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M. Heide et al.

Chapter 2
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Implementation andUtilization
ofChecklists inSurgical Patient Safety
MichaelKochis, NathanTurley, MaryBrindle, andAlexHaynes
Abbreviations
EPIS Explore, Prepare, Implement, Sustain
HDI Human Development Index
ICU Intensive care unit
OR Operating room
SSC Surgical Safety Checklist
UK United Kingdom
US United States
VHA Veterans Health Administration
WHO World Health Organization
M. Kochis
Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, MA, USA
e-mail: mkochis@mgh.harvard.edu
N. Turley
EQuIS Research, Department of Surgery, Cumming School of Medicine, The University of
Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada
e-mail: nturley@ucalgary.ca
M. Brindle
EQuIS Research, Department of Surgery, Cumming School of Medicine, The University of
Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada
Ariadne Labs, Boston, MA, USA
e-mail: mbrindle@ariadnelabs.org
A. Haynes (
Department of Surgery and Perioperative Care, Dell Medical School, University of Texas at
Austin, Austin, TX, USA
e-mail: Alex.Haynes@austin.utexas.edu
Switzerland AG 2024
J. Faintuch, S. Faintuch (eds.), Recent Strategies in High Risk Surgery,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-56270-9_2
*)
17© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature

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M. Kochis et al.
Introduction
Many people use checklists. Beyond routine applications like planning groceries
or chores, checklists designed for teams are simple, low-cost, and effective tools
for structuring communication and enhancing collaboration in high-stakes scenarios. They are used by airplane pilots (pre-ight, post-ight, and others), space
agencies launching satellites, large businesses making nancial decisions, and, in
the case of many of our readers, surgical teams mitigating errors and complications [1].
Medicine has become increasingly complex, and multidisciplinary teams are
common, especially in surgery. Within this environment, checklists help clinicians
focus on relevant information at the most appropriate time. By understanding the
history of surgical checklists and best practices in their implementation, you can
better use them as a member of the perioperative team. It is not simply the existence
of a checklist nor its declared use within an organization that effects change, but
rather actual integration into routine practice. To achieve lasting change, integration
requires resources, time, and cultural buy-in.
What Is aChecklist?
A checklist is a cognitive tool used to aid users’ memories and guide actions. On a
group level, it can provide a shared vision about how a process should progress or
what situations should prompt discussion or intervention [1]. Depending on the
exact circumstance, checklists can be used to help evaluate situations, conrm tasks
have been completed, facilitate communication and decision-making, and guide
step-by-step actions or considerations in real-time.
Checklists can take many forms, from a tangible instrument such as a paper or a
poster, to an electronic application, to even being implied in the deliberate design of
a kit of equipment. Weiser and Berry [1] posit there are two types of elements that
commonly appear in checklists: “read-do” and “challenge-conrm.” The former can
be used as a log of items to consider or tasks to accomplish. A common example is
a grocery list, in which an individual crosses off items as they are acquired. On the
other hand, “challenge-conrm” checklist elements involve a closed-loop discussion between two users. One states an item on the list, and the other issues a response
conrming a status or action. For example, before a plane takeoff, one pilot may
read, “brake” to which the other replies, “released.” The reality is that many industry checklists, including those used in medicine, combine elements of both formats.
As common as checklists may be, there is a growing science underpinning their
design. When teams design checklists, they consider the items included on the
checklist, the checklists’ performance within the perioperative workow, and, once
the checklist is introduced, ways for ensuring its continued success.

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19
Deliberate Design
Given the range of functions that checklists can achieve, teams must be deliberate
in considering a specic checklist’s content as it pertains to the task at hand and
local context. For both aspects, attention to human factors is essential. A given
checklist should arise from an identied concern and a thorough analysis of what
contributes to it. Sometimes, introducing a degree of standardization into a process
may be helpful in reducing errors [2].
Teams should be selective that the items they include in their checklist are
well- grounded in data, meet local needs, and promote communication [3, 4].
Teams should be conservative in their approach and practice restraint: checklists
should be concise and limited in items, as comprehensiveness sacrices usability.
After all, any change to a system may introduce new risks, and in healthcare,
poorly designed checklists can reduce efciency by distracting clinicians, complicating tasks, interrupting work ows, and ultimately hindering the delivery of
high quality care [4].
Workow Integration
Equally important to a checklist’s content is its timing. If it is determined that a
checklist is a worthwhile intervention, it should be carefully discussed how the
checklist will be used and how it may t into existing workows [2]. Typically,
checks are performed at natural pauses in a process, to ensure that all relevant
materials are acquired, and elements are addressed to allow corrective actions
before a non-reversible step forward. Checklists’ progression in an anticipated
sequence helps streamline use by ensuring consistency and minimizing disruptions, while identifying and correcting errors of omission or commission before
consequences to the patient. While some checklists were designed for routine use
in all circumstances, others were specically designed for emergencies or uncommon situations beyond most people’s familiarity. In the medical context, this
ranges from routine pre-procedural time-outs or anesthesia machine set-up to
“crisis checklists” which facilitate prompt, coordinated responses to events like
venous air embolism, anaphylaxis, cardiac arrest, re, or malignant hyperthermia,
among others [5, 6].
Effectiveness
The process of checklist design is just one stage of the more-encompassing process
of checklist development [2], which also includes the steps of trial and feedback,
formal testing and evaluation, and modication [1].

