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cooperate in trying to arrive at appropriate interpretations (Werner and Kaplan 1963, Bates 1976, Carter 1978, de León 1998).

How do children manage this? First, they make use of what they know, in context, to make inferences about the intentions of others. Take the episode in

(2) (from E. Clark, diary data).

(2)D (1;11.28, talking at breakfast, as his father tapped the edge of D’s bowl with a spoon): Herb hitting [ə] bowl.

Father: Why was I hitting your bowl? Why was I hitting your bowl? D (grinning, as he picked up his spoon): [ə] eat [ə] cornflakes.

This child drew on his experience of past mealtimes when he typically talked a lot and ate rather little. Oneand two-year-olds generally appear to rely on their knowledge about events in deciding how to treat requests (e.g. Shatz 1978). And by age two, for example, they readily treat negated why questions as requests for action (Ervin-Tripp 1970: 82), as shown in (3):

(3)Mother: Why don’t you put it in the wastebasket?

Sally (2;0): Throw away?

By age three, they can sometimes offer explicit analysis of a situation as well, as in (4) (Ervin-Tripp 1977: 182):

(4)Mother (in car): I’m cold.

Child (3;3): I already shut the window.

In short, children express their own intentions and make inferences about the intentions of others from an early age.

What kinds of pragmatic knowledge can children draw on as they acquire communicative skills? In this chapter, I take up some aspects of pragmatic development and the evidence that children are attending to speaker intentions on the one hand, and to what the addressee already knows on the other. Attending to these two factors in an exchange requires that children make use of common ground, updating it as needed; it also requires that they take note of speech acts, and learn which inferences to draw from what speakers do and don’t say (see Austin 1962, Levinson 1983, Horn 1996a).

1 Joint Attention

In the exchanges just cited, the children’s inferences seemed to be based on their own experience and licensed by what was in common ground. Common ground restricts the possible inferences, whether these concern the speaker’s intentions, the meaning of a new word or construction, or what is implicated by what the speaker said.

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To make use of common ground, speakers must first establish joint attention; then they can draw on that along with physical and conversational co-presence (H. Clark 1996). Consider the exchange in (5) where a parent establishes joint attention with a young one-year-old in order to show him an unfamiliar object. Joey’s mother tries six times to get his attention before succeeding. She uses his name twice, then touches his cheek, then uses his name again. She then switches to look, then combines look with an endearment as she moves her gaze to the target object. Only at this point did the child look at the object and so give evidence of joint attention.2

(5) Joey (1;5.3; being introduced to a small plastic crocodile) child looking at door, 0secs–4secs

parent looks at child, 0secs–7.03secs

(a)Parent: Joe. (0.25secs–)

(b)Parent: Joey. (2secs–)

parent touches J’s cheek, 3.1secs–

(c)Parent: Joey. (3.25secs–)

child looks off at camera, 4.2secs–8.23secs

(d)Parent: Look! (5.25secs–)

(e)Parent: Look! (7.1secs–)

(f)Parent: Honey – look at this. (7.15secs–) parent looks at toy crocodile, 7.25secs–

child looks at crocodile, 8.25secs–16.22secs parent presents crocodile, 9.05secs–

(g)Parent: Look at this. (9.2secs–)

As children get older, they appear to monitor adults more closely, and are able to switch their attention more quickly to whatever the adult is attending to. Consider the exchange in (6) between Cathy (1;9.4) and her mother. Within one second of her mother’s simultaneously picking up and looking at the (unfamiliar) measuring-spoon, Cathy switched her gaze to the spoon too.3

(6) Cathy (1;9.4, being introduced to a measuring-spoon) parent picks up measuring-spoon, 0secs–

parent looks at measuring-spoon, 0secs– child looks at measuring-spoon, 1sec–7.3secs parent holds out spoon, 2.05secs–

(a)Parent: This is a spoon. (2.95secs–) parent looks at child, 3.8secs–

(b)Parent: It’s a measuring-spoon. (4.05secs–)

The parents of one-year-olds get their children’s attention with gesture and gaze on the one hand and with language on the other (Moore and Dunham

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1995, Schmidt 1996). They look at the child and the target object; they point to the object, hold it out, pick it up, tap it, and point to properties like teeth, wheels, or spots. And they may also demonstrate how an object moves or works (e.g. pushing a toy truck across the table, putting sunglasses on) (see also Shatz 1978, Zukow 1986, Mervis and Mervis 1988, Gogate et al. 2000). They use deictic terms in introductory utterances (e.g. this, that, see, here), names, and formulaic utterances to engage the child’s attention. For their part, one-year-olds indicate when they are attending: they look at the focus of attention; they reach for the target object, touch it, or manipulate it. As they get older, they also repeat the term the adult has offered for it (E. Clark 2001b).

