MERICAN

FOREIGN POLICY

The Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century

FOURT H EDITION

BRUCE W. JENTLESO N

Duke University

W • W *	N O R T O N	& C O M P A N Y
N E W	Y O R K	• L O N D O N

CHAPTER

The Cold War Context: Origins and First Stages

Introduction : "Presen t a t th e Creation "

"Presen t a t th e Creation " i s ho w Dea n Acheson , secretar y o f state i n th e early days o f th e Col d War, title d hi s memoirs . A t th e outse t o f th e Col d War, American s felt the y wer e facin g threat s a s dangerou s an d challenge s a s profoun d a s an y the y ha d ever be - for e face d i n history . Moreover , th e Unite d States was n o longe r merel y pursuin g its ow n foreig n policy ; it was bein g looke d to as a worl d leader, a "superpower. " It ha d bee n a leade r i n Worl d Wa r II, bu t onl y afte r overcomin g isolationism , an d even the n onl y fo r a perio d that , a s dir e a s i t was, laste d less tha n fou r years. Th e Col d War, though , woul d g o o n fo r mor e tha n fou r decades . An d s o i t was that , whe n year s late r Acheso n wrot e hi s memoirs , h e chos e a titl e tha t reflecte d hi s generation' s sense o f havin g create d its ow n ne w era. ¹

Durin g Worl d War II th e Unite d States an d th e Soviet Unio n ha d bee n allies. Presi- den t Frankli n D . Roosevelt, th e British prim e ministe r Winsto n Churchill , an d th e Soviet leader Josef Stalin were know n as th e Big Three . Th e Soviets were second onl y to th e British as beneficiaries of America n Lend-Lease economi c assistance durin g th e war, re- ceiving mor e tha n $ 9 billion wort h o f food , equipment , an d othe r aid. Even Stalin's imag e as a ruthless dictato r wh o viciously purge d his ow n peopl e in th e 1930s was "spun " mor e favorably to th e mor e amiabl e "Uncle Joe." Yet fundamentally , th e American-Sovie t wartim e alliance was base d o n th e age-old maxi m tha t "th e enem y o f m y enem y i s m y friend." " I can't tak e communism, " was ho w FDR pu t it, "bu t t o cross this bridg e I'd hol d hand s wit h th e Devil."² Afte r th e wa r was over an d th e commo n enemy, Nazi Germany , ha d been vanquished , woul d th e alliance continue ? Shoul d it?

11 4

Introduction: "Present at the Creation" 11 5

Differen t views o n thes e question s are reflecte d i n th e debat e over th e origin s of th e Cold War. This debat e is marke d by two mai n schools of thought , th e orthodo x an d th e revisionist . Th e orthodox view put s principa l responsibilit y squarel y o n th e shoulder s o f Josef Stalin an d th e Soviet Union. ³ Thi s view ha s bee n strengthene d b y revelation s i n recen t years fro m Soviet an d othe r archives. "We no w know," th e his- toria n Joh n Lewis Gaddi s contends , tha t "as lon g a s Stalin was runnin g th e Soviet Union , a cold wa r was unavoidable. " Th e Soviets use d th e Red Arm y to mak e Easter n Europ e thei r ow n spher e o f influence . The y sough t t o subver t government s i n Wester n Europe . The y blockade d West Berlin i n a n effor t t o forc e th e Unite d States, France , an d Britai n out . I n Asia the y supporte d th e Chines e communist s an d helpe d star t th e Korea n War. The y supporte d communis t partie s i n Southeas t Asia an d Latin America , an d withi n Africa n anticolonia l movements ; indeed , on e o f th e fundamenta l tenet s o f Soviet communis t ideolog y was t o aid revolutio n everywhere. An d i n th e Unite d States the y ra n a majo r spy rin g trying , amon g othe r things , t o steal th e secret o f th e atomi c bomb .

