Ethics in Practice

Environment

disapprove of and be repelled by such 'vicious' behaviour. Moreover, ifhe doesn't see it, he will be viewed as abnormal and subject to censure. Indeed, he will be viewed as repellent.

Now, one advantage of construing moral 'properties' - the supposed referents of moral discourse - as seemingly objective properties which we presume all are equally capable of perceiving directly, rather than construing them simply as individual feelings, is that we can engage in arguments about such supposed referents. We cannot engage in similar arguments about opinions which merely result from personal tastes. If Amy likes something and Bob dislikes it, there is no inconsistency. But if Amy says that it is good and Bob says that it is not, then there is a clear disagreement between them. Indeed, they are contradicting each other. Construing the supposed referents of moral discourse as seemingly objective properties makes intelligible the arguments we frequently have about what is and what is not good - arguments that would be unintelligible if we were merely expressing our personal tastes.

Additionally, if one believes that one 'perceives' a moral 'property' correctly, then one is more likely to attempt to persuade others to 'see' it the same way than if one simply thinks that the differing assessments are due to differences in personal taste. Moreover, if there is reason to think that one might be in error because everyone else agrees that the moral 'property' is other than how one 'perceives' it, then there is reason to try to 'see' it differently - to try to 'see' it correctly. And given that moral disagreement is usually regarded as a serious matter, it seems a mistake, therefore, simply to reduce moral 'properties' to personal tastes.

Earlier we noted that Hume holds that an idea can acquire so much force through association with an especially forceful impression or idea that it, too, can become an impression. Given how much social pressure one can feel when one fails to 'see' things the way others 'see' them, given how forceful the idea this pressure gives rise to can thus become, and given that one would like to perceive an objective moral property correctly, then it is quite understandable, from a Humean standpoint, how Dan could come to acquire an impression

of his friend's vice - in other words, of how he could come to 'see' it for himself. And when he comes to 'see' the vice, it is quite understandable how he might come to view the vice, presumed to be the cause of pain, as 'objectively' repellent, and how he would then be motivated to avoid it. In a word, the idea oJ'vice , comes to be so associated with such forceJul ideas and impressions that it, too, becomes an impression. And because this impression is intimately connected to our passions, it is highly motivating.

2 HUlnean Normative Ethics

What moral principles might be thought to follow from the discussion so far? Behavioural traits which, in general, minimize suffering and maximize well-being would be expected to constitute the virtues, and virtuous behaviour would be expected to include a tendency to abide by social rules which, ideally, serve to minimize the suffering and maximize the wellbeing of all within one's society.

But there is no reason why we could not go further than Hume was prepared to go. And we might go beyond Hume in two ways. First, if we are to employ our reason in order to avoid prejudice, then there seems to be no good reason for stopping at the boundaries of our own society when seeking a general standpoint. A Humean ethic should therefore be cosmopolitan. But we could go further still. If we employ reason so as to be impartial, then in order to regard certain individuals as not meriting an equal appraisal or equal treatment, we would need to identify some morally relevant factor which differentiated them from the rest. For, ceteris paribus, any property of A which justifies treating or judging A in a certain manner will equally justify treating or judging B in a similar manner if B also possesses that property. Hence, unless there is a morally relevant difference which separates humans from nonhuman animals, it seems that it would be inconsistent of us not to count in our moral calculations their welfare alongside that of humans.

Second, not only do we dislike physical pain, we also greatly dislike our goals being frustrated. In short, each of us values our own

freedom. And there is no reason why the association of ideas cannot underpin a general valuing of freedom paralleling the way in which it underpins a general valuing of welfare. For just as we dislike our own freedom being restricted in certain ways, by means of the association of ideas we can come to dislike those sorts of restrictions being placed upon others' freedom. Furthermore, in order to reach agreement we can adopt a general standpoint with respect to evaluating restrictions on freedom. Hence, behavioural traits which are consistent with safeguarding everyone's freedom can also be expected to be considered virtuous. And social rules which serve to safeguard individual freedom can equally be expected to be 'seen' to be extremely valuable. Put another way, there is nothing to prevent a Humean from insisting on freedom-safeguarding rights as well as on rules which serve to maximize welfare. And unless there is a morally relevant difference which separates humans from nonhuman animals, it seems that we should respect animal rights along with human rights.

