• S

  Fig. 10

  ynergies of Scale. “The term refers to the well-established fact that the sheer number of participants may produce combined effects that could not be achieved by any individual, or even a smaller group” (Corning, 2007, p.116). A larger coalition of male lions is more successful in commandeering a group of females; a lager chimpanzee group hunts more efficiently.

• Modification of the Environment. For instance, penguins in Antarctica cuddle together, maintaining a sufficiently high temperature despite the frost.

• Cost and/or Risk Sharing. Vampire bats share part of the blood swallowed by them with their hungry group mates, thereby reducing the risk of their dying of starvation.

• Information Sharing and Collective ‘Intelligence’: Animals frequently communicate information to one another, whether intentionally or not (Corning, 2007, p.117).

• Labor (Function) Division, or Combination. One of the numerous examples in the realm of biology deals with cyanobacteria whose heterocysts specialize in fixing vital nitrogen from the air, whereas the rest of the cells in a cyanobacterial filamentous body carry out photosynthesis. As for human society, “the classical economist Adam Smith… provided us with one of the textbook examples. At a pin factory that Smith had personally observed, ten workers performing ten different tasks were able to manufacture about 48 000 pins per day. But if each of the laborers were to work alone, attempting to perform all of the tasks associated with making pins rather than working cooperatively, Smith doubted that on any given day they would be able to produce even a single pin per man” (quoted from: Corning, 2007, p.116).

Loyal behaviors, and particularly cooperation among our ancestors, presumably, provided the foundations for the development of primitive human society and, subsequently, political institutions, as emphasized in the literature on sociobiology and biopolitics. These protopolitical behaviors originated “early in the history of life on earth” and are “found at every level of life’s hierarchy, from the simplest cells to the huge nation states” in which most people lived in the modern historical period (Johnson, 1995, p.244).

The concept of cooperation is considered in the literature on sociobiology (see below) and biopolitics in conjunction with the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). In this situation, two or more individuals can choose between cooperation and defection. The classic example of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is as follows. Two suspects (A and B) are separately interrogated by the prosecutor. Each of them has been convicted on minor charges. In addition, they are suspected of having committed more serious crime together. Each of the suspects can (i) plead guilty thereby also proving the guilt of the other suspect; (ii) cooperate with the other suspect which means not pleading guilty and, therefore, not betraying him. If neither confesses (both cooperate), they will go to prison for a relatively short time, e.g., for 1 year. If one of them, say, A, confesses, he will be acquitted (0 years) as a reward for his assistance to the prosecutor, while the other suspect who does not confess will spend a long time (15 years) in prison. If both A and B plead guilty, each of them will get part of the punishment (8 years).

The PD can be reformulated in more general terms. It arises whenever defection is more advantageous for each partner than cooperation provided that the other partner decides to cooperate. However, if both partners defect, the consequences for them are worse than if both cooperate. Each partner resolves the dilemma without knowing the other’s decision.

The PD takes a large number of different forms in the biological and in the political realm. Two states conclude a disarmament treaty. If they both cooperate in implementing the treaty, they get important benefits such as guaranteed peace and a chance to cut down on arms race-related expenses. Nonetheless, each of the states faces the temptation to violate the treaty and start producing weapons surreptitiously. If the state (A) succeeds in stockpiling weapons, it will gain special advantages over the other state (B) that incurs considerable costs resulting from the threat posed by state A and the necessity to satisfy all its demands. Finally, if both parties ignore the treaty they will face the situation typical of the “cold war” between the USA and the USSR, i.e., an exhausting arms race associated with a constant war threat.

Several strategies of coping with the PD have been suggested including (i) “TIT-FOR-TAT”: you cooperate with your partner during the first round of your interaction with him. During the second and all subsequent rounds, you do exactly what your partner did to you during the preceding round, i.e. cooperate if he cooperated and defect if he did not cooperate with you (Axelrod, 1984); (ii) “Generous TIT-FOR-TAT”. In terms of this strategy, you forgive, with a probability of 1/3, the defection of your partner during the preceding round of the game, i.e. cooperate with him notwithstanding his previous refusal to cooperate (см. Low, 2000); and (iii) «PAVLOV»: you cooperate during the first round. After the first round, you follow the simple algorithm: if the result of the preceding round was positive for you, do exactly what you did; otherwise, you should change your strategy.

