
- •Introduction
- •Module 1. Classical Pragmatics
- •1. Basic Assumptions of Linguopragmatics
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Definition
- •Structural Ambiguity
- •Origins
- •Areas of Interest
- •Referential Uses of Language
- •Related Fields
- •Criticisms of Pragmatics
- •References
- •2. Speech Act
- •Issues Discussed:
- •J. L. Austin’s Taxonomy of Speech Acts
- •Speech Act and Language Development
- •Earlier Treatments of Speech Acts
- •Historical Critics of Speech Act Theory
- •References
- •3. Illocutionary Act
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Definition
- •Further examples:
- •Approaches to Defining "Illocutionary Act"
- •J. R. Searle’s Taxonomy of Illocutionary Speech Acts
- •Illocutionary Force
- •Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices
- •Illocutionary Negations
- •References
- •4. Indirect Speech Acts
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Definition
- •J. R. Searle's Theory of "Indirect Speech Acts"
- •Analysis Using Searle's Theory
- •References
- •5. Felicity Conditions
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Definition
- •Preparatory Conditions
- •Conditions for Execution
- •Sincerity Conditions
- •Felicity Conditions for Declarations
- •Felicity Conditions for Requests
- •Felicity Conditions for Warnings
- •References
- •6. K. Bach, r. Harnish and The Unified Theory
- •Issues Discussed:
- •K. Bach and r. Harnish on the Locutionary Acts
- •K. Bach and r. Harnish on the j. R. Searle’s Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts
- •Communicative Acts versus Conventional Acts
- •The Speech Act Schema
- •References
- •Module 2. Contemporary Pragmatics
- •7. Contemporary Pragmatic Theory and Two Models of Linguistic Communication
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Contemporary Pragmatic Theory
- •Two Models of Linguistic Communication
- •References
- •8. D. Sperber, d. Wilson and Relevance Theory
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Basic Assumptions of Relevance Theory
- •The Principles of Relevance
- •Implicated Premises and Conclusions
- •References
- •9. Levinson's Theory of Utterance-Type-Meaning
- •References
- •10. Literalists, Minimalists, Contextualists and Others
- •References
- •Module 1. Classical Pragmatics Seminar 1. Referential Uses of Language
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Definition of Sign
- •Dyadic Signs
- •Triadic Signs
- •Molino and Nattiez's diagram:
- •Modern Theories of Sign
- •Indexicality
- •Pragmatics and Indexicality
- •Ch. S. Peirce's Trichotomy of Signs
- •Referential Indexicality
- •Indexical Presupposition and Performativity
- •References
- •Tasks and Questions
- •Seminar 2. Non-Referential Uses of Language
- •Issues Discussed:
- •First, Second, and Higher Orders of
- •Sex/Gender Indices
- •Affect Indices
- •Deference Indices
- •T/V Deference Entitlement
- •Affinal Taboo Index
- •Hypercorrection as a Social Class Index
- •Multiple Indices in Social Identity Indexicality
- •Oinoglossia (‘Wine Talk’)
- •References
- •Tasks and Questions
- •Seminar 3. Performative Utterance
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Origin of the Term
- •J. L. Austin's Definition
- •Categories of Performatives
- •The “Hereby” Test
- •Distinguishing Performatives from Other Utterances
- •Are Performatives Truth-Evaluable?
- •E. Sedgwick's Account of Performatives
- •Some Examples (Mainly of Explicit Performative Utterances)
- •References
- •Tasks and Questions
- •Seminar 4. H. P. Grice and Theory of Conversation
- •Issues Discussed:
- •H. P. Grice’s Definition of Conversational Implicature
- •H. P. Grice’s Cooperative Principle and Conversational Maxims
- •Conversational Implicature and Its Characteristics
- •Conversational Implicature versus Conventional Implicature
- •Particularized and Generalized Conversational Implicatures
- •Other Types of Conversational Implicature
- •Implicature versus Entailment
- •H. P. Grice’s Theory of Meaning and Communicative Intentions
- •References
- •Tasks and Questions
- •Module 2. Contemporary Pragmatics Seminar 5. Near-Side Classical Pragmatics
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Indexicality
- •D. Kaplan on Indexicals and Demonstratives
- •Pragmatic Puzzles of Referentialism
- •R. Stalnaker on Context and Content
- •Presupposition, Common Ground and Context
- •Propositional Concepts
- •References
- •Tasks and Questions
- •Seminar 6. Politeness Theory
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Politeness and Its Types
- •Techniques to Show Politeness
- •Linguistic Devices to Show Politeness
- •P. Brown and s. Levinson’s Politeness Theory
- •Positive and Negative Face
- •Face-Threatening Acts
- •Negative Face Threatening Acts
- •Positive Face Threatening Acts
- •Politeness Strategies
- •Bald On-record
- •Positive Politeness
- •Negative Politeness
- •Choice of Strategy
- •Payoffs Associated with each Strategy
- •Sociological Variables
- •Social distance between parties (symmetric relation).
