THE SO CIALIST COMMONWEALTH

ho chi minh

Comrade Ho Chi Minh has died. [He died on September 3, 1969.]1 This sad news was broadcast over the radio today. Of all the people I met during the time of my political activity, Ho Chi Minh especially impressed me. They say that at one time on this earth there lived the holy apostles. Ho Chi Minh was like one of those holy apostles. Only he was an apostle of the revolution. I first met him when Stalin was still alive. He flew to our country directly from the jungles, and Stalin had a conversation with him at which the rest of us were present. I won’t list everyone who was there, because I only wanted to tell about my impressions. There was a kind of sincerity and purity that lit up Ho’s face. It was the sincerity of an incorruptible Communist, one who was highly principled and devoted to his cause. He was truly a saintly man. Ho Chi Minh told us how he had made his way through the jungles and how many days he had traveled on foot until he reached the Chinese border, from which he made his way to the Soviet Union. Then he told about the struggle being waged under his leadership in Vietnam. During that part of the conversation, he looked at Stalin, and at all the Soviet leaders present there, with a special kind of expression in his eyes. I would say that in his gaze there was a certain childish naiveté. He won you over with his sincerity, honesty, and conviction of the rightness of the Communist cause. His every word underlined the fact that the Communists were class brothers and that consequently any conversation among Communists should be the most sincere

and honest possible.

Ho Chi Minh raised the question of our supplying the fighting Vietnamese with arms. He was grateful for anything he could get from the Soviet Union for the struggle that Vietnam was waging against the French occupation forces. I liked him very much. And so I felt deeply offended by the way Stalin characterized Ho after our conversation. We had no exchange of views on the subject, but I could see that the others felt as I did and didn’t agree with Stalin and his negative comments. He spoke scornfully about Ho Chi Minh and used all kinds of offensive and insulting terms. There was no feeling of sincerity in his remarks, and yet we wanted sincerity to be shown by Stalin as the leader of the world Communist movement, sincerity in relation to a Communist leader like Ho Chi Minh, who under the most difficult circumstances had been able to organize the Communist movement in his country, had raised up his people in rebellion, and for so many years had been waging a successful struggle to liberate his country. A reverential attitude could have

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been taken in the presence of this man. Gratitude could have been expressed to him for his selfless service to the Communist cause, to which he had devoted all his efforts and abilities.

During one of our talks Ho took a Soviet magazine out of his briefcase. As I recall, it was the magazine entitled SSSR na stroike (The USSR Under Construction), and he asked Stalin to write something on it for him. In France autograph hunting is widespread, and Ho [who had lived in France for a number of years] was not free of that vice. Of course he was tempted by the prospect of showing people Stalin’s autograph when he returned to Vietnam. I don’t know what happened. Probably there was a manifestation of Stalin’s same old illness—his suspiciousness and mistrustfulness. He later gave orders to the security police to find the magazine and confiscate it. Apparently he felt that he had shown a lack of caution when he signed his name on the cover of the magazine. No difficulties were encountered—they turned everything upside down and inside out at the place where Ho was staying and brought back the magazine. Then Stalin joked: “He’s going to reach for it, and the magazine won’t be there.” I don’t know whether Ho told anyone that the magazine had disappeared, but I imagined his feelings when he opened his suitcase and found that this magazine, so precious to him, was gone. You can imagine the poison that entered into the soul of such a sincere man as Comrade Ho.

During that visit the decision was made to recognize the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.2 Later Stalin often returned to this question and expressed regrets: “We were too hasty; we shouldn’t have recognized them. We gave them recognition too early.” This indicated that Stalin did not believe in the possibility of victory for the movement that Comrade Ho was leading in Vietnam. But the deed had been done, and there was no one Stalin could blame.

I remember another troubling incident. Ho very much wanted his visit to Moscow to be announced publicly. He spoke to Stalin about this. I wasn’t present on that occasion; I only heard about it from Stalin afterward. Stalin told us that Ho wanted to be received officially as a representative of Vietnam. “But I told him that the right moment had been missed. You’re already in Moscow. You came here unannounced, so how can we announce you now?”