3An Application of Humean Moral Philosophy to Environmental Concerns

What, then, would follow from applying a Humean approach to environmental problems? We have seen that, although Hume ultimately bases morality on sympathy, reason plays an essential role in identifying an impartial standpoint and in ascertaining the rules of justice. And we have observed that unless there is a morally relevant difference which separates humans from nonhuman animals, then it would be inconsistent of us not to count their welfare alongside human welfare in our moral calculations or not to respect their rights alongside human rights.

However, there is a morally significant difference between humans and nonhuman animals: with some possible exceptions, the latter do not 'perceive' moral 'properties'. And as nonhuman animals do not 'perceive' moral 'properties', then it is wholly inappropriate to view them as moral agents bearing moral responsibility for

Hume and Nature

their actions. Consequently, we cannot, with justification, condemn predators for catching their prey. But unless nonhuman animals differ with respect to some other morally significant property that would justify their being treated by moral agents differently from how humans are treated, and insofar as they feel pain just as we do, then to disregard animal welfare is no less immoral than disregarding the welfare of humans.17 Moreover, unless nonhuman animals differ with respect to some other morally significant property that would justify their being treated by moral agents differently from how humans are treated, and insofar as they feel frustration, as we do, in being confined or restricted, then to disregard the rights of animals is no less immoral than disregarding human rights. IS In a word, the essential role played by reason in Hume's philosophy is sufficient for it to be amenable to cooption by promoters of both animal welfare and animal rights.

But what of the preservation of species and ecosystems? The stability and integrity of an ecosystem is essential for the well-being of the sentient beings dependent upon it. And if their well-being matters morally, so does the stability and integrity of the ecosystems they inhabit. Moreover, its stability and integrity requires the preservation of a large number of the species found within it. Furthermore, although predators harm the prey they catch, they ordinarily increase the well-being of those who escape their clutches, for predators prevent the numbers of their prey rising to a point where a great many would starve by overshooting the carrying capacity of their environment.

It should also be noted that evolution ordinarily serves to benefit the members of a species, even though it has been claimed that what is in the interests of a species is not what is in the interests of its members. 19 The latter has been advanced because, it has been argued, it is in the interests of the species to evolve, and evolution requires a large turnover of individual lives. For given an environment's finite carrying capacity with respect to the species in question, the shorter time individual members of the species live after producing offspring, then the greater the number of 'generations' that can appear within any given period of time, and the faster

Environment

the process of evolution. But it would not seem to be in the interests of individuals to die relatively young.

However, evolution of the species would ordinarily mean that its future individual members were better adapted to their environment and would therefore flourish within it to a greater extent than less evolved individuals would have done. And surely it is in the interests of an individual to flourish. Moreover, if members of a species do not flourish to a greater extent than previous 'generations' because their predators have also evolved, then less evolved members would have fared far worse. Furthermore, if the species had remained unchanged, other species could be expected to have evolved in a manner that made them better adapted to occupying its niche, and thus less evolved members of the species would be far worse off than more evolved ones would have been. And it is surely not in an individual's interests to find that other species are now better adapted to surviving within its niche. So, it would seem that maintaining the conditions for the evolution of any species is indeed in the interests of individual members of that species: namely, future members of that species. 2o

Nevertheless, while all the above goes some way towards a moral recognition of most environmentalist concerns, there are some remaining gaps. Many environmentalists are concerned with preserving species that have so few remaining members that it seems clear that their role within an ecosystem is inessential for its stability.21 Many environmentalists are also concerned to preserve 'unspoilt' inanimate natural entities (such as mountains or rivers), and not merely because of the habitats which they provide for sentient beings. The most likely explanation for these concerns is the great aesthetic value which landscapes, species and ecosystems are 'perceived' to possess. And the 'perception' of such a value provides no insurmountable difficulty for a Humean, because aesthetic 'properties', on a Humean account, are projections of a similar kind to moral 'properties'.