In th e revisionist view of th e origins of th e Cold War, as represente d in Reading 4.1, th e Unite d States bears its ow n significan t share of th e responsibility.⁴ Som e revisionists see th e Unite d States as seeking its ow n empire , fo r reasons of bot h Power an d Prosper - ity. Its method s ma y have bee n less direct an d mor e subtle, bu t its objectives neverthe - less were dominatio n to serve America n gran d ambitions . In citing evidence fo r U.S. neo-imperialis t ambitions , these critics poin t as far bac k as th e 1918-1 9 U.S. "expedi- tionar y force " that , alon g wit h Europea n forces, intervene d i n Russia t o tr y t o reverse th e Russian Revolution . Othe r revisionists see th e proble m mor e as on e of U.S. miscal- culation . The y maintai n tha t th e Soviets were seeking little mor e tha n t o ensur e thei r ow n securit y by preservin g Polan d an d Eastern Europ e as a cordon sanitaire to preven t futur e invasions of Soviet soil. Wha t transpire d in thos e early post-Worl d War II years, these revisionists argue, was akin to th e classic "securit y dilemma, " ofte n presen t in in - ternationa l politics, in whic h each side is motivate d less by aggression tha n by th e fear tha t th e othe r side canno t b e trusted , an d thu s sees its ow n action s a s defensive while th e othe r side sees the m as offensive. Ha d U.S. policy bee n mor e on e of reassuranc e an d cooperation , rathe r tha n deterrenc e an d containment , ther e migh t no t have bee n a Col d War.

Wit h thi s debat e i n mind , i n thi s chapte r an d th e nex t w e analyze th e dynamic s o f foreig n polic y choice fo r th e Unite d States as played ou t durin g th e Cold War, wit h re- gard to bot h foreign policy strategy an d foreign policy politics. In so doin g we will gain a deepe r understandin g o f th e Col d War itself an d provid e th e contemporar y contex t t o g o wit h th e historica l on e (fro m Chapte r 3 ) fo r th e challenges an d choices tha t face th e Unite d States i n th e post-Col d War era.

11 6 C H . 4 The Cold War Context: Origins and First Stages

Peace : Internationa l Institutionalis m an d th e Unite d Nation s

Wor k on th e Unite d Nation s (UN ) was begu n well befor e Worl d War II was over. On e of th e primar y reasons tha t Worl d War I ha d no t turne d ou t t o b e "th e wa r t o en d all wars," a s Woodro w Wilso n an d othe r leaders ha d hoped , was th e weakness o f th e League of Nations . Frankli n Roosevelt an d othe r worl d leaders felt the y ha d learne d fro m tha t experience, an d this tim e intende d t o create a stronge r global bod y a s th e basis fo r a stable peace.

The Original Vision of the United Nations

Th e gran d hop e for th e United Nations, as articulated by FDR's secretary of state, Cordell Hull, was tha t "there woul d no longer be nee d fo r spheres of influence, fo r alliances, for balance of power, or any othe r special arrangement s throug h which, in th e unhapp y past, nation s strove to safeguard their security or promot e their interests." Thei r vision was of "one world " an d a peace tha t was broa d an d enduring .

Thi s was quintessentia l International Institutionalism, a vision of internationa l re- lation s in whic h th e nationa l interest of th e Unite d States, as well as th e nationa l inter - ests o f othe r nations , woul d b e served best b y multilatera l cooperatio n throug h internationa l institutions— a worl d tha t coul d be, i n th e metaphor s cited bac k i n Chap - te r 1, th e "cultivable garden " of peace, no t necessarily th e "global jungle " of power. Th e Unite d States, mor e tha n any othe r country , saw th e worl d i n these term s an d pushe d fo r th e creatio n o f th e UN . I t was i n San Francisco o n Jun e 26,1945 , tha t th e U N Char - te r was signed (with fifty-on e original signatories) . Ne w York City was chose n as th e lo- catio n fo r U N headquarters .

