English for European Studies Students

3.Write a summary of the text using at lest 10 words and phrases from Ex.

1and 2.

4.Fill in the gaps with an appropriate preposition.

1.The PCA provision ______ trade does not apply _______ certain textile products and nuclear material.

2._____ regard ______ international maritime transport, the parties must apply effectively the principle of unrestricted access ______ the market and trade ______ a commercial basis.

3._____ essence, economic cooperation is aimed ______ contributing ______ the economic reform and rehabilitation process and to sustainable development in the new independent states.

4.Quantitative restrictions _______ imports may no longer apply between the parties and goods must be traded ______ the market price.

5.Fill in the gaps with the correct option from below.

EU – Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (1997)

The aim of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) 1_________encourage political, commercial, economic and cultural cooperation between Russia and the EU. It is the 2_________ of the joint commitment of the EU and Russia to promote partnership and understanding for mutual benefit.

Signed in June 1994, the PCA entered into force in December 1997. 3_________

commitments were set out in the 112 articles, ten annexes, two protocols and several joint declarations of the original Agreement.

The PCA represents a visionary 4__________ from both sides. It is ambitious in 5__________, covering almost all aspects of EU-Russia trade, commercial and economic relations, and instituting political communication up to the highest levels. It places a respect for human rights and democratic processes at the very 6_________ of the relationship. It is truly 7_____________: covering subjects as diverse as the exchange of best practice and know-how on the management of postal systems, to the conservation and preservation of sites and monuments.

The process of the PCA 8__________ was complicated by a number of circumstances, especially by Russian forces’ military 9__________ in Chechnya. With the start of peaceful negotiations in Chechen republic the ratification process 10__________: in October-November 1996 the PCA was ratified by the State Duma and the Federation Council, in October 1997 its ratification was completed by the EU member-states.

Task

Prepare for the seminar “The Problem 2007” – ratification of a new Russia–EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.

The link below can be of some help: http://www.globalaffairs.ru/books/6816.html

Render the article

Между нефтью и мясом

На пути сближения России и Евросоюза возникло новое препятствие. К Польше, которая уже несколько месяцев блокирует начало переговоров по новому договору о сотрудничестве между РФ и ЕС, готова присоединиться Литва. Вильнюс, как и Варшава, пытается переместить проблему из сферы двусторонних отношений с Москвой на общеевропейский уровень.

Недовольство Вильнюса вызвано затянувшимся ремонтом трубопровода «Дружба». В июле прошлого года российская компания «Транснефть» прекратила перекачку топлива в Литву из-за аварии на «Дружбе». Черное золото предназначалось для нефтеперерабатывающего завода Mazeikiu Nafta. Последствия аварии до сих пор не устранены. В Вильнюсе усматривают в этом политические мотивы.

В 2007 году Литва и Польша планируют провести в Вильнюсе конференцию по энергетике на высшем уровне. Тон форума наверняка будет критическим в отношении России. Руководство обеих стран ранее неоднократно обвиняло Москву в «манипуляциях» с поставками энергоносителей в Европу.

Объединив усилия, Варшава и Вильнюс тормозят сближение России и Евросоюза. Действующее соглашение о партнерстве и сотрудничестве истекает в ноябре этого года. СПС может автоматически продлеваться, но оно устарело. Чем раньше будет готов новый договор, тем лучше и для России, и для ЕС.

Соглашение о партнерстве и сотрудничестве - основной документ, регулирующий отношения России и ЕС. Оно затрагивает самые разные сферы, но основной является энергетика – поставка российской нефти и газа в Европу. После отказа России ратифицировать Европейскую энергетическую хартию, подписание нового договора о сотрудничестве стало особенно актуальным. Брюссель надеется включить в текст документа основные положения хартии, в частности принципы энергобезопасности. Страны ЕС хотели бы улучшить механизмы информирования и реагирования в случае чрезвычайных ситуаций, таких например, как нефтегазовые войны с Украиной и Белоруссией. На западе некоторые аналитики полагают, что для Москвы в первую очередь важен сам факт успеха переговоров с европейцами. То есть, по их мнению, это такой приоритет российской дипломатии. Но и само содержание нового договора о стратегическом сотрудничестве, безусловно, имеет большое значение. Россия никогда не согласиться с возможностью участия зарубежных инвесторов в нашей системе транспортировки нефти и газа, которая предусмотрена хартией. А поскольку Европа зависит от российских поставок энергоресурсов - Москва чувствует себя уверенно и может диктовать свои условия, заключают эксперты.

Общий контур нового договора о стратегическом партнерстве уже ясен. Это будет небольшой документ, построенный по принципу четырех общих пространств – экономического; свободы, безопасности и правосудия; внешней безопасности; науки и образования, включая культурные аспекты.

Для того чтобы начать переговоры по новому договору, Еврокомиссия должна получить мандат от всех 27 стран – членов сообщества. В прошлом году Польша заблокировала этот процесс, поставив свое согласие на переговоры в зависимость от снятия Москвой запрета на поставки ее сельхозпродукции. Урегулирование противоречий между Москвой и Варшавой не обязательно снимет проблему литовского вето.

(По материалам «Независимой Газеты» и радиостанции «Эхо Москвы»)

Unit 17. European Union – Russia: History of Relations (1988-1993)

Reading

EU – Russia relations have relatively short history. Despite being neighbours, neither the EC nor the USSR made any cooperation proposals until 1988. The EC and the USSR had absolutely different economies, political regimes, and views on public development in their countries. The USSR was an active actor on the international scene as a USA opponent, while the EC took an inbetween position – closer to the USA rather than to the USSR.

One of the first objectives of the EC was opposing imperial pursuit of the USSR. That is why there appeared an idea of creating a semi-federal union of European states able to compete with Russia in Asia and the USA in America.

Since the 1950s the USSR put great efforts into economic cooperation with East European countries in the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Meanwhile the EC refused to recognise CMEA as a trade partner.

Although CMEA was loosely referred to as the "European Economic Community (EEC) of Eastern Europe", important contrasts existed between the two organizations. Both of them administered economic integration; however, their economic structure, size, balance, and influence differed.