Once parents and young children achieve joint attention, they can count as grounded whatever object or action is at the focus of shared attention. This grounding restricts the candidate referents for any new words on that occasion, and so places limits on children’s hypotheses about the meanings of unfamiliar words.

2 Common Ground

Adults offer children extensive pragmatic information about language use, especially about word use (E. Clark and Wong 2002). They offer conventional terms for objects, properties, relations, and activities, and in so doing, place the referents of these terms in common ground. They offer information about how an unfamiliar term differs from and is related to other words in the same domain. They often point out distinguishing properties of the referents of new words, e.g. characteristic noises, activities, or details of appearance (E. Clark 2001a, E. Clark and Chouinard, in preparation). Consider the exchange in (7):

(7) Mo (looking at a picture of some owls in a book with child): what are these? those are birdies.

Notice that the mother here first offers the word birdies, which is immediately repeated by the child. She then offers owls and goes straight on to offer a distinguishing sound, hoo. This too is taken up by the child.

The child’s utterances suggest that she has probably made three inferences here: that the objects pictured belong to the category of birds (birdies), and to the subcategory owls (owls), and that this subcategory of bird says “hoo” (hoo) (see E. Clark 2001a).

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Some adult offers are tacit repairs of what the child has just proposed, as in (8), where the child takes up the adult term and makes use of it seconds later.

(8)D (2;8.14, with a toothbrush in his hand): An’ I going to tease.

Mother (puzzled): Oh. Oh, you mean you’re going to pretend to do your teeth?

Child: Yes.

(then, as father came by a minute later) Father: Are you going to do your teeth?

Both direct and indirect offers depend on joint attention combined with the physical co-presence of the target object or action, plus conversational copresence (the word for the target referent). Because, together, these factors restrict the domain of possible meanings, they limit the inferences children can make about a new word (E. Clark 2001a).

Adults also connect new words to known ones: they relate them through inclusion (“X is a kind of Y”), parts (“X is part of Y”), properties (“Xs have Ys”), and function (“X is used for doing Y”); they also give definitions and provide lists of entities or actions from the same domain (E. Clark and Wong 2002). All this information is introduced within conversational exchanges. By supplying conventional terms and relating them to others already known, adults offer children more general “maps” of how words represent the world. What these metalanguage directions convey is an important ingredient in adult–child conversations. They provide words and their connections, as shown in (9) and (10).

(9)Sarah (3;6.6) looking at a picture of a nest with eggs in it, with her mother) Mo: that’s a nest.

Sarah: a nest.

Mo: um. that’s where the birdies live. that’s a birdie house. they call it a nest.

[Brown: Sarah064, line 345+]

(10) D (3;9.18, at the airport; watching as a mechanic put two chocks by the plane wheels): Why did he put two loggers?

Mother: Oh, they’re called chocks and they keep the wheels from

With each offer of a word, adults add to common ground. And children often ratify these offers explicitly by repeating them. Whenever adults add further information about a new term, this too is added to common ground. With these directions about use, then, adults both provide new words and connect them to their semantic neighbors.

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3 Convention and Contrast

Users of language observe two general pragmatic principles. The first assumes conventionality in the system they are using. If a particular meaning is conventionally associated with a particular form, speakers typically use that form for that meaning. They can then be sure their addressees will understand them as intended. If they don’t use the expected form, their addressees assume they must mean something else (E. Clark and H. Clark 1979, Horn 1984a, E. Clark 1987, 1990, 1993). Conventionality can be defined as follows:

Conventionality: For certain meanings, speakers assume that there is a conventional form that should be used in the language community.

For a conventional system to be most effective, speakers will give priority to already-established, conventional forms for particular meanings.