Th e lesson draw n fro m th e failure of th e League of Nations was no t tha t th e Interna - tional Institutionalist strategy was inherently flawed, bu t tha t th e post-Worl d War I ver- sion of it ha d two crucial errors. On e was U.S. nonmembership . FDR kne w tha t America n membershi p was key t o th e UN an d tha t th e UN was necessary i n orde r tha t th e United States no t revert to isolationism. U.S. membershi p in th e UN thu s was "an institutiona l tripwire," as Joh n Ruggie calls it, "tha t woul d force America n policymakers to take posi- tion s on potential threats to internationa l peace an d security . . . no t simply to look th e othe r way, as they ha d don e in th e 1930s."⁵ FDR was determine d no t to make th e same political mistakes tha t Woodro w Wilson ha d made . Roosevelt worked closely wit h Con -

gress, including giving a majo r role in th e U.S. delegation to th e San Francisco Conferenc e to senior Republicans such as Senator Arthu r Vandenberg of Michigan. He also used his "fireside chats" an d othe r political technique s to ensure tha t publi c opinio n supporte d th e UN . All this wor k paid off: th e Senate vote on U.S. membershi p in th e UN was 89-2 ,

Peace: International Institutionalism and the United Nations 11 7

an d public-opinio n polls showed tha t 66 percent of American s favored U.S. membershi p an d only 3 percent were opposed (31 percent were uncertain).

Following th e second lesson draw n fro m th e interwa r years, world leaders strove to ensure tha t th e U N woul d b e a stronger institutio n tha n th e League ha d been. Having th e United States as a membe r was par t of this plan, bu t so was institutional design. Th e League ha d allocated roughly equal powers to its Assembly, comprisin g all membe r na - tions, an d to its Council, mad e up of permanen t seats fo r th e fou r "great powers" tha t were League member s (Britain, France, Italy, an d Japan) an d fou r seats to be rotate d amon g othe r membe r nations ; all seats on th e Counci l were equally powerful . In contrast, th e UN gave its Security Counci l muc h greater authorit y tha n its General Assembly. Th e UN Security Council could authoriz e th e use of militar y force, orde r th e severance of diplomati c relations, impos e economi c sanctions, an d take othe r actions an d mak e the m bindin g o n membe r states. An d th e fiv e permanen t member s o f th e Security Council — th e Unite d States, th e Soviet Union , Britain, France, an d China—wer e mad e particularly powerful , being given th e powe r to veto any Security Counci l action.

Th e UN Charte r even envisioned a standing UN military force. Article 43 of th e char- ter ha d called on "all Members.. . to make available to th e Security Council, on its call an d with special agreement or agreements .. . [to be] negotiated as soon as possible .. . arme d force, assistance an d facilities . . . necessary for th e purpos e of maintainin g internationa l peace an d security." This standing force was to be directed by a Military Staff Committee , consisting of th e chiefs of staff of th e arme d forces of th e permanen t member s of th e Secu- rity Council. Th e Military Staff Committe e woul d directly advise th e Security Council an d be in operational charge of th e military forces. No Article 43 agreements were ever con- cluded, however. Over th e years th e UN has raised temporar y military forces fo r particular missions such as peacekeeping, bu t it has never ha d a permanen t standing military of its own . I n this an d othe r respects, althoug h makin g importan t contributions , th e U N did no t prove able to provide th e institutional infrastructur e fo r a "one world " peace.

The Scaled-Back Reality

On e reason th e UN was unable to ensure peace was th e political ambivalence of a numbe r of countries, including th e United States, tha t wante d an international institutio n strong enoug h to help keep th e peace bu t no t so strong as to threate n nation-stat e supremac y or sovereignty. Althoug h Roosevelt an d Truma n administratio n officials ha d helped write th e Article 43 provision int o th e UN Charter, man y in Congress saw it as a step to o far toward "world government." The y supporte d th e UN , bu t no t tha t much , an d ha d th e power o f th e purse an d othe r legislative authorit y to ensure tha t no American troop s woul d be pu t unde r any sort of permanen t UN command . Congress demonstrate d similar reticence wit h the Genocide Conventio n ("convention" is used here as a synony m for treaty) an d th e Universal Declaration of Huma n Rights (UDHR) . Th e goals of preventing genocide an d

11 8 C H . 4 The Cold War Context: Origins and First Stages

promotin g huma n rights obviously were nonobjectionable . But the U.S. Senate refused for years to ratify the Genocide Convention an d gave only selective recognition to the UDH R because these document s ostensibly risked giving th e UN an d international courts juris- diction over American domestic affairs in a manne r tha t threatened American sovereignty. We will come back to this issue of international institutions versus national sovereignty in Part II of this book, fo r it has resurfaced as a majo r debate in post-Col d War foreign policy. The poin t here is tha t this issue was present even in the original gran d vision of th e UN .

