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Alessandro Duranti. Linguistic Anthropology.pdf
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Speaking as social action

Austin’s criteria give us insights into the kinds of factors that are involved in making a given speech act successful (both in terms of its production and its comprehension). At the same time, they leave us with several questions unanswered, including the range of ways in which illocutionary force is encoded in an utterance and the extent to which the interpretation of illocutionary force could follow universal principles. These issues have been behind the attention given since the 1970s to indirect speech acts, that is, utterances that, without having the grammatical form of imperatives or commands, conventionally have the force of a directive (see the articles in Cole and Morgan 1975).

7.2.1.1Indirect speech acts

Indirect speech acts might have the shape of questions and hence be classifiable as requests for information – see examples (5) and (6) – or the shape of declarative sentences (in the grammatical sense of “declarative”15) and hence be classifiable as assertions – see (7) and (8) –, but in most contexts they seem to work as requests for action (from Searle 1975):

(5)Can you reach the salt?

(6)Could you be a little more quiet?

(7)I can’t see the movie screen while you have that hat on.

(8)I would like you to go now.

Several competing proposals were made to account for these phenomena (see Levinson 1983 for an insightful review of several theories). These proposals had to face the issues of generalizability and universality. Where does the knowledge that speakers of English have in interpreting these sentences come from? Could generalizable, perhaps universal principles be found that would account for how indirect speech acts were produced and understood? Different principles were proposed, including the principle of conversational cooperation (Grice 1975; Levinson 1983), conversational postulates (Gordon and Lakoff 1975), and generalizations based on the notion of preparatory (read “felicity”) conditions like the following (from Searle 1975: 72):

15The term “declarative sentence” here must be distinguished from “declarative speech act” used by Searle (see above). “Declarative sentence” (which is in this case closer to what Searle calls “assertion”) is used by grammarians to refer to sentences in the form of statements, that is, utterances that are “subject to judgments of truth and falsehood” (Sadock and Zwicky 1985: 160). The terminological confusion is not helped by those grammarians who have used illocutionary force as one of the criteria for defining “declarative sentences.” For instance, Sadock and Zwicky (1985: 165) attempted a match between form and function by defining declarative as a sentence type that conveys “assertions, expressions of belief, reports, conclusions, narratives, assessment of likelihood, expressions of doubt, and the like.”

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