However, it might be objected that all this seems to fail to take into account Routley's Last Person Argument, with which we began. Now,

Peter Singer suspects - as I do - that one of the more promising avenues for justifying concern for species preservation may well be that 'the destruction of a whole species is the destruction of something akin to a great work of art'.22 But he doubts that this avenue would actually lead to the promised land. For if Singer found himself, genuinely, to be the last sentient being, he doubts that it would really matter if he were to amuse himself 'by making a bonfire of all the paintings in the Louvre,.23 No one would ever enjoy those paintings again, so why should their destruction matter?

But there is some reason to think that this might not be the most appropriate response to the Last Person Argument. If one happened to be the last sentient being, then no significant moral problems would seem to result from one's viewing the last member of a non-sentient species as the sort of thing that it would be wrong to destroy needlessly. For instance, so viewing the last member of a species would not cause any harm to other sentient beings. Yet viewing the rarity of a species as greatly increasing the value of any surviving members of that species would, ordinarily, greatly aid the preservation of species. And because a species might play an essential role within an ecosystem, and because ecosystems provide the conditions for our collective survival, then viewing rare species and stable ecosystems as extremely valuable generally serves a highly useful, social purpose. Indeed, given the extent of the environmental crises we seem to have induced and whose continuation, never mind extension, is most likely to be to our considerable detriment, such a perspective now appears to serve the most socially useful purpose imaginable. Consequently, it seems that it is currently in all our interests to keep viewing rare species and stable ecosystems as extremely valuable.

But what especially needs to be borne in mind - and this is crucial if we are to make sense of our response to the Last Person Argument - is that when we ask 'Would it be wrong for the last sentient being intentionally to engage in environmental destruction from which little was to be gained?', we are not addressing that question to the last sentient being.

We are asking ourselves that question. And we are

doing so in order to ascertain our values. And even if no one were ever to experience the loss of whatever was destroyed, we would only think that the destructive act would be of no moral significance if the seemingly objective property that demanded whatever it is be preserved had lost its hold over us. Put another way, we are, in effect, asking now how we should behave if we were the last sentient beings. But if we were to reply now that destructive acts performed at some future time would be irrelevant morally, then the relevant projected 'properties' - one's which demand that certain entities be preserved or left unharmed - would now have lost their social utility. They would be failing in their present social function. Hence, for the relevant projected 'properties' to retain their usefulness, it is necessary for us to think now that environmental destruction by the last sentient being would be wrong. It is far from surprising, therefore, that environmentalists should 'see' the viciousness in the last person's intentionally extinguishing a species.

Further light might be shed on the problem posed by the Last Person Argument by distinguishing between two 'levels' of moral thinking. 24 We could distinguish between thinking at the 'everyday level' - when we think in terms of those practical principles which we, by and large, unquestioningly apply in making our everyday moral judgements - and thinking at a 'higher level' - when we think in terms of the ultimate moral principle or principles, which must be consulted directly in unusual circumstances (for example, in the face of moral dilemmas), and which ordinarily justify everyday principles. A projectivist could view everyday moral judgements as remaining within the grip of projected moral 'properties'. However, were one actually to find oneself in the highly unusual situation occupied by the last person, then the social utility of those 'properties' would be a thing of the past. And then it would be necessary to think very carefully from first principles about what is required of one in such a situation - in other words, to think like an 'Archangel',25 as it were. But when we respond to the Last Person Argument now - i.e., while we are not, in actual fact, the last sentient beings - we think it wrong to extinguish a species because of the

Hume and Nature

hold 'everyday' projected moral 'properties' retain over us. In other words, the common environmentalist response to the Last Person Argument could be argued to result from allowing 'everyday' moral thinking to affect 'higher level' moral principles. And it might be because he spends all his time thinking like an Archangel that Singer fails to see anything wrong with the last person burning Grand Masters.

