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context of Western legal culture naturally cut off the subject matter due to the constitutional legal tradition, which implies not only the priority of the freedom of speech and freedom of expression,28 including the creative one, but mostly private-law means to protect these rights. This, in turn, leads to conditions under which, for example, questions of the limits of state intervention in artistic freedom in order to ensure various types of national security are actualized primarily in legal systems in which states actively and directly defend their sovereignty in the information space, which include, above all, the Russian Federation29 and People’s Republic of China,30 where at the current stage the problematics of the semantic limits of law is manifested most clearly in the form in which it is reconstructed in the framework of the present study.

In the framework of the general methodological paradigm of the postclassical type of scientific rationality, it is impossible to ignore the introspective analysis of the subjective significance of the research topic, since this may shed light on its objective significance because the author himself is in many ways a product of his era. The academic interest of the author to the subject of this study historically stems from interest in special

28However, despite the absence (at the time of writing) in many Western jurisdictions of direct legal provisions directly providing for public law restrictions on the dissemination of certain types of information in the same sense as established in Russia, it would be misleading to believe that such priority is absolute. As is well known, for example, the dissemination of a novel by V.V. Nabokov “Lolita” in the middle of the XXth century was restricted by the authorities of Great Britain and France (along with Argentina, New Zealand and South Africa). See e.g.: Lolita / The Hunger Games Reaches Another Milestone: Top 10 Censored Books // Time. Sept. 28, 2008 [Electronic resource]. – [Site]. – URL: http://entertainment.time.com/2011/01/06/removing-the-n-word-from-huck-finn-top-10-censored-books/slide/lolita/ (accessed: 02.10.2018). It should be noted that the book is not considered to be legally controversial in the light of the direct provisions of Russian law, even though its general topic can be considered as controversial to certain extent in moral sense. Another relevant case is “soft censorship”, which, from recent examples, banned Harper Lee’s “To Kill a Mockingbird” and Mark Twain’s “The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn” from the school libraries in Ackomac County, Virginia, USA, for statements that were considered racist. See e.g.: Allen N. To Kill a Mockingbird and Huckleberry Finn banned from schools in Virginia for racism // The Telegraph. 5 Dec. 2016. – [Electronic resource]. – [Site]. – URL: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/05/kill- mockingbird-huckleberry-finn-banned-schools-virginia-racism/ (accessed: 02.10.2018).

29An example of this may be legal norms aimed at restricting the dissemination of certain types of information – for example, Articles 15.1 or 15.2 of the Federal Law of 27.07.2006 No. 149-FZ “On Information, Information Technologies and Protection of Information”, and norms aimed at recognizing the jurisdiction of Russian courts in disputes involving foreign persons in connection with activities carried out via the Internet, in particular, Items 2, 10 and 11 Part 3 Article 402 of the Civil Procedure Code of the Russian Federation.

30See e.g.: Jiang M. Authoritarian Informationalism: China’s Approach to Internet Sovereignty // SAIS Review of International Affairs. 2010. No. 30(2). PP. 71-89. – Available at Social Science Research Network [Electronic resource]. – [Site]. – URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1702128 (accessed: 02.10.2018).

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interdisciplinary (at the intersection of game studies31 and jurisprudence) problem of the legal aspects of virtual worlds and multiplayer computer games, which has historically focused on the issue of “virtual property”. The hypothesis of the research significance of this study arose, in turn, from an intuitive understanding of the prospects of computer technology at an early age. Nevertheless, the subjective interest in any topic is not a guarantee of its objective research significance, therefore this direction of research should have been tested for methodological tenacity. The study of this problem from the point of view of the subject of legal science, at first glance, raises primarily special issues of civil and information law, but soon turns to a broader problem of the relationship between “virtual” and “real” in the context of a hypothetical border where “real” legal norms cannot be applicable (as a conditional example, which can be repeatedly met on the pages of this work, we can cite the prohibition of the “real” criminal law to murder, which, as it seems to many, does obviously not operate in relation to a virtual relationship between non-player characters of a videogame). The concepts associated with the explanation of such a hypothetical border are traditionally correlated in academic space with the concept of «magic circle» – a metaphor from the works of the eminent Dutch culturologist J. Huizinga, who, in his book “Homo Ludens”,32 among the first conceptualized, firstly, ideas about the role of games in human culture, and secondly, he drew an analogy between games and law as such (focusing primarily on archaic law). In the process of analyzing the literature devoted to this perspective of considering the problem, it becomes obvious that

31Game studies is a field which is interdisciplinary in itself and which unites, first of all, the subjects of culturology, sociology and philosophy as applied to games and, first of all, computer games.

