5
Predicates and arguments
5.1 Predicates and arguments
5.1.1 Predicates and arguments, in general
Argument phrases, which include nouns, pronouns, phrases consisting of nouns and adjectives or quantifiers and nouns, and prepositional phrases, establish entities for discussion.1 Predicates, which include verbs and non-verbal predicates such as yƒlj ‘[it] is needed’, [jhjij´ ‘[it] is good’ and predicative adjectives such as cdj,j´lys ‘free’, report on the properties of entities established by argument phrases and the relations among entities.
[1]Dj dnjhjq gjkjdbyt lyz vs ,skb cdj,jlys. Ctht;f Cf[fhjd b z jnghfdbkbcm j,jphtdfnm jrhtcnyjcnb. Gjljikb r ,thtue htrb Git[b. Vs htibkb gthtghfdbnmcz yf ne cnjhjye d,hjl. Hfpekbcm, cfgjub dpzkb gjl vsirb b gjikb. B nen vtyz cib,kj ntxtybtv, cfgjub gjgkskb. Cxfcnmt, xnj Ctht;f b[ gjqvfk.
We were free in the second half of the day. Serezha Sakharov and I set off to look at the environs. We approached the Pshekha River. We decided to ford the river. We took off our boots, stuck them under our arms, and set off. And then I was knocked off my feet by the current; my boots sailed off. Fortunately, Serezha caught them.
1Valence patterns -- combinations of arguments and predicates -- have been well studied in Russian (Apresian 1967, 1974). In general linguistics, the burden of description has been put on the arguments’ “thematic roles,” conceived of as exclusive, binary properties. We emphasize here the semantics of predicates and their relations to arguments. Critical is the idea of predicate history, a description of how a predicate presents change, responsibility, and information. The notions of agent and theme are extended to general notions of responsibility and aspectuality, which are neither binary nor exclusive. With predicate histories, it is possible to make explicit similarities between transitive and intransitive valences (both can combine with prepositional phrases expressing domains of change), to introduce some semantic correlates of case (not unlike Jakobson 1936/1971[b], Wierzbicka 1980), and to make connections between aspect and valence.
The discussion here blurs certain familiar distinctions, such as the distinction between governed arguments (recently, “configurational” cases) and ungoverned adverbial complements. For a rigorous treatment of valence with tests for government, see Schmidt and Lehfeldt 1995.
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In [1], for example, protagonists are introduced -- the speaker, his companion, their boots, the river -- and various properties, many of them changing, are reported -- their movement (gjljik∫), the fate of the boots (gjgks´kb), a new relation with the errant boots (gjqvƒk).
Argument phrases can mention a wide range of things, and predicates can describe a wide range of possible situations and changes of situations. A given predicate generally occurs with its arguments expressed consistently in the same cases; for example, gjljqn∫ ‘approach’ takes a nominative subject and a goal phrase expressed by the preposition r<\dat>. Some predicates can take different cases, but variation in case government is quite circumscribed: nominative or genitive with negated intransitive existential predicates (§5.3), accusative or genitive with negated transitive predicates (§5.4), nominative or instrumental of the predicative complement (§5.2), instrumental as opposed to another case to express synecdoche (§5.6). Overall, the va l e n c e patterns of predicates are limited, stable, and conventionalized.
When different predicates use the same cases to mark arguments, the relations of these arguments to their predicates are similar. A predicate uses the accusative (or dative or instrumental) because the relation of that argument to the predicate is similar to other accusative (or dative or instrumental) arguments of other predicates, more similar than to arguments expressed in other cases. For example, all arguments in the dative case are goals, although what it means to be the goal differs depending on the predicate. The dative with lƒnm/lfdƒnm l†ymub tvé<dat> ‘give money to him’ is the goal of the transfer of the money; the dative with gjlj´,yj tvé<dat> ‘similar to’ is the goal of a static relation of similarity; with gjvj´xm/gjvjuƒnm ‘help’, it is the recipient of the verbal activity (the help); with yƒlj ‘necessary’, the dative is the individual to whom obligation is directed.
Because the behavior of any given predicate is largely stable, it is possible to construct a typology of predicates according to the arguments with which they occur. Such typologies can in principle be finer, as is the typology of eightyfour kernel valence patterns of Apresian 1967, or they can be coarser, as is the typology below, where seven classes of predicates are distinguished. Before developing the typology proper, it will be useful to introduce basic concepts relevant for describing predicates: tense-aspect-mood and information. Both are relevant on two levels, on the level of the predicate itself (its semantics and interaction with arguments) and on the level of context.
5.1.2 Predicate aspectuality and modality
Predicates report states, situations, and more than that, they describe histories of states. These histories are temporal, in the sense that they are grounded in
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time, and they are aspectual, in the sense that the states can change over time. (In the following, the temporal and aspectual character of histories is compressed to a single idea of a s p e c t u a l i t y .) Predicate histories are also modal, in the sense that the states interact with other states and other alternative states.