This principle goes hand-in-hand with a second. It assumes that different forms differ in meaning. If a speaker uses two distinct forms, he must intend two different things. And if he uses a form different from the one anticipated, he must intend something else. This is the principle of Contrast, defined as follows:

Contrast: Speakers assume that any difference in form signals a difference in meaning.

Conventionality and Contrast interact: speakers are expected to use conventional forms. When they don’t (when they coin new terms, for instance), their addressees infer that they are trying to express some other meaning, one not captured by a conventional term (E. Clark and H. Clark 1979). For example, the speaker who first coined to winterize (meaning “to make winter-proof”) made clear by using an unfamiliar form that his meaning differed from that of the established verb from the same stem, to winter (“spend the winter”). Conventionality confers consistency over time for speakers denoting objectand event-types. This stability in conventional meanings, along with the contrasts among them, is what makes languages effective for communication (Lewis 1969, H. Clark 1996).

Children appear to grasp these principles at an early age (E. Clark 1983, 1993). They take as targets in producing words the conventional forms they hear from adults. Where there are discrepancies between adult and child productions, they repair their own pronunciations in the direction of adult forms, from age one onwards. They treat different words as having different meanings from the start, and rely on this as they build up semantic domains. In summary, they use both Conventionality and Contrast as they make inferences about new words.

Children rely on Conventionality more generally when they receive corrections from adults. Adults often reformulate erroneous child utterances,

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providing a conventional way to express the child’s apparent intention: they correct mispronounced words (e.g. fish for fis, jump for dup); they correct morphological errors, changing her to she, and comed to came; they offer the conventional word where children have chosen another term (e.g. peel for fix, logger for chock, or gardener for plant-man); and they correct children’s syntactic errors, fixing word-order or switching to the appropriate construction. In short, adult reformulations generally offer children the conventional forms for what they seem to be saying (Chouinard and E. Clark 2001, E. Clark and Chouinard 2000).

Adults often offer such reformulations in side-sequences as they try to establish what the child meant, as in (11), where the child’s father, in reformulating, initially misunderstood him:

And children generally acknowledge these reformulations. They repeat the words or constructions proposed by the adult, as in (12):

(12)Abe (2;5.10): I want butter mine.

Father: Ok, give it here and I’ll put butter on it.

They acknowledge the adult’s reformulation, with yes, uhhuh, or even no, within side-sequences, as in (11). Or they tacitly accept the reformulation by simply continuing on with their next turn in the exchange, much as adults do (H. Clark 1996).

When adults reformulate children’s utterances, they offer the conventional form for the meaning intended. By reformulating the child’s utterance with any changes called for, they offer an utterance that contrasts directly with what the child just said. By doing this, they implicate that this is how to say what the child apparently intended. Just as in adult exchanges (Walker 1996), these reformulations (or repeats with corrections) signal to children that there is some question about either what they said or how they said it. In summary, children become aware early on that adult reformulations signal that there is something awry with how they said what they said.

Children start to master the general conditions on conversations (how to start up, how to take turns, what to infer from certain kinds of contributions) fairly early. But what goes on in conversation cannot always be generalized to other situations. The pragmatic inferences applicable to questions, for instance, don’t always hold for test settings where children often have a hard time working out what the adult wants, and may at first take into account factors

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that are irrelevant (Donaldson 1971). Consider a conservation task where children are shown two sticks the same length, aligned in parallel, and asked Are they the same? They typically answer correctly with Yes. But if the experimenter then moves one of the sticks so the ends are no longer aligned and repeats the same question, three-, four-, and even five-year-olds now (wrongly) answer No. They take the change of position for the two sticks as relevant to the adult’s repeat question. When trained to ignore irrelevant or accidental changes, children do better (e.g. Gelman 1969, McGarrigle and Donaldson 1975).

If children interpret a repeated question as a direction to alter their initial answer (and therefore their judgment), they should manage better in such conservation tasks when questioned only once, right after they have observed a change designed to test whether they can conserve a property like length. When four-, five-, and six-year-olds are given tasks where they are asked either one or two questions about conservation of number, those who get a one-question task first, produce a larger number of conservation responses in later standard two-question versions, than children who get the standard task first and then the one-question version (59 percent versus 19 percent) (Siegal 1997). Initial experience with the one-question task helps make clearer to the children what the experimenter wants in asking questions.

