Illocutionary force

The notion of an illocutionary force remains rather unclear in Austin's original account. Some followers of Austin as, e.g., David Holdcroft view illocutionary force as the property of an utterance to be made with a certain intention, namely, the intention to perform this or that illocutionary act -- as contrasted with the successful performance of the act, which is supposed further to require the appropriateness of certain circumstances. According to this conception, my utterance of "I bet you five pounds that it will rain" may well have an illocutionary force even if you don't hear me. However, other scholars as, e.g., Bach and Harnish assume illocutionary force just in case this or that illocutionary act is actually (successfully, that means) performed. According to this conception, you must have heard and understood that I want to bet you in order for my utterance to have 'illocutionary force'.

Some utterances' illocutionary force is not quite obvious: if someone says, "it sure is cold in here", the effect of the statement is contextual. It could be that the person is simply describing the room, in which case the illocutionary force would be the description of the temperature of the room. If it is possible to change the environment, say by turning up the heat or closing a window, the person's intent may be to get someone else to do something about the cold, in which case the illocutionary force would be the other person's action. This latter use is referred to as an Indirect Speech Act as the standard illocutionary force of a question is to extract information but here by implicitly making a command the speaker is deviating from the normal purpose of a question.

This is in contrast to perlocutionary force, which involves the effects that an utterance has upon others in the world.

TASK: what are the necessary conditions to observe the force of an illocutionary act? A perlocutionary act?

Illocutionary force indicators

Illocutionary force indicators, according to the common conception of the notion, show how a given proposition is to be taken, what illocutionary force the utterance is to have, or what illocutionary act the speaker is performing. Examples in English include: word order, stress, intonation contour, punctuation, the mood of the verb, performative verbs, and context. In English, illocutionary force indicators are not always readily identifiable. They are sometimes hidden in the deep structure of the sentence.

Illocutionary negations

TASK: find out beforehand what propositions are.

An illocutionary negation can be distinguished from a propositional negation by considering the difference between "I do not promise to come." and "I promise not to come." The first is an illocutionary negation - the 'not' negates the promise. The second is a propositional negation. Generally, illocutionary negations change the type of illocutionary act.

TASK: give your own examples of illocutionary negations and contrast them with propositional negations.

References

Searle, John. Speech Acts. Cambridge University Press. 1969 ISBN 0521071844

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Self-check questions:

1. What are the various ways in which illocutionary acts are understood now?

2. What is the difference between illocutionary, locutionary and perlocutionary act?

3. In which conditions does the act of betting possess illocutionary force?

Inferences:

By the end of this lecture you should understand the difference between 3 types of acts: illocutionary, locutionary and perlocutionary acts. You should realize that the most complicated are illocutionary acts because they carry the most important information that leads to action.

“Searle’s theory of speech acts”

Plan:

• description of Searle’s findings;

• observations of indirect speech acts specifics.

Key words:

Indirect speech act, illocutionary act, relevance, cooperation.

Objectives:

The main objective is to learn the way Searle’s theory suggests to be used to recognize indirect speech acts. You will find out what differentiates indirect speech acts from imperatives, as well as learn other specific characteristics of indirect speech acts. You will be introduced to certain steps that Searle recommends to take in order to understand better the meaning that the speaker is trying to convey.

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“Searle’s theory of speech acts”

TASK: make a list of steps that Searle suggests for deriving meaning from indirect speech acts. Pay particular attention to the special features of indirect speech acts which Searle described as his observations.

Searle proposes a set of structural rules that generalize the steps that take place during indirect speech acts. His proposition is, "In indirect speech acts the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by way of relying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, together with the general powers of rationality and inference on the part of the hearer." Searle's solution will require an analysis of mutually shared background information about the conversation that will be pieced together with a theory of speech acts and linguistic convention.

Searle begins by making a distinction between primary and secondary illocutionary acts. A primary illocutionary act is not literal rather it is what the speaker means to communicate. The secondary illocutionary act is the literal meaning of the utterance (Searle 178). In the example:

(1) Speaker X: We should leave for the show or else we’ll be late.

(2) Speaker Y: I am not ready yet.

The primary illocutionary act is Y's rejection of X's suggestion and the secondary illocutionary act is Y's statement that she is not ready to leave. By dividing the illocutionary act into two sub-parts, Searle is able to explain how we can understand two meanings from the same utterance while at the same time knowing which is the correct meaning to respond to.

Searle attempts to explain how we are to separate the primary illocution from the secondary illocution by means of a set of steps that the speaker and hearer must subconsciously complete. For the previous example a condensed process would look like this:

Step 1: A proposal is made by X and Y responded by means of an illocutionary act (2).

