Schuman S. - The IAF Handbook of Group Facilitation (2005)(en)

Principle 10: Facilitate from an Egoless Presence to Keep the Spotlight on the Meeting, Not the Facilitator

When designing and facilitating meetings of all sizes, we always bear in mind that each meeting must be about the participants, not us. In large group meetings in particular, it is essential to create processes that enable participants sitting at tables to engage in conversation with one another rather than direct their remarks to a facilitator leading roomwide conversations from the front of the room. This requires that the facilitator be in a healthy, adult state and willing to gain satisfaction from the work of the group rather than being a star, often characterized by behaviors that exhibit respect, responsibility, and partnership. (See also Chapter Thirty-Two.)

As facilitators, examining our own value system and beliefs about people and ourselves is essential. First and foremost, we must be in touch with our personal purpose and individual control issues, ensuring that we always serve the client’s needs, not our own. We act out of our belief that the real wisdom in any organization is in the people, and we are driven to employ processes that uncover that wisdom. This belief is based on the characteristic of living systems to self-organize. When each part of the system sees the system as a commonly directed whole, they find the answers and know what to do in order to meet their purpose (Capra, 1996; see also Chapter Fourteen). To that end, we make a conscious effort to ensure that every interaction we have with the client system builds empowerment in its members. We seek to help connect the wisdom within the system rather than give the system our diagnosis and answers.

Standing in front of one hundred or more people can give one a great sense of importance and power. However, the kind of facilitation we are talking about involves facilitators’ being subtle enablers in the room—that is, intentionally creating clear, brief framings for assignments that help meeting participants engage with one other and then stepping out of the way. When our joy and affirmation come from helping people achieve their desired results, then we hope to hear participants say as they walk out the door, “That was exactly the meeting we needed to have right now. We need to do this more often,” instead of, “You are a very good facilitator to handle a crowd like this!”

Here are some additional considerations to keep in mind in developing an egoless presence:

•Never work alone. Ask and trust a partner to hold up a mirror for you regarding your facilitation.

•Be curious. When you listen to clients, listen to see the world they see. If you are arguing with clients or complaining to others about them, it might be a clue that you believe you have the answer. In order to be of service to clients, we need to love and respect them, especially when we do not agree with them.

•Create self-sufficiency. Build participants’ competencies in listening, speaking, recording, and facilitating throughout the meeting.

•Consult with your planning team when things are not going as expected.

•Base meeting evaluations on whether desired outcomes were achieved rather than how well participants liked the meeting or the facilitator.

•Admit when you are wrong, and learn from your mistakes.

CONCLUSION

Facilitating a meeting that gets results every time can become more predictable (and energizing for everyone) when you truly believe that the wisdom is in the people and that when connected around the right purpose and activities, they will find the answers.

As you integrate these principles into your own knowledge, experience, and style, stay alert to the fact that each client is unique, and adjust each engagement to meet that client’s specific requirements. Listen to the advice of the planning team members. Together with the meeting sponsor and planning team, agree that the meeting design has a clear purpose, a shared set of the right information that makes the system whole and wise so participants make and execute informed decisions, and structured processes to support the conversations and activities that must take place in order to accomplish the desired meeting outcomes.

Dennis S. Gouran

Randy Y. Hirokawa

Facilitation, broadly construed, is any activity that makes the accomplishment of tasks easier than would be the case in its absence, as even a casual examination of the essays in Lawrence Frey’s book

dealing with group facilitation (1995) in natural settings makes abundantly clear. However, for the specific context to which this chapter relates, we find the precise and appropriate sort of focus necessary for the ideas we develop in Schwarz’s characterization (2002) of facilitation as helping “a group improve its process for solving problems and making decisions so that the group can achieve goals and increase overall effectiveness” (p. 57).

Although Schwarz appears to be more concerned with external parties who engage in facilitation, he does not preclude their performance by group members themselves, the agents to whom most of our attention has been directed in the years we have been writing about the role of communication in group decision-making discussions. Our treatment of the subject of facilitation, then, relates primarily to what members can do to overcome problems they may have a hand in creating and

for which no sort of external agent may be available to provide assistance when

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the problems arise.

Finally, we think that it is important to acknowledge that our concerns lie largely in the realm of intentional behavior. We recognize that group members may engage in communicative acts that have facilitative influence without any conscious design on their part. However, in this chapter, we deal with problematic situations requiring awareness and activities having the deliberate aim behind them of altering those situations in positive ways, not incidental forms of behavior that may have such consequences.

