
- •Introduction
- •Module 1. Classical Pragmatics
- •1. Basic Assumptions of Linguopragmatics
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Definition
- •Structural Ambiguity
- •Origins
- •Areas of Interest
- •Referential Uses of Language
- •Related Fields
- •Criticisms of Pragmatics
- •References
- •2. Speech Act
- •Issues Discussed:
- •J. L. Austin’s Taxonomy of Speech Acts
- •Speech Act and Language Development
- •Earlier Treatments of Speech Acts
- •Historical Critics of Speech Act Theory
- •References
- •3. Illocutionary Act
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Definition
- •Further examples:
- •Approaches to Defining "Illocutionary Act"
- •J. R. Searle’s Taxonomy of Illocutionary Speech Acts
- •Illocutionary Force
- •Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices
- •Illocutionary Negations
- •References
- •4. Indirect Speech Acts
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Definition
- •J. R. Searle's Theory of "Indirect Speech Acts"
- •Analysis Using Searle's Theory
- •References
- •5. Felicity Conditions
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Definition
- •Preparatory Conditions
- •Conditions for Execution
- •Sincerity Conditions
- •Felicity Conditions for Declarations
- •Felicity Conditions for Requests
- •Felicity Conditions for Warnings
- •References
- •6. K. Bach, r. Harnish and The Unified Theory
- •Issues Discussed:
- •K. Bach and r. Harnish on the Locutionary Acts
- •K. Bach and r. Harnish on the j. R. Searle’s Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts
- •Communicative Acts versus Conventional Acts
- •The Speech Act Schema
- •References
- •Module 2. Contemporary Pragmatics
- •7. Contemporary Pragmatic Theory and Two Models of Linguistic Communication
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Contemporary Pragmatic Theory
- •Two Models of Linguistic Communication
- •References
- •8. D. Sperber, d. Wilson and Relevance Theory
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Basic Assumptions of Relevance Theory
- •The Principles of Relevance
- •Implicated Premises and Conclusions
- •References
- •9. Levinson's Theory of Utterance-Type-Meaning
- •References
- •10. Literalists, Minimalists, Contextualists and Others
- •References
- •Module 1. Classical Pragmatics Seminar 1. Referential Uses of Language
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Definition of Sign
- •Dyadic Signs
- •Triadic Signs
- •Molino and Nattiez's diagram:
- •Modern Theories of Sign
- •Indexicality
- •Pragmatics and Indexicality
- •Ch. S. Peirce's Trichotomy of Signs
- •Referential Indexicality
- •Indexical Presupposition and Performativity
- •References
- •Tasks and Questions
- •Seminar 2. Non-Referential Uses of Language
- •Issues Discussed:
- •First, Second, and Higher Orders of
- •Sex/Gender Indices
- •Affect Indices
- •Deference Indices
- •T/V Deference Entitlement
- •Affinal Taboo Index
- •Hypercorrection as a Social Class Index
- •Multiple Indices in Social Identity Indexicality
- •Oinoglossia (‘Wine Talk’)
- •References
- •Tasks and Questions
- •Seminar 3. Performative Utterance
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Origin of the Term
- •J. L. Austin's Definition
- •Categories of Performatives
- •The “Hereby” Test
- •Distinguishing Performatives from Other Utterances
- •Are Performatives Truth-Evaluable?
- •E. Sedgwick's Account of Performatives
- •Some Examples (Mainly of Explicit Performative Utterances)
- •References
- •Tasks and Questions
- •Seminar 4. H. P. Grice and Theory of Conversation
- •Issues Discussed:
- •H. P. Grice’s Definition of Conversational Implicature
- •H. P. Grice’s Cooperative Principle and Conversational Maxims
- •Conversational Implicature and Its Characteristics
- •Conversational Implicature versus Conventional Implicature
- •Particularized and Generalized Conversational Implicatures
- •Other Types of Conversational Implicature
- •Implicature versus Entailment
- •H. P. Grice’s Theory of Meaning and Communicative Intentions
- •References
- •Tasks and Questions
- •Module 2. Contemporary Pragmatics Seminar 5. Near-Side Classical Pragmatics
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Indexicality
- •D. Kaplan on Indexicals and Demonstratives
- •Pragmatic Puzzles of Referentialism
- •R. Stalnaker on Context and Content
- •Presupposition, Common Ground and Context
- •Propositional Concepts
- •References
- •Tasks and Questions
- •Seminar 6. Politeness Theory
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Politeness and Its Types
- •Techniques to Show Politeness
- •Linguistic Devices to Show Politeness
- •P. Brown and s. Levinson’s Politeness Theory
- •Positive and Negative Face
- •Face-Threatening Acts
- •Negative Face Threatening Acts
- •Positive Face Threatening Acts
- •Politeness Strategies
- •Bald On-record
- •Positive Politeness
- •Negative Politeness
- •Choice of Strategy
- •Payoffs Associated with each Strategy
- •Sociological Variables
- •Social distance between parties (symmetric relation).