Of course, given the plausibility of a Humean metaethic, we may well proceed to entertain doubts about the reality of moral 'properties' - especially while we remain within our studies. But rather than worry that we tend to continue 'seeing' value as a real property even after we have left our armchair theorizing behind, we should, instead, welcome that fact. For our continuing to 'perceive' moral 'properties' is precisely how it is that they have the social usefulness they undoubtedly have. And in today's world, amongst the most important values to 'perceive' if human societies are to survive would appear to be environment ones: the value of each sentient being, the value of each species, and the value of each ecosystem. Recognizing a plurality of values does, of course, create numerous difficulties, at least at times, for deciding how to act. It requires some method for trading off those values. But why should anyone presume in advance that morally acceptable environmental decisions must always be simple to make?26

Before closing, there is one objection to a projectivist approach that I must briefly respond to, for it is advanced by one of the leading environmental ethicists: Holmes Rolston, III. Rolston complains that

the anthropogenic account of intrinsic value is a strained saving of what is really an inadequate paradigm, that of the subjectivity of value conferral. For all the kindly language about intrinsic value in nature, the cash value is that, 'Let the flowers live!' really means, 'Leave the flowers for humans to enjoy' ... , because the flowers are valuable - able to be valued - only by humans even though when properly sensitive humans come along they do value these flowers for what they are in themselves. 27

Environment

But this objection either begs the question in simply presuming that there is more to value than projectivism implies,2s or, worse, if it is an objection worth stating, it is because of an implicit suggestion that any projectivist metaethic reduces the preservation of non-sentient life to the satisfaction of human interests. But we have just seen that the latter is not the case, for a projectivist approach is quite capable of accommodating Routley's Last Person Argument. Certain projected 'properties' are 'seen' as action guiding. If a species is 'seen' to be valuable, then its seeming 'intrinsic value' will appear to demand of us that we do not intentionally cause its extinction needlessly, and that apparent demand can, at that instant, be quite divorced from the satisfaction of human interests. Moreover, we have also seen that a Humean metaethic is wholly compatible with both animal welfarism and animal rights, neither of which can be reduced to the furthering of human interests.

In addition, if one is supposed to infer from Rolston's critique that projectivism reduces environmental values merely to some form of 'human value', then even if this is so, it is not necessarily a bad thing. For humans, if they are anything really distinctive, are value-driven beings. Humans have sacrificed their lives for their values, whether the value in question is freedom, democracy, human rights or whatever. Were environmental preservation a more widely held 'human value', like that of human freedom or democracy, I, for one, would not complain.

By way of conclusion, it is perhaps worth noting that H.]. N. Horsburgh, while reflecting on the possibility of nuclear annihilation, once remarked that 'only the non-violent can inherit the earth', adding that 'the violent can only deny them a world to inherit. ,29 We could similarly argue that only those adhering to an environmental ethic can inherit the earth. And if, as many environmentalists have argued, the very survival of our species is in doubt because of the environmental crises we seem to have engendered,3o then it would appear to be the case that the only ethic that can survive is an environmental one. Non-environmental ethics would spell 'species suicide', as it were, and would

face extinction along with those practlsmg them. 3l And the possibility of 'species suicide' does, at the very least, seem to provide some reason for why environmentalists should not abandon their moral views, nor cease 'perceiving' moral and aesthetic 'properties', even if dwelling on a Humean metaethic32 might appear, at first glance, to undermine them.

Notes

See Richard Routley (later Sylvan), 'Is There A Need for A New, An Environmental, Ethic?',

Proceedings ofthe XVth World Congress ofPhilosophy, Vol. 1 (Sophia: Sophia Press, 1973), pp. 20510, especially p. 207. For similar arguments attempting to establish that certain non-sentient forms possess intrinsic value, see Robin Attfield, 'The good of trees', Journal of Value Inquiry 15

(1981): 51, Mary Anne Warren, 'The rights of the nonhuman world' in R. Elliot and A. Gare (eds),

Environmental Philosopky (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1983), pp. 128-9, and Holmes Rolston III, 'Are Values in Nature Subjective Or Objective?' in Philosophy Gone Wild (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1989), p. 114.

2Tom Regan is the most famous exponent of animal rights. For a brief summary of his views, see Tom Regan, 'The case for animal rights' in Peter Singer (ed.), In Defence ofAnimals (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985).

3This approach is most associated with Peter Singer. For his earlier hedonistic position, see Peter Singer, Animal Liberation: A New Ethic for Our Treatment of Animals (New York: Avon Books, 1977). For his later position, which deploys preference utilitarianism, see Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

4]. Baird Callicott, 'Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair' in his In Defense of the Land Ethics: Essays in Environmental Philosophy (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1989), p.21.

5Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 224.

6 Callicott, 'Animal Liberation: A Triangular

Affair', p. 21.