Since 1983, we have been developing a perspective on group process, as related to decision making and problem solving, now commonly referred to as the functional theory of communication in decision-making groups (Gouran and Hirokawa, 1983, 1996, 2003). The central proposition of the theory is as follows. The likelihood that a decision-making or problem-solving group will make appropriate choices among the options it considers relates directly to the extent to which members’ communicative behavior ensures that they satisfy the requirements of their task. The theory also acknowledges that in the course of executing such tasks, and depending on the sorts of constraints that exist, group members frequently, if not always, encounter an array of obstacles that may be of a substantive (or taskrelated), relational, or procedural nature. (See Chapter Nine for more about these terms.) It is within such arenas that we see the need for skill in facilitation.

In this chapter, we briefly review the basic features of the functional theory of communication in decision-making groups, identify some of the problems that arise and that reveal a need for facilitation, and then provide an overview of some ways of furthering group members’ ability to manage such problems. The result will not be so much a repertoire of facilitation strategies and tactics on which he facilitators can mechanically draw, but rather an expanded awareness of the types of situations in which they can play a facilitative role, an improved understanding of how that role can aid in enhancing the performance of decision-making groups, and a knowledge of some general ways of addressing situations in which facilitation may be necessary if a group is to perform well in discharging its task.

THE FUNCTIONAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION IN DECISION MAKING

The basic propositions of the functional theory of communication in decision making rest on certain assumptions, including five of particular importance: (1) the members of a group seek to make good choices; (2) the collective resources of

the group, with respect to the task at hand, exceed those of any single member;

(3) the best choice is not obvious in the absence of relevant information and thoughtful processing of it; (4) the requirements of the task are specifiable; and (5) the members have the intellectual skills necessary to satisfy these requirements (Gouran and Hirokawa, 1996). Task requirements include (1) “showing correct understanding of the issue to be resolved”; (2) “determining the minimal characteristics any alternative, to be acceptable, must possess”; (3) “identifying a relevant and realistic set of alternatives”; (4) “examining carefully the alternatives in relationship to each previously agreed-upon characteristic of an acceptable choice”; and (5) “selecting the alternative that analysis reveals to be most likely to have the desired characteristics” (pp. 76–77).

This model is in line with others in the classical economics and reflective thinking traditions, for example, the one Bazerman (2002) presents. In Bazerman’s characterization, the task consists of defining the problem, identifying and weighting criteria, generating alternatives, assessing each alternative in the light of each criterion, and “computing” the optimal decision—by which he means determining the one with the highest “expected value” (see Beach, 1997, for a similar description). This description is consistent with the vigilance model that Janis and Mann (1977) introduced more than twenty-five years ago. Vigilance, according to these scholars, entails surveying the objectives to be fulfilled, canvassing alternative actions, searching intensively for information to be used in evaluating alternatives, reconsidering possible consequences of alternatives initially rejected, considering the comparative risks and benefits of initially preferred alternatives, choosing, making provisions for implementation, and monitoring the chosen course of action.

When the members of groups satisfy the requirements mentioned, whether in the form we have stated or an equivalent one, such as that of Bazerman (2002) or Janis and Mann (1977), the likelihood that their choices will be appropriate, if not optimal, is considerably greater than if they fail to satisfy them. From the perspective of functional theory, communication is instrumental in ensuring that such requirements are met.

Unfortunately, participants also encounter obstacles that interfere with their communication serving this function. The obstacles are often a product of three kinds of constraints, to which Janis (1989) applied the labels cognitive, affiliative, and egocentric and on which we focus in this chapter. We discuss each of these, identify some of the inhibiting influences to which they frequently give rise in various

domains of group interaction, and suggest the sorts of facilitative interventions that can one can apply.

OBSTACLES TO APPROPRIATE CHOICE MAKING

AND FACILITATIVE RESPONSES

Cognitive Constraints

Cognitive constraints, according to Janis (1989), consist of “all the salient external factors that restrict cognitive inputs . . . as well as internal factors that restrict the amount and quality of cognitive activity” (p. 17) in which decision makers engage. These include limited time, lack of expertise, multiple tasks, and ideological commitments. When the members of a group have fallen victim to a cognitive constraint, they are likely to experience feelings of psychological discomfort resulting from their perceptions concerning the amount of time available for completing their task, a lack of suitable information (or a way to integrate massive amounts of it), their ability to perform the task successfully, and conflicts with particular values to which they subscribe and that predispose them to some choices over others. Under these sorts of conditions, communication can serve to reinforce and intensify such perceptions and lead to one or more of the members’ taking the sort of mental shortcuts to choice that Nisbett and Ross (1980) refer to as heuristics.