32As J. Huizinga noted, “Formally, the function of such a fence and for the sake of a sacred purpose, and for the sake of a clean game is exactly the same. The racetrack, the tennis court, the playground for ‘classics’, the chess board are not functionally different from such things as the temple or the magic circle”, and even as applied to the law: “Every place where justice is served is a true temenos, a sanctified place, cut off, fenced off from the ordinary world. Thus, a place for the court is first allocated and then the court is convened. It is truly a magical circle, a playing space within which the habitual division of

people by their rank is temporarily stopped. For the time being, they are made inviolable”. See: Huizinga J. Homo Ludens; Articles on the History of Culture (in Russian) / Transl. by D.V. Silvestrov; Comment. by D.E. Kharitonovich. – M.: Progress– Tradition, 1997 – 416 p. It should be noted that in Huizinga's terminology the “magic circle” acts as a tool for ensuring formal equality.

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the concept of the “magic circle”, as it was subsequently developed, is criticized and often deservedly, because in reality the line between “virtual” and “real” turns out to be quite thin, if it exists at all. In this case, however, there is another logical conclusion. The concept of the “magic circle” can be interpreted differently, more broadly, and combine a complex of relationships connected not only with games, but also with other phenomena and practices of the modern information culture, or with previously known phenomena and practices that are being rethought within the framework of modern information culture. Such phenomena and practices that are noticeable when climbing to a higher level of theoretical generalizations include a wide range of phenomena related to the concepts of “games”, “unserious” and “fictional” (in arbitrary combinations) – this includes artistic works, folklore based on different types of humor and satire, and other similar social practices. From the height of this generalization in modern conditions, it becomes clear that such a formulation of the problem unexpectedly reveals a sui generis problem related to the philosophy of law and legal dogma. What is it? In the framework of the modern information culture, at first approximation, fundamentally new legal conflicts arise. The reason for their emergence, among other things, is the fact that the state begins to defend sovereignty in the information space, and consequently, the norms of law are regarded by the public authorities as extending to purely information relationships. In a number of cases, this leads to situations that may intuitively seem “strange”: for example, the blocking of Internet sites containing recipes for dynamite in computer games on the grounds of prohibitions and restrictions on the dissemination of information in order to counter terrorism.33 In a more detailed analysis it becomes clear that Russian legislation already now (and not only) contains a lot of norms in respect of which one can raise the

33 In this connection, it seems that the present study is related not only to such a priority direction of the Development Program of Saint Petersburg State University until 2020 as “Social Research and Technologies”, but also to “Information Systems and Technologies”. See Section IV of the Program for Development of the Federal State Educational Institution of Higher Education “Saint-Petersburg State University until 2020”, approved by the Order of the Government of the Russian Federation of 07.10.2010. (ed. on 22.11.2017) [Electronic resource]. – Access from the legal reference system “ConsultantPlus” (date of application: 11.09.2019)

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question of the limits of their application from the point of view of common sense, since other application and interpretation would be absurd.34 This statement of the problem definitely takes the problem beyond the limits of private and sectoral problems, as it implies an unambiguous parallel with the examples of absurdity in law, long known to the history of legal and political teachings (from the dialogue between the pirate and Alexander the Great35 to the previously mentioned examples of L. Fuller). The severity of the problem now, however, is caused by the fact that similar situations no longer constitute only the field of speculative models of philosophical and legal research or historical and philosophical anecdotes. It is in the context of modern information culture that practical problems of substantiating the semantic limits of law as a conceptualization of the discourse under consideration are actualized. At the same time, the proposed approach seems to be relevant not only at the current stage of development of the information society. For example, it has a significant prognostic potential because it creates a direct methodological basis for the analysis of the problems of virtual and augmented reality, while not losing touch with the tradition of philosophical and legal thought. A significant link is made to the doctrine of absurdity in the interpretation of statutes, and it is also clear from the proposed perspective that the substantive aspects of the doctrine come up against a “wall of obviousness” – the theory of law and interpretation of law as a whole lacks a sound and complete theory of why the application of law is absurd in certain cases. Here, and perhaps unexpectedly, the relationship with the classical discourse of law philosophy on the relationship between law and morality is seen, since it is the contradiction of