- •The absolute ranking of the threat of the fta.
- •Criticism of the Politeness Theory
- •G. Leech’s Politeness Maxims
- •The Tact Maxim
- •The Generosity Maxim
- •The Approbation Maxim
- •The Modesty Maxim
- •The Agreement Maxim
- •The Sympathy Maxim
- •References
- •Tasks and Questions
- •Seminar 7. Deixis
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Definition
- •Types of Deixis Traditional Categories
- •Other Categories
- •Discourse
- •Anaphoric Reference
- •Deictic Center
- •Usages of Deixis
- •Deixis and Indexicality
- •Tasks and Questions
- •Questions for Module Control 1
- •Questions for Module Control 2
- •References
- •Some Definitions of Pragmatics (versus Semantics)
- •Glossary
Tasks and Questions
Why did J. L. Austin find great difficulty in drawing a completely clear distinction between “performatives” and “constantives”?
Define the term “performative”. Dwell on its origin and categories.
What does J. L. Austin mean when says that a sentence is “unhappy”?
What is the essence of the “hereby” test? How does it work?
How can we distinguish performatives from other utterances?
Are performatives truth-evaluable? Why? Prove your answer.
What is the essence of E. Sedgwick’s dichotomy of performatives? Do you agree with her?
Seminar 4. H. P. Grice and Theory of Conversation
Issues Discussed:
H. P. Grice’s definition of conversational implicature
H. P. Grice’s cooperative principle and conversational maxims
Conversational implicature and its characteristics
Conversational implicature versus conventional implicature
Particularized and generalized conversational implicatures
Other types of conversational implicature
Implicature versus entailment
H. P. Grice’s theory of meaning and communicative intentions
H. P. Grice’s Definition of Conversational Implicature
In the series of lectures at Harvard University in 1967, the English language philosopher Herbert Paul Grice (1913 - 1988) outlined an approach to what he termed conversational implicature – how hearers manage to work out the complete message when speakers mean more than they say. The term refers to what is suggested in an utterance, even though not expressed nor strictly implied (that is, entailed) by the utterance [3, p. 189]. For example, the sentence “Mary had a baby and got married” strongly suggests that Mary had her baby before the wedding, but the sentence would still be strictly true if Mary had her baby after she got married. Further, if we add the qualification ‘not necessarily in that order’ to the original sentence, then the implicature is cancelled even though the meaning of the original sentence is not altered.
H. P. Grice emphasized the distinction Voltaire makes in our opening quotation between what words mean, what the speaker literally says when using them, and what the speaker means or intends to communicate by using those words, which often goes considerably beyond what is said. In the utterance “Have you got any cash on you?” the speaker really wants the hearer to understand the meaning: “Can you lend me some money? I don’t have much on me.” Or, say, I ask you to lunch and you reply: "I have a one o'clock class I'm not prepared for." You have conveyed to me that you will not be coming to lunch, although you haven't literally said so. You intend for me to figure out that by indicating a reason for not coming to lunch (the need to prepare your class) you intend to convey that you are not coming to lunch for that reason. The study of such conversational implicatures is the core of Grice's influential theory.
Grice's so-called theory of conversation starts with a sharp distinction between what someone says and what someone ‘implicates’ by uttering a sentence. What someone says is determined by the conventional meaning of the sentence uttered and contextual processes of disambiguation and reference fixing; what he implicates is associated with the existence to some rational principles and maxims governing conversation. What is said has been widely identified with the literal content of the utterance; what is implicated, the implicature, with the non-literal, what it is (intentionally) communicated, but not said, by the speaker. Consider his initial example: “A and B are talking about a mutual friend, C, who is now working in a bank. A asks B how C is getting on in his job, and B replies: ‘Oh quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues, and he hasn't been to prison yet’” [8, p. 24].
What did B say by uttering "he hasn't been to prison yet"? Roughly, all he literally said of C was that he hasn't been to prison up to the time of utterance. This is what the conventional sentence meaning plus contextual processes of disambiguation, precisification of vague expressions and reference fixing provide.
But, normally, B would have implicated more than this: that C is the sort of person likely to yield to the temptation provided by his occupation.
The conversational implicature is a message that is not found in the plain sense of the sentence. The speaker implies it. The hearer is able to infer (work out, read between the lines) this message in the utterance by appealing to the rules governing successful conversational interaction.
According to Grice, the ‘calculation’ of conversational implicatures is grounded on:
common knowledge of what the speaker has said (or better, the fact that he has said it),
the linguistic and extra linguistic context of the utterance,
general background information,
the consideration of what Grice dubs the ‘cooperative principle (CP)’: “Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” [8, p. 26].