Gintis Moral Sentiments and Material Interests The Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life (MIT, 2005)

% of Population

Collective Action Disposition

Figure 12.3

Multiple equilibria and tipping points.

effects); Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1225 (1997) (same).

11.See generally Armin Falk and Urs Fischbacher, Modeling Strong Reciprocity, chapter 6 of this volume.

12.See, for example, Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 947, 976–977 (1997); Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 683, 688–689, 746 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021, 2032–2036 (1996).

13.See John O. Ledyard, Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research, in The Handbook of Experimental Economics 111, 156–168 ( John H. Kagel and Alvin E. Roth eds., Princeton University Press 1995); Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. Econ. Perspectives 137, 146 (2000).

14.See Elinor Ostrom, Policies that Crowd Out Reciprocity and Collective Action, chapter 9 of this volume. See generally Bruno S. Frey, Not Just for the Money: An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation (1997); Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price,

29J. Legal Stud. 1 (2000) (finding that fine increased rather than decreased abuse of day care center rules by parents); Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, Pay Enough or Don’t Pay at All (unpublished manuscript, April 1999) (finding that incentives decreased rather than increased performance of individuals soliciting charitable donations); Richard M. Titmuss, The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy (1971) (finding incentives suppress donation of blood); Bruno S. Frey and Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory: A Survey of Empirical Evidence, J. Econ. Surveys (forthcoming).

15.See Gintis, et al., supra note 3; Fehr and Fischbacher, supra note 3; Ernst Fehr and Simon Ga¨chter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments, 90 Am. Econ. Rev. 980 (2000).

16.See generally Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 Va. L. Rev. 349 (1997).

17.See generally Micale G. Allingham and Agnar Sandomo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. Pub. Econ. 323 (1972).

18.See id. at 842; Frank A. Cowell, Cheating the Government: The Economics of Evasion 74 (1990); Steven Klepper and Daniel Nagin, The Criminal Deterrence Literature: Implications for Research on Taxpayer Compliance, in 2 Taxpayer Compliance 126, 142 ( J. Roth and J. T. Scholz ed., 1989).

19.See, for example, Harold G. Grasmick and Wilbur J. Scott, Tax Evasion and Mechanisms of Social Control: A Comparison with Grand and Petty Theft, 2 J. Econ. Psych. 213, 225, 226 table 2 (1982).

20.See James Andreoni, Brian Erard, and Jonathan Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J. Econ. Lit. 818, 841 (1998).

21.See Robert B. Cialdini, Social Motivations to Comply: Norms, Values, and Principles, in 2 Taxpayer Compliance 215 (J. A. Roth and J. T. Scholz ed., 1989); James P. F. Gordon, Individual Morality and Reputations Costs as Deterrents to Tax Evasion, 33 Euro. Econ. Rev. 797 (1989); Klepper and Nagin, supra note 18, at 144; Steven M. Sheffrin and Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance, in Why People Pay Taxes 193 (J. Slemrod ed., 1992).

22.See, for example, Grasmick and Scott, supra note 19, at 226 and table 4; Wilbur J. Scott and Harold G. Grasmick, Deterrence and Income Tax Cheating: Testing Interaction Hypotheses in Utilitarian Theories, 17 J. Applied Behavioral Sci. 395, 403 table 1 (1981).

23.Marco R. Steenbergen, Kathleen M. McGraw, and John T. Scholz, Taxpayer Adaptation to the 1986 Tax Reform Act: Do New Tax Laws Affect the Way Taxpayers Think About Taxes?, in Why People Pay Taxes 9 (Joel Slemrod ed. 1992).

24.See id. at 29–30.

25.See id.

26.See James Alm, Isabel Sanchez, and Ana De Juan, Economic and Noneconomic Factors in Tax Compliance, 48 KYKLOS 3 (1995); Cowell, supra note 18, at 102–103.

27.See Steven M. Sheffrin and Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance, in Why People Pay Taxes 193, 194–195 (J. Slemrod ed., 1992) (suggesting interdependence of taxpayer decisionmaking should generate multiple behavioral equilibria); see also Cowell, supra note 18, 112–113 (developing theoretical model predicting multiple compliance equilibria based on interdependence of taxpayers’ decisions to evade).