7For some objections to Callicott's reading of Hume, see Alan Carter, 'Humean Nature', Environmental Values 9/ I (2000): 3-37.

to David Hume, 'An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals' in Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p.

294.

II Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 469.

12 See J. L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory

(London: Routledge, 1980), pp. 71-2.

13See Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 469.

14Hence, when Hume claims that, 'according to modern philosophy, [colours] are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind' (ibid.), he should not be taken as meaning that colours cannot be 'seen' in some sense, otherwise he would simply be talking nonsense. For irrespective of what actually happens when we see colour, seeing in colour, along with seeing in monochrome, is precisely what gives content to our notion of 'seeing'.

15David Hume, 'Of the Standard of Taste' in

Essays Moral, Political and Litera~y (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 238-9.

16Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, pp. 581-2.

17In other words, the role played by reason in Hume's moral philosophy allows a Humean to employ Singer's welfarist arguments.

18And this means that the role played by reason in Hume's moral philosophy also allows a Humean to employ Regan's arguments for ascribing rights to nonhuman animals.

19See Holmes Rolston III, Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), pp.

147-8.

20However, given how much evolution may resemble an arms race, whether or not it is in the interests of the members of all species is, perhaps, open to question.

21'One could argue "that lichens, which were once ubiquitous, might play some arcane but vital role in the long-term ecology of forests". But the same claim could not seriously be made for the furbish lousewort, a small member of the snapdragon family which has probably never been other than a rare constituent of the forests of Maine.' David Ehrenfeld, The Arrogance ofHumanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1981), p. 188.

Hume and Nature

22Peter Singer, 'Not for Humans Only: the Place of Nonhumans in Environmental Issues' in K. E. Goodpaster and K. M. Sayre (eds), Ethics and the Problems of the 21st Centu~y (London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), p. 203. As he amplifies: 'On this view, to exterminate a species is to commit an act of vandalism, like setting about Michelangelo's Pieta with a hammer; while allowing an endangered species to die out without taking steps to save it is like allowing Angkor Wat to fall into ruins and be obliterated by the jungle.' Ibid.

23Ibid., p. 204.

24See R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method and Point (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981). Also see R. M. Hare, 'Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism' in A. Sen and B. Williams (eds), Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

25See Hare, Moral Thinking.

26For one argument which implies that value pluralism does not have to lead to indeterminacy, see Alan Carter, 'Moral Theory and Global Population', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99/3

(1999): 289-313.

27Rolston, Environmental Ethics, p. 116.

28Rolston observes that the perception of value in nature somehow arises as we learn more about individual species and ecosystems. See Holmes Rolston III, 'Is There An Ecological Ethic?' in

Philosophy Gone Wild, p. 20. Also see Rolston, Environmental Ethics, p. 232. But this observation tells us nothing about the ontology of value. For a projectivist has no difficulty in accepting that, phenomenologically, value 'appears' to arise and intensify as we study certain things. Remarkably, Rolston later writes: 'Humans value natural things for what they are in themselves - for example, enjoying a field of wild flowers, listening to loons call, or experiencing the sublime fury of a storm at sea.' Ibid., p. 331. And the storm's 'fury' isn't a projection?

29H. J. N. Horsburgh, 'Reply to Kai Nielsen',

Inquiry 24 (1981): 73.

30See, for example, Alan Carter, A Radical Green Political Theo~y (London: Routledge, 1999).

31I am, of course, here parodying Garrett Hardin's argument for the ascendancy of his notorious life-boat ethic. See Garrett Hardin, 'Living on A Lifeboat' in Jan Narveson (ed.), Moral Issues (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1983).

32For a fuller account of Hume's metaethic, see Carter, 'Humean Nature'.