In the 1980s, the EC incorporated the 270 million people of Western Europe into economic association through intergovernmental agreements aimed at maximizing profits and economic efficiency on a national and international scale. It was a regionally, not ideologically, integrated organization, whose members had all attained an accomplished level of industrialization and were considered to be roughly equal trading partners. The EC was a supranational body that could adopt decisions (such as removing tariffs) and enforce them. Activity by members was based on initiative and enterprise from below (on the individual or enterprise level) and was strongly influenced by market forces.

CMEA joined together 450 million people in 10 countries and on 3 continents. The level of industrialization from country to country differed greatly: the organization linked three underdeveloped countries – Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam – with some highly industrialized states. Likewise, a large national income difference existed between European and non-European members. The physical size, military power, and political and economic resource base of the Soviet Union made it the dominant member. In trade among CMEA members, the Soviet Union usually provided raw materials, and East European countries provided finished equipment and machinery. The three underdeveloped CMEA members had a special relationship with the other seven. CMEA realized disproportionately more political than economic gains from its heavy contributions to these three countries' underdeveloped economies. Socialist economic integration or "plan coordination" formed the basis of CMEA’s activities. In this system, which mirrored the member countries' planned economies, the decisions handed down from above ignored the influences of market forces or private initiative. CMEA had no supranational authority to make decisions or to implement them. Its recommendations could only be adopted with the full concurrence of interested parties and did not affect those members who declared themselves disinterested parties.

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As the period of great changes in the USSR started, the attitude of the Soviet authorities to the EC began to change. On 25 June 1988 EC and CMEA achieved a milestone by signing a Joint Declaration in Luxembourg which formalised their mutual recognition and opened the possibility for cementing diplomatic relations and concluding bilateral agreements between the EC and individual states within the Soviet bloc. The Declaration gave the USSR an opportunity to exceed the narrow bounds of CMEA and take an important step towards full international relations. The key idea of the Declaration was encouraging economic cooperation between the USSR and EC.

After signing the Joint Declaration, on 18 December 1989 the USSR and the EC concluded Trade and Cooperation Agreement that served as a basis for the development of bilateral relations. Above all, it envisaged the elimination of quantitative restrictions on import of some goods from the USSR (excluding coal, steel, and textile products.)

At the Rome Summit on 14-15 December 1990 an agreement on financial aid to the economic reforms in the USSR was reached. To implement this idea the TACIS (Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States) programme was established. It was aimed at the former USSR republics and Mongolia in their transitional periods from planned to market economy.

These were the first steps of the Russia – EU cooperation. It is worth mentioning that the EU was interested in Russia mainly as the source of raw materials and know-how. In the 1990s the democratic processes began in Russia. Not all the reforms were successful, but on the whole they were approved by the EU. However, in comparison with East and Central European countries the policy of the EU towards Russia and CIS was not targeted at far-reaching aims.

At the Essen Summit (9-10 December 1994) the EU adopted a pre-accession strategy for Eastern and Central European countries and this established a clear trajectory to full membership. Russia by contrast neither showed any official interest in membership nor did the EU envisage expansion further eastward beyond the associated countries. Thus by mid-1990s it was clear that a new EU curtain was emerging across Europe and that Russia and the CIS countries generally were not regarded as candidates for membership of the EU for the foreseeable future.

Comprehension Check

1.What was sort of organisation was CMEA?

2.What were the differences between CMEA and EEC?

3.Why did the EEC get interested in cooperation with CMEA?

4.What steps were taken towards closer cooperation between 1988 and 1991?

Vocabulary Activities

1. Match two parts of the phrases.

2. Complete the sentences with your own ideas.

a)The government of every country should envisage ………………………………………….

b)If an underdeveloped country wants to attain high living standards, it has to ……………..

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c)What forms the basis of……………………………. is ……………………………………..

d)To achieve a milestone in negotiations the parties should …………………………………..

e)The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation is opposing …………………..

f)Only people who …………………………………… can follow orders handed from above.

g)I take an in-between position in the issue of …………………………………………….

3. Fill in the gaps with the appropriate word from the list.

In the mid-1980s, West European exports to the Soviet Union were ____________, less than 0.5 percent of the combined gross national product of countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. OECD countries _________ the Soviet Union with high-technology and industrial equipment, chemicals, metals, and agricultural products. In return, Western Europe received oil and natural gas from the Soviet Union.

Although oil and gas were the ____________ Soviet exports to Western Europe, they represented only a small percentage of Western Europe's substantial fuel imports: Soviet oil provided 3% and natural gas 2% of the energy __________ in Western Europe. The completion of the Urengoy-Uzhgorod export pipeline project increased the importance of Soviet natural gas to Western Europe in the second half of the 1980s. In 1984 France, Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy began receiving natural gas from western Siberia through the pipeline, for which the Soviet Union was paid in hard ____________, pumping equipment, and large-diameter pipe.

Unlike the United States, the countries of Western Europe did not view trade as a tool to

____________ Soviet domestic and foreign policies. Western Europe rejected the trade restrictions

___________ by the USA after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. From 1980 to 1982, the USA ___________ the supply of equipment for the Urengoy-Uzhgorod natural gas pipeline, but Western Europe ignored United States pleas to do the same.

Despite the poor relations between the superpowers in the early and mid-1980s, Western Europe tried to improve international relations with the Soviet Union. One major step in this direction was the normalization of relations between CMEA and EEC. After fifteen years of negotiations, the EEC __________ an accord that established formal relations with CMEA effective June 25, 1988. Although it did not ____________ bilateral trade relations, the agreement "set the stage" for the exchange of information.

4. Translate.

Соглашение между ЕЭС и СЭВ о взаимном признании (25 июня 1988 г.)

Переговоры о заключении соглашения между ЕЭС и СЭВ о взаимном признании длились 15 лет и завершились 25 июня 1988 года. Столь длительный период был обусловлен отчасти политическими, а отчасти экономическими причинами. Первые из них были связаны с идеей СССР о том, что Сообщество не должно было стать автономным центром ни политическим, ни военно-политическим. Советская сторона полагала, что, система международных отношений является биполярной и в ней нет места Европейскому Сообществу как автономному военно-политическому центру.