Studies like these show that children construe questions according to the usual conversational practices. When such practices fail to hold, younger children may misread the adult speaker’s intentions. This can then result in mis-assessments of what children actually know. To succeed in many test situations, children must learn to suspend their assumptions about conversational practice and invoke additional pragmatic rules just for test settings.

4 Speech Acts

In any conversation, participants need to assess the current speaker’s intention. Is this a request for action or for information? Is this an offer awaiting acceptance or rejection? Is this a promise or a threat? Is he marking a social exchange with a greeting, an apology, a thank-you? Is this an action coextensive with the utterance, as in You’re it, I resign, or I name this ship the Nereid? (see Austin 1962, H. Clark 1996).

Between nine and 12 months of age, infants start to make active efforts to attract adult attention to what interests them or what they want. Sometimes these efforts involve actively enlisting adult attention, as when they hold on to adult clothing and pull in the direction of something they wish to have opened, or something they want reached down off a shelf. They indicate with pointing gestures, typically an index finger extended and the remaining fingers curled into a fist. Pointing contrasts with a different kind of gesture, less fixed in form, that marks desire rather than just interest. Infants this age persistently reach towards what they want. Pointing and reaching, typically present before the first words, have been documented by many researchers, and are generally

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viewed as proto-versions of the speech acts of asserting (points) and requesting (reaches) (Werner and Kaplan 1963, Bates et al. 1975, Bruner 1975). Early points and reaches are combined first with single words and later with combinations of words as children become more skilled with language. Their persistence in seeking adult acknowledgment – attending to assertions of interest or acceding to requests – offers further evidence that they use gestures and gesture–word combinations to express different intentions.

To further assess speaker intentions, children must work out which utterances can be used to perform which functions.4 Since a single construction can often be used with several functions, children have to infer what the speaker’s intention is in terms of what they know about form/function relations, what is physically co-present on each occasion, and what is conversationally co-present

– the linguistic content of the utterance in the current context.

Children must learn how to take factors like these into account in assessing the speaker’s intent, and hence the speech act being used. For instance, when asked to identify offers and requests, three-year-olds can distinguish some of the conditions for each speech-act type. Which features best identify the speaker’s intention? Reeder (1980) set up contexts where children heard variants of “Would you like to do A?” and then had to judge whether this utterance was equivalent to either “I want you to do A” (requests), or “I’ll let you do A” (offers). On each trial, children heard a sentence followed by the variants to be judged, as in (13):

(13)Would you like to play on the train?

(a)I want you to play on the train.

(b)I’ll let you play on the train.

Children’s judgments were elicited in scenes with a Speaker (S), an Addressee (H), and the target toy. In offer trials, H stood near the toy and S stood at a neutral distance. In request trials, S stood near the toy with H at a neutral distance. These scenarios, Reeder argued, licensed the pragmatic inferences needed to distinguish offers (14) from requests (15):

At 2;6, children generally chose the “let” variant (13b) for offers (69 percent of the time), but they didn’t yet show a significant preference for the “want” variant (13a) for requests. By age three, they chose the appropriate variants most of the time for both offers and requests. How were the children identifying the

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speech act at issue? They could have been using simple inferences of the following type: when the Hearer is close to the train, he wants to play with it; and when the Speaker is closer, he can let the Hearer play. Both require that children keep track of the speaker’s location and draw the appropriate inference.

As children get older, they add to their repertoire of speech acts and to the range of forms used to convey each one. Grimm (1975) set up a series of scenarios designed to elicit specific speech acts from fiveand seven-year-olds. She included acts of asking, ordering, forbidding, and allowing (all directives), and of promising (a commissive). A sample scenario is given in (16):

(16)To get a child to ask for something:

“You’re at the playground with Felix [a large toy cat]. He’s sitting on the swing and you’re on the slide. Now you’d like Felix to let you swing too. What do you say to him?”

In each scenario, the experimenter made Felix refuse to cooperate at least three times. This compelled the child to reiterate the targeted speech act at least four times. Consider the exchange between a seven-year-old and Felix the cat (his voice was supplied by the experimenter), in (17):

(17) Child: Felix, will you let me swing too, just once, please?