34It should be emphasized that, when considering in more detail, the restriction on the dissemination of information about the methods of making dynamite in computer games, in fact, cannot seem strange just because it is a computer game. The case is different, namely, what concerns us is the extent to which the subject matter of the relationship arising from such games actually corresponds to the real features of dynamite, and the extent to which it is a socially significant phenomenon. The study does not challenge the general thesis that certain types of information may be dangerous in the event of uncontrolled dissemination.

35This is a popular historical anecdote about the dialogue between Alexander the Great and the pirate, who noted that the right to manage the sea was granted to the pirate by the same source from whom Alexander got the right to manage the land, and the difference (in the interpretation of the pirate) is only that the pirate does it on his only ship, while Alexander – with the help of a huge army.

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morality that is often used as a universal explanation of the absurdity of interpretation or application of law. As research shows, this is not always the case. A contradiction to morality is neither necessary nor sufficient to consider the application or interpretation of law as absurd, even in the case of the “Radbruch’s Formula”. In this connection, there appears an idea to consider separate semantic limits of law as, figuratively (or not figuratively) speaking, the rules of the language game of law in the terminology of L. Wittgenstein. It is also impossible to ignore the mathematical theory of games, in the light of which a deep and scalable metaphor of law as a zero-sum language game is born. Thus, the concept of semantic limits of law, which was originally outlined based on the need to define the criteria of absurdity of law enforcement in relation to the model of game relations in the narrow and technical sense of the word – whether law can interfere in relations in multiplayer computer games – finds application in the context of the problems of game analogy in the philosophy of law. In the process of research, it becomes clear that the game analogy is quite interesting, but very poorly developed direction, which clearly needs to be rethought within the modern information culture, because now in culture we see a kind of “game turn”. Curiously, the “game analogy” can be traced in the works of such scholars as, for example, H. Hart36 or A. Ross.37 A small number of special studies on this topic (e.g., M. Midgley38 or B. Jackson39) contains interesting observations that

36H. Hart based his interpretation of the analogy on the idea that the legal system is a set of specific rules that can be compared to the rules of squash and tennis. In both cases, however, there is a “core meaning” of the rules and cases in which they are applied in different ways in specific situations. A good summary of the game analogy in the works of H. Hart is presented, for example, in the works of J. W. van Doren, see e.g.: Van Doren J.W. Theories of Professors H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin – A Critique // Cleveland State Law Review. – 1980. – Vol. 279. – PP. 279 – 309. I wonder what H. Hart would have said if he had carefully studied modern games?

37The basis of analogy A. Ross was playing chess. “Understanding” of the game means not causal connection but mutual certainty of events by means of game rules, thus within one game interpretation of rules and events should be identical, otherwise there will be no game as such. See: Ross A. On Law and Justice. – Clark, New Jersey: 2007. – PP. 12–15. We may address A. Ross the same question as to H. Hart.

38М. Midgley develops an analysis of the problem of the seriousness of the game as such, noting that it would be naive to think that all cases of games are not serious – on the example of sports games for many, not only professional athletes, but also fans, games occupy a very serious place in life, and this can be considered a sociological fact. See: Midgley M. The Game Game // Philosophy. – 1974. – No. 189 (Jul., 1974). – PP. 231–253. – URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3750115 (accessed: 26 July 2018).

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generally develop within the framework of the general “magic circle” approaches, which are only more oriented towards jurisprudence per se than towards games. However, we would like to emphasize that the views of thinkers of the XXth century could at least be significantly supplemented, or even changed in principle, if they caught up with modern computer games, which are much more methodologically rich than the games known at that time.

