Legislation as Intergroup Negotiation

Another dimension of the role of organized groups in the political process may be seen in the phenomenon of legislation by negotiation. An act of a legislature may be in reality only the ratification of an agreement negotiated by the representatives of those private groups with an interest in a specific question. The legislative body, far from being pressured into conversion of private understandings into the law of the land, may act with an alacrity that comes from the pleasure of avoiding the agony of deciding a dispute between groups.

An illustration of this pattern, drawn from the work of the Vermont legislature, has been recorded in detail by Oliver Garceau and Corinne Silverman. In 1951 the Associated Industries of Vermont found itself faced by a ClO-sponsored proposal to bring silicosis under the Workman's Compensation Act. The Associated Industries, on the other hand, wished to tighten the eligibility requirements for unemployment benefits, while the CIO favored an increase in both the duration and the level of benefits. In the negotiations the CIO, bargaining from a relatively weak position, agreed not to push its bills for more liberal unemployment benefits; the AIV agreed to drop its plea for tightened qualifications for benefits. The AIV conceded an occupational disease bill to deal with the silicosis question in a manner far less unacceptable to it than was the CIO proposal. All these negotiations took place in a situation that limited the demands each group could make. Enactment by the legislature came automatically when sponsors of the legislation announced that both industry and labor thought the bill should pass. The operation involved no buttonholing or pressuring of legislators, only a few of whom knew of the negotiations leading to the agreement.

In Illinois the process of legislation by negotiation has at times been formalized, according to studies by Gilbert Y. Steiner. Early in the century agreements between Illinois miners and operators "stipulated that neither party should introduce bills affecting the industry without previously consulting with the other." Under these arrangements the terms of a good many legislative proposals were fixed by collective bargaining. Labor might yield a point here and the operators concede a point there. An "agreed" bill would then be supported before the legislature by both the union and the operators, a set of circumstances likely to produce legislative results. Negotiation apparently became feasible in part because either group could block within the legislature proposals by the other.

These examples of lawmaking by negotiation among private groups followed by formal legislative ratification raise the question of how frequently this pattern occurs. Does a large proportion of legislation find its way to the statute books by this means? The answer is that nobody knows, but many acts are preceded by negotiation and agreement among private groups. Often, predictable opposition from other groups moves the interest sponsoring legislation to yield a point in advance with or without negotiation. The pattern shades over into one in which members of the legislative committee mediate among affected groups and bring them to agreement. Legislators, rather than undertake the onerous task of negotiating a compromise or the painful responsibility of deciding between conflicting interests, may even postpone action until the groups concerned narrow their differences. Administrative agencies at times take the lead in the negotiation of agreement among groups interested in legislation.