Добавил:
Upload Опубликованный материал нарушает ваши авторские права? Сообщите нам.
Вуз: Предмет: Файл:

прагматика и медиа дискурс / Mikhalkova_pragmatics_of_invective_some_corrections

.pdf
Скачиваний:
80
Добавлен:
08.06.2015
Размер:
1.43 Mб
Скачать

violence in organizations, derision is one of the forms of violence using language… According to Freud (1905), witticism stems from the unconscious life, and makes a distinction between the living subject and its objects. Conversely, derision causes one to laugh not at the situation but at the subject” (Faÿ 2005: 4).

According to Faÿ, derision as a speech act has the following characteristics:

expresses aggression verbally;

aimed to stand aside from the object of speech;

has a joky, not serious character.

These statements put derision close to Aristotle’s theory of degradation, according to which Comedy is low and it emerges from humiliation of someone by another who wants to confirm his or her higher status. S. V. Doronina thinks that “на шкале с такими крайними точками, как шутка и прямое оскорбление,

насмешка занимает промежуточную позицию”16 (Доронина 2000: 79). She notes that derision is based on the principle of collectivity: it “сохраняет и

“кооперативную” функцию, свойственную всякой шутке, которая используется здесь для сохранения comme il faut перед третьим лицом – свидетелем конфликта”17(Доронина 2000: 80). Derision has a double illocutive force: on the one hand, it alters reality according to all the rules of the humorous discourse; on the other hand, it expresses the aggressive position of the speaker, as it could be in the invective discourse. This presumption helps to observe the linguistic side of invective ritual in the way it shows itself in the humorous discourse – jokingly, playfully, not seriously.

We take the term derision (d) as the basis and use it to denote all the cases of straight derisive mockery in a dialogue. For the analysis of its pragmatic aspects let us use the method, suggested by J. R. Searle in his article “What is a speech act?” (1965). Searle applies his method to analyze the speech act of promise. He establishes five main rules that help to regulate this speech act. These rules can be put into a general scheme, suitable for any other kind of speech act:

16/On a scale with such extremes as a joke and a straightforward abuse derision takes a middle position./

17/…keeps ‘cooperative’ function, specific of every joke, which is used to preserve comme il faut in presence of a third party – the witness of the conflict./

Create PDF files without this message by purchasing novaPDF printer (http://www.novapdf.com)

Rule 1. Rule of propositional content.

Rule 2. Communicative strategy of the Speaker – wants to ask, promise, borrow, etc.

Rule 3. Communicative strategy of the Hearer – wants / does not want to be asked, promised, to lend, etc.

Rule 4. Illocution: intention/aim of the Speaker.

Правило 5. Essential rule (perlocution): pronouncing X counts as… (taking on an obligation, a challenge, a loan, etc.)

DERISION (D). Suppose that S pronounces a sentence T in presence of H. Then S, pronouncing T, gives H a funny name or characteristic d, that will be such, if and only if:

1.Normal input and output conditions obtain.

2.Pronouncing T, S expresses the proposition that d. This condition states the necessity of a propositional content of each separate derision.

3.In expressing that d S predicates an act A of lowering down H’s

status.

Н, having status higher than d, gets a name or a characteristic d, that lowers down his status. 2 and 3 are conditions of propositional content.

4. H would prefer not to be given a name or a characteristic d from S, rather than to be given a name or a characteristic d, and S is certain that H would prefer not to be given a name or a characteristic d from S, rather than to be given a name or a characteristic d.

Derision is not effective, if H wants to become the object of it (of course if it is not the case when H is mentally upset or has a meta-strategy – for example, in a diplomatic game or if the person functions in a community as a joker or a God’s

fool18).

18 In the folklore festive culture God’s fools have a special status: like jokers they tend to direct laughter and aggression towards themselves. Their task is to provoke sacred compensatory laughter. Bakhtin writes: “Clowns and fools, which often figure in Rabelais’ novel, are characteristic of the mediaeval culture of humor. They were the constant accredited representatives of the carnival spirit in everyday life out of carnival season.” (Bakhtin 1984: 8).

Create PDF files without this message by purchasing novaPDF printer (http://www.novapdf.com)

5.For S as well as for H it is obvious that h is not actually d; he only seems d or has some characteristic feature of d. In some cases it is italicized that H will never become d. For example, if one says “Cripple!” to a disabled person, who cannot walk, it will mean an offence, but this offence turns into a derision if one adds some other appellative components or gives a context with unreal conditions (in this case: “Try to get me!”).

4and 5 are preparatory conditions.

