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Файл:Kant. Aphorisms
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What can I know?
On Cognition and Experience
...Although all our cognition commences with experience, yet it does not on that account all arise from experience.
...We will understand by a priori cognitions not those
that occur independently of this or that experience, but
rather those that occur absolutely independently of all
experience.
Mathematics gives us a splendid example of how far
we can go with a priori cognition independently of experience.
...We can cognize of things a priori only what we
ourselves have put into them.
All our cognition is in the end related to possible intuitions: for through these alone is an object given.
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Kant. Aphorisms
VI
Thus all human cognition begins with intuitions,
goes from there to concepts, and ends with ideas.
... No curiosity is more disadvantageous to the expansion of our knowledge than that which would always
know its utility in advance, before one has entered into the
investigations, and before one could have the least concept of this utility even if it were placed before one's eyes.
...When taking something to be true is both subjectively and objectively sufficient it is called knowing.
If taking something to be true is only subjectively
sufficient and it is at the same time held to be objectively
insufficient, then it is called believing.
On Knowledge and Faith
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What can I know?
...I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for
faith...
Every doctrine that is supposed to be a system, that
is, a whole of cognition ordered according to principles,
is called a science.
...The founder and his most recent successors often
fumble around with an idea that they have not even made
distinct to themselves and that therefore cannot determine the special content, the articulation (systematic
unity) and boundaries of the science.
...The science must always be dogmatic, i. e. it must
prove its conclusions strictly a priori from the secure
principles...
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On Science
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Kant. Aphorisms
Mathematics has, from the earliest times to which
the history of human reason reaches, in that admirable
people the Greeks, travelled the secure path of a science.
What a mass of knowledge, what discoveries of new
methods would now be on hand if an Archimedes, a Newton, a Lavoisier with their diligence and talent had been
favoured by nature with a hundred years of continuous life
without decrease of vitality! But the progress of the species
is always only fragmentary (according to time) and offers
no guarantee against regression, with which it is always
threatened by intervening revolutionary barbarism.
If there is any science humans really need, it is the
one I teach, of how to occupy properly that place in creation that is assigned to humans, and how to learn from it
what one must be in order to be human.
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WHAT OUGHT I TO DO?

Kant. Aphorisms
26

What ought I to do?
Duty! Sublime and mighty name that embraces nothing charming or insinuating but requires submission, and
yet does not seek to move the will by threatening anything that would arouse natural aversion or terror in the
mind but only holds forth a law that of itself finds entry
into the mind and yet gains reluctant reverence (though
not always obedience), a law before which all inclinations
are dumb, even though they secretly work against it...
...Duty is the necessity of an action from respect for
law.
The majesty of duty has nothing to do with the enjoyment of life; it has its own law and also its own court,
and even though one might want to shake both of them
together thoroughly, so as to give them blended, like
medicine, to the sick soul, they soon separate of themselves...
On Duty
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Kant. Aphorisms
Morals is of itself practical in the objective sense, as
the sum of laws commanding unconditionally, in accordance with which we ought to act...
...morals is not properly the doctrine of how we are
to make ourselves happy but of how we are to become
worthy of happiness.
The threat of eternal punishment cannot be an immediate ground of morally good actions although it may be
a strong counterweight against temptations to evil.
This is the difference between false and healthy morality: the former seeks only for antidotes for evil, while
the latter is concerned that the cause of evil is not there at
all.
On Morals
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What ought I to do?
On the Moral Law
Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more often and more
steadily one reflects on them: the starry heavens above
me and the moral law within me.
But is man by nature morally good or bad? He is neither, for he is not by nature a moral being. He only becomes a moral being when his reason has developed
ideas of duty and law.
...act only in accordance with that maxim through
which you can at the same time will that it become a
universal law.
A maxim is the subjective principle of volition...
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Kant. Aphorisms
V
So act that you use humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of any other, always at the same
time as an end, never merely as a mean.
VI
The moral law is holy (inviolable). A human being is
indeed unholy enough but the humanity in his person
must be holy to him.
VII
But the moral law of itself still does not promise any
happiness, since this is not necessarily connected with
observance of the law according to our concepts of a
natural order as such.
VIII
In this way the moral law leads through the concept
of the highest good, as the object and final end of pure
practical reason, to religion, that is, to the recognition of
all duties as divine commands, not as sanctions — that
is, chosen and in themselves contingent ordinances of
another's will — but as essential laws of every free will
in itself...
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