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Файл:Dialogical self theory and mediation. Toward a self-narrative model of conflict resolution
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face interaction (e.g. Nothdurft, 1995a), the latter do not deny the importance of settling
dispute. Another critical point comes from Menkel-Meadow (1995), where she states
that Bush and Folger tend to neglect the cultural specific context of mediation:
“... mediation is deeply contextual and, when situated in different environments and institutions,
it will perform different social tasks. Bush and Folger attempt a meta- level explanation for mediation
that simply will not work. Transformative mediation is a concept that is both vague and, at the same
time, presumptuous; it is insensitive to social conditions and - dare I say? - too ethnocentric to reach all
mediations” (Menkel-Meadow, 1995: 236, cited from Sinclair, 2007 : 450).
One could also argue that there is nothing conceptually new about the
transformative mediation. Alone the understanding of the necessity of perspective
taking of the other in social science has existed long before it was presented in the
transformative mediation. Although Bush and Folger nowhere in their monograph
explicitly refer to it, the very same concept was known to be introduced by George
Herbert Mead (1934) (cf. Busch, 2007: 135). For Mead taking the role of the other
(perspective taking) is an important precondition for inter-personal understanding in
everyday interaction. Similarly, for Bush and Folger a reciprocal perspective-taking is a
precondition for mutual recognition shifts in mediation. Bush and Folger just seem to
have applied the well-known concept to the triadic form of conflict handling.
Despite the critical failure, the transformative theory authentically aspires to
adhere to the ideals of mediation set at the dawn of the ADR movement, answering
requirements of mediator's impartiality and neutrality or, at least, indirectness. Whatever
stance to Transformative Mediation presented by Bush and Folger one might take, they
introduced a new compelling view of mediation to the discourse. They for sure „shook
up the status quo“, in the words of Gaynier (2005), and challenged the commonly
accepted view of mediation.
2.3. Motivation for further theoretical and practical enhancement
of mediation
Let us briefly summarize the basic moments of historical review. The current
version of mediation's timeline (on the basis of available materials) showed that
institutional development of mediation began from the ADR movement. The ADR
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includes not only mediation, but also negotiation, arbitration, family law and
1
1
conciliation1. All of these types have always been bound to law and law studies. For
many years, mediation and other types of ADR served the purpose of resolving disputes
amicably and mutually short of litigation, „in the shadow of law“. By all means,
mediation has been perceived as aiming at serving practical goals. In 80's scholars of
Harvard University invented method of principled negotiation aimed at integrative
problem-solving. A few years later Folberg and Taylor presented seven stage mediation
for practitioners based on the Harvard negotiation model. From around that time,
scholars undertook empirical studies, among them the most often quoted Silbey and
Merry's article
published in Law & Policy about mediator's settlement strategies.
Whereas in Germany staff of scholars studied mediation talks by means of
conversational analysis. Their empirical observations allowed to define main features of
mediation as a communicative event. In 90's Bush and Folger challenged the status quo
of the problem-solving mediation by having introduced a highly controversial
transformative approach to mediation.
So far, general debates over mediation include whether the goal of mediation
lies in resolving specific issues or empowering humans' potential for conflict
transformation. As has been articulated, mediation is very much practical event. So,
the question is if it does need an all-encompassing theory. Bush and Folger made an
attempt to present theory of mediation as conflict transformation. The former chapter
describes both the theory and practice of transformative approach. Some aspects of
this theory have been critically examined by many scholars and practitioners, and
many conclude that the best stance to it that mediators basically apply those concepts
of empowerment and recognition i n their practice, though they have been known to be
used in problem-solving mediation practices in one way or the other even without
prior articulation by Bush and Folger, some say, and leave out the „theoretical crap“
about human moral potential for social connection. Some rather suggest that in its
theoretical underpinnings the transformative mediation would earn more, if it leaned, for
instance, on more credible Gestalt Theory (Perls et al., 1951) (Gaynier, 2005).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alternative_dispute_resolution
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Transformative Mediation indeed provoked a hot controversy over itself. On the
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other hand, it gave a valuable impetus for further transformation of mediation. Among
recent models of mediation that did not appear on the timeline of mediation emerged the
so-called Narrative Mediation (Winslade/Monk, 2000). Although the work has been
published more or less recently, the forefathers of the narrative approach to mediation
Michael White and David Epston had been working in the tradition of Narrative Family
Therapy (Australia) since mid 80's (Hansen, 2003). The Narrative Mediation based upon
a postmodern social constructionist theory conceives conflict as emerging from cultural
contexts that have a direct impact on how disputing parties build on their perceptions
of a particular event2. That is, conflict gains its meaning in narration. The story-telling
metaphor is thus central to narrative mediation. Accordingly, in order to resolve conflict
a narrative mediator helps parties to deconstruct the „conflict saturated story“ and
construct an alternative story.
