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Kant. Aphorisms

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What can I know?
On Cognition and Experience
...Although all our cognition commences with experi­ence, yet it does not on that account all arise from experi­ence.
...We will understand by a priori cognitions not those that occur independently of this or that experience, but rather those that occur absolutely independently of all experience.
Mathematics gives us a splendid example of how far we can go with a priori cognition independently of ex­perience.
...We can cognize of things a priori only what we ourselves have put into them.
All our cognition is in the end related to possible in­tuitions: for through these alone is an object given.
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Thus all human cognition begins with intuitions, goes from there to concepts, and ends with ideas.
... No curiosity is more disadvantageous to the expan­sion of our knowledge than that which would always know its utility in advance, before one has entered into the investigations, and before one could have the least con­cept of this utility even if it were placed before one's eyes.
...When taking something to be true is both subjec­tively and objectively sufficient it is called knowing.
If taking something to be true is only subjectively sufficient and it is at the same time held to be objectively insufficient, then it is called believing.
On Knowledge and Faith
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What can I know?
...I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith...
Every doctrine that is supposed to be a system, that is, a whole of cognition ordered according to principles, is called a science.
...The founder and his most recent successors often fumble around with an idea that they have not even made distinct to themselves and that therefore cannot deter­mine the special content, the articulation (systematic unity) and boundaries of the science.
...The science must always be dogmatic, i. e. it must prove its conclusions strictly a priori from the secure principles...
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On Science
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Mathematics has, from the earliest times to which the history of human reason reaches, in that admirable people the Greeks, travelled the secure path of a science.
What a mass of knowledge, what discoveries of new methods would now be on hand if an Archimedes, a New­ton, a Lavoisier with their diligence and talent had been favoured by nature with a hundred years of continuous life without decrease of vitality! But the progress of the species is always only fragmentary (according to time) and offers no guarantee against regression, with which it is always threatened by intervening revolutionary barbarism.
If there is any science humans really need, it is the one I teach, of how to occupy properly that place in crea­tion that is assigned to humans, and how to learn from it what one must be in order to be human.
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WHAT OUGHT I TO DO?
Kant. Aphorisms
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What ought I to do?
Duty! Sublime and mighty name that embraces noth­ing charming or insinuating but requires submission, and yet does not seek to move the will by threatening any­thing that would arouse natural aversion or terror in the mind but only holds forth a law that of itself finds entry into the mind and yet gains reluctant reverence (though not always obedience), a law before which all inclinations are dumb, even though they secretly work against it...
...Duty is the necessity of an action from respect for law.
The majesty of duty has nothing to do with the en­joyment of life; it has its own law and also its own court, and even though one might want to shake both of them together thoroughly, so as to give them blended, like medicine, to the sick soul, they soon separate of them­selves...
On Duty
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Morals is of itself practical in the objective sense, as the sum of laws commanding unconditionally, in accor­dance with which we ought to act...
...morals is not properly the doctrine of how we are to make ourselves happy but of how we are to become worthy of happiness.
The threat of eternal punishment cannot be an imme­diate ground of morally good actions although it may be a strong counterweight against temptations to evil.
This is the difference between false and healthy mo­rality: the former seeks only for antidotes for evil, while the latter is concerned that the cause of evil is not there at all.
On Morals
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What ought I to do?
On the Moral Law
Two things fill the mind with ever new and increas­ing admiration and reverence, the more often and more steadily one reflects on them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me.
But is man by nature morally good or bad? He is nei­ther, for he is not by nature a moral being. He only be­comes a moral being when his reason has developed ideas of duty and law.
...act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.
A maxim is the subjective principle of volition...
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So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a mean.
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The moral law is holy (inviolable). A human being is indeed unholy enough but the humanity in his person must be holy to him.
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But the moral law of itself still does not promise any happiness, since this is not necessarily connected with observance of the law according to our concepts of a natural order as such.
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In this way the moral law leads through the concept of the highest good, as the object and final end of pure practical reason, to religion, that is, to the recognition of all duties as divine commands, not as sanctions — that is, chosen and in themselves contingent ordinances of another's will — but as essential laws of every free will in itself...
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