- •The absolute ranking of the threat of the fta.
- •Criticism of the Politeness Theory
- •G. Leech’s Politeness Maxims
- •The Tact Maxim
- •The Generosity Maxim
- •The Approbation Maxim
- •The Modesty Maxim
- •The Agreement Maxim
- •The Sympathy Maxim
- •References
- •Tasks and Questions
- •Seminar 7. Deixis
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Definition
- •Types of Deixis Traditional Categories
- •Other Categories
- •Discourse
- •Anaphoric Reference
- •Deictic Center
- •Usages of Deixis
- •Deixis and Indexicality
- •Tasks and Questions
- •Questions for Module Control 1
- •Questions for Module Control 2
- •References
- •Some Definitions of Pragmatics (versus Semantics)
- •Glossary
3. Illocutionary Act
Issues Discussed:
Definition
Approaches to defining “illocutionary act”
J. R. Searle’s taxonomy of illocutionary speech acts
Illocutionary force
Illocutionary force indicating devices
Illocutionary negations
Definition
Illocutionary act is a term in linguistics introduced by John L. Austin in investigations concerning what he calls 'performative' and 'constative utterances'. According to Austin's original exposition in “How to Do Things with Words”, an illocutionary act is an act
for the performance of which I must make it clear to some other person that the act is performed (Austin speaks of the 'securing of uptake');
the performance of which involves the production of what Austin calls 'conventional consequences' as, e.g., rights, commitments, or obligations.
The idea of an "illocutionary act" can be captured by emphasizing that "by saying something, we do something", as when someone orders someone else to go by saying "Go!", or when a minister joins two people in marriage saying: "I now pronounce you husband and wife." In order to successfully perform a promise I must make clear to my audience that the promise occurs, and undertake an obligation to do the promised thing: hence promising is an illocutionary act in the present sense.
Further examples:
Greeting (in saying, "Hi John!", for instance), apologizing ("Sorry for that!"), describing something ("It is snowing"), asking a question ("Is it snowing?"), making a request and giving an order ("Could you pass the salt?" and "Drop your weapon or I'll shoot you!"), or making a promise ("I promise I'll give it back") are typical examples of "speech acts" or "illocutionary acts".
In saying "Watch out, the ground is slippery", Mary performs the speech act of warning Peter to be careful.
In saying "I will try my best to be at home for dinner", Peter performs the speech act of promising to be at home in time.
In saying "Ladies and gentlemen, please give me your attention", Mary requests the audience to be quiet.
In saying "Race with me to that building over there!", Peter challenges Mary.
Approaches to Defining "Illocutionary Act"
Many define the term "illocutionary act" with reference to examples, saying for instance that any speech act like stating, asking, commanding, promising, and so on is an illocutionary act. However, this example-based approach at definition generally has failed to give any useful hints about what traits and elements make up an illocutionary act - that is, what defines such an act.
It is also often emphasized that Austin introduced the illocutionary act by means of a contrast with other kinds of acts: the illocutionary act, he says, is an act performed in saying something, as contrasted with a locutionary act, the act of saying something, and also contrasted with a perlocutionary act, an act performed by saying something. But it may be misleading to distinguish between 'kinds' of acts, for these are not separate categories of speech, but instead describe different levels on which speech might work. Any one particular speech event may have any combination of locutionary, illocutionary or perlocutionary effects.
Still another conception of an illocutionary act goes back to Stephen Schiffer's famous book “Meaning” (1972), in which the illocutionary act is represented as just the act of meaning something [7, p. 103].
According to the conception Kent Bach and Robert M. Harnish adopt in “Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts” (1979), an illocutionary act is an attempt to communicate, which they again analyze as the expressing of an attitude [3].
According to a widespread opinion, an adequate and useful account of "illocutionary acts" has been provided by John R. Searle [9, 11]. In recent years, however, it has repeatedly been doubted whether Searle's account is well-founded [4, 5, 12].