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In the Netherlands, the odds ratio for death within 30days of surgery ranged from 0.44 for full implementation, to 1.09 for partial implementation, and up to 1.16 with noncompliance [45].
In July 2010, the Ontario (Canada) Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care man­dated adherence to the SSC.Among the 101 hospitals in the study, there was no signicant difference in risk of death during the hospital stay or within 30days after discharge. There were also no differences in surgical complications, emergency department visits, or hospital readmissions in 3-month periods before and after implementation [46].
On reection, the approach to implementation in Ontario may have contributed to the disappointing ndings [47]. While almost all hospitals in Ontario reported some sort of educational intervention, it was unclear what these interventions entailed or the degree of support they received. Self-reported compliance across centers was greater than 92% during the study period. However, as has been dem­onstrated in many studies since, hospitals are motivated to report high levels of compliance in administrative auditing processes. These inated numbers are often not reected in independent observations, especially when compliance is nancially rewarded or when it is a requirement for hospital accreditation [46].
In Ontario, it was observed that most hospitals did not modify the SSC for their local needs, raising concerns about whether the surgical teams were meaningfully engaged in implementation. Buy-in remains a critical piece of effective implemen­tation, as people tend to embrace interventions they have a hand in designing [48]. Perhaps most importantly, one of the great lessons in these large scale interventions is that effective implementation takes time, and the 3-month follow-up period might not have been adequate to demonstrate meaningful change [49].
M. Kochis et al.
Implementation Matters
Building on early studies examining the impact of SSC effectiveness, a wave of research grounded in implementation science and quality improvement principles have explored the elements of successful implementation. Contrasting the former investigations’ quantitative methods characterizing mortality or complication rates, these later investigations often relied on qualitative methods, employing practices from organizational psychology and medical sociology examining the human expe­rience. In this eld where the nuances of local circumstances are critical, case stud­ies are particularly illustrative.
Behavioral Change
A follow-up study to the initial eight-site pilot trial with an intensive implementa­tion strategy showed that checklist rollout was associated with a statistically signi­cant increase in safety attitudes as measured by a validated questionnaire; the degree
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of improvement in safety scores correlated with a reduction in complication rate. Overall, 80% of respondents indicated the SSC was easy to use, 79% felt the pro­gram prevented errors, and 93% would want the checklist used if they were a patient [50]. Subsequent studies in many contexts delved deeper into exploring how check­list implementation impacted the culture and attitudes of the surgical teams and perceptions of surgical safety.
Case Study: South Carolina In the South Carolina experience, a state-wide implementation of the SSC was achieved through a partnership between the South Carolina Hospital Association and Ariadne Labs, a health systems research plat­form including many of the original developers of the WHO SSC at Harvard. These organizations co-developed a program of recommended practices to sup­port and facilitate checklist implementation (Table2.1). This process, although less intensive than the implementation of the initial WHO pilot, was performed over multiple years with signicant nancial and leadership investment. By design, it ensured a degree of rigor and commitment from the surgical teams involved in the checklist rollout.
As part of this process, surveys were performed that measured perceptions of perioperative safety practices. These surveys found that the process of checklist implementation was associated with improved perceptions of mutual respect, clinical leadership, and team coordination and communication; however,
Table 2.1 Barriers and Facilitators to Successful Checklist Implementation
Domain Barriers Facilitators
Checklist design
Culture
Workow
Execution
Outcomes
Adapted from [22, 39, 51, 52]
− Impractical layout
− Confusing wording or content
− Poor relevance
− Ambiguity how to use (who, when)
− Resistance to change
− Skepticism about evidence
− Anxiety of unfamiliarity
− Staff hierarchy
− “Going through the motions”
− Noncompliance
− Increasing workload
− Repetition, wasted time, delays
− Unsuitable timing of checks
− Poor planning
− Limited access to necessary resources (marking pens, antibiotics)
− Unintended negative effects
− Patient perceptions/anxiety
− Straightforward format
− Modication/adaptation
− Organizational priority
− Demonstrable leadership
− Local champions
− Senior clinician buy-in
− Support from hospital management
− Integration with existing processes
− Education/training on safety and improvement
− Involving entire OR team
− Starting small
− Evident progress and execution of plans
− Regular audits
− Feedback on local data
Accountability for noncompliance
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differences in perceptions based on professional role signied room for improve­ment [53].
These measures of improved perceptions of surgical safety and team culture were aligned with safety outcomes. Among the 14 hospitals that enrolled in the SSC program, there was a 22% decrease in 30-day mortality, but there was no such dif­ference among control hospitals [54].
M. Kochis et al.
Best Practices forImplementation
The efcacy of a checklist depends on successful implementation, which is thoughtful and deliberate. While there are several frameworks available to teams, the Explore, Prepare, Implement, and Sustain (EPIS) framework is easy to understand and use across the pre-implementation, implementation, and post-implementation phases [55]. As a rst step, teams should Explore their surgical context, its members, and their needs. Next, teams should Prepare a customized SSC by leveraging teams’ experiences and contextual knowledge, so it aligns with their workow and patient populations. The third step, Implement, entails the team introducing their customized SSC to the OR and working to engrain the new SSC into their processes. The last step of the EPIS frame­work, Sustain, involves teams evaluating their SSC’s use and impact on their OR and nding ways to ensure teams’ performance does not wane. This framework can also be applied to re-implementation if previous efforts have stalled [56].