6.S intends to let H down and prove that he (S) thinks, he has a higher status, than H.

7.With the help of T, S wants to express his negative antagonistic attitude towards H.

8.S intends to provoke a reciprocal negative reaction from H, when H recognizes conditions 6 and 7, and S figures that this recognition will be a consequence of knowledge that sentence T is normally used to create such effect19.

9.“The semantical rules of the dialect spoken by S and H are such that T is correctly and sincerely uttered if and only if conditions 1-8 obtain” (Searle 1965: 61).

The rules of D can be formulated in the following manner:

Rule 1. The rule of propositional content. It is derived from conditions 2 and 3: D should be uttered in the context of a sentence or a bigger speech unit, pronouncing which will assign H a lower status, than the one that H has at the present moment.

Rule 2. D should be uttered, only if H would prefer S not to utter D and S is certain that H would prefer S not to utter D.

Rule 3. D should be uttered, only if it is obvious for S and H that H’s status is higher than the one that S assign to H.

19 The rule, as described by Searle (Searle 1965: 60-61), states, that “the speaker intends to produce a certain illocutionary effect by means of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to produce that effect, and he also intends this recognition to be achieved in virtue of the fact that the meaning of the item he utters conventionally associates it with producing that effect”.

Create PDF files without this message by purchasing novaPDF printer (http://www.novapdf.com)

According to Searle rules 2 and 3 are preparatory rules and are derived from preparatory conditions 4 and 5.

Rule 4. D should be uttered, only if S intends to show that his status is higher than H’s status.

Rule 5. Essential rule: Uttering D reveals antagonistic attitude of S to H and is aimed to provoke a reciprocal antagonism in H.

Analyzing derision, using Searle’s method, we stated five rules that guarantee its effectiveness. The next step is to relate derision with invective.

Rule 1. The propositional content of derision will be the name of H and the name, given by S to H (“H is d”). In a humorous discourse this name has a semantics of destructor, rule-breaker, and it refers to the archetype of trickster. In reality H is not d, so the formula can also contain tha negation of the real name: “H is not H, but d”, or “H is not-H”, where “not-H d”. “Not-H” will mean that S doubts that H’s real name is H. This reversion correspond with the general idea that Comedy puts common order upside down, so that top becomes bottom, real turns into unreal, right – into wrong.

Rules 2 and 3. These rules explain the narrative strategy of S (attacks) and H (has to protect himself). It should be noted that the position of the one who attacks first is more advantageous, than the one who is provoked – it is conditioned by unwillingness of any addressee to be let down and be called d.

Rule 4. Uttering D, S states that his status is higher than H’s, otherwise he does not have the right to mock at the antagonist. In the invective S takes on a role of prosecutor – so emerges the aspect of accusation (finding guilt).

Rule 5. In his article “What is a Speech Act?” J. Searle notes that any rules that regulate human activity can be divided into two types: regulative (organize activity that existed before the rule was created, for example, etiquette in courtship regulates the way of expressing feelings) and constitutive (create and define new forms of behavior, for example in any card-game the game won’t start until the rules are specified). If the first type of rules has the form of imperative (“Do X” or “If Y, do x”), then the second type together with the imperative form have the form

Create PDF files without this message by purchasing novaPDF printer (http://www.novapdf.com)

“X counts as Z (if Y)” (Searle 1965: 34). Let us see if Rule 5 for invective can be put in the form “counts as”?

Why does S want to make his antagonistic intentions obvious for H? According to the mediaeval narrative practice20 derision is a variant of a verbal battle, that precedes a physical competition. I. e. initially uttering D counts as a gage, a challenge to fight, and so the reciprocal hostility of H counts as taking up gage. Therefore Rule 5 explains the ludic aspect of derision, when the preparatory rules assign roles to the “fighting” communicants.

Considering the semantics of humor and the theory of archetypes, invective has the following set of pragmatic characteristics. In the communicative situation both addresser and addressee take a first-hand part. The aim of invective is to challenge the opponent to a verbal battle and win over him, getting the acceptance by a third party (a crowd or an authority). The communicative strategy of the addresser includes words with negative emotive and evaluative connotations (metaphors and hyperboles are quite common as well). Invective makes addresser and addressee play roles of trickster and cultural hero. The message contains information about the “guilt” of the addressee: he or she has a quality or committed an act, of which the addresser accuses him. At the same time, the addresser stands in position of a higher, better person, devoid of these deficiencies. He has a legal power to prosecute against the one, who is lower than he, because he postulates himself as the leader. The addresser – cultural hero – has a function to put order into the society, that is why he or she should convince the crowd, that the addressee brings damage and his or her status is not legitimate. In the reciprocal invective he or she will have to protect their interests in leadership. If the leader is proclaimed after the victory, the looser, former pretender, is thrown down with the help of laughter. The accusation can contain information about breaking a taboo, deviant behavior, friendship or family relation with lower class, enemies or castaways. The function of invective is to reconstruct social hierarchy, confirm the earlier given status, establish leadership, isolate the unwanted elements.