The decision to cooperate in a PD-like situation is made, with a high probability, even by a selfish individual on condition that he plans to interact with the other partner for a sufficiently long period of time. The “shadow of the future” is sufficiently important (Axelrod, 1984), and the partner will definitely revenge himself for any defection or deceit. The probability of cooperating increases in a Prisoner’s Dilemma-like situation if a third party watches the game and punishes noncooperators (defectors, see Shinada et al., 2004) or if face-to-face interactions and direct communication between the partners is encouraged (Ostrom, 1997).

Cooperation in terms of a PD-like game occurs even between the soldiers of two armies facing each other during a prolonged position war such as World War I (Axelrod, 1984). This cooperation follows the Live and Let Live principle. Both parties tacitly ignore their commanders’ orders concerning military action. Similar dilemmas are faced by biological systems. In a parasite-host system, it is advantageous for both partners involved to cooperate, i.e. to let each other live. If the parasite defects, i.e., kills the host, it risks dying of starvation.

Edward O. Wilson, the author of the ground-breaking work Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975) defined this field as “the extension of population biology and evolutionary theory to social organization“. In contrast to ethology that originally concentrated on empirical studies of animal behavior, sociobiology was envisaged as a predominantly theoretical area of research. Sociobiologists developed theoretical models and widely used ethological data in their studies. Generally speaking, sociobiological models were aimed at explaining complex forms of social behavior making good use of concepts borrowed from game theory, decision-making theory as well as economics and other social sciences.

For instance, sociobiologists interpreted the behavior of various biological species in terms of cost-benefit analysis. In a large number of species, females appear to prefer long-term relationships with the same male. In contrast, males tend to change their “girlfriends” frequently. In terms of sociobiology, this is accounted for by the fact that the two partners make unequal investments in their offspring. In the numerous species in which females nurture the young, they invest considerably more resources than males. Therefore, it is only the males who are interested in changing their partners in order to transmit their genes to a maximal number of offspring. Females aim to secure the long-term support of a resource-providing male.

Sociobiologists designed mathematical models applying to animals or, in terms of human sociobiology, humans. According to the popular hawk—dove model (Dawkins, 1976; Morikawa et al., 2002), individuals can choose between attacking another, i.e. using the hawk strategy, avoiding him (the dove strategy), or, finally, pretending to be ready to fight without real aggressive intentions (the bluff strategy). By estimating the probable costs and benefits of each strategy in a given situation, sociobiologists made predictions concerning the strategy that is likely to be preferred by each partner involved. Calculating the probability of obtaining valuable resources by attacking like a hawk as well as the chances to sustain serious injury during the attack enabled predicting the likelihood of the hawk strategy in the situation under study.

Apart from the hawk—dove and the above PD models, sociobiologists applied other game models including, e.g., the exchange game model. According to this model, partners estimate their potential costs and benefits and decide whether they should engage in exchanging food or other goods with each other or not. An additional model also related to sociobiology, termed “costly signaling”, is to be considered below.

Sociobiologists accepted the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution based upon natural selection of genes: the more adaptive the genes the larger is the number of offspring generated by individuals carrying these genes. The specific goal pursued by sociobiologists was to explain not only competitive but also cooperative behaviors of living beings from the neo-Darwinian perspective. Even altruism, self-sacrificial behavior benefitting others, is explicable in terms of the theory of evolution if the beneficiaries are the altruist’s kin (kin altruism, Hamilton, 1996) or they will assuredly reciprocate in the future, helping the altruist (reciprocal altruism, Trivers, 1971). These points will be addressed below.

Evolutionary psychology (EP), a field related to sociobiology with respect to methodology and research goals, took shape in the late 80’s. It was defined as the application of adaptational (i.e. evolutionary – O.A.) logic to the architecture of the human mind (Cosmides and Tooby, 1997). Unlike sociobiology, EP only deals with human behavior. It is assumed that human behavior like the human body evolved as an adaptation to the environmental conditions – to the environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA). Accordingly, EP is based upon “the principle that the mind is an adapted organ like any other in the service of reproducing our genes under specific environmental conditions” (Nicholson, 1997, p.1053). For example, child-rearing behavior of women took shape, according to evolutionary psychologists, about 200,000 years ago as an adaptation to cope with dangers faced by children. This point on the time scale corresponds to the EEA for child rearing by women (Rossano, 2003).