Step 2: X assumes that Y is cooperating in the conversation, being sincere, and that she has made a statement that is relevant.

Step 3: The literal meaning of (2) is not relevant to the conversation.

Step 4: Since X assumes that Y is cooperating; there must be another meaning to (2).

Step 5: Based on mutually shared background information, X knows that they cannot leave until Y is ready. Therefore, Y has rejected X's proposition.

Step 6: X knows that Y has said something other than the literal meaning and the primary illocutionary act must have been the rejection of X's proposal.

Searle argues that a similar process can be applied to any indirect speech act as a model to find the primary illocutionary act (178). His proof for this argument is made by means of a series of observations that he takes to be facts.

Observation 1: Indirect speech acts should not be confused with imperatives.

Observation 2: Indirect speech acts "are not ambiguous as between an imperative illocutionary force and a nonimperative illocutionary force" (180).

Observation 3: Indirect speech acts are usually used as directives.

Observation 4: Indirect speech acts are not idioms of a particular language since they can be translated without losing their original meaning.

Observation 5: Indirect speech acts are idiomatic because a paraphrase may not produce the same primary illocution.

Observation 6: Indirect speech acts have a secondary illocution that have meaning when taken literally but do not have any sort of indirect meaning.

Observation 7: When a request is made using an indirect speech act whose literal meaning is also a request, the speaker adds meaning so that he may respond appropriately.

Observation 8: When a request is made using an indirect speech act whose literal meaning is also a request, the speaker responds to both the primary and secondary illocution by virtue of responding to the primary illocution.

The last two observations (7 and 8) seem to not be indirect speech acts because both illocutions are requests; however, while they are both requests they may still have different meaning. Consider the example of a telephone call:

(3) Speaker P: Is Tom there?

Possible appropriate responses include:

(4) Speaker Q: No, he’s not here right now.

(5) Speaker Q: Yes, I’ll hand him the phone.

Observation 7 notes that there are two possible ways in which the speaker can respond while fulfilling the requirements laid out in Searle's process (cooperation, relevance, sincerity, ect.). The question in 3 can be taken either as a question about Tom’s location or as a request to speak with Tom. Observation 8 notes that in Q's responding to 3 by handing Tom the phone he has answered the primary illocution (P's request to speak with Tom) and at the same time the secondary illocution (the location of Tom).

Searle has shown that his series of steps form a framework by which we can understand requests; however, he has yet to show that this process will work to help us point to the meaning of other indirect speech acts. To use this process on other indirect speech acts he will have to prove that there are two illocutionary forces for each utterance, one that is the speakers intent (primary) and one that is the literal meaning of the utterance (secondary). He will also have to propose a system by which we can differentiate the illocutionary forces. Searle offers the following process for doing this:

Step 1: Understand the facts of the conversation.

Step 2: Assume cooperation and relevance on behalf of the participants.

Step 3: Establish factual background information pertinent to the conversation.

Step 4: Make assumptions about the conversation based on steps 1–3.

Step 5: If steps 1–4 do not yield a consequential meaning, then infer that there are two illocutionary forces at work.

Step 6: Assume the hearer has the ability to perform the act the speaker suggests. The act that the speaker is asking be performed must be something that would make sense for one to ask. For example, the hearer might have the ability to pass the salt when asked to do so by a speaker who is at the same table, but not have the ability to pass the salt to a speaker who is asking the hearer to pass the salt during a telephone conversation.

Step 7: Make inferences from steps 1–6 regarding possible primary illocutions.

Step 8: Use background information to establish the primary illocution (Searle 184).

With this process, Searle concludes that he has found a method that will satisfactorily produce two illocutionary forces that explain how we can act upon indirect speech acts.

TASK:

1. Which steps does the Searle’s theory generalize?

2. In what way are speakers able to communicate more than they actually say?

3. What does Searle’s solution require?

4. What are the two acts between which Searle differentiates?

5. How does Searle explain the fact that we are able to understand two meanings from the same utterance while at the same time knowing which is the correct meaning to respond to?

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Self-check questions:

1. Can indirect speech act be equaled to imperatives?

2. What are the relations of indirect speech acts to directives?

3. Why are indirect speech acts idiomatic?

4. What system does Searle propose to differentiate the illocutionary forces?

Inferences:

This lecture should make you aware of a special mechanism that Searle elaborated to analize communication more efficiently. It may seem complicated, but indeed uncovers the discreet mental processes that take place in a human’s brain during communication.