Five-year-olds found it easier to ask, order, and forbid than to allow or promise. Seven-year-olds did well on all four of the directives, but knew less about how to promise. Overall, children seem to find it easier to produce speech acts that require addressees to act than ones where the obligation remains with the speaker (see also Read and Cherry 1978, Bernicot 1992). But in tasks like these, the speech acts produced are second-order ones since the children are either making a judgment about a speech act or taking on a specific role themselves; they are not expressing their own intentions directly.

5 Speaker Intentions

Can children understand the intentions behind an utterance? How consistent are they in their inferences about what adults say to them? To what extent do their responses show they have understood the speaker and are attempting to respond appropriately? The ability to make inferences in context appears

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critical because it affords children a basis for interpreting the speaker even when their knowledge of language is still minimal. It also provides a basis for any coping strategies that children rely on in the earlier stages of mapping meanings onto words (E. Clark 1997), and so helps them accumulate information across contexts as they start to fill in details about meanings for different words and constructions.

Children begin to participate in conversation very early in acquisition. While the earliest “turns” in preverbal infants are imposed by adults who count hand-waves, smiles, burps, and babbles as turns in babies (Snow 1977), one- year-olds can often take a more deliberate role in contributing to conversation. They contribute one-word utterances both in response to adult prompts and questions, and in initiating exchanges with adults. In fact, young children initiate some two-thirds of adult–child exchanges (Bloom et al. 1996).

If children can follow the speaker’s intention, they should be able to deal with repairs to that intention. There is good evidence that they can. As young as two, they are aware that they need to discard information that has been repaired, and replace it by the speaker’s more recent offering. For example, in one study young two-year-olds were taught a new word for an unfamiliar object-type, then, after the learning trials were completed, the experimenter made an explicit repair such as “Oops, these aren’t X’s; they’re Y’s” and then proceeded to teach a second new word (Y) as the term for the same objects (E. Clark and Grossman 1998). When tested, nearly all the children knew that they did not know what the first term (X) meant. (They all knew the second term that had replaced it.) Similarly, children this age are able to distinguish intended from accidental actions performed in the course of an adult’s teaching them a new word for an object or an action. Verbal signals marking accidental actions (uhoh, oops, etc.) effectively lead two-year-olds to ignore those events in favor of others (Tomasello and Barton 1994, Carpenter et al. 2000). Finally, two-year-olds take account of what the speaker is attending to in talking about unfamiliar, unseen objects. They assume that any new word introduced refers to whatever the speaker is attending to, and not to what they were attending to themselves (Baldwin 1993).

By age two, children are already quite skilled at tracking the speaker’s intentions in a variety of settings. These intentions may be obscured for young children by language that is too complex, but in tasks where children are focused on the activity at hand, they show good understanding of the pragmatic consequences of speaker repairs. They are also responsive to requests for clarification, whether from peers (Garvey 1979) or adults (e.g. Corsaro 1977, Gallagher 1977). These requests help the interaction run smoothly and repair disruptions by clearing up misunderstandings that result from not hearing or from misinterpreting what a child said. In responding to such requests, children may repeat themselves, repair words that were poorly pronounced, reword what they are saying, or speak more loudly. Much of the time, their repair zeroes in on what led the adult interlocutor to ask for clarification in the first place (see also Chouinard and E. Clark 2001).

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6 Taking Account of the Addressee

To what extent do children take into account what their addressees know? Such an ability is important for establishing and updating common ground, and even two-year-olds appear to keep quite careful track of what adults know on occasion. For instance, O’Neill (1996) gave two-year-olds (2;7) a game where she told them their parents would help them. She then showed them a toy that she placed in one of two containers (a box or a cup), on a shelf out of the child’s reach. The child’s task was to get the toy in order to drop it into another container. The parent, meanwhile, was either in the room, watching, or else outside the room or seated with eyes closed and so unable to see where the toy was put. What happened? These two-year-olds provided significantly more information about where the toy was when the parent did not know its location (parents who had been outside or had had their eyes closed) than when the parent did know it (parents who had been present and watching while the object was put into one of the containers).

