
- •Introduction
- •Module 1. Classical Pragmatics
- •1. Basic Assumptions of Linguopragmatics
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Definition
- •Structural Ambiguity
- •Origins
- •Areas of Interest
- •Referential Uses of Language
- •Related Fields
- •Criticisms of Pragmatics
- •References
- •2. Speech Act
- •Issues Discussed:
- •J. L. Austin’s Taxonomy of Speech Acts
- •Speech Act and Language Development
- •Earlier Treatments of Speech Acts
- •Historical Critics of Speech Act Theory
- •References
- •3. Illocutionary Act
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Definition
- •Further examples:
- •Approaches to Defining "Illocutionary Act"
- •J. R. Searle’s Taxonomy of Illocutionary Speech Acts
- •Illocutionary Force
- •Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices
- •Illocutionary Negations
- •References
- •4. Indirect Speech Acts
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Definition
- •J. R. Searle's Theory of "Indirect Speech Acts"
- •Analysis Using Searle's Theory
- •References
- •5. Felicity Conditions
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Definition
- •Preparatory Conditions
- •Conditions for Execution
- •Sincerity Conditions
- •Felicity Conditions for Declarations
- •Felicity Conditions for Requests
- •Felicity Conditions for Warnings
- •References
- •6. K. Bach, r. Harnish and The Unified Theory
- •Issues Discussed:
- •K. Bach and r. Harnish on the Locutionary Acts
- •K. Bach and r. Harnish on the j. R. Searle’s Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts
- •Communicative Acts versus Conventional Acts
- •The Speech Act Schema
- •References
- •Module 2. Contemporary Pragmatics
- •7. Contemporary Pragmatic Theory and Two Models of Linguistic Communication
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Contemporary Pragmatic Theory
- •Two Models of Linguistic Communication
- •References
- •8. D. Sperber, d. Wilson and Relevance Theory
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Basic Assumptions of Relevance Theory
- •The Principles of Relevance
- •Implicated Premises and Conclusions
- •References
- •9. Levinson's Theory of Utterance-Type-Meaning
- •References
- •10. Literalists, Minimalists, Contextualists and Others
- •References
- •Module 1. Classical Pragmatics Seminar 1. Referential Uses of Language
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Definition of Sign
- •Dyadic Signs
- •Triadic Signs
- •Molino and Nattiez's diagram:
- •Modern Theories of Sign
- •Indexicality
- •Pragmatics and Indexicality
- •Ch. S. Peirce's Trichotomy of Signs
- •Referential Indexicality
- •Indexical Presupposition and Performativity
- •References
- •Tasks and Questions
- •Seminar 2. Non-Referential Uses of Language
- •Issues Discussed:
- •First, Second, and Higher Orders of
- •Sex/Gender Indices
- •Affect Indices
- •Deference Indices
- •T/V Deference Entitlement
- •Affinal Taboo Index
- •Hypercorrection as a Social Class Index
- •Multiple Indices in Social Identity Indexicality
- •Oinoglossia (‘Wine Talk’)
- •References
- •Tasks and Questions
- •Seminar 3. Performative Utterance
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Origin of the Term
- •J. L. Austin's Definition
- •Categories of Performatives
- •The “Hereby” Test
- •Distinguishing Performatives from Other Utterances
- •Are Performatives Truth-Evaluable?
- •E. Sedgwick's Account of Performatives
- •Some Examples (Mainly of Explicit Performative Utterances)
- •References
- •Tasks and Questions
- •Seminar 4. H. P. Grice and Theory of Conversation
- •Issues Discussed:
- •H. P. Grice’s Definition of Conversational Implicature
- •H. P. Grice’s Cooperative Principle and Conversational Maxims
- •Conversational Implicature and Its Characteristics
- •Conversational Implicature versus Conventional Implicature
- •Particularized and Generalized Conversational Implicatures
- •Other Types of Conversational Implicature
- •Implicature versus Entailment
- •H. P. Grice’s Theory of Meaning and Communicative Intentions
- •References
- •Tasks and Questions
- •Module 2. Contemporary Pragmatics Seminar 5. Near-Side Classical Pragmatics
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Indexicality
- •D. Kaplan on Indexicals and Demonstratives
- •Pragmatic Puzzles of Referentialism
- •R. Stalnaker on Context and Content
- •Presupposition, Common Ground and Context
- •Propositional Concepts
- •References
- •Tasks and Questions
- •Seminar 6. Politeness Theory
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Politeness and Its Types
- •Techniques to Show Politeness
- •Linguistic Devices to Show Politeness
- •P. Brown and s. Levinson’s Politeness Theory
- •Positive and Negative Face
- •Face-Threatening Acts
- •Negative Face Threatening Acts
- •Positive Face Threatening Acts
- •Politeness Strategies
- •Bald On-record
- •Positive Politeness
- •Negative Politeness
- •Choice of Strategy
- •Payoffs Associated with each Strategy
- •Sociological Variables
- •Social distance between parties (symmetric relation).