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M. Kochis et al.
A Role forChecklists inSurgery
Motives: Patient Safety
Surgical checklists originated in the patient safety movement [7]. While the scientic and technological advances of the mid-twentieth century fostered an immense
growth in the healthcare industry’s ability to treat many medical conditions, so too
grew the frequency with which treatments, and particularly surgical interventions,
caused inadvertent harm.
In the early 1990s, the “Harvard Medical Practice Study” by Brennan and colleagues examined outcomes from a year’s worth of hospitalizations in NewYork
State. Adverse events occurred in 3.7% of hospitalizations, of which 13.6% led to
death [8]; 48% of these errors involved an operation [9]. Nearly a decade later, a
similar analysis in Utah and Colorado found the rate of adverse events to be 2.9%
of all hospitalizations [10]; among these, 66% were surgical [11]. These ndings
were replicated outside the United States (US), with adverse events occurring
among 10.8% of hospitalized patients in the United Kingdom (UK) [12] and 7.5%
of patients in Canada [13]; again, in both of these countries, surgical care was often
the main contributor. In all these analyses, around half of the errors were considered
to be preventable [11, 12, 14]. It became clear that action was necessary.
In 2000, the Institute of Medicine issued the landmark publication “To Err is
Human.” The publication not only dened the scope of medical errors as common
causes of morbidity and mortality, but also examined how systems of care and
human factors contribute to them. It served as a call to action to improve the care
delivered by creating systems of safety in healthcare organizations [14]. “To Err is
Human” spurred a proliferation of research examining the nature of the errors and,
ultimately, how to prevent them.
Adverse Events inSurgery
Despite being called “never events” since they can have catastrophic results and are
entirely preventable, wrong-site surgery still occurs in about 1in 100,000 cases, and
retained surgical items occur in 1in 5000 to 10,000 cases [15]. Additional preventable complications common in the surgical context include infection, deep venous
thrombosis, and pulmonary embolism [7]. Less dramatically but more commonly,
surgical equipment failure, whether related to availability, conguration and settings, or direct malfunctioning, was found to occur a median 2.4 times per operation [16].
Given the diversity of negative outcomes, it should come as no surprise that there
was great interest in determining their common features and root causes. While
many classications have been applied to this purpose, the human performance
deciency framework characterizes errors pertaining to planning or problem solving, execution, rules violation, communication, and teamwork. Among individual

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errors in problem solving and execution, cognitive bias and lack of recognition of
important pieces of data are each just as frequent as technical errors [17].
Strikingly, 60–70% of sentinel events (serious safety events, registered by
accredited hospitals) reported to the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations involved a failure of communication [18, 19]. In particular, the patterns of communication breakdowns resulting in injury to surgical
patients often clustered around failure in verbal communication between a surgical
attending and another caregiver, and ambiguity about responsibilities [18]. Such
failures can relate to occasion, content, audience, or purpose: over a third of them
affected patient safety by impacting efciency, generating team tension, wasting
resources, or resulting in procedural error [19]. The recognition of surgical errors
and their relation to cognitive biases and communication failures sparked interest in
interventions promoting systematic thinking and better interactions among operating room (OR) teams.
21
Antecedents forChecklist Interventions
In an ideal world, tasks would be sequential, predictable, and controllable. However,
the real world has interruptions, concurrent tasks, changes in sequence, and unanticipated additions. These push us into situations where we try to multitask, which
inevitably leads to important things being forgotten [20]. By providing an external
reference, checklists compensate for the fallibility of human attention and memory
under complex and stressful circumstances [4].
The aviation industry has used checklists for nearly a century, prompted by crashes
of Boeing jets own by experienced pilots in the 1930s. It was understood that some
systems are simply too complex for even the most accomplished individual to manage
alone. The airline industry is a useful parallel to medicine since both elds have
unpredictable yet rare deviations, embedded role hierarchy, lengthy training requirements, and highly visible implications for everyone involved [21]. Another parallel
eld is the military, where checklists guide brieng and debrieng sessions to enhance
safety by promoting discipline and eliminating errors of omission [22].
Central Line Infections
In 2001, anesthesiologist and critical care physician Dr. Peter Pronovost introduced
a bundle of interventions pertaining to central line management at Johns Hopkins
Hospital. These interventions included a checklist to reinforce adherence to
infection- control practices during line insertion: handwashing, skin cleaning with
chlorhexidine, sterile draping of the patient, wearing sterile equipment, and applying a sterile dressing. An initial study indicated the rate of catheter-related blood
stream infections decreased dramatically, preventing multiple deaths and saving
their hospital millions of dollars per year [23].

