Цывкунова АРМС ЦОНТРОЛ АНД ДИСАРМАМЕНТ 2013

Unit III. Section 2. The 1986 Reykjavik Summit. Interview with P. Palazchenko

Task 1. Focus on Words. a) Analyze the following vocabulary items:

•The Clive Anderson show – a popular British television talk

show

•The INF Treaty – Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty -

Соглашение о сокращении ракет средней дальности. The treaty is formally titled The Treaty Between the United States of America and

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles.

The treaty eliminates nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with intermediate ranges, defined as between 500 - 5,500 km.

•heavy (land-based / sea-launched) missiles – ракеты большой мощности (наземного/ морского) базирования

•in a kind of whimper (an allusion to T.S. Eliot’s “This is the way the world ends / Not with a bang, but a whimper.”)

b)Find in the interview the English equivalents for the following words and word combinations:

(1) говорить на одном языке; (2) рассудительный человек; (3) давать интервью; (4) взаимодействие, хороший контакт; (5) доверяй, но проверяй; (6) человек, которого переводят; (7) политикпрагматик, «не летающий в облаках»; (8) совместное заявление; (9) стенографист; (10) хорошо осведомленный; (11) неровно, с трудом; (12) отстаивать свои позиции; (13) острый вопрос; (14) набирать скорость, силу; (15) явиться на работу (после отпуска); (16) встреча с глазу на глаз; (17) не достичь цели

Task 2. Give Russian equivalents for the following words and word combinations. Provide your own context in which they may be used.

evermore crucial, unobtrusive, blast of fresh air, hiatus, adversary, it’s a must, to trace back to, nuts and bolts, bean counting, to eliminate (to abolish), consistent with something, to have a good grasp of foreign affairs, to be inclined to, to talk somebody out, to back out of some-

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thing, attempted coup (d’etat), facelift, contested election, it’s common knowledge

Task 3. Look at the pictures. Mind that each photo illustrates an important meeting mentioned in the interview. Describe the pictures.

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Task 4. Interview in numbers. Explain which event mentioned by P. Palazchenko is meant by the following dates and numbers.

Task 5. Answer the following questions:

•What do we come to know about Pavel Palazchenko’s ‘big experience in interpreting’?

•What was so different about Gorbachev versus all previous Soviet leaders?

•What information is provided about R. Reagan?

•What did Pavel Palazchenko reveal about the summits at Geneva and Reykjavik?

•Where and how did the Cold War end?

•How did the 1991 coup affect Mr. Gorbachev?

Task 6. Read some extracts from the book of Ambassador James E. Goodby (At the Borderline of Armageddon—How American Presidents Managed the Atom Bomb (2006), who was vice chair of the U.S. START delegation during 1982-1983.

What additional information is provided about the Reykjavik summit? Give Russian equivalents for the expressions in bold type.

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The story of the 1986 Reykjavik summit meeting is a tale of two visionary leaders and an “impossible dream.” It was the most remarkable summit ever held between U.S. and Soviet leaders. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev seriously discussed the elimination of all ballistic missiles held by their two countries and aired the possibility of eliminating all nuclear weapons.

As Gorbachev said in these pages, “[T]he 1986 U.S.-Soviet summit in Reykjavik, seen by many as a failure, actually gave an impetus to reduction by reaffirming the vision of a world without nuclear weapons and by paving the way toward concrete agreements on intermediaterange nuclear forces and strategic nuclear weapons.”

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The world has changed since those heady days, but it is clearer than ever that the twin challenges of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism must be addressed “by reaffirming the vision of a world without nuclear weapons.” At a time when the international community is struggling to prevent a cascade of decisions by more and more states to acquire nuclear weapons, the ideas that briefly occupied center stage at Reykjavik look like the best answer we have.

Reagan and Gorbachev brought two great nations close to the end of the era of the Cold War. Two revolutionaries, each in his own way, became history’s catalysts for change. Gorbachev realized that the Soviet Union needed radical economic reform, and that to do it, he had to end the ideological confrontation with the West. Reagan was unlike any other U.S. president in his revulsion against the immorality of nuclear war, his willingness to do something about it, and his ability to act on his instincts. Turning away from classical arms control, he insisted on nuclear disarmament and succeeded to a remarkable degree. Reagan and Gorbachev found common ground at their first summit in Geneva in 1985; the two leaders declared that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”

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The final session was a scene of high drama. Gorbachev said he wanted to eliminate all strategic forces, not just ballistic missiles. Reagan said, “It would be fine with me if we eliminated all nuclear weapons.” The break point began to appear when Gorbachev, following the script laid out in his initial presentation, insisted that all research and testing of spacebased ballistic missile systems be restricted to laboratories.

In the final minutes at Reykjavik, Reagan, as reported by Secretary of State George Shultz, re-read the key clause to Gorbachev: “Listen once again to what I have proposed: during that 10-year period [of nonwithdrawal from the ABM treaty], while continuing research, testing, and development which is permitted by that treaty. It is a question of one word.” Reagan did not want to enter into a negotiation that he viewed as amending the treaty. He had accepted a “broad” interpretation of the treaty, under which wide latitude was allowed for space-based testing, although the treaty’s original negotiators, the Soviets, and the Senate supported a more restrictive interpretation.

