es6

Table III. Civil war outcome and international

sanctions

(multinomial

logit)

y =

1, conflict resolved through military

y = 2, conflict

resolved through negotiated

means

settlement

variables

(1)

(2)(3)(2)(1)(3)

Independent

Intercept

2.03

1.22

(1.76)

(2.12)

Mountains

0.008

0.004

(0.010)

(0.010)

Forests

0.020*

0.023*

(0.012)

(0.012)

Log

population

0.006

-0.073

(0.270)

(0.292)

Log

GDP

per

capita

-0.705**

-0.539

(0.331)

(0.368)

Oil

production

14.78**

12.72*

(6.51)

(6.86)

Diamond production

1.55

1.80

(1.05)

(4.44)

Ethnic fractionalization

4.84

6.25

(4.61)

(8.35)

(Ethnic

fractionalization)2

-4.96- .19

(4.69)

(7.88)

Contraband

-1.42**

-1.37**

(0.633)

(0.684)

Number

of borders

-0.235*

-0.186

(0.122)

(0.126)

Army size (log)

-0.283

-0.319

(0.273)

(0.324)

Deaths/year

2.08e-06

3.89e-06

Ethnicwar

(3.11e-06)

(3.96e-06)

0.516

0.598

(0.570)

(0.674)

Sons

of

soil

war

-2.56**

-2.45**

(1.20)

(1.19)

Military

intervention -0.293

(0.588)

Non-institutional

sanction

1.17***1.19***

(0.367)

(0.385)

International

institution

sanction

0.6540.582

(0.761)

(0.935)

Int.

institution

sanction

(no member)

Int.

institution

sanction

(membet)

Model

1

Duration

splines

yes

Observations

612

Log-pseudolikelihood

-159.91

0.1692

Pseudo

R-squared

Robust

standard errors in parentheses.

**><

.01; **/><

.05;><

.10.

Cooperation

and commercial

interdependence

are

likely

to

be

found

among

the members

of

some

multilateral

organizations.

To

test this straightforwardproposition,

I have

recoded

the

variable used

inModel

1 by dividing the sanctions imposed

by

an

international

institution

into

two

extra

dummy

1.27

5.25

7.19

6.00

(2.13)

(4.43)

(6.05)

(6.32)

0.004

-0.044

-0.046

-0.045

(0.010)

(0.038)

(0.046)

(0.048)

0.023*

-0.030

-0.047**

-0.056*

(0.012)

(0.022)

(0.019)

(0.029)

-0.074

-0.816

-1.02

-1.17

(0.289)

(0.504)

(0.749)

(0.827)

-0.542

-0.222

-0.060

0.331

(0.369)

(0.559)

(0.686)

(0.696)

12.79*

-25.45

-34.33

-80.32

(6.85)

(23.13)

(34.49)

(54.75)

1.89

3.16*

2.67

10.93

(4.59)

(1.66)

(5.29)

(7.17)

6.25

6.01

2.57

3.51

(8.31)

(7.30)

(11.49)

(14.31)

-6.20

-10.16

-7.86

-9.96

(7.84)

(8.29)

(13.37)

(16.75)

-1.38**

-0.954

-0.701

-1.01

(0.689)

(0.841)

(0.904)

(0.978)

-0.187

0.382*

0.489*

0.708**

(0.128)

(0.232)

(0.294)

(0.351)

-0.322

-0.744**

-0.836*

-1.20*

(0.322)

(0.380)

(0.440)

(0.687)

3.88e-06

-6.13e-06

-2.36e-06

-8.90e-06

(3.96e-06)

(0.00002)

(0.00003)

(0.00004)

0.601

0.784

0.366

0.197

(0(0.672).893)

(1.18)(1.34)

-2.45**

-1.97

-1.93

-2.49

(1.17)

(2.02)

(2.51)

(3.11)

-0.292 -1.63*

-1.67*

(0.587)

(0.865)

(0.896)

