-Borovets was put into prison by Germans.

D. Kliachkovsky (Klym Savur), a member of the OUN-B leadership, was appointed commander-in-chief of the UPA. The UPA quickly grew into a large, well-organized partisan army, which took control of large parts of Volhynia, Polissia, and, later, Galicia. Its numbers reached close to 40,000 fighters.¹⁰ Compared to other underground movements in Nazi-occupied Europe, the UPA was unique in that it had practically no foreign support. Its growth and strength were, therefore, an indication of the very considerable popular support it enjoyed among the Ukrainians.

Compared to Soviet partisans, the UPA tried to avoid direct anti-German actions. The UPA units fought against the Germans only when being attacked or when it was necessary. They tried to spare local population from Nazi’s retaliating actions. More than 250 villages in Ukraine were burned with their inhabitants as punishments for Soviet partisan actions (the so-called collective responsibility practice). Moreover, in many regions of Volhynia and Polissia the UPA managed to protect German communications from diversions of Soviet partisans. By protecting German communications they protected Ukrainian civilians from retaliating actions. On the other hand the UPA did not want to help the Soviet army by attacking the German army and thus loosing their men. Regular fighting between the UPA and Germans started only from February 1943 and was not large-scale. The major enemies of the UPA were Soviet and Polish partisans.

In the course of war the OUN changed its ideology to get broader support. At its major large meetings in August 1943 and July 1944 the organization proclaimed democratization of the national movement. The OUN allowed the existence of several political parties instead of one, and gave up their slogan “Ukraine is for Ukrainians.” Such democratic freedoms as those of speech, meetings, the press, consciousness, etc were also proclaimed, mostly to attract attention of the old western democracies (USA and Great Britain). The OUN hoped to get their help in the ‘fight against both dictators’: Hitler and Stalin. In general, the number 1 enemy of the UPA was the Soviet Union, the number 2 – Poland, and the number 3 – Germany.

When Soviet troops came to Western Ukraine in 1944 the UPA concluded an armistice with the Germans to spare its men for the fight against the Soviets. The retreating Germans even left military supplies for the UPA and continued to supply the nationalists by air. Some Russian historians and pro-Russian politicians from Eastern Ukraine (N.Vitrenko, P.Simonenko) stress these facts as signs of collaboration between the Nazi and the UPA. Most Ukrainian historians, however, say that it was practical decision on both sides as the Germans and the UPA had now a very powerful common enemy. The materials from German archives clearly indicate that in 1944 the Nazis had no illusions about possible combined fighting against the Soviets. Documents from Wéhrmácht (German ground forces) headquarters state that “the UPA refuses to fight on the German side.”