It is obvious, that the most recent theories of mediation either transformative, or
narrative, are nourishing from the borrowings from the fields of communication studies,
social and cultural studies, psychology, and even psychotherapy, if you want, moving
model of mediation away from its original rational methods of integrative problemsolving. So in case of dialogical self theory, the natural desire to test this theory for the
benefit of conflict-resolution is understandable. The following chapter presents the
theory and practice of dialogical self.
http://narrative-mediation.crinfo.org/
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3. Dialogical Self: Theory and Practice
3.1. Summary of dialogical self theory
The first inception of the notion dialogical self dates back to early last decade
of the last century (Hermans, Kempen, van Loon, 1992). Prior to that author of the
dialogical self Dutch personality psychologist Hubert J. M. Hermans worked on
Valuation Theory (Hermans, 1987) which served as a foundation for the inception of
dialogical self. Later on, Hermans with his ex-wife therapist Hermans-Jansen (1995)
elaborated on Valuation Theory and presented the Self-Confrontation Method (SCM) for
the assessment of personal valuations in their book „Self-Narratives“. For over two
decades the notion of dialogical self has been studied, particularly in counseling and
psychotherapy (e.g. Hermans/Dimaggio, 2004). The most recent book (2010) that
Hermans wrote with his present wife Hermans-Konopka is about dialogical self in the
context of globalization. Apart from clearly defined basic concepts of dialogical self
theory, the book rather offers an eclectic compilation of views and examples on topics
related to dialogicality (Kuusela, 2011). In the Dialogical Self Theory
(Hermans/Hermans-Konopka, 2010) the self is conceived as a dialogical entity that
emanates from social, societal and historical processes, and that transcends the
dichotomy between individual and society. The main purpose of their study is to analyze
the formation of self and identity in the course of globalization. Inspired by pragmatist
tradition, Hermans and Hermans-Konopka also set the task to present practical
implications for organizations, motivation and conflict-resolution. The aim of the
current chapter is merely to present core concepts, historical development and main
tenets of dialogical self theory (DST). There is no critical or in-depth inspection of the
theory expected.
Emerged at the intersection of diverse psychological and philosophical theories,
research traditions and practices, DST positions itself as a “ bridging theory”. Inspired
by American pragmatists William James (1890) and George Herbert Mead (1934) and
European philosophers and literary scholars Martin Buber (1970) and Mikhail
Bakhtin ([1929] 1973), authors of the current theory bring two on the internal- external
axis controversial concepts of self and dialogue together. Generally, the self is
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considered as a reflexive concept that deals with the question of internal organization
within the person, whereas the dialogue usually takes place in the external environment,
i.e. between person and other. The dialogical self theory however proposes that the self
does not exist separately from society, but is part of society. The self becomes thus a
“mini-society” or “society of mind”, term borrowed form Minsky (1985). Changes and
developments in the self provoke changes and developments in society and vice versa.
Self and society are thus mutually inclusive (cf. Hermans, 2001a).
Dialogical self theory originates from two different traditions – American
pragmatism and Russian dialogism. Taking best from each school, it proposes the
conclusion that there can be no clear distinction between self and other, and that by its
very nature, the self has ability to encompass others in itself as well as to extend itself
to others. As such, self may enter into the dialogical relationships with perceived,
extended and actual others. In the following there will be presented some concise
insights on origins of the dialogical self from some of its historical forerunners:
William James vs. Cartesian Self and Other
According to Rosenberg (1979), James introduced a classic in the psychology
of the self basic distinction between I and me, where I corresponds with I-as- knower or
the self-as-subject, while me is equalized with I-as-known or the self- as-object. James
was also well aware of the gradual transitions between me and mine. The me is
composed of all that the person can call his or her own (not only his body or psychic
powers, but also his family, friends, home, work and reputation etc). People and things in
the environment belong to the self, as long as they are felt like mine. Thus, the self is
„extended“ to the environment. The Cartesian self (René Descartes) on the contrast is
built on a dualistic conception between the self and the other, also self and body. In the
extended self, the transition between the self and non-self is gradual (cf.