1.19***

0.374

0.5660.645

(0.381)

(0.600)

(0.557)

(0.451)

1.84**

2.32*

(0.922)

(1.23)

0.553

0.116

(1.49)

(0.883)

0.561

3.45**

(0.981)

(1.59)

2

3

yes

yes

589

589

-142.65

-141.64

0.1873

0.1931

by an international

institution

but is not member

of that insti

tution,and the second iscoded 1 ifthecountry isbeing sanc

tionedby an internationalinstitutiontowhich

itbelongs.The

coefficientsof the

newly

createddummies

confirmour

largely

Escriba-Folch_139

expectations.

Note

first that

the

strong

positive

impact

of'non

institutional'

sanctions

on military

victory

is not

altered. In

contrast,

for

those

countries

belonging

to

the

institution

imposing

the

sanctions,

the

impact

of

such

coercive

measures

is

great

and

The

estimated

probability

of a

negoti

significant.

ated settlement is0.0008 when

no sanction ispresent; ifthe

country

is targeted

by

sanctions

of

an

international

institution

itbelongs

to, the probability of a negotiated

termination is

0.024.

On

the

other

hand,

a

country

under

non

no sanc

theconflictresolved throughmilitarymeans, while if

tion is imposed, the likelihood is just 0.023.

Table IV shows theresultsof theeffectsof the typesofmea

sure sanctions involve on war outcome. These

results should

be carefully interpretedas theyare quite

sensitive to sample

size,which in this case

is restrictedto theTIES

data (from

1971).

To

increase

the

number

of

observations,

the

variable

'log GDP

per capita'

has

been

ruled

out,

since itwas

not

sig

nificant

anyway,

and

we

use the natural

resources

dummies.

The

evidence suggests that the only measures

effective in

shortening

conflicts

are

total

embargoes,

which

increase

the

trast, international

arms

embargoes

have

a

negative

and

signif

icant impact on

the probability of a military victory.This

has been

irrelevant at best,

and even counterproductive

(Tierney,

2005). Multilateral

arms embargoes may re

of a

settlement.17

This

latter finding

supports

to some

extent

the proposition

that

arms embargoes

decrease

uncertainty

over

each

party's power.

Other

results

of

these

tables merit

comment:

military

inter

The

inclusion of thisvariable reduces the sample somewhat

and

slightlyalters some of the results.Again, contraband

of a military victory,as

it allows

the rebels to finance their

activities.

The

number

of

borders

has

contradictory

effects.

On

theone hand, it serves tohinder amilitary victory (argu

ably,

by

government

forces),

since

it eases the maintenance

of

rebel bases outside

the boundaries of the state; but, on

the

other hand,

it increases the likelihood of a negotiated resolu

tion, as

inDeRouen

&

Sobek (2004). The size of the army

also

represents

a significant

obstacle

to

a negotiated

resolution

of conflicts,

as itmay

tend

to make

the government

overesti

mate

its relativestrength,pe, and

the probability ofwinning

(Mason &

Fett, 1996). Natural resources,both diamonds and

oil, are

again

related to shorterwars,

differ

although through

ent mechanisms.

Abundant

forest

areas

increase the

likelihood

17

at the 0.10 level; the

is0.105.

The coefficient is almost

significant

Rvalue

Table

IV. Types

of sanction and civil war outcome

(multinomial

logit)

Event: Civil

war

outcome

=

j

Military

Negotiated

Independent

variables

victory

settlement

Intercept

-0.1679.09

(0.278)

(6.15)

Mountains

-0.012

-0.041

(0.012)

(0.043)

Forests

0.003

-0.081*

(0.015)

(0.043)

Log

population

-0.481*

-1.12**

(0.261)

(0.568)

Mineral exporting

4 71***

6.45**

(1.81)

(2.60)

Oil

exporting

0.257

0.441

(0.566)

(1.57)

Ethnic

fractionalization

14.68

0.739

(9.53)

