In The Observer of March 10, 1946, Orwell wrote that “fter the Moscow conference last December, Russia began to make a ‘cold war’ on Britain and the British Empire.”

The first use of the term to describe the post–World War II geopolitical tensions between the USSR and its satellites and the United States and its western European allies is attributed to Bernard Baruch, an American financier and presidential advisor.[3] In South Carolina, on April 16, 1947, he delivered a speech (by journalist Herbert Bayard Swope) saying, “Let us not be deceived: we are today in the midst of a cold war.”Newspaper reporter-columnist Walter Lippmann gave the term wide currency, with the book The Cold War; when asked in 1947 about the source of the term, he referred it to a French term from the 1930s, la guerre froide.

The security dilemma asserts that both strength and weakness in national security can be provocative to other nations. If a nation is too strong, this can be provocative since “most means of self-protection simultaneously menace others.” On the other hand, if a nation is too weak, “great dangers arise if an aggressor believes that the status quo powers are weak in capability or resolve." Thus, directly and indirectly, both strength and weakness can upset the balance of security in international relations.

This concept is also referred to as the spiral model. This term is used in international relations and refers to a situation in which actions by a state intended to heighten its security, such as increasing its military strength or making alliances, can lead other states to respond with similar measures, producing increased tensions that create conflict, even when no side really desires it.

The term was coined by the German scholar John H. Herz in his 1951 book Political Realism and Political Idealism. At the same time British historian Herbert Butterfield described the same situation in his History and Human Relations, but referred to it as the "absolute predicament and irreducible dilemma."In John Herz’ words, the security dilemma is “A structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend, regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and measures of others as potentially threatening.”

A frequently cited example of the security dilemma is the beginning of World War I. Supporters of this viewpoint argue that the major European powers felt forced to go to war by feelings of insecurity over the alliances of their neighbors, despite not actually desiring the war. Furthermore, Germany's fear of fighting war on two fronts led it to the formulation of the infamous Schlieffen Plan, which specified a particularly accelerated mobilization timetable. The onset of German mobilization, in turn, put pressure on other states to start mobilizing early as well. However, other scholars dispute this interpretation of the origins of the war, contending that some of the states involved really did want the conflict.

The security dilemma is a popular concept with cognitive and international relations theorists, who regard war as essentially arising from failures of communication. Functionalist theorists affirm that the key to avoiding war is the avoidance of miscommunication through proper signaling.

The security dilemma has important relationships with other theories and doctrines of international security. Part of the strength of the security dilemma theory is that it subsumes and