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SWEDEN

maintain the level of safety and to ensure that older facilities, as much as possible, can achieve a comparable level of safety as new nuclear facilities.

As part of the PSR, the licensee shall pay particular attention to:

•the circumstances under which the activities are carried out;

•how equipment and facilities are affected by operation and ageing;

•experiences from operations and similar activities; and

•developments in science and technology.

When reviewing and assessing a PSR prior to a reactor entering the stage of continued operation, the SSM particularly focuses on issues related to organisation, competence and staffing, as well as ageing management and TLAAs.

At the end of its PSR, the licensee shall submit to the SSM a report, which shall include all the documents and information equivalent to that of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (2013), Periodic Safety Review for Nuclear Power Plants, IAEA Safety Standard, Specific Safety Guide No. SSG-25, IAEA, Vienna, and incorporate the TLAAs at least equivalent to the specifications of the IAEA (2015), Ageing Management for Nuclear Power Plants: International Generic Ageing Lessons Learned (IGALL), Safety Report No. 82, IAEA, Vienna.

After completing its review of the PSR report provided by the licensee, the SSM issues an in-depth review report, which includes conclusions on safety and radiological protection, as well as measures required to be taken to ensure that safety and radiological protection are maintained and improved until the next PSR. The SSM may order the licensee to implement such improvements within a certain time.

The SSM has a strong mandate as a regulatory authority. According to the Nuclear Activities Act, the SSM may, when granting a licence or during the term of validity of a licence, decide that certain conditions are necessary for safety. The SSM may also decide additional measures are necessary and issue orders and prohibitions to the licensee to ensure that the Act, or regulations or conditions issued under the Act, are observed.

Normally, new safety requirements are implemented through a regular process including reviewing or revising existing SSM regulations or issuing new SSM regulations. Thus, during special circumstances, the SSM may consider it more effective to impose licence conditions or issue an order. An example of new safety requirements by licence conditions is the requirement of independent core cooling for nuclear reactors.

SWEDEN

Figure 3.4. PSR and LTO-review process in Sweden

Source: Ministry of the Environment.

Environmental

In accordance with the Swedish legal framework, the PSR process does not include an assessment of environmental impacts for the concerned nuclear power reactor. The environmental impacts are reviewed during the initial licensing process, and the licensee is required to ensure during operation that such environmental impacts do not exceed the initially agreed limits, under the monitoring of the relevant public authorities. A reassessment of the environmental impacts would, however, be required in case of modifications to the nuclear power reactor requiring an amendment to the initial licence or a new licence. This has, for example, been relevant when a licensee has applied for permission to increase the thermal effect at a nuclear power reactor.

In addition, the operation of a nuclear power reactor requires an environmental permit, granted under the Environmental Code. This permit may be reviewed by the relevant public authorities, namely the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency; the Legal, Financial and Administrative Services Agency; the County Administrative Boards; the Swedish Civil

SWEDEN

Contingency Agency; and the Swedish Agency for Marine and Water Management. Such revisions would require a reassessment of the environmental impacts of the concerned nuclear power reactor, for example if its operation causes any significant damage that was not anticipated when the permit was granted or if a significant improvement to human health or the environment can be achieved by the use of a new process or treatment technology to improve the safety of a structure. The reviews of environmental permits are, however, not directly linked to PSRs or to the continued operation of a nuclear power reactor.

New safety requirements

As previously mentioned, the SSM may decide to impose new safety requirements following its review of the PSR report provided by the licensee. In general, the SSM may impose new safety requirements at any time outside of the PSR process if necessary, within its role of regulatory authority.

Transboundary notification

The PSR process does not include any legal requirement for transboundary notification and consultation.

Public participation

There is no legal duty for either the SSM or the licensee to solicit public participation during the PSR process leading to the continued operation of a nuclear power reactor.

Access to information

The legal framework in Sweden establishes a general duty for the SSM to provide information to the public, as part of the principle of public access (open government), which is enshrined in Chapter 2-3 of the Freedom of the Press Act (1949:105). The Freedom of the Press Act is included in the Swedish Constitution. This principle entitles the general public to access all official documents submitted to, or drawn up by, public authorities, including the SSM, such as letters, decisions and inquiries. Information may only be withheld by public authorities if classified as confidential under the Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act (2009:400). This legal duty does not, however, extend to the licensee.

In addition, members of the public may access specific information regarding nuclear safety through the Local Liaison Safety Committees, which are established in every region where an NPP is located.

Legal challenges

As previously explained, there is no specific authorisation granted by the SSM for the continued operation of a nuclear power reactor, given the indefinite term of initial operation licences. Therefore, there is no decision to authorise the continued operation that could be subject to a legal challenge.

However, the SSM may decide to issue new specific safety requirements to the licensee following a PSR, if the review concludes that nuclear safety and/or radiological protection at the concerned nuclear power reactor require improvements. The SSM’s decision to impose new safety requirements can be subject to a legal challenge. Appeals against decisions made by the SSM with a mandate in the Act on Nuclear Activities are made to the government.