In a second game, O’Neill had younger children enlist parental help to retrieve stickers dropped into one of two identical opaque containers, out of reach. Again, on some trials the parent was visibly watching; on others, the parent sat with eyes closed and ears covered. The children (aged 2;3) took into account what their parents knew. They supplied information about location more often when parents had not seen which container was used than when they had (see also Maratsos 1976).

Children are quite skilled by age four at distinguishing among addressees on other grounds as well, and they adjust the way they speak according to the age of their addressee (Shatz and Gelman 1973). For instance, when offering instructions to adults about a toy, four-year-olds used longer utterances, few imperatives, and no attention-getters, compared to their speech to two-year- olds. Their speech to other four-year-olds didn’t differ from their speech to adults. Distinguishing among addressees by age is consistent with children’s growing skill in “doing voices” for different characters. Sachs and Devin (1976) recorded four children (aged 3;9 to 5;5) talking to an adult, a peer, a baby, and a baby-doll, as well as role-playing “a baby just learning how to talk.” The speech addressed to adults and peers versus babies replicated earlier findings. Children distinguished younger addressees by shortening their utterances, using attention-getters, and modifying their speech significantly along a number of dimensions.

Children also talk differently to mothers and fathers (Andersen 1990). This may be a function of the time each parent spends with the child. The more familiar parent is usually addressed less formally (and less politely) than the less familiar parent. This matched the differences in status and sex that showed up in Andersen’s children’s role-play (see also Newcombe and Zaslow 1981).

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7 Taking Turns

One way to assess children’s skill in conversation is to look at whether they offer pertinent information when they take a turn in an ongoing exchange. This has been studied from several perspectives: answering questions and eliciting responses; joining in conversations between other family members; and contributing to conversations between a parent and older sibling. What children say on such occasions is generally relevant to the topic, and they add new information. But they may often come in late, perhaps a reflection of their lack of skill in production (E. Clark 2002c), so what they have to say may not be as relevant as it would have been a couple of seconds earlier.

One measure of turn-taking is how successful younger versus older children are at taking over from the current speaker. In a detailed study of three two- year-olds and five four-year-olds, Ervin-Tripp (1979) found that, having interrupted an ongoing turn, two-year-olds then produced delayed responses from 27 percent to 55 percent of the time, compared to four-year-olds who produced delayed follow-up utterances between 9 percent and 20 percent of the time.

Children get better at timing the placement of their interpolated turns as they get older (Ervin-Tripp 1979). Those under 4;6 entered at syntactic or prosodic boundaries 25 percent of the time with a single speaker, but got the timing right only about 12 percent of the time when they interrupted a dyad to take a turn. Their slowness in getting out what they wanted to say led them to overlap with the next turn, which was often no longer relevant to what they wanted to say. Older children (4;6 to 6;0) did better, with 27 percent appropriate timing, regardless of whether they were interrupting a single speaker or a dyad. The younger children were probably not yet as good at processing an ongoing conversation and, at the same time, planning their own turns, so that when they took a turn, they were often late and therefore judged to be saying something irrelevant.

8 Politeness

What are the social rules behind choices of polite forms? To make appropriate use of politeness, children must master several different dimensions of use. They need to know the linguistic forms for marking different degrees of politeness. They must identify the pragmatic conditions on greetings and requests, for instance, according to the status, age, and sex of their co-participants. And they need to learn what the costs and benefits are of gaining (or losing) face in relation to others (Brown and Levinson 1987).

Take the case of requests. What do young children know about the forms available, and how polite each form is? Bates (1976) looked at spontaneous requests in the speech of Italian children and identified three early stages of use. Up until age four, children rely mainly on direct questions and imperatives. As they get older, they add expressions like please, they give reasons, they add

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softeners of various kinds, and they start to state their wishes in generic form. By age six, they can produce a range of syntactic forms, but do not yet modulate their requests appropriately. By age seven or so, they can vary both form and content in making polite requests. These findings are consistent with children’s judgments of politeness (Garvey 1975, Bates 1976, Bates and Silvern 1977).

Children are politer, by adult norms, when they produce positive requests (for someone to do something) than when they produce negative ones (for someone not to do something). And they are generally politer to older addressees: they are politer to adults to peers, and politer to peers than to younger children. One measure of this appears in their uses of please: it occurs in 84 percent of requests to adults, but in only 37 percent of requests to two-year- olds ( James 1978).