В экономической сфере препятствиями стали ограничение на экспорт товаров стратегического назначения со стороны западных стран (даже пищевые продукты могли рассматриваться как стратегические), неконвертируемость валюты социалистических стран, сложность и негибкость бартерных сделок и проч. Все это осложнялось общей асимметрией в области торговли: социалистические страны импортировали главным образом

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капиталовложения и потребительские товары, а страны Сообщества полезные ископаемые и энергию.

Кроме того, опасаясь потерять контроль над союзниками социалистического лагеря,

СССР предложил, чтобы Сообщество установило договорные связи не просто с отдельными социалистическими странами, а с Советом Экономической Взаимопомощи и дополнительно

скаждым социалистическим государством. Сообщество со своей стороны стремилось заключить прямые соглашения с социалистическими государствами, опасаясь манипуляции ими со стороны СССР.

Врезультате соглашение оказалось скорее символическим, так как в действительности переговоры Европейского Сообщества с некоторыми странами Восточной Европы (особенно

сВенгрией) уже начались. Тем не менее оно имело важное историческое значение, ибо включало сферы торговли, а также научных исследований, связей в области транспорта, окружающей среды.

Unit 18. Russia – EU: history of relations (1994-1999)

Reading

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

The first important legal instrument between Russia and the EU is the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), signed on Corfu in 1994 for an initial period of ten years. The PCA came into force only in 1997 because of the EU’s protest over Russia's handling of the Chechen situation. The PCA covers an extensive range of policy areas from trade and financial cooperation through science and technology and education to the cooperation on the prevention of illegal activities. While the PCA created a framework for political dialogue, the most important aspect for Russia was that it created a way to gain access to the EU market.

The PCA established a complex institutional structure for regular consultations. The highest level of meetings take place at the top executive level – the President of Russia and the President of the Council and of the Commission meet twice annually at summits held in Russia and on EU territory. The next level is the ministerial, where members of the Council and Commission, representing the EU, meet with members of the Russian government in the Cooperation Council. These meetings take place at least once a year. In 2003 the Permanent Partnership Council was created to facilitate regular discussions. The Cooperation Committee is made up of experts assisting the higher level groups. The last organ is the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee made up of parliamentarians of the two sides.

In the economic realm the significance of the PCA was that it declared Russia to be a "transit economy" which was a step beyond its earlier status of state trading economy. In this area the long term aim is to eventually establish a free trade area between Russia and the EU. Pointing in this direction, it did away with most of the quantitative restrictions for Russian goods, with the exception of steel, textiles and nuclear material.

The PCA did not turn out to be a really successful instrument. As the situation changed, Russia felt that the document had become obsolete and it was necessary to either amend it heavily or to adopt a completely new agreement. The EU maintained that it was still possible to use the document and it was not replaced.This meant that before the enlargement in 2004 the PCA had to be extended to the future members as well. This caused considerable trouble as Russia threatened not to agree to the extension if its demands were not met. In the end the extension was signed.

At the moment one of the main issues on the EU-Russia agenda is the expiration of the PCA in 2007 and thus the need and the opportunity to rethink the basis of EU-Russia relations. The two sides want the new agreement to reflect the changes that have taken place in both entities and the new goals

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that resulted from these changes. At the same time, the partners want to come up with a solution that would be "capable of promoting the future evolution of relations, including the perspective of enhanced trade and economic integration once Russia has joined the World Trade Organization (WTO)." As it is possible that coming up with a new agreement may take longer than the old PCA is valid for, the two sides agreed to allow the document to stay in force until the new agreements comes into effect.

The EU Common Strategy on Russia and the Middle-Term Strategy of Russia towards the EU

The next major policy instrument came solely from the EU. It was the first of its kind, a common strategy introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty. The purpose of this new instrument was to create a general framework of foreign policy action in important regions "leading to more coherent and unified CFSP actions." From this point of view, it is fitting that Russia was the first region to be covered by a common strategy

The Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia was adopted at the European Council in Cologne in June 1999 for four years, which in 2003 was extended with one more year – but not more. The objective of it was to strengthen the existing partnership between the EU and Russia, established by the PCA.

The document did not go into details regarding its purpose – it provided only general aims, such as the consolidation of Russia's democracy, its integration into the European economic and social architecture and a stable and secure environment. As for the EU, it wished to "strengthen political dialogue with Russia." One important idea introduced by the common strategy is the Common European Economic Space (CEES) between the respective entities. This would give Russia better access to the European common market in exchange for which it would bring its standards and regulations in line with the acquis of the Union. The most important facet of this idea was that it signaled the EU’s commitment to economic integration with Russia.

Russia responded to this document promptly: it announced the Middle-Term Strategy towards the EU at the Helsinki summit in October 1999. It identified the strategic interests of Russia such as the "development of a collaborative pan-European defense identity," the strengthening of economic relations, the launching of an energy dialogue, European support for Russia's entry into the WTO and increased political dialogue leading to a "united Europe without dividing lines."

This was all the more significant because previously there had been no official document spelling out Russia's stance towards the European Union. Although the adoption of the two documents confirmed the mutual interest, it showed different priorities.

The common strategy did not fulfill the expectations and did not become a significant policy instrument. When it came to evaluating the common strategy on Russia, opinions pointed in the direction of disappointment. High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana criticized the strategy for being "too loose and indefinite." It failed to single out concrete steps in order to achieve a larger vision and it did not pay heed to situations in which things go wrong.

There were also problems with the implementation of the plan. The first one was the fact that the Russian government started the second Chechen war, which caused the EU to consider even sanctions against its eastern neighbour. The second obstacle was the limited nature of administrative and financial instruments available to the EU. The third problem was that member states – in spite of the existence of a coordinated strategy – carried on acting on their own initiatives in their relations with Russia.

Comprehension Check

1.Tell about the history of the PCA using the key words: Corfu – 1994 – 10 years – 1997 – EU protest.

2.What was the most important factor of the PCA?

3.What institutional structures were established to control the implementation of the PCA?

4.What was the significance of the PCA in the economic realm?

5.Why did the PCA fail to be a successful instrument?

6.What is the current status of the PCA?

7.What was the purpose of the EU Common Strategy on Russia?