28.See Richard D. Schwartz and Soya Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 274, 298 (1967).

29.See Steven M. Sheffrin and Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance, in Why People Pay Taxes 193, 211–213 (J. Slemrod ed., 1992).

30.See id.

31.See Stephen Coleman, The Minnesota Income Tax Compliance Experiment: State Tax Results (1996).

32.See Cialdini, supra note 21, at 215.

33.See the Wicked Witch Who Has Poisoned the Big Apple, Times (London), Sept. 3, 1989 (‘‘‘She deserves everything she gets, she’s scum,’ said one of hundreds of people who waited outside the federal courthouse in Manhattan on Wednesday to jeer at Leona.’’).

34.See, for example, David Cay Johnston, A Smaller I.R.S. Gives Up On Billions in Back Taxes, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 2001, at A1.

35.See, for example, Tom Brazaitis, Wimpy IRS Emboldens Cheats, Plain Dealer (Cleveland, OH), Apr. 18, 2001 at 11B; Amy Feldman and Joan Caplin, Should You Cheat on Your Taxes?, Money, Apr. 2001, at 108.

36.Janet Novack, Are You a Chump?, Forbes, Mar. 5, 2001, at 122.

37.See generally Don Munton, Introduction: The NIMBY Problem and Approaches to Facility Siting, in Hazardous Waste Siting and Democratic Choice 1 (D. Munton ed., 1996); Barry G. Rabe, Beyond NIMBY: Hazardous Waste Siting in Canada and the United States 1–2 (1994).

38.The classic statement of this analysis is Michael O’Hare, ‘‘Not on My Block You Don’t’’: Facility Siting and the Strategic Importance of Compensation, 25 Pub. Pol. 407 (1977).

39.See Kent E. Portney, Siting Hazardous Waste Treatment Facilities 28 (1991); Rabe, supra note 37, at 36–37.

40.See id. at 39–44.

41.Munton, supra note 37, at 17.

42.See Frey, supra note 14, 69–75.

43.See Howard Kunreuther and Doug Easterling, The Role of Compensation in Siting Hazardous Facilities, 15 J. Policy Analysis & Management 601, 605–606 (1996); Howard Kunreuther, Douglas Easterling, William Desvousges, and Paul Slovic, Public Attitudes Toward Siting a High-Level Nuclear Waste Repository in Nevada, 10 Risk Analysis 469,

480(1990).

44.See Munton, supra note 37, at 16; Douglas J. Lober, Beyond NIMBY: Public Attitudes and Behavior and Waste Facility Siting Policy 124–125 (Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, School of Forestry & Environ. Stud., 1993).

45.See at Kunreuther and Easterling, supra note 43, at 605.

46.Lober, supra note 44, at 120; see also Kunreuther et al., supra note 43, at 470; see also Paul Slovic, M. Layman, N. Kraus, James Flynn, J. Chalmers, and G. Gesell, Perceived Risk, Stigma, and Potential Economic Impacts of High-Level Nuclear Waste Repository in Nevada, in Risk, Media, and Stigma (James Flynn, Paul Slovic, and Howard Kunreuther eds., 2001).

47.See Robin Gregory, Howard Kunreuther, Doug Easterling, and Ken Richards, Incentive Policies to Site Hazardous Waste Facilities, 11 Risk Analysis 667, 672 (1991); Kunreuther et al., supra note 43, at 472; Lober, supra note 44, at 140–142.

48.See Kunreuther and Easterling, supra note 43, at 601–602; Lober, supra note 44, at

49.See id. at 145; Rabe, supra note 37, at 21.

50.See Lober, supra note 44, at 126; Rabe, supra note 37, at 44.

51.See generally Kunreuther and Easterling, supra note 43, at 618; Munton, supra note 37, at 19–20; Rabe, supra note 37, at 59.

52.See Kunreuther and Easterling, supra note 43, at 618; Lober, supra note 44, at 222–

53.See Geoffrey Castle and Don Munton, Voluntary Siting of Hazardous Waste Facilities in Western Canada, in Hazardous Waste Siting and Democratic Choice 56–57 (D. Munton ed., 1996); Rabe, supra note 37, at 61–81.

54.See Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, reprinted in The Utilitarians (1961).

55.See Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. of Pol. Econ.

