
- •Abstract
- •Resumé
- •Contents
- •Remerciements
- •Personal Bibliography
- •Introduction
- •The Need for Dedicated Cryptographic Primitives for RFID Tags
- •Privacy Issues in RFID Systems
- •Our Privacy Model
- •Preliminaries
- •Notations
- •Probabilities and Negligible Functions
- •Classical Cryptography
- •Message Authentication Codes
- •Cryptographic Hash Functions
- •Universal Hash Functions
- •Pseudo-Random Functions
- •The Random Oracle Model
- •Proof Techniques
- •Hard Problems
- •The LPN Problem and the HB Family
- •The LPN Problem
- •Extensions of the LPN Problem
- •Security Models for the HB Family
- •The HB Protocol
- •The GRS Attack
- •Attempts to Thwart the GRS Attack
- •Description
- •Proposed Parameter Sets
- •Asymptotic Complexity Analysis
- •Optimizing the Attack
- •Thwarting the Attack: the Case of Vectors without False Rejections
- •Perspectives
- •SQUASH
- •Description
- •Handling Window Truncation
- •Handling the Truncation of the Combinaison of Many Integers
- •Generalization
- •Conclusion
- •Privacy Failures in RFID Protocols
- •ProbIP and the SAT Problem
- •Violation of Anonymous Privacy
- •Future Development
- •MARP
- •Description
- •Auth2
- •Description
- •YA-TRAP+
- •O-TRAP
- •A Backward and Forward Untraceable Protocol
- •Tracing O-FRAP
- •Violating the Forward Privacy of O-FRAP
- •Conclusion
- •Privacy Models for RFID
- •The ADO Model
- •Description
- •RFID System
- •Correctness
- •Privacy
- •From Narrow Privacy to Privacy
- •Narrow-Strong and Forward Privacy Using Public-Key Encryption
- •Achieving Strong Privacy
- •Our Proposal: Incorporate the Blinder into the Adversary
- •Sampling Algorithms and the ISH Hypothesis
- •Plaintext-Awareness
- •Instances of Plaintext-Aware Encryption Schemes
- •From PA+ to PA++ Plaintext-Awareness
- •Privacy
- •Security Proof
- •Correctness
- •Security
- •The Case of Mutual Authentication
- •RFID System with Mutual Authentication
- •Correctness
- •Privacy
- •Correctness and Security for the Reader
- •Security for the Tags
- •Strong Privacy with Mutual Authentication
- •Strong Privacy
- •Conclusion
- •The Security of RFID Primitives
- •Our Contributions
- •Further Work
- •Our Contributions
- •Further Work
- •Final Notes
- •List of Figures
- •List of Tables
- •List of Definitions
- •Bibliography
- •Curriculum Vitæ

3
THE LPN PROBLEM AND THE HB FAMILY
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e LPN Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
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De nition of the Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
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e Average Hardness of the LPN Problem . . . . . . . . . . |
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Extensions of the LPN Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
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Security Models for the HB Family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
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e HB Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
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. HB+ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
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e GRS Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
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Attempts to wart the GRS Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
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HB++ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
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HB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
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PUF-HB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . |
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