8.What do you know about the history of the both Strategies?

9.What is the idea of the Common European Economic Space like?

10.What are the main points of the Middle-Term Strategy of Russia towards the EU?

11.What is the specificity of the Middle-Term Strategy of Russia towards the EU in comparison with the prior EU-Russia documents?

12.Why was the common strategyon Russia unsuccessful?

Vocabulary Activities

1. Match words with their definitions, then fill in the gaps in the sentences given below (if necessary put verbs and nouns in the appropriate form.)

2.commitment b) no longer used because of being replaced by smth newer and more

(n)effective

8.to enhance (v) h) an attitude or view about an issue that you state clearly

9.to facilitate (v) i) to make it possible and easier to happen

1.Everything in his background _____________ him for a diplomatic career.

2.One of the most important ___________ of Russia – EU relations is energy dialogue.

3.Russia may be able to ________________ negotiations between Iran and the USA.

4.The Government will continue to honour its ______________ to pensioners.

5.The measures taken should considerably ______________ the residents’ quality of life.

6.The PCA quickly became _______________ because it turned out to be a mere formality.

7.The two countries fought for the right to become separate ___________.

8.This is not really within _____________ of my experience.

9.We need to take a more positive ________________ towards globalization.

10.What will he do at the _______________ of his term in office?

2. Translate.

В 90-е годы связи между Россией и Европейским союзом развивались в целом позитивно, однако накопленный потенциал в полной мере не используется. В 1994 г. Россия и ЕС заключили Соглашение о партнерстве и сотрудничестве. Соглашение предусматривало широкий круг мер по развитию связей во всех направлениях. Однако в полной мере оно не работало и не работает в настоящее время. Началось с задержкой его ратификации (ряд стран ЕС ссылался при этом на военные действия в Чечне) и в силу оно вступило уже тогда, когда отношения России и Запада в целом переживали заметный спад, что не могло не сказаться на отношениях России и ЕС. Механизм политических консультаций и переговоров между

Россией и ЕС, созданный Соглашением 1994 г., функционирует достаточно стабильно. Хорошая результативность происходящих переговоров (особенно во время встреч на высшем уровне) признается обеими сторонами. В противоположность этому экономические статьи Соглашения 1994 г. практически не действуют. Большинство из них было ориентировано на скорейшее вступление России в ВТО. Но этого не произошло - переговоры

очленстве России в ВТО идут уже не один год и сроки постоянно отодвигаются.

В1999 г. Россия и Европейский союз приняли документы, определяющие политику в отношении друг друга - "Стратегия развития отношений Российской Федерации с Европейским союзом на среднесрочную перспективу (2000-2010 гг.)" и "Коллективная стратегия Европейского союза по отношению к России". Сам по себе факт, безусловно, положительный, свидетельствующий о желании обоих сторон идти на встречу друг другу. В этих документах есть и ряд общих или близких положений, но многое в них и отлично. Стратегия ЕС в основном ориентирована на построение гражданского общества в России, а среднесрочная стратегия России - на решение торгово-экономических проблем.

(выдержки из статьи К.К. Худолея «Россия и Европейский союз: некоторые аспекты отношений»)

Task

Prepare for the seminar “The EU Common Strategy on Russia and the Middle-Term Strategy of Russia towards the EU: comparative analysis”.

Unit 19. EU-Russia: The four “common spaces”

Reading

Historical Background

At the St.-Petersburg Summit in May 2003 the EU and Russia confirmed their commitment to further strengthen their strategic partnership. They agreed to reinforce co-operation with a view to creating four EU-Russia common spaces, in the long term and within the framework of the existing Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA), on the basis of common values and shared interests. These common spaces cover economic issues and the environment; issues of freedom, security and justice; external security, including crisis management and non-proliferation; and research and education, including cultural aspects.

The Moscow Summit in May 2005 adopted a single package of Road Maps to act as the short and medium-term instruments for the implementation for the creation of the four Common Spaces. These built on the on-going cooperation as described above, set out further specific objectives, and determine the actions necessary to make the common spaces a reality. They thereby determine the agenda for co-operation between the EU and Russia for the medium-term.

The further EU-Russia summits focused on the practical implementation of the Road Maps for the four Common Spaces.

The Common Economic Space

The objective is to create an open and integrated market between the EU and Russia. Work on this space will bring down barriers to trade and investment and promote reforms and competitiveness, based on the principles of non-discrimination, transparency and good governance. Among the wide range of actions foreseen, a number of new dialogues are being launched. Cooperation is being stepped up on regulatory policy, investment issues, competition, financial services, telecommunications, transport, energy, space activities and space launching, etc.

Environment, including nuclear safety and the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, also figures prominently.

The Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice

Work on this space has already made a big step forward with the conclusion of negotiations on the Visa Facilitation and the Readmission Agreements. The agreements were signed at the EURussia Summit on May 25 2006 in Sochi, Russia. The visa dialogue will continue with a view to examine the conditions for a mutual visa-free travel regime as a long-term perspective. Cooperation on combating terrorism, and other forms of trans-national illegal activities such as money laundering, fight against drugs and trafficking in human beings will continue as well as on document security through the introduction of biometric features in a range of identification documents. The EU support to border management and reform of the Russian judiciary system are among the highlights of this space. With a view to contributing to the concrete implementation of the road map, the Justice and Home Affairs Permanent Partnership Council (PPC) agreed to organise clusters of conferences and seminars, bringing together experts and practitioners on counter-terrorism, cyber-crime, document security and judicial cooperation. There was also agreement on developing greater cooperation between the European Border Agency (FRONTEX) and the Federal Border Security Service of Russia, as well as to explore the possibilities of an agreement between EUROJUST and the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office.

The Common Space on External Security

This Common Space Road Map underlines the shared responsibility of the parties for an international order based on effective multilateralism, their support for the central role of the UN, and for the effectiveness of, in particular, the OSCE and the Council of Europe. Work is ongoing to strengthen cooperation in the five priority areas identified in the Road Map: strengthening dialogue and cooperation on the international scene; fight against terrorism; non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); crisis management; and civil protection. Under the first priority, particular attention is given to securing stability in the regions adjacent to Russian and EU borders (notably, the ‘frozen conflicts’ in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh).

