Ординатура / Хирургия / Библиотека им академика М.И. Перельмана / Книга_205_библиотеки_им_акад_М_И_Перельмана

Second, although natural and sexual selection operate on the phenotype of any given trait, there is no “goal” in evolution apart from an anagenic tendency (an evolu­tionary trend from simpler to more complex forms) (Mayr 2001). Organisms do max-

imize replication of genes, whereby the concept of kin selection refers to the replication of an individual’s genes shared with relatives of varying degree (Hamilton 1964). These technical statements have at least two important implications for the present chapter: 1) evolution does not specifically favor well-being or health, and 2) evolved traits are not optimal by design but rather are compromises of sometimes opposing selection pressures. Accordingly, low mood can be regarded as a defense against real or perceived environmental threats (i.e., a rescue strategy to preserve one’s reproduc tive potential), whereas high mood can be viewed as an effort to attain reproductive success via higher social rank. In the next section, we illustrate this principle of “de sign compromise” by describing the compromise with the furthest-reaching conse­quences for human mental life.

In humans, the typical primate pattern is extended in all stages of development from infancy to adolescence and adulthood (Bogin 1999). It is important to note, how ever, that there is also within-species variation in life history strategies, commonly re­ferred to as the “pace of life.” In other words, some human life histories appear to be slightly more pushed to an r-selected-like pattern (“fast” life history), whereas others have a more extreme K-selected pattern (“slow” life history). Indeed, humans differ with regard to timing of biological maturation, age at onset of sexual activity and re­production, mating, number of offspring, and care provided for offspring (Ellis et al.

Although Bowlby (1969) believed that only secure attachment could be adaptive, more recent work suggests that fluctuations in ancestral environmental conditions in terms of resource availability have selected for a set of flexible adaptive behavioral re­sponses to accomplish important biosocial goals (Simpson 1999). For example, when confronting harsh environmental conditions, which may include food scarcity or lack of emotional availability of caregivers, an individual is more likely to develop an inter­nal working model that the world is unsafe and future resources are uncertain, so that immediate resource extraction might be the best strategy. Such strategies may include exploitation of others with an opportunistic interpersonal style, more risk-prone be haviors, early mating efforts with limited investment in offspring, and even the accel­eration of biological maturation, thus driving the “pace of life” slightly into a “faster” direction (Belsky 1999). Insecure attachment therefore reflects, to some extent, a prox­imate adaptive strategy evolved to ensure survival and to maximize reproductive suc­cess under unpredictable environmental conditions. However, as the likelihood of not reaching significant goals also increases, it is plausible to assume that a “faster” pace of life is associated with an increased risk for psychopathology, including depression and mania (Brüne 2016a; Del Giudice 2014; Hurst and Kavanagh 2017). Such individ­ual differences are observable to the present day, in that poverty and social inequality leave their marks on individual pace of life (Hochberg and Belsky 2013).