The aspects of implementation described below reect the robust theoretical frameworks relevant to effective implementation of the SSC.The ndings and rec­ommendations are based on studies with various methodologies ranging from a scoping review to a realist synthesis, which is an approach designed to consider what works for whom, under what circumstance, and why [57]. These insights will be just as relevant to other checklist interventions.
Pre-Implementation: Explore andPrepare
For the pre-implementation phase, which encompasses the Explore and Prepare steps, best practices include grounding the work within a theoretical framework, understanding barriers and facilitators, and analyzing the local safety culture [58].
Grounded inTheory
Two organizational behavior theories relevant to the SSC include the Normalization Process Theory and Response Regulation Theory. The former examines the cognitive and physical steps involved in embedding a practice into routine work patterns, while the latter describes how leaders use various methods to steer attitudes and behaviors [57].
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Understanding theLocal Context
In a systematic review of 33 studies, Treadwell etal. [39] summarized barriers into four categories: confusion regarding how to properly use the checklist, prag­matic challenges to efcient workow, access to resources, and beliefs and atti­tudes of participating staff—particularly surgeons [39]. This latter nding was borne out in a qualitative study in the UK, which found the single most cited bar­rier to checklist implementation was active resistance or passive noncompliance among OR team members, with the vast majority being senior surgeons and/or anesthesiologists.
Even so, the study found the majority of reported barriers pertained to the check­list itself, either in terms of layout (e.g., no space to write answers) or content (e.g., confusing wording like “are there any unexpected steps?” since by denition they are not anticipated) [52]. Anticipating, identifying, and addressing barriers and opti­mizing facilitators is a key aspect of achieving initial success in SSC rollout as well as sustaining checklist use (Table2.1). To reference a real-world example, a strength of the aforementioned VHA checklist lies in the researchers’ 2-month period dedicated to gathering information on safety barriers and understanding the local culture before implementing the team interven­tion [29].
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Implementation
Here, strategies include customizing the SSC, empowering leaders, and providing support, awareness, and training. Gillespie and Marshall also found that active involvement of physicians and their adaptation of the checklist to their specic cir­cumstances are critical aspects of this stage of implementation [57].
Customization
From the beginning, the WHO has encouraged teams to tailor the SSC based on their contextual needs. Modication of the SSC is associated with successful uptake, as a UK study found modication to be the most commonly cited implementation facilitator [52]. Making changes addresses surgical teams’ needs inlocal contexts and helps create a sense of ownership. Additions should not introduce unnecessary burdens, and eliminations should not compromise opportunities for all team mem­bers to speak up; all changes should promote tool usage and teamwork [3]. In gen­eral, modications may involve adding elements that the current checklist overlooks (e.g., surgical implants), or aspects of the procedure (e.g., robotic surgery) or patient (e.g., neonates) where additional processes need to be considered [3, 59].
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M. Kochis et al.
As an example, adaptation of the checklist to ambulatory surgeries, where mor­bidity and especially mortality are so low, shifted the focus to reducing pain and preventing postoperative nausea/vomiting [60]. Checklists have been applied to many surgical subspecialties including Neurosurgery, Orthopedics, Cardiac Surgery, Urology, and Otolaryngology [61], each with their own adaptations. In Pediatric surgery, for example, a well-regarded practice is encouraging parental involvement in checklist activities [62].
However, adaptation should be viewed with caution due to potential downsides. First is diminished effectiveness, which can occur through either loss of important elements or addition of items that are irrelevant to regular use or make the tool too onerous, lead­ing to disengagement or inefciency. Second, modications complicate comparability and aggregation which are necessary for benchmarking and research purposes. Such was a concern among researchers in Switzerland, who discovered signicant variations in content, timing, and role denitions in checklists across the country [63].
Multi-Level Leadership
A study of SSC implementation at ve hospitals in Washington State found leaders to be a strong factor for implementation success, since they can explain the reason­ing behind checklist use and demonstrate how it is used in real life. When there was a lack of understanding on why or how the SSC works, it led to staff frustration, disinterest, and eventual abandonment [64]. Furthermore, the tone among high­level hospital or departmental decision-makers can have a profound inuence on users’ buy-in and acceptance of the SSC.As John Kotter, a thought leader on orga­nizational change, once said, “Unless you win support for your ideas, from people at all levels of your organization, big ideas never seem to take hold or have the impact you want” [65]. Indeed, engagement of institutional stakeholders like hospi­tal CEOs, and not just physicians and nurses, was believed to be a key element of the success of the South Carolina program [66].