The Common Space on Research, Education, Culture

Building on the long-standing relations with Russia through its participation in EU Research and Development activities and in particular the Framework Programme for Research and Development, the aim is to capitalise on the strength of the EU and Russian research communities and promote joint research activities in areas of common interest. The 4th Common Space is seen by the scientific community as an essential element for the creation of a truly inclusive European Research Area and for the implementation of the EC–Russia Scientific and Technological Cooperation Agreement. Examples of initiatives include: the INTAS Programme (International Association for the Promotion of Cooperation with Scientists from the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union) has since 1993 supported scientific infrastructure projects, conducted a variety of jointly funded initiatives, organised Young Scientist Fellowship programmes, as well as international conferences and seminars; and the ISTC (International Science & Technology Centre) in Moscow which provides weapons scientists from Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States with new opportunities in international partnerships.

In the area of education, the TEMPUS programme, the European Commission’s transEuropean cooperation scheme in higher education, provides grants for the development and restructuring of higher education in partner countries. The programme is based on the understanding that higher education institutions are of particular importance for the social and economic transition process; and as pools of expertise and human resources provide for the training of new generations.

Russia and the European Commission participate in the intergovernmental Bologna Process, aiming to establish a European Higher Education Area by 2010, mainly in the areas of curricular

reform and quality assurance. The Bologna process coincides with Commission policy in higher education supported through the Tempus and Erasmus Mundus European programmes.

The cultural and intellectual heritage shared by the EU and Russia lays a firm basis for cooperation in the cultural field. The objectives are:

-To promote a structured approach to cultural cooperation between the enlarged EU and Russia, to foster the creativity and mobility of artists, public access to culture, the dissemination of art and culture, inter-cultural dialogue and knowledge of the history and cultural heritage of the peoples of Europe.

-To strengthen and enhance the European identity on the basis of common values, including freedom of expression, democratic functioning of the media, respect for human rights including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, and promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity as a basis for vitality of civil society in Europe without dividing lines.

-To develop cooperation between the cultural industries of the EU and Russia in order to increase both their cultural and economic impact.

Comprehension Check

1.What do these dates refer to: May 2003, May 2005?

2.What do you think the idea of the four common spaces was born?

3.What are the objectives of the Common Economic Space?

4.What are the objectives of the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice?

6.What are the objectives of the Common Space on External Security

7.What are the objectives of the Common Space on Research, Education, Culture in each of

the areas?

8. How important do you think the idea of the four common spaces is?

Vocabulary Activities

1. Find in the text English equivalents for the following:

2. Make word combinations using adjectives on the left and nouns on the right.

3. Find in the text synonyms for:

4.Use the words and phrases from Ex. 1-3 to make some sentences of your

own.

5.Fill in the underlined gaps with an appropriate word (the first

letter is given) and the dotted ones with a derivative from the stem in brackets.

The legal base of Russia-EU relations has become outdated; moreover, it has been

……………….. (adequate) from the very beginning. The parties failed to f_________ the terms of the PCA, concluded in 1994. Furthermore, neither Russia nor the EU is preparing an adequate substitute for the PCA, which e___________ in 2007. Instead – partly due to …………….

(administrate) inertia, partly due to the fear that a pause in the dialogue would increase the atmosphere of ……………. (negative) – the parties are continuing to work out new mechanisms of cooperation within the f___________ of the “four common spaces.”

Although the joint “road maps” actually put Russia on an equal level with other EU neighbours, the i_____________ of the “four spaces” concept will not help the parties to

………………… (come) the present crisis in their relations but will only create an outward impression of progress, which later will ……………… (evitable) bring about a new wave of disillusionment.

An absolute m___________ of the experts argue that Russia should refrain from s___________ any binding agreements with the European Union for the next two to three years. If, however, Russia does decide to sign documents with the EU, these should be limited to “agreements on ……………. (strategy) intent.” The work on the “common spaces” should be reoriented to the preparation of a new “major” treaty between Russia and the EU, which must

……………. (place) the PCA, and specific agreements on individual areas of interaction.

The content and nature of a new treaty must be determined not by the need for “rapprochement”, but by Russia’s final o___________ in its relations with the EU. Since the drafting of the treaty must be preceded by a ……………. (define) of Russia’s intended goal, and not vice v________, it is the final goal that will determine the nature of the new treaty – whether it will be, for example, a treaty of association or, ……………… (convert), a less significant agreement that will not provide for any serious integration.

Task

Work in pairs or groups. Choose one of the Road Maps and prepare for the seminar on the Road Maps for the four common spaces. The questions to consider include:

1.How are current issues of EU – Russia relations taken into consideration?

2.How detailed are the provisions for future cooperation?

3.What are the possible short-term and long-term developments in each of the space?

The texts of the road maps are available at http://www.russia-it.org/russian/rMap/rMap_eng.pdf

Render the text

ЕС-РОССИЯ: ЧЕТЫРЕ "ОБЩИХ ПРОСТРАНСТВА"

Общее экономическое пространство

Цель взаимодействия в этом направлении – развитие разносторонней торговли между ЕС и Россией, а также создание новых инвестиционных возможностей путем продолжения экономической интеграции и правового сближения, открытия рынка, стимулирования торговли и развития инфраструктуры. Общее экономическое пространство охватывает широкий спектр вопросов, таких как торговля, инвестиции, промышленное сотрудничество, политика предпринимательства, а также более конкретные области, такие как права на интеллектуальную собственность, конкуренция и сельское хозяйство. В этом пространстве ЕС и Россия также намерены поддержать основу существующего энергетического диалога и стимулировать работу в области транспорта по таким вопросам, как инфраструктурные проекты, морская безопасность, спутниковая навигация и авиация, в том числе поэтапное сокращение расходов на сибирские перелеты. Сотрудничество в вопросах защиты окружающей среды является центральной частью работы над созданием такого пространства.