Hermans/Gieser, 2012: 3).
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George Herbert Mead: Generalized other
DST assumes that dialogue is innovative. This is due to Mead's (1934)
observations that the selves are not only representatives of the society who tend to
conform to existing institutional structures, but are also able to create and innovate them.
Both James and Mead agree on the „agentic“ qualities of the self. Mead sees an
innovative potential of the I, while James speaks for its capacity to appropriate and to
reject. Me according to Mead is a place for social conventions and rules of the
generalized other. One of his famous examples unconventional artists who are not
complete outsiders for they can accept rules of expression, but at the same time they are
innovative. However, Mead went further than James by introducing such influential
concepts as „generalized other“ and „taking the role of the other“. The generalized other
is necessary for a society that is in need of social rules that are shared and understood by
all the participants of a societal game. It was argued however that his theory is based
on the metaphor of the homogeneous society, with the emphasis on micro-social and
game-like processes. In a modern globalized wo rld there are many different generalized
others that interact with each other. As such, they can be imagined as „collective
voices“ that meet and are articulated by one and the same individual, due to different
cultural-social backgrounds (cf. Hermans/Gieser, 2012: 3-6).
Mikhail Bakhtin: polyphonic novel and dialogue
The metaphor of the „polyphonic novel“ is presented by Mikhail Bakhtin in his
book „Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics“. After the extensive research on the
Dostoevsky's work he suggested that there is a plurality of consciousness within one and
the same personality. This multiplicity of voices accompany and oppose one another in
dialogical ways like for instance in canon or fugue (musical pieces) (cf. Hermans/Gieser,
2012: 6-7).
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Martin Buber: I-thou relationship
Whereas James approached the other on the object level, Buber was well aware of
the other as subject and the other as object. In his view, I manifests itself in two different
ways: I as part of I-you relationship, that is subject-subject relationships; and I as part of
I-it relationships, that is subject-object relationships. The I is not single in itself, but is
rather part of the word-pair I- you and I-it. Only in I-you relationship there is an
encounter, where the you as the other is addressed as an independent other. I as part of I-
it relationships is objectifying, rather than dialogical. The term it proposes the act of
observation. Bakhtin and Buber agree that one should address and treat the other on the
subjective level (I-thou relationship). To consider the other as an extended self on the
subject level is crucially important for DST. In this regard, the other can be in the self
and can be addressed as an I-position as part of an extended self (cf. Hermans/Gieser,
2012: 7-8).
Dialogical self
Fundamental to DST is the proposition that the self has extension in space and
time through processes of positioning, repositioning and counter-positioning. Along
with James (1890) and Rosenberg (1979) Hermans and Hermans-Konopka assume that
the self is extended in space and time. From the spatial perspective the self is extended
on local and global nexus. Just as Robertson (1995) suggested the composite term
Glokalization to articulate the mutual interconnectedness of global and local, authors
of DST argue that processes of globalization and localization are reflected in the
“society of mind”, meaning that self and society are interconnected. From this
perspective the self can extend itself within the globalized space like never before.
With the globalization the boundaries of one's own local culture vanish, and the self is
now being extended. Different cultures meet each other in one and the same individual.
Localization appears as a counter-force to globalization. People are now more aware of
their own specific culture and want to preserve it from globalization. The argument is
that in the mini-society different global and local positions occur in response of the self
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to the ever globalizing world that can lead either to identity confusion or the higher level
of integration (cf. Hermans/Hermans-Konopka, 2010: 2-
3). These global and local connections require a dialogical conception of self and
identity. Living on the intersections of cultures, there is an increasing contact between
different cultural groups, but also a growing contact between different cultures within
one and the same individual. In order to deal with one's own differences, tensions,
uncertainty, heterogeneity, one is in need to develop dialogical capacities
(Cooper/Hermans, 2007).
From the temporal perspective, the self is conceived as emerging from personal
and collective history. Three models of self and identity, associated with different
historical phases are: traditional, modern and post-modern. Each model has its own
assets and disadvantages.
• The traditional self is characterized by the distinction between lower and
imperfect life on earth and higher and perfect existence after-world; body and senses as
hindrance to a spiritual life; moral telos; dogmatic truths; connection with the natural
environment.