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Gorbachev insisted on the word “laboratories.” Over this one word, the negotiations broke off. Washington read Gorbachev’s proposal as an attack on the missile defense program, the Strategic Defense Initiative. That one word, “laboratories,” obviously rang alarm bells in the minds of those who had been operating under tense conditions for two days.

So ended “the highest stakes poker game ever played,” as Shultz described it. In Reagan’s words, “We proposed the most sweeping and generous arms control proposal in history. We offered the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles—Soviet and American—from the face of the earth by 1996. While we parted company with this American offer still on the table, we are closer than ever before to agreements that could lead to a safer world without nuclear weapons.”

One of the great imponderables of history is what would have happened if Gorbachev had dropped the word “laboratories” and his objections to testing in space or if Reagan had accepted the limitation that Gorbachev sought? With the hindsight of history, it seems likely that the deployment of an effective ballistic missile defense system would not have been affected one way or the other. What we do not know is whether a treaty of the kind discussed at Reykjavik would have released Russia and United States from the nuclear deterrence relationship in which they are still entrapped.

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Nonetheless, Reagan and Gorbachev achieved a great deal at Reykjavik. They had stretched the envelope of thinking about reducing the nuclear danger. They had clearly distinguished between nuclear weapons and all other weapons and had stigmatized nuclear weapons as immoral, their use unacceptable in conflicts among nations. They reinforced the tradition of the non-use of nuclear weapons, and despite the famous word “laboratories,” the Reykjavik meeting led to the signing of the U.S.-Soviet treaty on banning intermediate-range nuclear forces and to a draft treaty on reducing strategic-range nuclear forces that was almost complete by the time Reagan left office. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), signed in 1991, is still in force. The first treaty to cut strategic nuclear arms significantly, it also provides the basis for verification of the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) concluded by Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, which endorsed further strate-

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gic weapons cuts. Reykjavik was a long stride toward one part of Reagan’s dream, the elimination of nuclear weapons.

As things stand, however, each country is still hedging in its nuclear weapons programs so as to be prepared for an adverse turn of events in the other. Nuclear weapons are still a major factor in international relations. Rather than pursuing Reagan’s genuine interest in eliminating all nuclear weapons, the Bush administration, for example, has conflated nuclear and conventional weapons in its definition of offensive forces in its new “strategic triad” and refused to consider further reductions in operationally deployed nuclear forces, below SORT levels, even in response to appeals from non-nuclear-weapon states.

These policies contrast sharply with Reagan’s thinking about nuclear weapons. Of course, the world has changed since Reagan left office, and new threats have emerged. Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs were not the problems in the 1980s that they are in 2006. Nuclear-armed terrorist groups were imaginable then but not the real possibility that they are today.

I would argue, however, that Reagan’s ideas about nuclear weapons are as salient today as they were then. There is no doubt that national decisions to acquire nuclear weapons are motivated by regional rivalries, a desire to have an equalizer against the conventional weapons superiority of a global adversary, and by prestige and a sense of entitlement. Iran and North Korea are motivated by these considerations. U.S. policies have to be targeted on local and regional specifics in each case.

Task 7. Divide into two groups – pro and con, and conduct a debate on the topic “Is the elimination of nuclear weapons a ‘possible dream’? Appoint the “Chair” of the debate who will give the floor to the speakers of both teams. Make use of the following information while framing your arguments:

Although huge cuts have been made to the more than 65,000 nuclear weapons that existed at the time of Reykjavik, in recent years negotiations have become mired in political stalemate with the result that today there are still as many as 20,000 nuclear weapons in the world

– an estimated 18,000 of them in the arsenals of the United States and Russia. With some 4,000 nuclear warheads deployed and ready to be launched at a moment’s notice, the threat to the world is critical. At the

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same time, as global economies falter, the costs of maintaining these arsenals amount to billions of dollars.

Imagine a world without nuclear weapons. Where there is no more fear that bombs on hair-trigger alert might be launched by accident or miscalculation. Or that the thousands of arms stored in global nuclear arsenals might be used, unleashing forces powerful enough to destroy our planet many times over. The threat of terrorists obtaining these weapons of mass destruction no longer exists. And while the term Nuclear Superpower is now redundant, the trillions of dollars formerly spent on maintaining nuclear arsenals have been diverted to education, health and development. Impossible? Well, a quarter of a century ago that dream nearly became reality.

“In my opinion the United States and Russia should jointly declare their willingness to eliminate their nuclear weapons as part of an effective commitment, via the United Nations. The United States and Russia, together, have the capacity to eliminate the world of nuclear weapons and arrive at a world-wide zero,” says Max Kampelman (American diplomat, educator and lawyer, was chief arms control negotiator for all summit meetings between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev. Ambassador Kampelman was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1999, the highest civilian award in the United States).

Task 8. Choose one of the quotations and comment on it.

1. The way to win an atomic war is to make certain it never starts. (Omar Nelson Bradley, American general, Speech on Armistice Day, 10 Nov. 1948)

2.There is no evil in the atom; only in men’s souls. (Adlai Ewing Stevenson, American Democratic politician, diplomat, lawyer. Speech in Hartford, 18 September 1952)

3.Let us keep pushing on disarmament and non-proliferation. Let us fulfill the

dream … a world free of nuclear weapons. (Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Statement at the GA, 21 September 2011)

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APPENDIX I

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty,

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

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Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,

Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

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Article II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article III

1.Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

2.Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.

3.The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or

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