According to Janis (1989), cognitive heuristics manifest themselves in a variety of forms, for example, concluding that the first alternative that appears on its face to be appropriate is the one to endorse, resorting to a standard operating procedure in the face of uncertainty, or analogizing and subsequently selecting the alternative that appears most strongly to resemble one that has worked under other circumstances. Decision-making and problem-solving groups, under the grip of severe cognitive constraints, may also display a pattern of avoidance and fail to choose while seeming at a superficial level to be concerned about the impact of their actions and thorough in their deliberations (Janis and Mann, 1977).

The consequences of allowing cognitive constraints to dominate the efforts of decision-making and problem-solving groups to make appropriate, informed choices can pose both substantive and procedural obstacles for members to overcome. Of course, a reliance on heuristics does not inevitably lead the members of a group to make poor choices. However, it can increase the likelihood of their doing so. At the very least, resorting to such mental shortcuts and rules reduces a group’s chances for making the best choice. In the case of avoidance, moreover, it

is clear that leaving the issue under consideration unresolved can be undesirable, as when a deadline is near but a decision does not appear to be forthcoming and the group therefore endorses the status quo by default or agrees to the least objectionable, but far from best, alternative. As a result, when a member of a group senses that a cognitive constraint has come into play in a potentially injurious way, he or she should attempt to intervene.

We do not wish to imply that making decisions quickly or avoiding doing so are inevitably in opposition to the interests of good decision making. Our concern is with the effects of the heuristics and rules to which decision makers resort that provide no assurance of sound judgment or reasoned choice.

When a cognitive constraint is operative and is adversely affecting a group’s ability to satisfy the requirements of its task, useful facilitation may consist initially of simply pointing that out, for example, “I think that we may be rushing toward a decision when I am not convinced we are ready to choose or that we need to at this point.” Having focused attention on the fact that one or more cognitive constraints are operative and exerting possibly unhealthy influences on how the group is performing, one could then easily shift into a different mode, for instance, proposing that the group halt its work until the members are able to acquire more information, suggesting that the group ask for an extension in the time allowed to complete its task, or offering reassurances that the members have the ability to perform competently if they go about the task in a thorough and vigilant manner (such as using a more powerful analytical framework to manage and integrate the available information). In the case of a group whose members are displaying avoidance behavior, a participant functioning in the role of facilitator could share his or her perception that this, rather than the nature and requirements of the task, may be the reason for their apparent inability to achieve closure and then proceed to identify what would constitute a reasonable or realistic effort to satisfy the requirements, putting the task into perspective.

Clues for how one might address situations stemming from the presence of cognitive constraints derive from work in the area of leadership. For instance, the life cycle theory of leadership (Blanchard, 1985; Hersey and Blanchard, 1993) suggests that when individuals who are in fact competent to perform a task do not see themselves as competent, a supportive style of leadership has value in motivating them to perform in a more productive manner. Borrowing from this insight, by implication, a facilitator who adopts a supportive posture and style of interaction in a group whose members, under a particular set of circumstances, doubt

their competence or ability to choose appropriately presumably could be of considerable assistance in convincing them to the contrary, and thereby freeing them from any felt need or reflexive tendency to resort to any of the various cognitive heuristics in Janis’s inventory (1989).

Affiliative Constraints

If the constraint taking hold in the discussion of a decision-making or problemsolving group qualifies as affiliative, the members are likely to be experiencing some sort of difficulty that reflects a conflict between what may be necessary to make an appropriate choice and relationships among the members. In such situations, it often, if not usually, is the case that a desire to maintain positive relationships or have a strong identification with a group has a distorting influence on how one or more members see their task and go about performing it. The preoccupation with relational needs can predispose those experiencing it to the well-known phenomenon that Irving Janis (1972, 1982) introduced under the heading of groupthink, a syndrome that can in some manifestations be a source of substantive, relational, and procedural obstacles to making optimal choices, or even reasonably good ones, in situations in which such choices may be of considerable importance. (See Chapter Seven for more information concerning groupthink.)

As in the case of cognitive constraints, when an affiliative constraint is exerting a powerful influence on the members of a group, they are likely to resort to heuristics rather than persist in a vigilant approach to the performance of their task. Among the rules that are operative, according to Janis (1989), are ones he characterizes as “avoid punishment” (a form of going along to get along), “preserve group harmony,” and, in the case of possible power struggles, “follow the party line,” “exercise one-upmanship,” and “rig meetings to suppress the opposition.” The last two aim to prevent unwanted sources of contention relating to initially preferred alternatives from even surfacing.