Human culture evolves according to its own laws that are distinct from those of biological evolution, although the two evolutionary processes do interact (this gene-culture coevolution will be briefly discussed in 2.3.4). Nonetheless, many long-lived cultural norms tend to be in conformity with biological evolution-shaped behavioral predispositions rather than to run counter to them. This is exemplified by the Decalogue, or the Ten Commandments of the Bible which encourage “human cooperation, stability, and predictability of behavior”, “the basic ingredients for survival and propagation” (Hartigan, 1995, p.167).

EP supporters emphasize that the conditions created by modern civilization substantially differ from those of the EEA to which our behavior was adjusted. Behaviors that were useful for hunter-gatherers in the savannah of Africa may prove to be useless in the suburbs of Chicago (Low, 2000, p.31). Tasty sugar-containing food was energetically valuable and, therefore, vitally important in primitive society. It became harmful in more recent historical periods starting from the late Middle Ages when bad teeth acquired a new social meaning – as a symbol of wealth and high status (actually, this is a peculiar kind of costly signaling, see below, in this subsection).

Estimatedly, ”humans left the EEA only 10,000 years ago, when agriculture and settled communities began, so there has been too little time for our minds to re-adapt to these newer conditions. As a result, we cope with industrial society using Stone Age brains” (Mazur, 2001, p.240). The misfit between evolutionarily programmed human behavioral predispositions and the present-day situation can result in serious stress. It manifests itself in such civilization-related problems as child abuse, sectarianism, sexism, racism, mental illness and crime, pornography, and substance abuse (Nicholson, 1997). For instance, child abuse is disproportionally frequent with adopted children. This is apparently due to the ancient behavioral predisposition to take care only of those children that are genetically related to the individual acting as a parent. The more recent practice of adopting children is in conflict with this behavioral tendency.

Nevertheless, the above problems can be at least partly eliminated if adaptations evolved in the EEA can be “used under new circumstances for purposes other than those for which they were designed… For humans, our bipedalism and opposable thumb can be pressed into service for many useful functions beyond chasing down prey and foraging” (Nicholson, 1997, p.1055).

Evolutionary psychologists consider the human brain a tool used to cope with challenges faced by primitive human societies and, to some extent, by our ape-like ancestors (Cosmides & Tooby, 1997; Tooby & Cosmides, 2010). EP subdivides the brain into functional units, or modules originally specializing in vital problems like identifying kin and non-kin; responding to dangerous stimuli including aggressive intentions of others; social communication; and locating resources and safe territories. The brain is compared to the Swiss Army knife kit, where each blade performs its own function (Cosmides and Tooby, 1989).

The brain combines “our propensity for categorical thinking with our interest in in-group/out-group distinction”. Its structure provides for the dominance of positive over negative emotions that helped it work in dangerous and unpredictable situations (Nicholson, 1997, p.1063) arising in primitive human society.

Brain modules responsible for the social cognitive function (SCF) enable evaluating one’s own and another’s social status and rank and knowing what one must, may, and must not do in a particular social situation. The SCF is closely linked to the capacity to understand others and to know what they can and what they cannot know (theory of mind, TOM).

The term kin altruism refers to sacrificial behavior for the benefit of a close relative. The development of such behavior in the course of biological evolution promotes kin selection as suggested by W.D. Hamilton, D.S. Haldane, and J. Maynard Smith in the 1960’s. Close relatives such as siblings or parents and their offspring have a large number of common genes. Hence helping a relative at the expense of one’s own reproduction or survival chances actually promotes the spreading of the helper’s genes within the population. Hamilton (1996 [1964]) coined the term inclusive fitness that was widely used in sociobiology and evolutionary psychology. He assumed that the probability that an individual will transmit its genes to the progeny depends (i) on its own fitness in the given environment/situation (A) and (ii) the fitness of its closest relatives with whom it shares a large part of its genes (A_R):

А^* = А + R x A^R ,

where А^* is inclusive fitness and R relatedness degree, i.e. the percentage of genes shared by the individual and its kin. Hamilton argued that evolution tends to maximize inclusive fitness. Kin altruism makes sense if it increases and not decreases fitness. Therefore, an individual’s self-sacrificial behavior will be selected for by evolution if he sacrifices his reproductive success and perhaps life for at least 2 children/brothers or 4 grandchildren/cousins because they share with him, statistically speaking, 50% or 25 % of the genes, respectively. Hamilton (1996 [1964]) also used the term kin egoism. If the goal is to maximize inclusive fitness then it makes sense for an individual to let one brother/sister (sharing 50% of the individual’s genes) die rather than risk his own life because 100% of the genes will be retained if the individual survives and reproduces.