20 See the article “From accusation to narration” by E. A. Gurevich (Гуревич 2004).

Create PDF files without this message by purchasing novaPDF printer (http://www.novapdf.com)

§ 1.2.2. STRUCTURE OF INVECTIVE NAMES

AS THE BASIS FOR A COMPARATIVE STUDY

Let us define now what will be the object of analysis in the compared scripts of comedy TV-shows. In the text it will be an invective name (d), which the addresser (S) ascribes to the addressee (H) directly (with the help of verbs of naming) or indirectly (giving unreal conditions, hyperbolization, etc.). The invective name will be a word, a set of words or word-phrases that in the process of naming H will differ from H so, that it will lower his status and find his guilt in breaking the social order.

Invective names can be viewed as a result of nomination: they are a product of language activity of a nominator. In the speech act of derision this name is attached to the actual object of derision through a number of characteristics, corresponding with actual characteristics of the object, mentioned within these names.

Let us analyze the following example of a joke from the Russian TV-show Comedy Club: “If Rambo spent 20 years captive in a Vietnamese camp, he would look like Vadik ‘Rambo’ Galygin” (Ведущий Арташес Саркисян объявляет выход Вадика «Рембо» Галыгина, выпуск 21, 15.10.2005. – из личной видеоколлекции, Е. М.). The extra-linguistic context helps to establish nomination through the match of the key characteristic of the two people – their appearance. There are obviously some common features between them: dark hair, high cheekbones. On the other hand, there is a difference that makes the comparison humorous: unlike the movie-character, Vadim Galygin is skinny and weak (which could happen to any person who has spent 20 years captive). His “guilt” is that he belongs to an out-group of physically insufficient people and that is why he cannot claim leadership within this context.

The linguistic side of this invective can be shown in the structure of the invective name:

Create PDF files without this message by purchasing novaPDF printer (http://www.novapdf.com)

1 2 3

Н is not Н, but d; where d not-Н

An invective name includes:

1.A real name or characteristic of ‘H’ (Vadyk ‘Rambo’ Galygin);

2.Somebody else’s or a created name ‘not-Н’ (Rambo);

3.Characteristics or any other semantic components ‘d’, that add to or explain ‘not-H’ (spent 20 years captive in a Vietnamese camp).

The second naming of H with the help of not-H is occasional, but d has some features as well that are common for all invective names as they are based on the archetype of trickster. His typical characteristics are: physical deficiencies (small, ugly, crippled, weak, has animal features), deviant social behavior, strange likes, aggressiveness, lack of reason. Though these features are universal, in different cultures they tend to join into clusters. For example, in the Western culture small height and ugly appearance were united in numerous images of evil spirits – dwarves, Alrauns, elves. The Russian culture would rather treat small people as children and would not on the common basis notice their ugliness.

The number of differences grows bigger at the level of cultural and social stereotypes. For example, the emancipation of women in the XIX c. gave rise to a lot of jokes with gender-confused images of female politicians (in SNL it was lately reflected in the image of Hillary Clinton, taking part in the President elections last year). On the ground of these stereotypes groups of images form. In a derision they easily provoke audience’s laughter and give a basis for social discrimination. The French semiotician Jean Baudrillard offers a list of social groups that in modern culture are judged as worthy of isolation from the society of ‘normal people’: “But the old have also become ‘inhuman’, pushed to the fringes of normality. Like so many others, the mad, children and the old have only become ‘categories’ under the sign of the successive segregations that have marked the development of culture. The poor, the under-developed, those with subnormal IQs, perverts, transsexuals, intellectuals and women form a folklore of terror”

Create PDF files without this message by purchasing novaPDF printer (http://www.novapdf.com)

(Baudrillard 1976: 126). In the invective these groups represent the destructive function of humor, advancing different types of social conflict.

Finally, at the level of modern informational context invective becomes most obscure for people of a different culture. It is restricted by laws of a local cultural and media communication (social connections, political situation, mass media discourse) that form a special surface level of invective semantics.