Th e other, mor e importan t reason tha t th e UN fell shor t of its original vision was th e onset of th e Cold War an d th e resultant priorit y given to consideration s of Power. Even befor e th e UN Charte r was signed, U.S.-Soviet tensions ha d flared over th e futur e of Poland an d othe r states of Eastern Europe. It also was only weeks after th e signing of th e U N Charte r tha t th e United States droppe d th e world's firs t atomi c bomb s o n Japan. Pres- ident Harr y Truma n defende d his A-bom b decision as th e only alternative to a majo r an d risky invasion, bu t som e critics believed it was less abou t getting Japan to surrende r an d establishing peace tha n abou t demonstratin g America n military migh t so as to intimidat e

th e Soviet Union. ⁶ Whichever interpretatio n on e took, th e tensions tha t arose durin g this

tim e demonstrate d th e limits of the UN fo r managin g key internationa l events an d ac- tions. This weakness was confirme d by th e controversy in 1946 over th e Baruch Plan. Name d for Truman' s adviser Bernard Baruch, th e plan was a U.S. proposa l to th e UN Atomi c Energy Commissio n fo r establishing internationa l control of nuclear weapons. Th e Soviet Unio n rejected th e Baruch Plan. Some cited this as evidence of Stalin's non - peaceful intentions . Other s assessed th e Baruch Plan as on e sided an d actually intende d to spu r a rejection. ⁷

In othe r ways as well, instead of a unifyin g institutio n th e UN becam e yet anothe r foru m for th e competitio n between th e United States an d th e Soviet Unio n an d their re- spective allies. The y differed over wh o shoul d be secretary-general. The y disagreed on which countrie s woul d be admitte d to th e General Assembly. Each used its veto so man y times tha t th e Security Council was effectively paralyzed. At on e point , following th e Oc- tobe r 1949 communis t triump h in th e Chinese civil war, th e Soviets boycotted th e Secu- rity Council in protes t against its decision to allow Jiang Jei-shi (Chiang Kai-shek) an d his anticommunis t Nationalist government , which ha d fled to th e island of Taiwan, to continu e to hol d China's UN seat. In fact, on e of th e few times th e Security Council did act decisively in these early years was in June 1950, whe n communis t Nort h Korea in- vaded South Korea, setting off the Korean War: Th e United States too k advantage of th e Soviet boycott of th e Security Council to get a resolution passed creating a UN-sponsore d military force to defen d South Korea.

American s ofte n view th e United Nation s as mor e hostile tha n friendly. In later chap - ters, we address this idea as it pertain s to th e contemporar y era. Durin g th e early Cold War era, though , as th e table in "Internationa l Perspectives" on page 119 shows, th e UN was quite supportiv e of America n foreign policy. Even so, as an internationa l institutio n it

Power: Nuclear Deterrence and Containment 119

Internationa l perspective s support for the united states

In the un general assembly, 1946-60

This table compares U.S. an d Soviet success rates on votes in the UN General As- sembly fro m 1946 to 1960. Two sets of issues are disaggregated: Cold War issues and othe r internationa l affairs issues. On Cold War issues th e American position was supporte d in 94.3 percent of General Assembly votes, compare d with only 6.1 per - cent for the Soviet position. On othe r issues the margi n was closer bu t still favored the United States, 55.1 percent to 50.3 percent for successes and the even larger mar - gin of only 28.6 percent of votes that passed the General Assembly despite U.S. oppositio n but 40 percent for the Soviets (this takes abstention s into account) . Th e overall scores were 60.3 percent success an d 25.3 percent failure for th e United States, and 44.5 percent success an d 47.2 percent failure fo r the Soviets.

Percentage of votes in the UN Genera l Assembly, 1946-60*

UNITE D STATE S			SOVIE T	UNIO N
	Success	Failure	Success	Failure
Cold Wa r issues	94.3%	3.2%	6.1%	91.4%
Other issues	55.1	28.6	50.3	40.0
All issues	60.3	25.3	44.5	47.2

^Differences from 100 percent are votes in which the United States and the Soviet Union abstained.

