- •Abstract
- •Resumé
- •Contents
- •Remerciements
- •Personal Bibliography
- •Introduction
- •The Need for Dedicated Cryptographic Primitives for RFID Tags
- •Privacy Issues in RFID Systems
- •Our Privacy Model
- •Preliminaries
- •Notations
- •Probabilities and Negligible Functions
- •Classical Cryptography
- •Message Authentication Codes
- •Cryptographic Hash Functions
- •Universal Hash Functions
- •Pseudo-Random Functions
- •The Random Oracle Model
- •Proof Techniques
- •Hard Problems
- •The LPN Problem and the HB Family
- •The LPN Problem
- •Extensions of the LPN Problem
- •Security Models for the HB Family
- •The HB Protocol
- •The GRS Attack
- •Attempts to Thwart the GRS Attack
- •Description
- •Proposed Parameter Sets
- •Asymptotic Complexity Analysis
- •Optimizing the Attack
- •Thwarting the Attack: the Case of Vectors without False Rejections
- •Perspectives
- •SQUASH
- •Description
- •Handling Window Truncation
- •Handling the Truncation of the Combinaison of Many Integers
- •Generalization
- •Conclusion
- •Privacy Failures in RFID Protocols
- •ProbIP and the SAT Problem
- •Violation of Anonymous Privacy
- •Future Development
- •MARP
- •Description
- •Auth2
- •Description
- •YA-TRAP+
- •O-TRAP
- •A Backward and Forward Untraceable Protocol
- •Tracing O-FRAP
- •Violating the Forward Privacy of O-FRAP
- •Conclusion
- •Privacy Models for RFID
- •The ADO Model
- •Description
- •RFID System
- •Correctness
- •Privacy
- •From Narrow Privacy to Privacy
- •Narrow-Strong and Forward Privacy Using Public-Key Encryption
- •Achieving Strong Privacy
- •Our Proposal: Incorporate the Blinder into the Adversary
- •Sampling Algorithms and the ISH Hypothesis
- •Plaintext-Awareness
- •Instances of Plaintext-Aware Encryption Schemes
- •From PA+ to PA++ Plaintext-Awareness
- •Privacy
- •Security Proof
- •Correctness
- •Security
- •The Case of Mutual Authentication
- •RFID System with Mutual Authentication
- •Correctness
- •Privacy
- •Correctness and Security for the Reader
- •Security for the Tags
- •Strong Privacy with Mutual Authentication
- •Strong Privacy
- •Conclusion
- •The Security of RFID Primitives
- •Our Contributions
- •Further Work
- •Our Contributions
- •Further Work
- •Final Notes
- •List of Figures
- •List of Tables
- •List of Definitions
- •Bibliography
- •Curriculum Vitæ
CURRICULUM VITÆ
Khaled Oua was born in Paris, France, in . A er attending primary school and part of secondary school in Paris, he moved to Bordj Bou Arreridj, Algeria, in where he nished
his secondary school in Arabic. Five years later, he obtained a scienti |
c baccalaureate with a |
major in Math and Physics (“Baccalauréat de l’enseignement supérieur |
lière sciences exactes”) |
with mention “Très Bien” and ranked at the regional level and at the national level. is achievement quali ed him for an excellence scholarship for studies abroad awarded by
the President of Algeria and the Ministry of Higher Education and Scienti c Research.
In consequence, he moved to Switzerland and joined EPFL where he was enrolled in the preparatory year, Cours de Mathématiques Spéciales. He then spent one year studying communication systems before switching to computer science in which he successively obtained a Bachelor and Master in Computer Science in and . His Master thesis was supervised by Prof. Serge Vaudenay and entitled “Fail-StopSignatures and their Applications”. In parallel to his studies, he has worked as an independent web designer and was part of a team responsible for organizing a stand in the expo “Le Comptoir Suisse ”. He was also an active member of several student associations such as Unipoly, Junior Entreprise, and Forum EPFL.
Since , he is a PhD student and full-time research assistant at EPFL’s Laboratory of Security and Cryptography (LASEC) led by Prof. Serge Vaudenay where, in parallel to working on completing his PhD thesis, he is involved in other activities, including teaching and IT system administration.
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