Общее пространство свободы, безопасности и правосудия

ЕС и Россия серьезно заинтересованы в укреплении сотрудничества в области правосудия и внутренних дел для борьбы с общими угрозами, связанными с организованной преступностью, терроризмом и иной незаконной деятельностью, имеющей международные масштабы. Для ЕС такое сотрудничество должно отражать необходимый баланс между безопасностью, с одной стороны, и правосудием и свободой, с другой стороны, а также общие ценности, лежащие в основе взаимоотношений ЕС и России. С целью достижения поставленных задач ЕС и Россия проводят регулярные консультации по правам человека, в том числе по вопросам прав лиц, относящихся к меньшинствам, и фундаментальных свобод, включая свободу средств массовой информации.

Общее пространство сотрудничества в области внешней безопасности

Задача работы по этому пространству заключается в укреплении сотрудничества по вопросам безопасности и управления кризисами, проведении действий в ответ на новые угрозы, такие, как терроризм, распространение оружия массового уничтожения (ОМУ), региональные конфликты, а также в укреплении сотрудничества по устранению последствий стихийных бедствий.

ЕС четко выразил свое пожелание, чтобы географическим приоритетом в таком пространстве являлись общие соседи ЕС и России (например, Белоруссия, Молдова, Грузия), где, по мнению ЕС, в интересах ЕС и России следует урегулировать давние конфликты и обеспечить стабильность и процветание.

Общее пространство в области научных исследований, образования и культуры

Это пространство направлено на укрепление контактов между людьми и содействие повышению конкурентоспособности экономики ЕС и России.

Идея заключается в том, чтобы использовать богатое интеллектуальное наследие и знания в ЕС и России для содействия экономическому развитию России и ЕС при участии гражданского общества. Это пространство будет служить для укрепления связей и обмена в области образования и культуры, а также способствовать определению и внедрению успешного опыта.

(по материалам http://www.delrus.cec.eu)

Unit 20. Future of EU-Russia Relations

Reading

Russia’s European Strategy: A New Start

(by Sergey Karaganov)

Despite the long and active dialogue between Russia and the European Union, which includes a well-developed system of bilateral ties at various levels and a solid legal base, relations between Russia and the EU remain in a state of uncertainty. The parties lack a shared understanding of the phrase “strategic partnership,” although this has been used to officially summarise the nature of their relations. Both Russia and the EU are becoming disillusioned with each other, and this feeling often gives way to irritation. This has resulted in the fact that the agenda of bilateral summits, together with the meaningful content of their drafted agreements, have been coming up short. Both parties lack a strategic understanding of how their mutual relations should develop.

There are two possible models of the EU-Russia relations in future: 1) gradual integration of Russia into EU; 2) cooperation between the two friendly yet independent centers of power will not strive for formal integration, including the harmonization of their respective legislation.

Presently, the only clearly formulated point concerning Russia’s policy toward the European Union is its assertion that “Russia does not seek EU membership.” Representatives of both the EU and Russia emphasize the “special Russian mentality,” as well as Russia’s huge size and relative economic backwardness when speaking about the hypothetical impossibility of Russia integrating itself into the European Union. However, there are candidates for EU accession that are less economically developed than Russia, or have a mentality that differs significantly from the “Central European mentality” (for example, Turkey). When speaking about the size of Russia as an argument against EU integration, this seems to lack real validity in our modern era of communication; moreover, it may be balanced by Russia’s rich natural resources.

In the long term (after 15 to 20 years) the issue of Russia’s accession to the European Union could be raised. In this time, much will depend on what path the EU and Russia take. The EU may transform into a quasi-federation with strong supranational governing bodies, or a socio-economic union, whose members may share some aspects of their foreign and defense policies. Russia may become an idle and weak authoritarian state or a developed democratic country. Russia’s integration with a quasi-federative state is much less probable than its integration with a union of a more or less free configuration.

Russia is prompted to make the “European choice” by several objective factors.

First, Russia’s acute demographic crisis, together with its increasing lag behind the advanced countries in terms of technological progress, will inevitably reduce its role as an independent global center of power.

Second, among Russia’s foreign-policy partners and neighbors, the European Union is the most predictable, civilized and attractive.

Third, from an economic perspective Russia is greatly dependent on the European Union. Therefore, Russia’s most rational, pragmatic and successful decision would be to end its

unrealistic claims of being an absolutely independent “pole” and assume a steady rapprochement with the European Union.

The transition to more advanced relations should be carried out in two stages. First, the parties should work to “cool down” their relations a bit. This would guard them against excessive expectations and, therefore, disappointments. Furthermore, it is necessary to revise the entire sphere of EU-Russian relations in order to bring the formal framework of their cooperation into line with the political and economic realities. Perhaps it would make sense to give up the idea of the “four common spaces,” or to partially adopt it in a general and non-binding way.

In any case, any reference to integration must be temporarily removed from Russia-EU relations, in particular those references that demand the extension of EU legislation to Russia. Russia’s priority must be its adaptation to international, as opposed to European, legislation. Once Russia’s legal norms are brought into line with international standards, it will be able to raise its relations with the EU to a higher integration level.

Russia and the EU must draft a new treaty that would provide for close economic and political relations between two mutually independent economic and political actors of the world stage.

Finally, relations with the EU, which now dominate Russia’s foreign policy agenda, must be temporarily given a less significant place in the hierarchy of Russia’s foreign-policy priorities. This will help Russia and the European Union to achieve a higher level of integration in the future, as they will proceed not from the present negative state of affairs in their mutual relations but from a relatively clean sheet.

http://www.globalaffairs.ru

Discussion

1.Why do you think relations between Russia and the EU remain in a state of uncertainty?

2.What is ‘strategic partnership’ in your opinion?

3.Which way in your opinion is more probable in EU-Russia relations gradual integration of Russia into EU or cooperation between the two friendly yet independent centers of power?

4.What is the difference between quasi-federation and socio-economic union?

Vocabulary Activities

1. Find in the text English equivalents for the following:

2.Write a summary of the text using at least 8 of the phrases from Ex.1.

3.Multiple choice.

EU Objectives on Russia

Russia is an important partner with which there is considerable interest to 1_________ and build a strategic partnership. Russia is the EU’s largest neighbour, brought even closer to the EU by the 2004 enlargement. The 2003 European Security Strategy correctly 2__________ Russia as a key player on geo-political and security issues at global and regional level. Russia is a key 3________

in EU efforts to combat new threats to security, including from terrorism, pollution, crime, illegal migration and trafficking.