^{Source: Edward T. Rowe,"The United States, the United Nations and the Cold War," International Organization}

^{25.1 (Winter 1971): 62.}

was no t strong enoug h to en d th e global game of "spheres of influence.. . alliances.. . bal- ance of power " an d mak e th e brea k wit h tha t "unhapp y past" envisioned by Secretary of State Hull an d othe r UN founders . This was no t th e peace tha t was suppose d to be.

Power : Nuclea r Deterrenc e an d Containmen t

A "one world " peace ha d its attractions, bu t was unrealistic—power ha d to be me t with power. Some argued tha t this should have bee n foreseen even before World War II was over, and that FDR ha d conceded to o muc h at th e Yalta summi t on issues such as th e futur e

12 0 C H . 4 The Cold War Context: Origins and First Stages

of Poland. No w mor e tha n ever, in th e classic Realist dictu m presented back in Chapte r 1, American foreign policy had to be based on interests defined in term s of power.

For all the othe r differences that emerged over the course of th e Cold War, two basic doctrines of Power that developed in these early years remained th e core of U.S. foreign pol- icy. On e was nuclear deterrence. Bernard Brodie's Strategy in the Missile Age (Reading 4.2) was one of the first an d most influential books developing nuclear deterrence doctrine. Th e standard definition of deterrence is the prevention of attack throug h the fear of retaliation. On the one hand , deterrence is mor e than just the capacity to defend oneself sufficiently to prevent defeat. On the other hand , it is less tha n compellence, which mean s getting anothe r state to take a particular action that it otherwise would not. ⁸ Although the use of deterrence strategy goes far back in history, the nuclear age gave it greater centrality. As devastating as

the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbo r had been, th e United States manage d to absorb it an d recover fro m it. But nuclear weapons, so muc h mor e destructive tha n anything the world ha d ever seen, changed th e world's security landscape. Th e single atomic bom b (A-bomb) droppe d on Hiroshima instantly killed 130,000 people, one-thir d of the city's population; anothe r 70,000 died later of radiation poisoning and other injuries. As the United States though t abou t its own national security in the nuclear age, its leaders realized tha t a strong an d resilient defense, thoug h still necessary, no longer was sufficient. Any at- tack with nuclear weapons or that could lead to th e use of nuclear weapons had to be de- terred before it began. This capacity for deterrence required a strong military, an d especially nuclear weapons superiority, an d also had political, psychological, an d perceptual dimen - sions. Th e deterrence "formula " was a combinatio n of capabilities an d intentions, bot h the capacity to retaliate an d th e will to do so. The requisites for meeting this nuclear deterrence formul a changed over time, bu t the basic strategy of preventing attack throug h fear of retal- iation stayed the same. Its development is a striking example of theor y shaping policy, as we elaborate in "Theor y in the World."

Containment was th e othe r basic doctrin e developed durin g th e early Cold War. In Februar y 1946, George F. Kennan, the n a high-rankin g U.S. diploma t in Moscow, sent a "long telegram" back to Washington, in which he sounde d th e alar m abou t th e Soviet Union . A version of th e lon g telegram later appeared in th e prestigious journa l Foreign Af- fairs as "Th e Sources of Soviet Conduct, " wit h authorshi p attribute d to an anonymou s "X" (Reading 4.3). Kennan's analysis of Stalin an d his Soviet Unio n was tha t "there can never be on Moscow's side any sincere assumptio n of a communit y of interests between th e Soviet Unio n an d powers which are regarded as capitalist." America n strategy there- fore ha d to seek th e "patient bu t fir m and vigilant containmen t of Russian expansive ten- dencies." Th e Soviet Unio n was seeking "to mak e sure tha t it has filled every noo k an d crann y available to it in th e basin of world power." Kennan recommende d a policy of "containment, " whereby th e United States woul d counte r any attemp t by th e Soviets to expan d their sphere of influence or to spread communis m beyon d their own borders. Onl y sustained containmen t ha d a chance of bringin g abou t "th e gradual mellowing of

Power: Nuclear Deterrence and Containment 12 1