A classic example discussed by Hamilton (1996) is related to the behavior of social insects including bees, wasps, and ants.³ In terms of natural selection, worker individuals in these species are at an advantage if they take care of the reproducing queen instead of reproducing themselves. Females in social insects are diploid – their cells contain two copies of each chromosome while males (drones) are haploid, i.e., have only one chromosome copy. All working females have the same mother as the queen female. Calculations reveal that ¾ of the worker’s and the queen’s genes are identical (Maynard Smith, 1996). Helping the queen reproduce results in transmitting to the progeny more of the worker’s genes, therefore, than if the worker reproduced herself because her own offspring would have lesser common genes with her (1/2).

Almost all genes are identical in clones such as microorganisms of the same colony. This provides for a high probability of altruistic behavior with microbial cells, which is actually supported by some data obtained by microbiologists. A widespread phenomenon in bacterial colonies is programmed cell death that helps the whole colony survive. For instance, a part of the colony’s cells burst at the beginning of its growth, and nutrient substances released from these suiciders are utilized by other cells that rapidly proliferate.

The kin altruism concept provides an explanation for selective affiliation among relatives that have many genes in common. This genetic similarity manifests itself in similar traits. Recognizing the phenotypic similarity causes genetically related individuals to group together. Studies with twins revealed a considerably higher frequency of affiliative and cooperative behavior in monozygous (identical) twins, or natural clones, in contrast to dizygous (fraternal) twins that statistically share only 50% of their genes. If one twin dies, the other twin shows more sorrow if the two twins are identical not fraternal (Segal, 2000). These facts are easily accommodated by the kin altruism concept.

As mentioned above, sociobiology applies cost-benefit calculus to behavior. Kin altruism is actually a variation on the theme of the zero—sum model. The altruist gets zero: it loses important resources or even dies while the genetically related beneficiary gets sum (“The winner takes it all”), i.e. uses all resources made available by the act of altruism. The kin altruism concept accounts for the self-sacrificial behavior by demonstrating that a large part of the altruist’s genes are passed on to the posterity via a relative.

However, several interacting individuals can implement a substantially different model termed the sum—sum (or win—win) model. It is possible that all partners benefit from the interaction which is regarded as synergistic (Corning, 1983, 2003a,b, 2005). Several monkeys form a group which makes it easier for each monkey to obtain food and to fight predators. This phenomenon is also known as the positive effect of cooperation or as the advantage of a social lifestyle.

Sociobiologists and biopoliticians invoke the kin altruism concept to explain the mutual support that is typical of groups of related people. In modern bureaucracies, this results in cliquishness and nepotism that is accompanied by isolation from “outsiders” and hostility toward them.

The term reciprocal altruism was coined by R. Trivers in 1971. Unlike kin altruism, reciprocal altruism is self-sacrificial behavior that may benefit an unrelated individual, provided that the beneficiary is ready to perform an analogous act of altruism benefitting the altruist. “Rescue the drowning that will rescue you if you drown”.

Sociobiologists applied the reciprocal altruism concept to various forms of loyal behavior including coalition formation by primates. Coalition members typically assist one another, e.g., in courting females (de Waal, 1996b). The reciprocal altruism concept is vulnerable to the criticism that altruists can be exploited by free riders that benefit from their help without helping others.

However, free riders will not be selected for if their cheating endangers the survival of all group members including the free riders themselves (Corning, 1983, 2003b, 2005). A mammoth would not be caught and the whole hunter band would starve if some hunters shirked, allowing the mammoth to escape.

A number of scholars assume that public opinion exists, apart from Homo sapiens, in nonhuman primates. Interactions between two individuals (A and B) are in the focus of attention of other group members that gossip about them. If an individual violates a social norm, e.g. if a male inflicts injury on a female (de Waal, 1996b), the whole group punishes the perpetrator by ostracizing him and refusing to fulfill his requests. Similar sanctions can be used if altruistic behavior is not reciprocated.