Janis (1982) has described various approaches to counteracting harmonypreserving heuristics in the face of affiliative constraints. These include such activities as suggesting that the group establish the role of critical evaluator and rotate it among members, that those who have strong preferences absent themselves from portions of discussions, and that members discuss the options under consideration with knowledgeable individuals who are not members of the group. Along similar lines, in playing a facilitative role, one might recommend that a

group consider adopting formal procedures, such as devil’s advocacy and dialectical inquiry (see Meyers, 1997; Schweiger, Sandburg, and Rechner, 1989), that force the members of groups to think about issues and positions on them in ways that run counter to their initial inclinations and choice-making proclivities.

Other approaches include “establishing resistance to authority [including majorities] in ways that are nonthreatening,”“trying to restore a focus on substantive concerns” when efforts to promote harmony seem to be dominating, and “looking for overarching goals” that accommodate the interests of parties who might be in dispute (see Gouran, 2003b, pp. 177–178). However, first and foremost is the need to realize, and acknowledge in a public way, that relationships, rather than issues and pertinent information, are driving the interaction. Otherwise the possibilities of overcoming these problems may be limited.

A significant challenge is to find ways to acknowledge and respect members’ needs for affiliation without permitting them to sacrifice the interests of informed choice. In this vein, various aspects of the path-goal theory of leadership (House, 1971, 1996; House and Dessler, 1974) are instructive. Of particular importance is the style of interaction that best suits one’s affiliative needs while also allowing sufficient attention to task requirements.

Just as a supportive style can be helpful to group members lacking confidence in their ability, so too can such a style enhance the performance of the members of groups who have pronounced needs for affiliation. However, such support should aim at reinforcing members’ behavior that satisfies task requirements rather than behavior that promotes positive relations. Another style that House and Dessler identify as participative can be of value as well. In short, one can contribute to the satisfaction of other group members’ affiliative needs by inviting their active involvement in a discussion, not pandering to their desires to be liked and accepted by others.

Egocentric Constraints

Egocentric constraints are present when personal needs of a controlling nature surface and influence choice making. According to Irving Janis (1989), these needs typically involve efforts “to realize personal ambitions, to counteract frustrations, to avoid damage to self-esteem, and ‘to cope with the anxiety, fear, or guilt, that they experience from time to time’ when dealing with decisional dilemmas” (p. 18). Because needs of the types mentioned are often emotionally arousing,

members of groups are given to a reliance on emotion-based rules or heuristics. Among these, Janis identifies the “rely-on-gut-feelings,” “retaliate!” and “can do! [that is, audacity]” rules.

When egocentric constraints activate such emotion-based rules, control and coping with personal needs, as opposed to making good choices, become the motives for action, as well as interaction. When this is the case, the likelihood that the affected group members will display vigilance is sharply reduced. They are much more likely to exhibit any of three patterns: defensive avoidance, essentially not making a choice; hypervigilance, or seizing on an alternative in a less-than- thoughtful manner; or bolstering, that is, endorsing whichever alternative appears to be least objectionable at the moment (Janis and Mann, 1977). We have already discussed the first two of these in connection with cognitive constraints and as responses stemming from perceptions of inadequacy and a corresponding inability to make optimal decisions. In the context here, these response mechanisms represent means of influencing interaction in ways that work to one’s perceived advantage, or what Folger, Poole, and Stutman (2001) portray as forms of dominance and issue control, and in the process to address concerns that are more compelling to them at the time than the quality of judgment and choice. In short, the parties under the influence of egocentric constraints frequently eschew the use of highquality procedures in return for the realization of self-serving ends. To the extent that there is a relationship between the quality of procedures that groups use (Herek, Janis, and Huth, 1987), resorting to self-serving rules for making choices can be detrimental to the interests of effective decision making.

In addition, because those applying egocentrically based rules do so primarily, if not exclusively, out of self-interest, their disregard for the views and feelings of others can contribute to relational difficulties. When this occurs, discussion can become a contest of wills, in which the participants are enmeshed in either of the destructive cycles of escalating hostility or withdrawal, about which Folger, Poole, and Stutman (2001) have so convincingly written.

Facilitating groups under conditions in which powerful egocentric constraints are operative can be a daunting task. But neither is one helpless in this regard. Janis (1989) mentions several measures on which one can draw. First, a group member enacting the role of facilitator can simply note that the subject is one that invites individuals to pursue self-serving interests and then make salient the norms and conventions of the group that seemingly proscribe such activity. Gouran (1982) has made much the same point for dealing with the idiosyncratic tendencies of