Haslett, D. W. 25, 30

hate speech 150, 287, 339, 345, 364-78,380, 381, 383-5, 619

Hayek, Fredrick 531,532 health-care reform 57 health-care system 59

hedonistic utilitarianism 231, 592 Hegel, Georg 158, 162, 166,

390,602

heroin 20, 288, 295-9, 301, 303-5, 310

Hill, Thomas E. Jr. x, xi, 155, 166, 254

Hobbes, Thomas 27, 30 Holocaust 394, 493 homosexuality x, 13,209,210,

233-50, 375, 586

honesty 6,97, 222, 223, 251, 266, 390,413,415,476

human capital 431,567,569,570 human dignity 113, 151,201,203,

206-8, 485, 486, 491

human life 45, 50, 56, 60, 71, 97, 99-101, 129-31, 133-8, 169, 172,173,188,198,201,220, 234, 243, 262, 283, 292, 365, 501, 582, 596, 634, 645, 651

see also abortion; euthanasia; capital punishment

human rights 114, 120, 126, 142, 145, 188,201, 203, 208, 250, 256, 258, 476, 568, 604, 628, 629, 654, 669, 672

human traits 656, 662

Hume, David xi, 277, 283, 587, 588,590,619,662,664-9, 672,673

humility 101, 102,251,252, 276-84, 478, 657, 659-63

hunger xi, 10, 13,21, 25, 61, 149, 150,211,229,251,428-30, 465, 512, 560-2, 590-603, 610,616,618, 622, 623, 625, 627

Hunt, Lester H. 261,313-24,326, 330, 337, 379

Huntington's chorea 49, 53 Hursthouse, Rosalind 60-2, 94,

253

immigration 209,389, 567, 568, 570, 571, 623, 629

impartiality 66,168,169,172,173, 175,176,393,573,581

in vitro fertilization 178, 179

incitement to lawlessness 367 income distribution 623 individual liberty 287, 320, 330,

338,431, 512

individual responsibility 252, 306, 464,475

individualism 299, 323, 534, 542, 648

inequality 113-15, 127, 355,430, 454,459,480, 521, 522, 531, 541,542,544,564,602,604, 605, 607-9, 612-14

197,297,299,598 inherent value 135, 142-5, 651

196, 200, 222, 223, 248, 251, 342, 624, 626, 635, 664, 669

intentions 41, 179,213,245,250, 279,349,352,404-7,425,635

interest theory 307 international trade 558, 559 intuitions 10, 33, 74, 129, 173,

229, 233, 256, 277, 283, 522, 582,664

involuntary euthanasia 25-9

James, Willliam ix-xi, 42, 47, 59, 126, 162, 166, 167, 177, 250, 271, 272, 295, 384, 385, 453, 460, 466, 486, 496, 545, 550,571,600,601,617,642, 663

just war 88 justice

see economic justice; social justice; punishment

justice in acquisition 527-9, 538 justice as fairness 494,514-17,

521, 522, 525 justice in transfer 528

juvenile offenders 478,479

Kant, Immanuel 4, 10, 11, 39, 85, 93, 201, 202, 258, 260, 270, 396,466,473,474,482,483, 492,494,505,510,514,526, 622,663

Kevorkian, Jack 45-7 Keynes, Alfred 566, 571, 672 killing 10, 576, 58

Index

abortion 60, 61, 65, 67-9, 71, 72, 78-80, 83, 86-93, 96, 99,

and punishment 465, 483, 493-5, 499, 503, 505, 507, 509

and saving nature 622, 629 kindness 47, 55, 64, 67, 85, 97,

142, 158,276,281, 283, 582 King, Martin Luther 382, 582

Labor Department 432 labor market 431,439,610

LaFollette, Hugh 1, 30, 58, 106, 151,289,324,325,337, 353, 559, 562, 590, 600, 615

land ethic xi, 619, 631, 632, 635, 664

law 8, 563, 566, 570, 571, 577, 585-7,617,634,643,650,663

and abortion 70-2, 74, 81, 82, 98

about economic exchange 520, 525, 541, 543, 548, 557

against discrimination 387,400, 402-11,414

and drug use 294, 296-9, 301, 304

and euthanasia 19, 32, 38,40-2, 45,47

and gun ownership 314,316, 323, 328, 329, 336, 337 influence on virtues 261-70

see also punishment laziness 234, 257

legal rights 60, 119, 120,213,491, 551,610

Leopold, Aldo xi, 618, 631, 664, 672

letting-die 40-5

Levin, Michael x, 210, 233, 240, 244-6,249,250,428,431, 440, 502

libel 367

liberalism 313-15, 317-24, 339, 375,480,494, 550, 570, 603

liberation movements 107 Locke,John 271,324,495,513,

514,607,608,617 Longino, Helen 345, 353