The EU’s main objective is to engage with Russia to build a genuine strategic partnership, founded on common interests and shared values to which both sides are 4___________. These interests and values include in particular democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and market economy principles.

The EU has a strong and genuine interest to work together with Russia to 5_________

political, social and economic stability in Russia, in the region and worldwide. The EU and Russia are already cooperating 6__________ a wide range of issues, including the modernisation of Russia’s economy and its integration into the world economy, security issues, international issues,

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as well as "soft" security threats for example in the fields of justice and home affairs, environment and nuclear safety. The EU and Russia have every reason to 7_________ cooperation in these areas as well as to engage in many other areas, including cooperation in the Southern Caucasus and the western NIS in light of the development of the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy, and on international issues such as the fight against terrorism and organised crime.

EU relations with Russia 8________ a large spectrum of particular EU policies, including external policies like the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and trade policy; the external aspects of general EU policies such as on energy, transport, environment, etc.; the external dimension of freedom/security/justice activities; and the principles retained for development cooperation and assistance.

Task

Work in groups or individually, choose one of the topics listed below and prepare for the seminar “The Prospects of the EU – Russia relations”. Topics for discussion include:

-The four common spaces

-Energy dialogue.

-The role of private business.

-Legal base of the relations.

-Promoting knowledge about the EU in Russia and about Russia in the EU.

Be ready to come out with certain suggestions on the ways of improvement of the relations.

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Россия и Евросоюз: предстоящий период

Сергей Караганов

Европа для России – многовековой полюс притяжения, ключевым образом определивший и продолжающий определять ее цивилизационную идентичность. Для Европы Россия – защитник и угроза одновременно. Защитник от татаро-монголов, турок, нацистов, самый надежный среди почти сплошь ненадежных крупных поставщиков энергии, которую сама Европа производит в ничтожных количествах. Но, защищая и защищаясь, Россия наступала, порой доминировала в Европе или ее частях. К тому же, следуя европейским базовым путем, она никогда вполне европейской не была, да и не могла быть.

Последние годы запутали российско-европейские отношения еще больше, чем обычно. Добившись потрясающего успеха, построив постевропейскую цивилизацию, основанную на отрицании насилия, индивидуализма, частично суверенитета, создав весьма комфортное для жителей общество, Европа потеряла стратегический ориентир. Расширившись до 27 стран, она не знает, что делать дальше. Не имеет она никакой стратегии и в отношении России.

Наша страна, вырвавшись из пут коммунизма, рванула к Европе, но выяснила, что ее не очень ждут и главное, что Европа стала постевропейской, не той, к которой мы стремились. В результате Россия тоже утратила старый вектор движения.

Особенно эта обоюдная потеря стала заметна в последние годы. Быстро двинувшись в начале десятилетия друг к другу, установив тесный диалог, стороны выяснили, что наполнить его особенно нечем. Тогда сближение закончилось принятием пустых

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документов о четырех пространствах. Ситуация усугублялась тем, что в Европе, благодаря расширению ЕС, не только усилились традиционно антироссийские силы, но и стало складываться убеждение, что внутриполитически, а частично и внешнеполитически Москва идет неевропейским, а то и антиевропейским путем. У нас же решили, что запутавшаяся в выборе дальнейшего пути Европа слаба. И, в соответствии с худшей российской политической традицией, помноженной на реакцию на собственное унижение прошлого десятилетия, мы начали говорить с европейцами высокомерно, если не пренебрежительно.

Диалог свелся к жестком торгу вокруг энергетики. Давление становится все жестче и даже бесцеремонней. Требуют отказа от монополии на энергопроводы. Хотя де-факто член ЕС – Норвегия – такую монополию держит. Требуют доступа иностранных компаний к добыче ресурсов, хотя по всему миру эти компании лишаются этих ресурсов государствами. Неизвестно, хорошо это или плохо. Но Россия, похоже, избрана в качестве «слабого звена».

Россия чувствует себя пока сильной и уступать, похоже, не собирается. Обещания построить нефте- и газопроводы вокруг России ее не пугают. Скорее, укрепляют желание проложить трубы на Восток и еще более усилить свои позиции на рынке. Новый договор между Россией и ЕС, который должен придти на смену «Соглашению о партнерстве и сотрудничестве» от 1994 г. не просматривается или грозит стать очередной бюрократической пустышкой.

Но ситуация в отношениях между Россией и ЕС только кажется тупиковой. Выход есть и через несколько лет он будет найден. Это произойдет, когда (и если) Россия преодолеет свою нынешнюю, уже пару лет как очевидно неэффективную, модель политического и экономического развития. Европа же должна выйти из того тупика, где она оказалась благодаря прошлым успехам и нынешней неспособности мыслить стратегически и на будущее.

Пока мне видятся три возможных сценария развития событий в ЕС. Нужно либо провозглашать курс на действительный политический союз, создание квазифедеративного государства. Но на это европейцы не согласятся. Либо призывать к движению назад, признавать, что курс на политическое объединение, общую внешнюю и оборонную политику оказался ошибочным. Это будет трудно сделать. Есть еще третий путь - на создание сверхсоюза - стратегического союза с территориями, вооруженными силами, ресурсным потенциалом России. На это европейцы пока совсем не готовы.

Так что надо ждать, не торговаться по мелочам, не уступать, сближаться на человеческом, культурном уровне, на уровне конкретных малых дел и проектов.

Мы можем дождаться. Если мы не провалимся цивилизационно, не ухнем в болото изоляционизма, будем усиливаться, уже через несколько лет европейцы, которые будут неизбежно слабеть относительно других центров, могут задуматься о предлагаемом мною «третьем пути».

И тогда начнется новый тур исторического сближения России и Европы, выгодного и спасительного для всех европейцев - от Атлантики до Владивостока.

http://www.globalaffairs.ru/redcol/0/6996.html

APPENDICES

Appendix 1

Glossary of the EU

(abridged from www.europa.eu)

Accession criteria (Copenhagen criteria)

Any country seeking membership of the EU must conform to the conditions set out by Article 49 and the principles laid down in Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union. Relevant criteria were established by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and strengthened by the Madrid European Council in 1995.