• The modern self is portrayed in terms of autonomy; individualism; development
of reason; pretension to the universal truth; strict division between the self and the other;
control of the external environment; separation of value and fact, science and faith,
politics and religion, theory from practice.
• The post-modern self proclaims importance of difference, otherness, local
knowledge and fragmentation; dissolution of symbolic hierarchies; decentralization of
the subject, tendencies towards a consumer culture etc.
These historical developments of the self are not successive, but rather
simultaneous, meaning that the next part is starting when the first part continues. The
evidence of this can be depicted in the example of simultaneous coexistence of reason
and belief in the contemporary self (cf. Hermans/Hermans-Konopka, 2010: 4-5).
The dialogical self, as the distinct model of the self, takes into account both pros
and cons of the previous three models of self and even goes beyond them, emphasizing a
learning process. As a learning process, the dialogical self has the capacity to move
itself to a higher level of awareness and integration through a dialogue. The question
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under consideration is not whether a person is dialogical or not, but when and under
which conditions is dialogue possible and can it be fostered. In order to clarify what
really constitutes dialogical self, one should draw a clear line between dialogical self and
terms that are often confused with dialogical self: inner speech or egocentric speech. The
dialogical self is different from inner speech in at least four ways:
it is multi-voiced and is engaged in interchanges between voices from
different social and cultural origins;
voices are not only “private” but also “collective”, and as such they talk
through the mouth of the individual speaker;
the other is not outside the self, but included in the self; the other is an
intrinsic part of the self that is extended to its social environment;
the self is not only verbal but also nonverbal: e.g. child's ability to enter
the dialogue before he/she is able to verbalize or use any language (cf.
Hermans/Hermans-Konopka, 2010: 7).
Positioning theory as central to DST
In its very concise explanation, dialogical self can be imagined as a dynamic
multiplicity of I-Positions. I emerges from its intrinsic contact with the social
environment and is bound in space and time. I is able to move from one position to the
other according to the changes in situation and time. These positions, among which I
vacillates, can be both within the self, and between self and perceived, remembered
and imagined others and can be involved in relationships of relative dominance and
social power. These positions can be voiced so that the dialogical exchange between
them can occur. The voices interact with each other, involved in processes of question
and answer, agreement and disagreement, conflicts and struggles, negotiations and
integrations. Each of the voices has its own story to tell, and as such, they create a
complex, narratively structured self (cf. Hermans/Gieser, 2012: 2-3).
Like in the micro-social environment social dominance and power are central to
dialogical self, as well. There are many ways in which parties can dominate or control
between the participants in social exchange. In turn-taking (reciprocal process)
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participants continually alternate their roles as „power holders“. By initiating moves in
conversation, one can determine the context (interactional dominance). When one talks a
lot he/she prevents other parties from taking a turn (amount of talk). Or when one
predominantly introduces and maintains topics and perspective on topics (topic
dominance). Or one might speak not so much, but can introduce a few but really
important things that strongly influence the further development of the conversation
(strategic dominance). The process of turn-taking is only possible by allowing parties
to be temporarily dominant in the course of exchange.
Social powers matter in the process of question and answer and relationships of
agreement and disagreement between participants in interaction. Thus, minimal social
power difference enable them to relatively free interact with each other by asking
questions at any time in the exchange. The dialogical process is then reciprocal. On the
contrast, in a legal interrogation questions and answers are highly asymmetrical. There
can be no free interchange due to determined institutional context. In this regard, the
relationships of agreement and disagreement are also constrained by the social power
differences. To conclude is that both question and answer and agreement and
disagreement are not automatically forms of dialogue in which parties can express and
further develop their positions. Power differences structure and constrain the process and
the content of dialogical relationships (Hermans/Gieser, 2012: 9-11).
I-position
The notion of I-position recognizes the multiplicity of the self, preserving at the
same time its unity and coherence. The I is constantly involved in the process of
positioning responding to changes in space and time (decentring movements). At the
same time, I appropriates or owns some of positions and disowns or rejects some of
them (centring movements). Appropriated I-positions are perceived as “mine” or as
“belonging to myself”, contributing to the more coherence and continuity of the self.
Different I-positions are building dialogical relationships in “dialogical spaces” both
within the selves and between the selves. I-positions structure and constrain such
relationships (Hermans/Gieser, 2012: 14-15). The notion of I-positions actually relates
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