However, returning to the consistent presentation of the internal logic of the study, the concept of semantic limits of law, which is a set of theoretical provisions aimed at addressing a scientific problem of great political, socio-economic and cultural importance, is formed based on the previously presented key methodological approaches. Political – because, as will be demonstrated in this paper, legal policy in the field of freedom of information is of serious importance in the current environment. Socio-economic – in the applied legal aspect. Cultural – since the approach to the semantic limits of law largely determines the freedom of artistic creation and the creation of other cultural artifacts. As will be shown later in this paper, the semantic limits of law are best explained by means of two key concepts: “open texture” of legal norms,40 as developed in the works by H. Hart, and generalized symbolic media, the idea of which is developed in theoretical sociology,

39B. Jackson is the author of one of the most consistent and in-depth publications analyzing the analogy of law and games in the context of the modern type of scientific rationality and structural approach. See: Jackson B.S. Towards a semiotic model of the games analogy in Jurisprudence // Droit et société. – 1991. – No. 17–18. – PP. 99–123. – doi: https://doi.org/10.3406/dreso.1991.1105.

40It should be noted that, in the context of this study, it is essential to establish the functional adequacy between the “core meaning” of the disputed concept and a fact of media reality in the process of interpreting legal texts. Although the main way to establish such adequacy is to apply the notions of late Wittgenstein about “family resemblance”, it is necessary to note the closeness of this approach to the interpretation of the correspondent theory of truth, in which correspondence is understood as a relative isomorphism, in relation to the closed universum of law. Correspondent truth theory is perhaps the best known theory in this field. It presupposes “correspondence” of statements to the fact. Isomorphism implies not only conformity but also structural adequacy of reality. See e.g.: Marian D. The Correspondence Theory of Truth [Electronic resource] // Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. – [Site]. – URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/#6 (accessed: 03.10.2018). Criticism of such a theory of truth, based on the notion of fragmentation and disconnectedness of reality, does not affect jurisprudence in the postclassical type of scientific rationality, since law is precisely the “constructed” model of reality – this is its purpose in social life, which implies an agreement on the conventions and rules of the game

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and in its explicit form – starting with the works of T. Parsons.41. In the end, the results of the research allow both to supplement philosophical and legal notions about the nature of law and to determine the methodology of legal argumentation in applied situations that require a legally significant explanation of absurdity or reasonableness of application, or interpretation of certain legal norms in borderline situations related to media space.

Degree of development of the topic. This dissertation is an academic qualification work, which solves the academic problem of reconstruction of the semantic limits of law, which has important political, socio-economic and cultural significance. This required, first, to carry out the formulation of this problem, because in the perspective in which it is distinguished by the empirical material in this study, this problem has not previously been and could not be stated. L. Fuller approached the problem earlier the closest to the statement of the problem. In “Anatomy of the Law”, he defined the dependence of the law on the “generally shared assumptions”, the contradiction to which leads to the absurdity of this or that legal position. At the same time, this idea, in the angle suggested in this paper, did not find a fundamental development and was not clearly reflected in the subsequent work of the thinker and his followers. In addition, it should be emphasized that the uniqueness of the experience of conceptualization of the problem of the semantic limits of law in this work is also explained by the relevance of the problem to the modern information society, which is characterized by a new and poorly researched context of modern information culture, corresponding to the conditions of the medial turn – these

41 In modern terms, a generalized (generalized) symbolic medium is a “token” of a social (i.e., generally significant) value corresponding to one of the subsystems of the social system. For example, money is a generalized symbolic medium of material resources, corresponding to the economic subsystem, and power implies a legitimate monopoly on physical violence, corresponding to the political subsystem. See e.g.: Johnson H.M. The Generalized Symbolic Media in Parsons’ Theory // Sociology & Social Research. – 1973. – PP. 208–221; Chernilo D. The Theorization of Social Co-Ordinations in Differentiated Societies: The Theory of Generalized Symbolic Media in Parsons, Luhmann and Habermas // British Journal of Sociology. – 2002. – Vol. 53. – Issue 3. – PP. 431–449; Turner T.S. Parsons’ Concept of “Generalized Media of Social Interaction” and its Relevance for Social Anthropology // Sociological Inquiry. – 1968. – Vol. 38. – Issue 2. – PP. 121–134. The most relevant approach to generalized symbolic media is presented in the works by S. Abrutyn, see e.g.: Abrutyn S. Money, Love, and Sacredness: Generalised Symbolic Media and the Production of Instrumental, Affectual, and Moral Reality // Czech Sociological Review. – 2015. – Vol. 51. – No. 3. – PP. 445–471.