All in all, there seems to be four major levels that collect and structure the invective semantics:

 

 

Table 1

 

 

Levels of invective semantics

 

 

 

LEVEL

DESCRIPTION

1.

Archetype

The deepest level of semantic activity, where meaning is not

 

 

anyhow connected to the modern communicational and

 

 

cultural context of the speaker. At this level the invective

 

 

meaning, according to our understanding of the problem, is

 

 

drawn from the archetype of trickster.

2.

Cluster

Specific for the speaker’s cultural background way of joining

 

 

and associating archetypical semes within one context.

3.

Stereotype

At this level perception of a phenomenon is conditioned by

 

 

the cultural and social history it has within this context.

4.

Actual

Realia, allusions of the culture. The surface level, where

 

informational

semantics is connected with the actual context of the speaker,

 

context

his/her informational background. It is most influenced by

 

 

mass media discourse and mundane communication.

At this stage of research the question rises whether it is possible to classify the invective on the basis of its semantics. First, it should be noted that, despite the four-level structure, invective semantics is deeply integrated in the archetypical level, where humor finds its carnival nature. Thus, the archetypical features, being immediate constituents of carnival humor semantics, can be traced at all levels. Second, we should also consider the discussion, that humor semantics is based on the archetype of trickster. If it is so, then the key characteristics of trickster will be found in any humorous image and so they will be immediate constituents of an

Create PDF files without this message by purchasing novaPDF printer (http://www.novapdf.com)

invective name. We are now concerned with a set of these key features as the basis

for the classification.

Let us compare several classifications, that mention humor semantics or

invective:

1.the key features of the bearer of humor semantics – classification by I. P. Smirnov (see above in § 1.1.): meeting biological needs, loss of material attributes, loss of reason, ill condition, confusing human and animal;

2.“inhumans”, by J. Baudrillard: the old, the mad, children, the poor, the under-developed, people with subnormal IQs, perverts, transsexuals, intellectuals and women;

3.gender-oriented classification of invectives, suggested by D. Holland and

D.Skinner (quoted from: Жельвис 2001: 69): (addressed to women) breaking promise to have a sexual intercourse, deviant social behavior, i. e. breaking norms, ugliness / unattractiveness, promiscuity; (addressed to men) femaleness, weakness, insincerity, meanness, insufficiency, unattractiveness or attractiveness, but with a lot of aggressive sexuality;

4.a number of themes, found in invectives in all cultures – classification by

V.I. Zhelvis: names of animals, names of biowaste, names of parts of body, names of despised professions, names of acts of obscene character, names of plants, names of inanimate objects, names of physical and intellectual deficiencies, proper names, chauvinistic nicknames, swearing connected with different religions and ideologies, names of relatives

(especially the deceased), names of maladies (Жельвис 2001: 219-220). These classifications do not correspond, but they have several common components. Humor and invective discourses both in a way express aggression towards a cultural bearer, mentioning his/her physiological deficiencies, personal failures (especially in relations with the other sex), sinful inclinations, wrong origin and other deviances from social standard. Moreover, these accusations portray his/her natural inclinations, that ruin the set order in culture. Summing up all the

trickster’s guilt before the society, we get a following set of key invectives:

Create PDF files without this message by purchasing novaPDF printer (http://www.novapdf.com)

Invective of physical deficiencies;

Invective of intellectual deficiencies;

Invective of age;

Invective of social status;

Invective of animalistic character;

Invective of deviant social behavior;

Invective of destructive nature;

Invective of unusual sexual likes;

Invective of unusual nutritive likes;

Invective of origin and family connections.

In a comparative study of invective names we hope to research, how the level of archetype retains all these types unchanged by the social, historical and cultural development of language. Furthermore, the semantic clusters will illustrate some cultural key images, that lie behind actual invective names and stereotypes will consequently characterize that side of these images, that is conditioned by social-historical perception and categorization of different phenomena. The last level will show fluctuation of different features, caused by processes of modern communication. This level, being most inexplicit for different cultures, also shows divergence in media context in the texts analyzed.

CONCLUSION (FIRST CHAPTER)

1.The scientific theory of the category of humor started to form in works of classic philosophers. Aristotle was the first to suggest the theory of degradation, defining comedy as “imitating lower people”, but not serious and without pain. Later multiple theories of humor appeared to explain the essence of humorous semantics.

2.Nowadays, the aesthetic approach offers a dual understanding of the nature of comedy: it has a humorous and a satirical side. The humorous side is connected with the carnival nature of humor (Bakhtin) and is culturally parallel

Create PDF files without this message by purchasing novaPDF printer (http://www.novapdf.com)