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Файл:Kant. Aphorisms
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What ought I to do?
On Will
I
It is impossible to think of anything at all in the
world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation except a good will.
The will is thought as a capacity to determine itself
to acting in conformity with the representation of certain
laws.
Even if, by a special disfavour of fortune or by the
niggardly provision of a stepmotherly nature, this will
should wholly lack the capacity to carry out its purpose
— if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing and only the good will were left (not, of course, as a
mere wish but as the summoning of all means insofar as
they are in our control) — then, like a jewel, it would
still shine by itself, as something that has its full worth in
itself. Usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add anything to this worth nor take anything away from it.
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Kant. Aphorisms
On Freedom
There can be nothing more terrible than that the actions of one person should be subordinated to the will of
another. Thus, no aversion can be more natural than that
which a person has towards slavery. For the sake of this
[aversion] a child cries and embitters itself if it has to do
what others want, without someone having bothered to
endear it to [the child]. It only wishes to be a man soon
and act in accordance with its will.
The heart is freed and relieved of a burden that always secretly presses upon it, when in pure moral resolutions... there is revealed to the human being an inner
capacity not otherwise correctly known by himself, the
inner freedom to release himself from the impetuous
importunity of inclinations so that none of them, not
even the dearest, has any influence on a resolution for
which we are now to make use of our reason.
But it is so certain that we cannot dispense with this
means of assuring ourselves of the truth of our judgement that this may be the most important reason why
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What ought I to do?
learned people cry out so urgently for freedom of press.
For if this freedom is denied, we are deprived at the
same time of a great means of testing the correctness of
our judgements, and we are exposed to error.
On Virtue
One need not be an enemy of virtue but only a cool
observer, who does not take the liveliest wish for the
good straightaway as its reality, to become doubtful at
certain moments... whether any true virtue is to be found
in the world.
To behold virtue in her proper from is nothing other
than to present morality stripped of any admixture of the
sensible and of any spurious adornments of reward or
self-love.
Virtue signifies a moral strength of will.
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Kant. Aphorisms
IV
Softness gets rid of more virtue than wantonness.
V
A man does not take part in the fortune or misfortune
of others until he feels content. Thus bring it about that
he is content with less, and you will create good people;
otherwise it is in vain.
VI
All human virtue in circulation is small change — it
is a child who takes it for real gold. — But it is still better to have small change in circulation than no funds at
all, and eventually they can be converted into genuine
gold, though at considerable loss.
On Benevolence
... one cannot, by any repayment of a kindness received, rid oneself of the obligation for it, since the recipient can never win away from the benefactor his priority of merit, namely having been the first in benevolence.
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What ought I to do?
II
I cannot do good to anyone in accordance with my
concepts of happiness (except to young children and the
insane), thinking to benefit him by forcing a gift upon
him; rather, I can benefit him only in accordance with
his concepts of happiness.
III
Do not accept favours you could do without...
On Evil
I
However, it must be premised here that a seed of
the Good is left in its entire purity and cannot be
destroyed or spoiled; it certainly cannot be egoism,
which, taken as a principle of all our maxims, is the
very source of all evil.
Evil is only the result of nature not being brought
under control. In man there are only germs of good.
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Kant. Aphorisms
The common opinion that previous times were better
comes from the evil that one feels and the presupposition
that otherwise everything would be good.
III
On Happiness
I
Happiness is the state of a rational being in the world
in the whole of whose existence everything goes according to his wish and will...
II
Whoever is able to be happy only according to another person's choice (no matter how benevolent this
other person may be) rightly feels that he is unhappy.
III
To assure one's own happiness is a duty...
IV
One cannot therefore act on determinate principles
for the sake of being happy, but only in empirical coun-
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What ought I to do?
sels, for example, of a regimen, frugality, courtesy, reserve and so forth, which experience teaches are most
conductive to well being on the average.
This ultimate purpose of pure practical reason is the
highest good, so far as it is possible in the world, though
it is to be sought not merely in what Nature can furnish
(the greatest amount of pleasure); it lies, rather, in what is
also the supreme requirement, or condition, under which
alone reason can accord happiness to the rational worldbeing, namely that the latter's behaviour should simultaneously conform to the utmost with the moral law.
A person may tinker as much as he wants, but he
cannot force nature to follow other laws. He himself
must either work or others [work] for him, and this work
will rob others of so much bliss that he will increase his
own beyond the average
Sympathy for the natural misfortune of others is not
necessary, but it certainly is in the injustices suffered by
others.
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Kant. Aphorisms
On the Truth and Lie
... truthfulness is a duty that must be regarded as a
basis of all duties to be grounded on contract, the law of
which is made uncertain and useless if even the least
exception to it is admitted.
To be sure, I think much with the firmest conviction
and to my great satisfaction that I will never have the courage to say; but I will never say anything that I do not think.
Thus a lie, defined merely as an intentionally untrue
declaration to another, does not require what jurists insist
upon adding for their definition, that it must harm another (mendacium est falsiloquium in praeiudicium alterius). For it always harms another, even if not another
individual, nevertheless humanity generally, inasmuch as
it makes the source of right unusable.
By a lie a human being throws away and, as it were,
annihilates his dignity as a human being.
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What ought I to do?
V
Lying makes a man the object of common contempt…
VI
Everyone who’s a coward lies but not vice versa.
What makes one weak brings about lying.
On State
For a state is not (like the land on which it resides) a
belonging (patrimonium). It is a society of human beings
that no one other than itself can command or dispose of.
Now the republican constitution is the only one that
is completely compatible with the right of human beings,
but it is also the most difficult one to establish and even
more to maintain, so much so that many assert it would
have to be a state of angels because human beings, with
their self-seeking inclinations, would not be capable of
such a sublime for of constitution.
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Kant. Aphorisms
The problem of establishing a state goes like this:
“Given a multitude of rational beings all of whom need
universal laws for their preservation but each of whom is
inclined covertly to exempt himself from them, so to
order this multitude and establish their constitution that,
although in their private dispositions they strive against
one another, these yet so check one another that in their
public conduct the result is the same as if they had no
such evil dispositions”.
The desire for freedom and the exclusive force of a
dominator is a great misfortune, but it becomes just as
much an orderly system, in fact, there is actually more
order, although less bliss than in free states.
With general luxury one complains about the divine
rule and about the rule of the king. One does not consider
that, as concerns the latter, just the same desire for honour
and immoderacy that the civilians control can have no
other form on the throne than as they have that such civilians cannot otherwise be ruled. The subject wants the
master to overcome his inclinations of vanity in order to
promote the good of his lands and [he wants] to think that
demands of him do not occur in consideration of lowly
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