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In October 2003, Pronovost’s pilot was followed by a much larger initiative
called the “Keystone ICU Project,” which implemented the package at more than
100 intensive care units across Michigan. Over an 18-month study period, this intervention decreased the infection rate by 66% [24]. Though Pronovost’s checklist was
just one of several aspects to the Keystone ICU Project, his checklist’s impact
caught broad attention throughout the surgical space. It inspired surgeon and author
Dr. Atul Gawande to muse, “If something so simple can transform intensive care,
what else can it do?” [25].
Universal Protocol
Shortly after the Keystone ICU Project, the Joint Commission took decisive action
to broadly implement checklists for tackling widespread surgical errors head-on. As
such, by July 2004, all accredited organizations had to adhere to a “Universal
Protocol for Preventing Wrong Site, Wrong Procedure, Wrong Person Surgery”
[26]. This protocol involved verifying the patient, marking the surgical site, and
performing a time-out before the procedure begins. While it is unclear whether the
Universal Protocol achieved its goals in reducing the key avoidable surgical errors,
it was a profound step toward institutions’ incorporation and habituation of routine
safety measures [15].
M. Kochis et al.
Additional Early Surgical Checklists
Also in 2003, while the Keystone ICU Project was happening in the US, a team
from Canada developed and implemented a checklist focused on surgical teams and
their communication [27]. Using a vascular surgery team as their participants, the
researchers found that key communication functions were provision of adequate
case-related information, conrmation of details, articulation of concerns, and team
building. Practically speaking, the execution of this checklist took just a few minutes and, while it caused some inconveniences in terms of altered workow, all
participants felt the discussions were efcient. Thus, the Canadian study established
that a team checklist could promote information exchange and facilitate team
cohesion.
The Johns Hopkins OR Brieng checklist was another early tool which had three
parts involving introducing members of the team, reviewing information about the
procedure, and addressing anticipated hazards in the OR using call-and-response
prompts [28].
Three years later, in 2006, the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) implemented a nationwide Medical Team Training program across more than 100 facilities. Following a 2-month preparation phase, training staff worked with
implementation teams to assess problem areas and understand local contexts. The
actual training session involved a day-long workshop where OR teams were trained

2 Implementation andUtilization ofChecklists inSurgical Patient Safety
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to work together, challenge each other when they identied safety risks, and perform checklist-guided preoperative briengs and postoperative debriengs, among
other elements. The initial implementation included quarterly check-ins to enhance
transparency and aid in resolving issues. Facilities enrolled in the program witnessed notable reductions in mortality and morbidity, with longer implementation
periods correlating with even greater decreases [29, 30].
The SURPASS Checklist
Based on the recognition that many, if not most, surgical errors occur outside the
OR, the Surgical Patient Safety System (SURPASS) checklist was developed by a
group of medical centers in the Netherlands to address the full scope of surgical
patients’ care from admission to discharge. Beyond participation from the surgeon,
anesthesiologist, and operating assistant, the SURPASS checklist involves participation of the ward doctor and nurse with added components like hand-off of postoperative instructions and medication provision at discharge. While most surgical
checklists’ items take place within the OR, SURPASS contains 124 items collected
across six time points and multiple potential locations.
The SURPASS checklist was studied from October 2007 to March 2009in the
Netherlands. While there was no change in the rate of complications in the control
group before and after implementation, intervention hospitals saw a statistically
signicant decrease in postoperative complications from 27.3 to 16.7 per 100
patients and a reduction in mortality from 1.5% to 0.8%. Furthermore, when the
results were stratied based on checklist compliance, patients for whom 80% or
more of checklist items were completed had lower rates of complications than those
for whom fewer items were completed [31]. While a benet of the SURPASS
checklist is that it is comprehensive and interdisciplinary, it is also complex to
implement due to the involvement of multiple teams, time points, and locations,
which often requires reorganization of care processes [32].
23
The World Health Organization Surgical Safety
Checklist (SSC)
Development oftheSSC
By the early 2000s, it was estimated that at least one million patients across the
globe died after surgery annually, and seven million were injured from surgical
complications [33]. This recognition led the WHO to launch the World Alliance for
Patient Safety in October 2004. The Alliance framed their work under “Global
Patient Safety Challenges” as a means of focusing and catalyzing global