The change, or aspectuality, reported by a predicate history is often concentrated in one argument, the subject of an intransitive (in [2], the pack of cigarettes is lying in a certain position) or the object of a transitive verb (in [2], the cigarette or the match which are moved).
[2]-- Rehbnt! -- ytj;blfyyj jy ghtlkj;bk vyt gfgbhjce<acc> bp gfxrb, kt;fotq yf cnjkt<loc> , cfv pf;tu cdj/, gjlytc vyt cgbxre<acc> . Z pfrehbk, dpukzyek yf ytuj.
-- Have a smoke! -- unexpectedly he offered me a cigarette from a pack lying on the table; he lit up one himself and offered me a light; I lit up and glanced at him.
When aspectuality is concentrated in one argument, it can be termed the a s p e c t u a l argument.
Change is by its nature a modal concept. In [3],
[3]Vfnm vskf gjk. Dth[y// /,re jyf cyzkf, herfdf pfcexbkf gjxnb lj gktx. Mother was washing the floor. Her outer skirt she removed, her sleeves she rolled up almost to her shoulders.
the change in the sleeves -- the aspectual argument -- is associated with different modal possibilities. In the initial, descended position, the affected entity is vulnerable to possible contact with soap and water, while after the change in configuration, the entity is presumed to be out of harm’s way. Thus pfcex∫nm reports not only change in physical position, but also changes in possibilities.
Aspectuality is not always concentrated in a single argument. Often it is more abstract. Sometimes it has to do with the status of activity; for example, in [2], dpukzyék reports a change in the status of gazing -- gazing comes into existence -- more than a change in a concrete entity. There is more than one layer of aspectuality. In [2], the event of lighting (pf;=u) both affects a specific entity (a cigarette) and, at the same time and more abstractly, brings into existence a process (of burning). Thus aspectuality is not always concentrated in a single argument, and in the long run, aspectuality should be viewed as a property of the predicate history rather than of a single argument.
The aspectuality of a predicate -- its states and changes of state over time -- exists or occurs in spaces of possible states, or domains. Oblique cases and prepositional phrases can explicitly name domains -- or rather, critical landmarks within the domain.2 For instance, [1] above mentions the goal of the heroes’
2 Jackendoff 1976.
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motion, r ,†htue htr∫ ‘to the shore of the river’, and the final goal of ascension of the boots, dpz´kb gjl vs´ irb ‘took up under our arms’. Because aspectual arguments are objects of transitives and subjects of intransitives, domains in effect state where the motion of these arguments will occur. For this reason, for many of the intransitive valence patterns described in Apresian 1967, there is an analogous transitive combining with the same case or prepositional phrase. For example, Apresian’s intransitive pattern 17 ghbdcnƒnm c v†cnf ‘stand up from a place’ and transitive 57 cjhdƒnm hƒvs c jrj´y ‘remove the frames from the windows’ both have a domain phrase with the preposition c describing the source of motion of the aspectual argument; in the same way, intransitive 20 gjljqn∫ r cnjké ‘approach the table’ parallels transitive 60 ;ƒnm ghjn∫dybrf r htr† ‘squeeze the enemy against the river’.
The lexical history of a predicate is not only aspectual but at the same time modal. It is concerned with possibilities and with responsibility -- why the world is the way it is. A specific entity is responsible to the extent that the reported situation is the way it is because the entity is what it is; if the entity had different properties, what one could say about the world would differ. An argument that is responsible in the sense of having certain properties that determine why the world is the way it is can be termed the modal or agentive argument (using “agentive” here in the sense of “responsible,” but not necessarily “willful” or “conscious”). The subject argument is usually, perhaps always, a modal argument. A subject is obviously responsible when it is an animate being that willfully initiates an activity, such as dispenser of cigarettes in [2]. But subjects can also be responsible when they are not intentional or energetic actors. The subject of ;lƒnm is responsible by virtue of remaining “in a state of readiness,” anticipating that “there must, or may, occur a certain event” (Slovar sinonimov). Or consider the subject X of ,jΩnmcz ‘fear’, who holds the opinion that “the realization of an event Y, undesirable for {, is highly likely, while X is incapable of counteracting Y, and X would like to act in such a way as to avoid Y” (Tolkovokombinatornyi slovar ). This X is responsible in multiple ways. X is responsible for the opinion about the impending event, for the desire to act, but also for the inability to counteract the impending event.
In some instances responsibility can be displaced to an argument that has some other role in the predicate history, for example, the dative argument of yƒlj is responsible and, at the same time, the goal of the imposed obligation; the instrumental in vtyz´ ci∫,kj ntx†ybtv ‘I was caught by the current’ in [1] obliquely names a phenomenon of nature as the responsible force.
The limiting case of responsibility is the subject of existential predicates like be. The subject of be is not agentive in the usual sense of engaging willfully in an activity. Yet it is possible to apply modal operators such as dtlm ‘after all’,