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circumstances were not and could not be known to the authors who studied the problems of philosophy of law in the XXth century and earlier.

However, the approach proposed in this study relates to at least three main areas of legal theory and philosophy, each of which has been separately reflected in the works of a wide range of authors. First, the concept of the semantic limits of law is related to the notion that law is or should be aimed at regulating not any but the “most important”42 social relationships. This observation can be considered a “deceptive common place” of legal theory, and in one form or another it is reflected in the works, speeches and other materials of many domestic and foreign authors of works – from textbooks to monographs

– which address the issues of sources of law (S.S. Alekseev, V.V. Lazarev, O.E. Leist, M.N. Marchenko, V.S. Nersesyants, A.V. Polyakov, E.V. Timoshina, etc.). At the same time, criteria that allow for a reasonable degree of accuracy and credibility to determine which social relationships are “important” and which are not, cannot be considered as having been developed to at least a minimum satisfactory degree specifically in legal studies. Second, the concept of the semantic limits of law corresponds to the discourse on the relationship between law and morality, including in the context of the discussion between positivists and legal scholars of the XXth century. The notion of the limits of law was usually considered through the prism of the moral limits of law. Thus, for example, J. Stanton-Ife, systematizing notions about the limits of law, analyzes mainly the works of those foreign authors who directly or indirectly dealt with the problems of the relationship between law and morality (R. Dworkin, D. Lewis, N. MacCormick, J. Raz, J. Rawls, J. Feinberg, J. Finnis, L. Fuller, H. Hart, J. Hampton, etc.),43 and it’s the moral discourse that

42See e.g.: Polyakov A.V., Timoshina E.V. General Theory of Law: Textbook. – Saint Petersburg: Publishing House of Saint Petersburg State University, Publishing House of the Law Faculty of Saint Petersburg State University, 2005. P. 305.

43See: Stanton-Ife J. The Limits of Law [Electronic resource] // The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). – [Site]. – URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/law-limits/ (accessed: 17.10.2018).

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leads to the questioning.44 One of the components of the research novelty of this study is precisely the justification of the “area of absurdity”, which excludes not only the application of law, but also weighing (balancing)45 of values that have moral nature. Third, the key area of application of the concept of semantic limits of law is the interpretation of legal texts. The doctrine of legal interpretation is in twofold position. On the one hand, we can find examples of addressing the problem of interpretation of law in a wide range of sources – from the works of the abovementioned domestic authors on the general problems of the theory of law to philosophical and sociological works, which address the prerequisites for the interpretation of law. Among the latter, one should first of all note the authors whose studies belong to the subject area of analytical and linguistic philosophy (L. Wittgenstein, B. Russell, J. Moore, M. Schlick etc.), hermeneutics and phenomenology (W. Diltey, M. Heidegger, H.-G. Gadamer, E. Husserl etc.), social constructivism in theoretical sociology (P. Berger, T. Luckmann, J. Austin etc.). On the other hand, there are not many special researches in the field of theoretical bases of methodology of legal interpretation, strange as it may seem. Inevitably, these problems were touched upon by the previously mentioned foreign authors who were engaged in the problems of the relationship between law and morality (a typical example of discussion in this area is, of course, the dispute between L. Fuller and H. Hart). Among the most relevant special works of foreign and, first of all, Anglo-American authors, it is necessary to note the works devoted to the analysis of certain practical principles of interpretation – “plain meaning

44The author, in particular, cites Lord Devlin, who said, “I think, therefore, that it is not possible to set theoretical limits to the power of the State to legislate against immorality. It is not possible to settle in advance exceptions to the general rule or to define inflexibly areas of morality into which the law is in no circumstances to be allowed to enter”. Cited by: Stanton-Ife J. The Limits of Law. See e.g.: Devlin P. The Enforcement of Morals. – Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks, 1968. – 154 p.