- •The absolute ranking of the threat of the fta.
- •Criticism of the Politeness Theory
- •G. Leech’s Politeness Maxims
- •The Tact Maxim
- •The Generosity Maxim
- •The Approbation Maxim
- •The Modesty Maxim
- •The Agreement Maxim
- •The Sympathy Maxim
- •References
- •Tasks and Questions
- •Seminar 7. Deixis
- •Issues Discussed:
- •Definition
- •Types of Deixis Traditional Categories
- •Other Categories
- •Discourse
- •Anaphoric Reference
- •Deictic Center
- •Usages of Deixis
- •Deixis and Indexicality
- •Tasks and Questions
- •Questions for Module Control 1
- •Questions for Module Control 2
- •References
- •Some Definitions of Pragmatics (versus Semantics)
- •Glossary
When a diplomat says yes, he means ‘perhaps’; When he says perhaps, he means ‘no’; When he says no, he is not a diplomat. When a lady says no, she means ‘perhaps’; When she says perhaps, she means ‘yes’; When she says yes, she is not a lady.
Voltaire |
These lines are surely correct in reminding us that more is involved in what one communicates than what one literally says; more is involved in what one means than the standard, conventional meaning of the words one uses. The words ‘yes,’ ‘perhaps,’ and ‘no’ each has a perfectly identifiable meaning, known by every speaker of English (including not very competent ones). However, as those lines illustrate, it is possible for different speakers in different circumstances to mean different things using those words. How is this possible? What is the relationship among the meaning of words, what speakers mean when uttering those words, the particular circumstances of their utterance, their intentions, their actions, and what they manage to communicate? These are some of the questions that pragmatics tries to answer.
Introduction
We use language all the time to make things happen. We ask someone to pass the salt or marry us – not, usually at the same time. We order a pizza or make a dental appointment. Speech acts include asking for a glass of beer, promising to drink the beer, threatening to drink more beer, ordering someone else to drink some beer, and so on. Some special people can do extraordinary things with words, like baptizing a baby, declaring war, awarding a penalty kick to Arsenal FC or sentencing a convict.
Linguists have called these things “speech acts” – and developed a speech act theory to explain how they work. Some of this is rooted in common sense and stating the obvious – like felicity conditions. These explain that merely saying the words does not accomplish the act. Judges (unless they are also referees) cannot award penalty kicks to Arsenal, and football referees (unless they are also heads of state) cannot declare war.
Speech act theory is not the whole of pragmatics, but is perhaps currently the most important established part of the subject. Contemporary debate in pragmatics often focuses on its relations with semantics. Since semantics is the study of meaning in language, why add a new field of study to look at meaning from a novel viewpoint?
This is an elementary confusion. Clearly linguists could develop a model of semantics that included pragmatics. Or they could produce a model for each, which allows for some exploration and explanation of the boundary between them – but distinguishes them as in some way different kinds of activity. However, there is a consensus view that pragmatics as a separate study is necessary because it explains meanings that semantics overlooks.
Pragmatics deals with utterances, by which we will mean specific events, the intentional acts of speakers at times and places, typically involving language. Logic and semantics traditionally deal with properties of types of expressions, and not with properties that differ from token to token, or use to use, or, as we shall say, from utterance to utterance, and vary with the particular properties that differentiate them. Pragmatics is sometimes characterized as dealing with the effects of context. This is equivalent to saying it deals with utterances, if one collectively refers to all the facts that can vary from utterance to utterance as ‘context.’ One must be careful, however, for the term is often used with more limited meanings.