(14.06)

(Ethnic

-15.84*

-5.58

fractionalization)2

(9.27)

(15.22)

Contraband

-1.53**

-3.08

(0.748)

(2.14)

Number ofborders

0.141

0.665**

(0.114)

(0.302)

Army

size

(log)

-0.663*

-1.56***

(0.372)

(0.498)

Deaths/year

0.00001**

1.15e-06

(0.00004)

(5.64e-06)

Ethnic

war

1.16

-0.373

(0.761)

(1.25)

Sons

of soil war

-2.36***

-2.56

(0.666)

(2.34)

Military

intervention

-0.656 -1.34***

(0.629)

(0.490)

Total

embargo

2.04***6.03***

(0.634)

(1.98)

Aid

termination

0.7810.692

(0.479)

(1.42)

Trade

restrictions

0.5081.60

arms

(0.671)

(2.08)

Multilateral

-1.48** 1.71

embargo

(0.673)

(1.05)

Other

sanctions

0.5381.02

(1.10)

(1.45)

Duration

splines

Yes

Observations

592

Log-pseudolikelihood

-141.65

Pseudo

R-squared

0.2152

Robust

standard errors in parentheses.

***/><

.01;**/><

.05;><

.10.

variables

that often assess

the success

of

a sanction

episode

of

sanctions

in a very specific

context,

civil war duration,

using

a

time-series

cross-sectional

dataset

and a

direct measure

of

event occurrence,

civil war

termination

and

outcome.

parties' viability of continued fighting.Our

second proposi

tion

contended

that

those

sanctions

maximizing

the

costs to

bemore

the

would

effectivethanother

of

targeted

target

war

to an end.

types

measures

in

Finally,

I further

bringing

proposed

that

those

sanctions

imposed

by an

international

institution

would

be more

effective in augmenting

the probability of

intrastate

conflict termination.

Our

empirical

evidence

using

new

data

on

sanctions

shows

that,

effectively,

sanctions

have

had a

significant

and

negative

impact

on

intrastate

conflict

duration.

Moreover,

this effect

grows

the more

years

a given

country

is targeted.

These

results

military

interventions.

Moreover,

the

empirical

evidence

seems

to

suggest that

the most

successful measures

so far have

been

total

economic

embargoes.

Such

measures

are

shown to

settlement,

while

international arms

embargoes

are found

only

to

decrease the likelihood of a

military victoryby

significantly

one of

the

parties.

about

the efficacy of

sanctions

Regarding

the debate

imposed

by

international

institutions or not,

this

article

has

imposed

by

international

institutions

significantly

increase

the

likelihood of conflict resolution, especially

if the targeted

country

is amember

of

the

organization.

In

contrast,

sanctions

applied by other bodies aremuch more

conducive tomilitary

victories.

In sum,

the

article

has

several

policy

implications.

First,

it

suggests

that,

overall,

sanctions

have

been

relatively

useful

in

helping

to

shorten

civil wars,

as

the

statistical

association

sug

gests.

Yet,

this

role needs

to

be

improved.

Concretely,

our

results suggest that any coercivemeasures

should preferably

be conducted by

we

internationalorganizations, especially if

are

interested

in

promoting

conflict

resolution.

Concerning

themeasures

imposed, the evidence suggests thatmaximizing

costs

via

embargoes

ismore

effective

than other

sanction

types.

Multilateral

arms

embargoes

can

also

result

in

increased

chances

of

negotiated

settlement,

although

implementation

problems so farhave

limited theireffectiveness,as remarked

by many

scholars.

Replication

data

in this article can

be

found

at

The

data

used

http://

www.

prio. no/j

pr/datasets.

140

journal a/Peace

Research

47(2)

Acknowledgements

for sharing thedata on sanctions and

I thankCliftonMorgan

the editor, T?nia Verge

and

three anonymous

referees

for very

d'Estudis

Internationals,

where

this research was

started,

and

all thepeople there.

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