To join the EU, a new Member State must meet three criteria:

political: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;

economic: existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;

acceptance of the Community acquis: ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

Accession of new Member States to the European Union

Accession of new Member States to the European Union is governed by Article 49 of the EU Treaty. A state that wishes to become a member of the Union must be a European state, and it must respect the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.

The Council must agree unanimously on accession, after consulting the Commission and receiving the assent of the European Parliament.

The conditions and date of accession, any transition periods required and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the Union is founded must be agreed in the form of an accession treaty between the candidate country and the Member States.

To give due form to the accession, this treaty is ratified by all the Member States and the candidate country in accordance with their own constitutional rules.

In practice, accession is not automatic, since it depends on the situation of the candidate country concerned. There is thus a pre-accession period of varying length, during which the candidate countries adapt their institutions, standards and infrastructure to enable them to meet their obligations as Member States at the time of accession.

Accession partnership

Accession partnerships are a pre-accession strategy instrument which determines the candidate countries' particular needs on which pre-accession assistance should be targeted and provides a framework for the short and medium-term priorities, objectives and conditions determined for each candidate country on the basis of the accession criteria, and pre-accession assistance.

An accession partnership is established for each candidate country to provide guidance and encouragement during preparations for membership. To this end, each candidate country draws up a National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA), which sets out a timetable for putting the partnership into effect. Each candidate country also draws up an action plan for strengthening its administrative and judicial capacities.

The accession partnership may also be revised in the light of new developments, especially any new priorities identified during the pre-accession process.

Agenda 2000

Agenda 2000 is a strategy paper, adopted by the European Commission on 15 July 1997, which sets out a project for Europe for the year 2000. It announces a reform of Community policies, particularly in the light of the enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe, and the financial framework for the period 2000-2006. Agenda 2000 tackles all the political, economic and social issues facing the Union at the beginning of the 21st century. Attached to it are the Commission's opinions on the countries that have applied for Union membership.

Agenda 2000 is in three parts:

1)the question of the European Union's internal operation, particularly the reform of the common agricultural policy, and of the policy of economic and social cohesion. It also contains recommendations on how to face the challenge of enlargement in the best possible conditions and proposes putting in place a new financial framework for the period 2000-06;

2)a pre-accession strategy incorporating two new elements: the partnership for accession and extended participation of the candidate countries in Community programmes and the mechanisms for applying the Community acquis;

3)a study of the impact of enlargement on European Union policies.

These priorities were fleshed out in some twenty legislative proposals put forward by the European Commission in 1998. The Berlin European Council reached an overall political agreement on the legislative package in 1999, enabling the measures to be adopted in the same year. They cover four closely linked areas for the period from 2000 to 2006:

reform of the common agricultural policy,

reform of the structural policy,

pre-accession instruments,

financial framework.

A new reform of the European project is currently being drawn up. It will allow the measures implemented by the enlarged European Union to be consolidated and preparations to be made for future accessions. A new financial perspective for the period 2007-2013 is also being examined. It will determine the nature and extent of the next generation of Community policies.

Architecture of Europe

This refers to the various organisations, institutions, treaties and traditional relations making up the European area within which members work together on problems of shared interest.

An essential part of this architecture was established by the Treaty on European Union, which formed three pillars: the European Community (first pillar), the common foreign and security policy (second pillar) and cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs (third pillar). Matters falling within the second and third pillars are handled by the Community institutions (the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament etc.), but intergovernmental procedures apply.

The European Constitution, which is in the process of being ratified, envisages a total recast of the architecture. It plans to merge the three existing pillars, while maintaining the procedures specific to the CFSP and the defence policy.

Area of freedom, security and justice

It was decided to establish an area of freedom, security and justice, the aim being to ensure genuine freedom of movement for individuals on the territory of the European Union and more effective action against organised crime and fraud.

Matters relating to justice and home affairs used to be dealt with solely under the intergovernmental rules.

The Amsterdam Treaty "communitised" asylum, immigration and judicial cooperation in civil matters. It preserved the third pillar, now devoted solely to police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. But all JHA matters are regrouped under the general heading of the area of freedom, security and justice.

The Constitution currently being ratified introduces a major innovation: it abolishes the pillars and communitises police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The Constitution fully preserves the special opt-outs for the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark.

Assent procedure

The assent procedure (Article 192 of the Treaty establishing the European Community) was introduced by the European Single Act (1986). It requires the Council to obtain the European Parliament's assent before certain important decisions are taken. The assent principle is based on a single reading. Parliament may accept or reject a proposal but cannot amend it. If Parliament does not give its assent, the act in question cannot be adopted.

The assent procedure applies mainly to the accession of new Member States (Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union), association agreements and other fundamental agreements with third countries.

It is likewise required with regard to citizenship, the specific tasks of the European Central Bank (ECB), amendments to the Statutes of the European System of Central Banks and the ECB, the Structural and Cohesion Funds, and the uniform procedure for elections to the European Parliament (Article 190 of the EC Treaty).

Lastly, the European Parliament gives its assent for the application of sanctions imposed on a Member State for a serious and persistent breach of fundamental rights (Article 7 of the EU Treaty) and for closer cooperation in fields subject to the codecision procedure.

Parliament's assent is given by a majority of votes cast. However, a majority of Members is also required in two cases, namely the accession of a new Member State and the electoral procedure.

In order to simplify legislative procedures, the European Constitution, currently being ratified, includes the assent procedure, referred to as "consent", under "special legislative procedures". This procedure applies to European laws and framework laws.

Barcelona Process

The Barcelona Process, also known as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, constitutes the policy of the European Union towards the Mediterranean countries. Its purpose is to strengthen the links between the Union and the partner countries, whilst encouraging closer ties among the Mediterranean countries themselves.

The objective of the Partnership launched in 1995 following the Barcelona Declaration is to promote peace and stability in the region by establishing a political dialogue that respects the partners' shared values, such as democracy and the rule of law. Further aims are to promote the prevention and resolution of conflicts, as well as prosperity, particularly through the creation of a free-trade area, and to develop cooperation.