- •Abstract
- •Resumé
- •Contents
- •Remerciements
- •Personal Bibliography
- •Introduction
- •The Need for Dedicated Cryptographic Primitives for RFID Tags
- •Privacy Issues in RFID Systems
- •Our Privacy Model
- •Preliminaries
- •Notations
- •Probabilities and Negligible Functions
- •Classical Cryptography
- •Message Authentication Codes
- •Cryptographic Hash Functions
- •Universal Hash Functions
- •Pseudo-Random Functions
- •The Random Oracle Model
- •Proof Techniques
- •Hard Problems
- •The LPN Problem and the HB Family
- •The LPN Problem
- •Extensions of the LPN Problem
- •Security Models for the HB Family
- •The HB Protocol
- •The GRS Attack
- •Attempts to Thwart the GRS Attack
- •Description
- •Proposed Parameter Sets
- •Asymptotic Complexity Analysis
- •Optimizing the Attack
- •Thwarting the Attack: the Case of Vectors without False Rejections
- •Perspectives
- •SQUASH
- •Description
- •Handling Window Truncation
- •Handling the Truncation of the Combinaison of Many Integers
- •Generalization
- •Conclusion
- •Privacy Failures in RFID Protocols
- •ProbIP and the SAT Problem
- •Violation of Anonymous Privacy
- •Future Development
- •MARP
- •Description
- •Auth2
- •Description
- •YA-TRAP+
- •O-TRAP
- •A Backward and Forward Untraceable Protocol
- •Tracing O-FRAP
- •Violating the Forward Privacy of O-FRAP
- •Conclusion
- •Privacy Models for RFID
- •The ADO Model
- •Description
- •RFID System
- •Correctness
- •Privacy
- •From Narrow Privacy to Privacy
- •Narrow-Strong and Forward Privacy Using Public-Key Encryption
- •Achieving Strong Privacy
- •Our Proposal: Incorporate the Blinder into the Adversary
- •Sampling Algorithms and the ISH Hypothesis
- •Plaintext-Awareness
- •Instances of Plaintext-Aware Encryption Schemes
- •From PA+ to PA++ Plaintext-Awareness
- •Privacy
- •Security Proof
- •Correctness
- •Security
- •The Case of Mutual Authentication
- •RFID System with Mutual Authentication
- •Correctness
- •Privacy
- •Correctness and Security for the Reader
- •Security for the Tags
- •Strong Privacy with Mutual Authentication
- •Strong Privacy
- •Conclusion
- •The Security of RFID Primitives
- •Our Contributions
- •Further Work
- •Our Contributions
- •Further Work
- •Final Notes
- •List of Figures
- •List of Tables
- •List of Definitions
- •Bibliography
- •Curriculum Vitæ
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2.5 Hybrid Encryption |
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Public-key encryption has contributed to the simpli |
cation of key management, reducing the |
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number of keys in a network of n users from n(n |
1) to n. Despite that, the price to pay |
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for this simpli cation is that encrypting with a public-key scheme is much slower than doing so with a symmetric encryption scheme. Another limitation of public-key encryption relates to the xed length of plaintexts: While it is possible to encrypt arbitrary long message using modes of operations, there is no generic way to extend the message space of a public-key encryption scheme.
erefore, to combine the advantages of both types of encryptions, a dual mechanism of key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) coupled with a data encapsulation mechanism (DEM) was proposed. Simply put, this system works by having a random symmetric key encrypted in a ciphertext which is used in a symmetric scheme to encrypt the data to send. More explicitly, we give the following de nition.
De nition . ( e KEM/DEM Paradigm of Hybrid Encryption)
A KEM consists of the following algorithms
KeyGen(1 ) ! (sk; pk): is rst probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm generates the pair of keys.
KEM:Encpk() ! (K; C): Taking no input, this algorithm produces a symmetric key K for the DEM de ned below and outputs its corresponding ciphertext C.
KEM:Decsk(C) ! K: Via this algorithm the receiver makes use of his secret key sk to reco er the symmetric key K.
A DEM is then de ned as for a symmetric encryption scheme without key generation.
DEM:Enc(K; m) ! c: Using this algorithm, the sender encrypts the message m.
DEM:Dec(K:c) ! m: By this algorithm, the receiver decrypts c and gets the underlying
ciphertext m.
From a very high level, a KEM/DEM can be seen as a public-key encryption scheme. Since they mimic public-key and symmetric-key encryption schemes, it is rather easy to de ne similar security properties for KEMs and DEMs.
2.6The Random Oracle Model
e Random Oracle (RO) model consists of replacing hash functions by black-box oracles that produces uniformly distributed outputs [BR ]. e RO model has been useful in proving the security of many schemes with fairly simpler design than comprable ones with security proofs in the standard model. ere is however a separation between the two as Canetti,
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