An important role is played by the group’s hierarchical structure. It is the individual at its pinnacle that incites others to punish social norm violators including free riders.

The reciprocal altruism strategy is less vulnerable to free riding if the animals involved are characterized by a sufficiently advanced nervous system and efficient sense organs. This enables the animals to individually recognize each individual with whom they dealt in the past. Primates satisfy these criteria and, therefore, reciprocal altruism is widespread among them. Baboons and chimpanzees tend to help the individuals who helped them before, e.g., give food to those that earlier shared food with them. Chimpanzees even punish those who were reluctant to share food by behaving aggressively toward them or concealing information about the location of food (Cummins, 2001).

Punishing free riders/cheaters can be denoted as negative reciprocity, i.e. doing harm (or at least withholding help) to those doing harm to you. Similarly, positive reciprocity is helping those who provide resources or otherwise help you.

Cooperation among individuals may be based upon both positive and negative reciprocity, i.e. cooperators are motivated by both a reward provided for helping others and a punishment imposed upon dishonest or unreliable individuals. This is strong reciprocity, or the “you shall be either rewarded or punished” principle (Gintis, 2000). “Strong reciprocity is a predisposition to cooperate with others and to punish those who violate the norms of cooperation” (Gintis et al., 2003, p.153). In all likelihood, strong reciprocity was widespread in primitive human society. Similarly, a large number of more advanced human societies were characterized by severe punishments for noncooperators, and strong reciprocity presumably contributed, among other factors, to the formation of large-scale human societies as well as to the development of civilization.

Obviously, reciprocal altruism as well as sanctions against free riders are common phenomena in human society. Trivers (1996) pointed to mutual aid among people under extreme conditions as well as to the help provided to the disabled and the ill, to children and aged people. Implicit in all these situations is the expectation that helping others will be rewarded at least indirectly, via third persons in whose eyes the helper has a good reputation and, therefore, assistance should be provided to him whenever possible. This is indirect reciprocal altruism (Alexander, 1979).

Efforts made by individuals to acquire an advantageous reputation include behavior called honest costly signaling. Displays performed in order to signal one’s high hierarchical rank or good reputation range from shaking empty gas cans by dominant chimpanzee males (to impress other males) to charitable donations and conspicuous consumption in civilized human society. The ultimate benefits of such signals are the privileges enjoyed by reputable and/or high ranking individuals such as membership in politically influential or economically powerful alliances. As for the Homo sapiens species, costly signaling is facilitated by human language that helps spreading information about each group member’s behavior and gossiping. Signaling and language are considered prerequisites for the development of advanced human societies (Smith, 2010), along with such factors as indirect reciprocity, cheater punishing, intergroup competition, and social cognitive function.

Reciprocal altruism often provides a basis for relations between states. However, interstate relations are vulnerable to cheating by free riders, even though they are based on official agreements. A notorious example is the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939-1941. Even though a mutually beneficial non-aggression pact was signed by both parties in 1939, Germany violated the pact and made war on Russia on June 22, 1941.

It is widely believed that humans are capable of altruism that is not based on expecting rewards in the future or on passing one’s own genes on to posterity (via one’s closest relatives). Dawkins considered the ability to perform acts of genuine, non-reciprocal and non-kin, altruism a unique human feature distinguishing human beings from other biological species. The question to ask, though, is whether other species are principally unable to perform purely altruistic deeds (dog owners may doubt that). Dawkins (1976) assumed that genuine altruism can develop in human society under the influence of cultural not genetic/biological factors. ‘‘Let us try to teach generosity and altruism because we are born selfish”. Even in present-day civilized society, it seems likely that most humans predominantly engage in behavior based upon kin or reciprocal altruism, whereas genuine acts of altruism are relatively rare.

Nevertheless, studies conducted by social psychologists yield encouraging data that humans are capable of self-sacrificial behavior for the benefit of others even though any selfish motivations including internal motivations linked to conscience and pride are lacking. For instance, subjects agree to receive an electric shock in order to prevent giving a similar shock to other unknown subjects (Bateson, 1991: quoted from Richerson and Boyd, 1998).