45Hereinafter, by referring to “weighing” or “balancing”, we will mean referring to concepts specific to constitutional law and judicial reasoning. See e.g.: Belov S.A. Rationality of the Judicial Balancing of the Constitutional Values by Means of the Proportionality Test // Saint Petersburg Lawyer. – 2016. – No. 1. – P. 63–75; Timoshina E.V. The Problem of Justiciability of Human Rights in Situations of Their Competition and the Principle of Proportionality // Proceedings of the Russian University of Peoples’ Friendship. Series: Legal Sciences. 2017. Vol. 21. No. 4. P. 464–485; Timoshina E.V., Krayevsky A.A., Salmin D.N. Axiology of Judicial Interpretation: Means of Weighing in the Situation of Competition of Human Rights // Proceedings of Saint Petersburg University. Law. 2015. No. 3. P. 4–34. Any particular development of such procedures is not in itself part of the scope of this work.

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rule”,46 “mischief rule”47 and “golden rule”),48 – and also the most relevant trends of court interpretation as reflected in the terms “textualism”49 and “absurdity doctrine”.50 It is about the works of such authors as W. Daugherty, F. Easterbrook, J. Manning, A. Scalia, L. Solum, C. Whittington and others. Taking into account the specifics of Anglo-American law, some of the approaches in this area have also been reflected in various case law, including, for example, the following: Chung Fook v. White, 264 U.S. 443 (1924) (USA),51

Re Sigsworth: Bedford v Bedford [1935] 1 Ch. 9852 (UK).53 However, in these sources, the development of notions of common sense and absurdity in the interpretation of law is quite ad hoc and is due to specific practical problems, which does not yet mean that the general research problem is solved. In the Russian doctrine of legal interpretation there are also very few works devoted to theoretical substantiation of not only any semantic boundaries in the interpretation of law, but also the methods of interpretation as such.54 Perhaps, we can emphasize just the classic work of E.V. Vaskovsky “Civilistic methodology. Teaching

46The “Plain Meaning Rule” can be considered as an analogue to the principle of applying a literal interpretation in volume, unless otherwise required by the situation, within the framework of the Russian legal doctrine.

47The “Rule of Harm” are based on the principle that, in interpreting the statute, the court must determine which harm the rule of parliament was intended to eliminate or prevent, in order to rely on this notion in its enforcement. Analogue to teleological interpretation.

48The “Golden Rule” is inherently the closest thing to the subject matter of this study, as its essence is to avoid literal interpretation where such interpretation would lead to outright absurdity or public order controversy.

49The concept of textualism, which is more typical for the United States than for the United Kingdom (in contrast to the above principles), assumes that the interpretation of the statute should be guided by its text and exclude other possible sources of information about the legal norm from the scope of consideration (the intention of the legislator, the problem that the law seeks to address, abstract notions of fairness, etc.).

50The doctrine of absurdity, on the contrary, postulates the need to apply common sense as opposed to literal interpretation where literal interpretation would lead to absurd results. It should be noted that despite the fact that the doctrine of absurdity itself is developed, the ideas of what exactly should be considered absurd are far from systematic and explicit in modern legal science.

51Chung Fook v. White, 264 U.S. 443 (1924) [Electronic resource] // FindLaw. – [Site]. – URL:

https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/264/443.html (accessed: 18.10.2018).

52Re Sigsworth: Bedford v Bedford [1935] 1 Ch. 98 [Electronic resource] // E-Lawresources.co.uk. – [Site]. – URL: http://www.e-lawresources.co.uk/Re-Sigsworth.php (accessed: 18.10.2018).

53It should be noted that there are, in fact, much more examples from the UK and US courts, but the disclosure of the theoretical basis for the methodology of law interpretation in relation to the issues of absurdity and common sense cannot be considered sufficient.

54It is quite characteristic, for example, that in the article “Interpretation of Law in the Context of Different Types of Legal Understanding” A.V. Korneev is more oriented to the classics of domestic legal thought, whose works are devoted mainly to the general problems of legal science and only partially touch upon the problems of law interpretation (B.A. Kistyakovsky, S.A. Muromtsev, P.I. Novgorodtsev, L.I. Petrazhitsky, G.F. Shershenevich, etc.). See: Korneev A.V. Interpretation of Law in the Context of Various Methods of Law Congition // Russian Law Journal. 2016. No. 8. P. 29–43.