Different theorists have focused on different properties of utterances. To discuss them it will be helpful to make a distinction between ‘near-side pragmatics’ and ‘far-side pragmatics.’ The picture is this. The utterances philosophers usually take as paradigmatic are assertive uses of declarative sentences, where the speaker says something. Near-side pragmatics is concerned with the nature of certain facts that are relevant to determining what is said. Far-side pragmatics is focused on what happens beyond saying: what speech acts are performed in or by saying what is said, or what implicatures are generated by saying what is said.
Near-side pragmatics includes, but is not limited to resolution of ambiguity and vagueness, the reference of proper names, indexicals and demonstratives, and anaphors, and at least some issues involving presupposition. In all of these cases facts about the utterance, beyond the expressions used and their meanings, are needed.
We can divide these facts into several categories. For indexicals such as ‘I,’ ‘now,’ and ‘here’ basic facts about the utterance are required: the agent, and when and where it occurred. For other indexicals and demonstratives, speaker intentions are also relevant. While it seems the referent of ‘you’ must be a person addressed by the speaker, which of several possible addressees is referred to seems up to the speaker's intentions. Within syntactic and semantic constraints, anaphoric relations seem largely a matter of speaker's intent. Speaker's intentions and the way the speaker is connected to the wider world by causal/historical ‘chains of reference’ are relevant to the reference of proper names.
Far-side pragmatics deals with what we do with language, beyond what we (literally) say. This is the conception according to which Voltaire's remarks belong to pragmatics. It's up to semantics to tell us what someone literally says when they use expressions of a given type; it's up to pragmatics to explain the information one conveys, and the actions one performs, in or by saying something.
Pragmatics is usually thought to involve a different sort of reasoning than semantics. Semantics consists of conventional rules of meaning for expressions and their modes of combination. John Locke supposed that communication was basically a matter of a speaker encoding thoughts into words and the listener decoding words back into thoughts. The same basic picture is found fairly explicitly in Ferdinand de Saussure and other influential theorists. This picture seems to fit reasonably well with the picture that emerged from the logicians and philosophers of language in the tradition of logical analysis, of language as a system of phonological, syntactic and semantic rules, of which competent speakers and interpreters have implicit mastering. Paradigmatically, the sincere speaker plans to produce an utterance with the truth-conditions of a belief he wishes to express; he chooses his words so that his utterance has those truth-conditions; the credulous interpreter needs to perceive the utterance, and recognize which phones, morphemes, words and phrases are involved, and then using knowledge of the meanings, deduce the truth-conditions of the utterance and of the belief it expresses.
In contrast, pragmatics involves perception augmented by some species of ‘ampliative’ inference — induction, inference to the best explanation, or perhaps some special application of general principles special to communication, as conceived by Herbert Paul Grice — but in any case a sort of reasoning that goes beyond the application of rules, and makes inferences beyond what is established by the basic facts about what expressions are used and their meanings.
The facts with which pragmatics deals are of various sorts, including:
Facts about the objective facts of the utterance, including: who the speaker is, when the utterance occurred, and where;
Facts about the speaker's intentions. On the near side, what language the speaker intends to be using, what meaning he intends to be using, whom he intends to refer to with various shared names, whether a pronoun is used demonstratively or anaphorically, and the like. On the far side, what he intends to achieve by saying what he does.
Facts about beliefs of the speaker and those to whom he speaks, and the conversation they are engaged in; what beliefs do they share; what is the focus of the conversation, what are they talking about, etc.
Facts about relevant social institutions, such as promising, marriage ceremonies, courtroom procedures, and the like, which affect what a person accomplishes in or by saying what he does.
Pragmatics studies the factors that govern our choice of language in social interaction and the effects of our choice on others.
It is also a way of investigating how sense can be made of certain texts even when, from a semantic viewpoint, the text seems to be either incomplete or to have a different meaning to what is really intended. Consider a sign seen in a children's wear shop window: "Baby Sale - lots of bargains". We know without asking that there are no babies are for sale - that what is for sale are items used for babies. Pragmatics allows us to investigate how this "meaning beyond the words" can be understood without ambiguity. The extra meaning is there, not because of the semantic aspects of the words themselves, but because we share certain contextual knowledge with the writer or speaker of the text.
A simplified way of thinking about pragmatics is to recognize, for instance, that language needs to be kept interesting - a speaker or writer does not want to bore a listener or reader, for example, by being over-long or tedious. That is why humans strive to find linguistic means to make a text, perhaps, shorter, more interesting, more relevant, more purposeful or more personal. Pragmatics allows this.