Implementation Support
Finally, the last theme–providing support, awareness, and training–can again be illustrated through the South Carolina implementation (Table2.1). Here, implemen­tation success was associated with the completion of low- and high-touch activities: while inexpensive webinars and coaching phone calls were easy to implement and supported the process, more intensive activities like in-person meetings and team­work skills trainings resulted in greater engagement and effectiveness [66]. It is likely that a combination of these approaches can address issues of feasibility and cost as well as efcacy.
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Post-Implementation: Sustain
After evaluation, strategies that audit and improve the ongoing use of the SSC are critical so that its value can be sustained or augmented, and it can continue to address the changing needs of surgical teams. The key themes in this phase include ongoing monitoring in which data on the use of the checklist are documented, and feedback in which that data are shared with users for the sake of reinforcing positive behaviors or correcting problematic behaviors. While successful pre- and during- intervention ini­tiatives are necessary for a checklist to achieve its best effect, demonstration of the benets to the involved parties can enhance utilization and ensure that the outcomes are sustained in the long term. Locally collected data, observations, and anecdotes which are personally relevant are persuasive and should be fed back and discussed with teams frequently [52]. The Proctor framework introduces eight standard out­comes used to evaluate successful implementation of an intervention [67]; assessment of these outcomes helped demonstrate sustained nationwide checklist implementation in Benin [68].
After providing surgical teams with the knowledge and resources needed to implement the SSC, it is important to realize that change does not happen immedi­ately. There is no standard implementation timeline, since acceptance of an inter­vention is idiosyncratic and multifactorial. The South Carolina program, for example, spanned 8years, with additional hospitals joining the community as suc­cess became evident [66]. This underscores the notion that the act of translating knowledge into action should not be taken for granted.
Next Steps
SSC inLow andMiddle-Income Countries
It is a common misperception that checklists’ benet is seen exclusively or primar­ily in low-resource settings. In reality, early studies demonstrated that the checklist could be effective in both high- and low-resource settings, the latter ranging from an under-resourced hospital in Moldova [41] to a large multi-specialty hospital in India [40]. However, low-resource settings face several barriers which hamper the ef­cacy of the SSC.
Slow Progress
The WHO sought nationwide implementation of the SSC in 15 African countries in 2011 by convening a group of one representative hospital from each country. By October 2012, 10 of the 15 hospitals reported successful implementation of the checklist, but none of them implemented it in all of their ORs, and no national
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efforts were underway [69]. While efforts since then have been limited, there have been some successes. For instance, the health ministries of Madagascar, Benin, and Guinea partnered with the non-prot Mercy Ships, which runs the world’s largest civilian hospital ship [70]. Furthermore, several studies have examined successful implementation initiatives, identifying barriers and establishing best practices [68, 71].
Although SSC use does not rely on technology and is designed to be used in all settings, the competing demands, diminished infrastructure, and cultural barriers in low resource settings have resulted in poor adoption and sustainment of the SSC in these contexts. Ten years after introduction of the SSC, signicant variability exists in terms of use of SSC, with decreased overall use in low Human Development Index (HDI) countries compared to those with very high HDI [72].
The Clean Cut Program
Developed by local surgical leaders both within and external to Lifebox, a non­prot organization focused on improving worldwide surgical care (lifebox.org), Clean Cut is an adaptive, multimodal checklist-based program that targets six areas: appropriate skin and hand antisepsis, maintenance of a sterile eld, instrument ster­ilization, appropriate prophylactic antibiotic administration, routine gauze count­ing, and routine use of the SSC.Following program implementation in ve hospitals in Ethiopia from August 2016 to October 2018, compliance with the six items increased, and the risk of infections decreased [73]. This program is currently being scaled throughout Ethiopia, and teams have begun to implement in several other African countries.
M. Kochis et al.
Beyond theWHO SSC
In many settings, it has been over a decade since the SSC’s rst implementation, with new users inheriting SSCs from a prior implementation period [3, 59]. In light of changing needs, organizations should periodically review and update their check­lists, not only because it refreshes the items on their SSCs, but also because it gal­vanizes the team and recognizes new perspectives. Such a review should be comprehensive and systematic. While this process may seem daunting, there are various systems for changing teams’ checklists and revitalizing their use. For exam­ple, in assessing SSC use at Singapore General Hospital, a team from Ariadne Labs developed a three-part evaluation plan involving assessing (1) quality of care via a review of surgical safety events, (2) safety culture through a validated survey and informal feedback, and (3) checklist performance through direct observations and a survey of staff. This allowed them to revise and re-implement the checklist in Singapore while also setting forth a framework for other organizations [56].
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Technology Tools
The potential opportunities provided by visual displays, real data integration, and clinical decision support may result in further checklist evolution. One study used checklists displayed via an app on smart glasses. As compared to standard approaches such as a poster on the wall, the smart glasses group had improved completion rate and decreased time spent performing the checklists [74]. Another innovation involves a Digital Checklist Box, which projects the timeout information onto the patient’s drapes and allows surgeons to navigate the interface with hand gestures [75].
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