169(1968).

56.See id.

57.See id.; Richard Posner, An Economic Theory of Crime, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1193 (1985).

58.See generally Daniel Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century, 23 Crim. & J. 1 (1998).

59.See Robert J. Sampson, Stephen W. Raudenbush, and Felton Earls, Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 Science 918 (1997).

60.See Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990).

61.See Kahan, supra note 16, at 359–360.

62.See Jeffrey Fagan and Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence, and Social Control: The Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities (Columbia Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 10, Mar. 25, 2000).

63.See Kahan, supra note 61.

64.See generally Elijah Anderson, Streetwise: Race, Class, and Change in an Urban Community 3, 70–77 (1990) (discussing role of generalized youth supervision, and consequence of its deterioration, in containing crime in inner-city); Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 191, 204, 207 (1998) (surveying empirical evidence).

65.See Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities 29–35 (1961).

66.See Meares, supra note 64; Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (2000).

67.See generally Martı´n Sa´nchez Jankowski, Islands in the Street: Gangs and American Urban Society 193, 202–203 (1991) (arguing that cooperation between community and police is both necessary and sufficient to destroy viability of criminal gangs).

68.See George Akerlof and Janet L. Yellen, Gang Behavior, Law Enforcement and Community Values, in Values and Public Policy 180 (Henry J. Aaron, Thomas E. Mann, and Timothy Taylor eds. 1994).

69.See id. at 181–182; Anderson, supra note 64, at 190, 195–196, 205.

70.See Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regulation, 81 B.U.L. Rev. 361, 368–369 (2001).

71.See id. at 367–368, 376–378, 385–386.

72.See id. at 389.

73.See Anderson, supra note 64, at 202–203; cf. Tyler, supra note 70, at 369, 384 (noting potential for displays of aggression to feed on each other in encounters between police and citizens).

74.See generally Harold G. Grasmick and Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 Crim. L. & Criminology 325 (1980).

75.See generally Tomas J. Philipson and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Epidemiology of Crime, 39 J. L. & Econ. 405 (1996); Keith Hylton, Optimal Law Enforcement and Victim Precaution, 27 Rand J. Econ. 197 (1996); Omri Ben-Shahar and Alon Harel, Blaming The Victim: Optimal Incentives for Private Precautions Against Crime, 11 J. L. Econ. & Org. 434 (1995).

76.See Anderson, supra note 64, at 57–58.

77.See Jankowski, supra note 67, at 202–203.

78.See Akerlof and Yellen, supra note 68, at 192–193, 195.

79.See generally Wesley G. Skogan and Susan M. Hartnett, Community Policing Chicago Style (1997).

80.See id. at 174–175, 225.

81.See id. at 166–167, 175–176.

82.Id. at 177–178.

83.See id.

84.See Jon Elster, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order 278–270 (1989); Peter H. Huang and Ho-Mou Wu, More Order without Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures, 10 J.L. Econ. Org. 390 (1994).

85.Elster, supra note 84, at 270.

86.See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform (1999).

87.See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors

609 (1962); Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & Econ. 293 (1970).

88.See, for example, Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, Yale L.J. (2003); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U.L. Rev. 77 (1999).

89.See Benkler, supra note 88; Rai, supra note 88.

90.Olson, note 1 above, is again the foundational work. See also James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy

(1962).

91.See, for example, Ian Ayres and Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Anonymity to Disrupt the Market for Political Influence, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 837 (1998).

92.See generally Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitations and the Myth of the CitizenLegislator, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 623 (1996) (critiquing use of term limits to counteract public choice dynamics).

93.See Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget Process and the Line Item Veto Act, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 871 (1999).

94.See Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal Budget Process, 35 Harv. J. Leg. 1113 (1998).

95.See generally Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (1994).

96.See Jerry Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public Choice to Improve Public Law (1997).

97.Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott, The Stakeholder Society (1999); Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres, Voting with Dollars (Yale Univ. Press 2002).

98.See Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community Of Aid: A Rejoinder to Opponents of Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 Wash. U.L.Q. 1 (1993).

99.See Bibb Latene and John M. Darley, The Unresponsive Bystander: Why Doesn’t He Help? (1970) (reporting experimental results showing that failure to intervene is attributable to errors in perception especially likely to occur in group settings).

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