What criteria do children themselves use in judging whether a request is polite? When asked to classify spontaneous requests, not until age nine did children make adult-like judgments (Axia and Baroni 1985). Do children recognize the “cost” of requests for speaker versus addressee? To study this, Axia and Baroni devised a game where children needed to ask for help. Adults used two forms of “resistance” to the children’s requests: (a) turning a deaf ear, so as to elicit a further request, and (b) motivated refusals, also designed to elicit further requests where children were forced to infer from context what to do, namely, ask again more politely.

First requests tended to be as impolite for nine-year-olds as for younger children (fiveand seven-year-olds). After encountering resistance, the two older groups generally produced requests that were more polite. After deafear refusals, five-year-olds simply asked again more loudly; older children opted for politer forms. After motivated refusals, five-year-olds gave very few polite requests; seven-year-olds gave more, and nine-year-olds gave the most. The older children also added expressions of deference (mitigators, please, and use of question-forms) (see also Axia and Baroni 1985).

Studies of younger children report similar findings. Newcombe and Zaslow (1981) looked at the requests two-year-olds use to adults. In transcripts from 11 children, they found both hints and questions serving as requests. When the adult didn’t comply with the initial request, children persisted 82 percent of the time, repeating their original utterance in a variant that was also a hint or question (83 percent), or else producing a more explicit directive (17 percent). This suggests that even very young children have quite an extensive repertoire for making requests (see also Read and Cherry 1978).

Other studies suggest that not until age seven do children become more polite when trying to get their addressee to comply with a request. In one study of small groups of six-year-olds reading in the classroom, Wilkinson et al. (1982) found that children this age tended to use direct forms to their peers in requests for action or information, and that they more often aggravated than mitigated any follow-up requests. (Aggravation usually meant repetition of the same form, with a rise in pitch and more accompanying gestures.) The form of Annie’s request to another six-year-old in (18) is typical:

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(18) Annie: Judy. Judy, what’s this word?

Judy. Judy. Judy. Judy, what’s this word?

Judy, Judy, Judy, Judy. Judy, Judy, Judy, Judy, Judy. What’s this word?

Judy: “Only.”

Children this age use some mitigations, e.g. I can’t get it. Why don’t you read this page too, please? and also offer reasons for compliance, e.g. Michelle, can I have the pen? I need the eraser for it. I did something wrong (Wilkinson et al. 1982: 170– 1). In summary, many six-year-old requests to peers are unsuccessful, and they make little use of politer forms in repeat requests.

At the same time, children as young as four or five are aware that greater status calls for more politeness. In their role-play with puppets, children who do the voices for younger and less powerful roles (e.g. a child talking to an adult, a woman talking to a man, or a nurse talking to a doctor) made requests that were more polite than those they made for the voices in more powerful roles in each dyad. In their role-play, children made doctors less polite to nurses, men less polite to women, and adults less polite to children, than the reverse (Andersen 1990). Children seemed quite aware of some of the correlations of power or status with gender and age.

What is deemed polite in one culture doesn’t always hold for another (Brown and Levinson 1987). Politeness is a matter of convention, and children have to learn what the relevant conventions are. Those acquiring Chinese or Japanese must learn to use the appropriate address terms for relatives for each occasion as well as any honorifics required (Clancy 1985, Erbaugh 1992, Nakamura 2001). Children learning Norwegian must learn to use hints in comments or remarks rather than the more elaborate requests conventional in Hungarian (Hollos and Beeman 1978). In all cultures, children have to learn how they are expected to speak as male or female participants in the society. And in each culture, children have to learn what counts as polite, and adopt prevailing norms for how to reiterate a request. Politeness is an important tool for achieving one’s goals, and children appear to recognize this quite early.

9 Conclusion

By age six, children already know a lot about how to use language. They observe conventionality and contrast, and readily make inferences from what others do (and don’t) say. And they have begun to master many of the details of how to participate in and manage conversations. They have also grasped when and where to use polite forms. They are guided in all this, in part, by the pragmatic directions adults offer on how to speak, when, and to whom (E. Clark 1998, E. Clark and Wong 2002). They are also guided early on by the information adults provide about words for objects and actions, and how these are related to other familiar words. But the pragmatic knowledge children