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commitment to key risk areas. The rst Challenge addressed healthcare-associated
infections. The second Global Patient Safety Challenge, which began in January
2007, focused on safe surgery. Here, the WHO Patient Safety Programme convened
focus groups of experts from around the globe to settle on four areas of opportunity
for dramatic improvement: (1) surgical site infection prevention, (2) safe anesthesia,
(3) safe surgical teams, and (4) measurement of surgical services. These discussions
ultimately settled on ten safety standards that every surgical team in every setting
should meet. Recognizing the simple power of previous checklist interventions in
healthcare, the team tasked with the work chose a checklist as the tool to enact change.
Development of the checklist was guided by three principles: simplicity, wide
applicability, and measurability. The content was selected based on a comprehensive review of safety practices with known benets to surgical patients, with consideration of global settings with various resources [21]. In terms of timing, the team
identied three points in the typical surgical workow which were conducive to
pauses for conrmation and action if needed: “Sign In” prior to induction of anesthesia: “Time Out” before skin incision, and “Sign Out” before the patient leaves the
OR.The SSC was extensively trialed and iterated, whereby confusing actions and
language were claried and rened before being retested in new settings according
to the Plan-Do-Study-Act model [21]. Through this iterative, consensus-based process, the initial standards were translated into a highly useable, one-page, 19-item
checklist for use in ORs (Fig.2.1) [33]. To successfully develop a surgical checklist,
however, formal testing and evaluation are just as important as the initial creation of
content, as will be discussed in subsequent sections.
M. Kochis et al.
Global SSC Adoption
The rst stage of this work involved a global pilot. Eight international sites evaluated the WHO SSC between October 2007 and September 2008. After baseline data
collection, local investigators were given information about site deciencies and
tasked with implementing the checklist based on an implementation manual that
provided adaptable guidance. The implementation process was intensive and
included translation into the local language and tailoring of the checklist and its use
to t local practices. This process was followed by written and in-person instruction
of surgical teams to optimize buy-in and performance. Patients’ death rate decreased
from 1.5% to 0.8% following the SSC’s introduction, and inpatient complication
rate decreased from 11.0% to 7.0% [34]. It should be noted that while the sites represented a variety of economic circumstances and diverse patient populations, they
were specically chosen to maximize the chances of implementation success and
were not necessarily representative of typical hospitals.
Shortly after that pilot study, the SSC proliferated. By March 2009, over 1000
hospitals around the world were using it; by January 2010, that number more than
tripled [35]. Numerous health agencies endorsed the checklist and facilitated its

2 Implementation andUtilization ofChecklists inSurgical Patient Safety
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Fig. 2.1 The World Health Organization/WHO Surgical safety checklist/SSC, initially developed
in 2007 and containing 19 items across three perioperative stages. The complete list, reproduced
by permission, is available in the chapter of Useful tables and internet sites
25
implementation in their jurisdictions. In some instances, the SSC was implemented
along with a package of other patient safety interventions [36].
Checklist Outcomes intheReal World
SSC adoption is associated with decreased rates of complications and mortality across
diverse global contexts [32, 37–39], even those with limited resources [40, 41]. Within
the scope of research performed, there are some randomized controlled trials showing
positive effects from the checklist, including ones in Norway [42] and India [40], but
most studies were pre−/post-implementation designs without controls [32].
In January 2009, the United Kingdom’s National Patient Safety Agency mandated that all National Health System organizations adopt the SSC within a year
[43]. While most cases conducted at least one of the checklist’s three panels, the
entire checklist was completed only 62% of the time. Patients had a statistically
signicant reduced odds of experiencing a complication if all three elements were
completed, but not if the checklist was only partially completed. Furthermore, there
was a greater benet for high-risk patients than low-risk patients [44].
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