SWITZERLAND

In particular, LTO requirements are laid down by:

•the Nuclear Energy Act, Article 22(2)(e);

•the Nuclear Energy Ordinance, Articles 34 and 34a; and

•ENSI-A03 (Guideline for Swiss Nuclear Installations), Periodic Safety Review for Nuclear Power Plants.

Responsible government bodies

The body responsible for reviewing the PSR, to which the review for LTO belongs, is the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (Eidgenössisches Nuklearsicherheitsinspektorat – ENSI), the national nuclear regulatory body. As previously explained, ENSI does not issue any specific authorisation for LTO.

Application and review timing

Swiss nuclear power reactors operate with unlimited licences. In accordance with the Nuclear Energy Ordinance, Article 34, the holder of an operating licence for a nuclear power reactor must carry out a comprehensive PSR every ten years. The documents related to the PSR have to be submitted to ENSI at least two years at the latest before the end of any operating decade. For the period following the fourth operating decade, proof of safety for LTO must also be submitted as part of the PSR (Article 34a of the Nuclear Energy Ordinance).

There is no specific due date for ENSI’s review of the LTO documentation. It might be that the LTO review takes longer than the PSR, but also that the LTO review is finished faster than the PSR. In practice, the LTO review as part of the PSR for the Beznau I and II nuclear power reactors was completed in November 2010, 1 year past 40 years of operation for Beznau I and 2 years prior to 40 years of operation for Beznau II. The LTO review for the Mühleberg NPP was completed in December 2012, 1 month after 40 years of operation.

Scope of review

Safety

The scope of the safety-related LTO review includes:

•proof that the design-limits for the parts of the plant technically of safety relevance will not be reached during the planned period of operation;

•backfitting and technical or organisational improvements planned for the upcoming operating decade;

•measures intended to guarantee sufficient numbers of staff with the required expertise for the planned period of operation.

The main documents provided by the applicant to justify LTO in Switzerland are contained in the PSR documentation, including the additional required proofs of safety specifically relevant to LTO (see the above-mentioned Guideline ENSI-A03).

Environmental

There is no specific environmental assessment as part of the LTO-related aspects of the PSR. As such, there is no specific documentation related to an environmental review as part of the PSR for nuclear power reactors.

SWITZERLAND

right to request and obtain a decision. For persons living within a 20 km radius around the nuclear power reactor, i.e. “zone 2” under the aforementioned Ordinance, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court has left the question open as to whether the sole geographical component is sufficient to demonstrate a current interest worthy of protection.

The subject of the challenge is either the authorisation for operation of the nuclear power reactor, or any amendment to such authorisation, which is granted by the Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications (Le Département fédéral de l’environnement, des transports, de l’énergie et de la communication – DETEC), or any permit delivered by ENSI. As a general rule, DETEC has competence for issuing construction and operation licences, as well as for authorising significant amendments to the initial licence. In the event of amendments that do not deviate significantly from the initial licence, but which may have an influence on nuclear safety or security, the holder is required to obtain a permit from ENSI. A plaintiff may request from either DETEC or ENSI that it refrain from, discontinue or revoke unlawful acts, rectify the consequences of unlawful acts or confirm the illegality of such acts.

The legal basis for challenging an authorisation issued by DETEC is provided by Article 67(1) of the Nuclear Energy Act, pursuant to which the licensing authority shall withdraw a licence if either the prerequisites for granting it are no longer met or if the licence holder fails to comply with a ruling or ordered measure despite having been reminded to do so. The conditions governing the granting of an operating licence are mentioned in Article 20(1) of the Nuclear Energy Act. The legal basis for challenging a permit issued by ENSI is laid down by Article 72(2) of the Nuclear Energy Act, according to which ENSI shall order all necessary and reasonable measures aimed at preserving nuclear safety and security.

Appeals to decisions issued by either DETEC or ENSI shall be lodged before the Swiss Federal Administrative Court, which acts within its competence as ordinary administrative jurisdiction. These decisions are challenged on the basis of Article 44 and 47(1)(b) of the Swiss Federal Act on Administrative Procedure, as well as Article 1, 31, and 32(1)(e) of the Federal Administrative Court Act of 17 June 2005 (FACA, SR 173.32).

The Federal Administrative Court rulings may in turn be appealed in front of the Supreme Court of Switzerland, which is the court of last resort. The legal basis for such appeal is provided for by Articles 82, 86 and 89 of the Federal Supreme Court Act of 17 June 2005 (FSCR; SR 173.110).

TURKEY

Legal challenges

Although there are no provisions yet in the licensing and regulatory system governing the authorisation of LTO, legal challenges to such an authorisation could, presumably, be allowed based on the general Administrative Jurisdiction Law.

In this instance, any real or legal person could raise a challenge. There could be a geographical component to establishing standing to challenge an authorisation based on the person’s residing or working near the plant, but no specific criteria are set.

The TAEA would be the subject party of the challenge. The authorisation decision would be the subject of the challenge. Challenges would have to be raised to the Administrative Court within 60 days of the decision. A decision by the Administrative Court could be appealed to the Regional Administrative Court, which is the court of final resort.