To this Ho replied: “Let’s do it this way. Give me a plane, I’ll go up in the air, the appropriate preparations will be announced, and when I land a welcoming ceremony will be organized corresponding to my rank as chief of state.”

Stalin laughed and made fun of him. “Imagine what he wanted. He wanted that! Ha, ha!” No, Stalin didn’t believe in the possibility of victory for the guerrillas in Vietnam.

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Sometime after his departure Ho sent us an appeal in writing, asking that we send quinine because his people were suffering terribly from malaria. The production of quinine in our country had been organized on an industrial scale. In a fit of generosity Stalin said, “Send him half a ton.” Half a ton? And this was for people who had carpeted the earth with their bodies in the struggle against the foreign invader. We looked at one another and felt indignant. How could he not be ashamed to show such miserliness, such—we didn’t even know what to call it. Evidently Stalin didn’t understand what half a ton of quinine costs compared to what Ho was paying in the struggle for the common cause.

Subsequently I met with Comrade Ho many times. In talking about him I would like to record my reminiscences of our work together at the time of preparations for the Geneva Conference on Vietnam in 1954.3 In that period we had the very best relations with Vietnam and the same kind of relations with the Chinese Communist Party. At a preparatory conference in Moscow, China was represented by Zhou Enlai and Vietnam by President Ho Chi Minh and Prime Minister Phan Van Dong.4 We jointly worked out our position for the Geneva Conference and looked into the situation existing in Vietnam. The situation was very difficult and painful: The liberation movement was on the verge of collapse, and the guerrilla fighters needed an agreement with us so that the conquests that had been achieved by the Vietnamese people in the fight against the occupation forces could be preserved. Hanoi was in the hands of the French, and the guerrilla fighters could not aspire to retake it. Other cities and provinces were also controlled by the French. If you took a map, on which our demand number one would be reflected, North Vietnam would have been covered with numerous islands where the French occupation forces would remain in the event that our demands [at the Geneva Conference] were met in full.

After one of our sessions in Catherine’s Hall at the Kremlin,5 Zhou buttonholed me, drew me aside into a corner, and said: “Comrade Ho has told me that their situation is hopeless. If they don’t get a cease-fire in the near future, they won’t be able to hold out against the French forces. They have therefore decided to retreat to the Chinese border, so that China can move its troops in, as it did earlier in North Korea, and help the Vietnamese people drive the French out of Vietnam.” Then Zhou added that they [the Chinese] couldn’t do it, because in Korea they had lost a lot of people and that war had cost them dearly. They were in no position to become entangled in a new war and therefore could not agree to what Ho was asking. I then made a request to Comrade Zhou: “A very cruel struggle is being waged, the Vietnamese are

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fighting well, and the French are suffering heavy casualties. Therefore you shouldn’t tell Ho Chi Minh that you can’t give him aid if they retreat to the Chinese border under pressure from the French. Let it be a little white lie. Let the Vietnamese believe they will be helped. It will be an additional source of strength for the Vietnamese resistance, for the guerrilla fighters against the French occupation.” Zhou agreed not to tell Comrade Ho that China would refrain from entering the war against the French on Vietnamese territory.

Then a miracle happened. Just as the delegations were arriving in Geneva, the Vietnamese guerrilla forces won a major victory and took the French fortress of Dienbienphu [in May 1954].6 At the first session of the Geneva Conference, Mendès-France,7 who then headed the French government, proposed that the French forces in Vietnam would limit their presence to south of the 17th parallel. I must confess that when this news from Geneva was reported to us we gave a sigh of relief and pleasure; we had not expected this. It was the maximum we had aimed for. We gave our representatives in Geneva orders to demand that the demarcation line be moved farther south, to the 15th parallel, but we warned them that this was a bargaining position and that Mendès-France’s proposal would have to be accepted and in this way the gains made by the Vietnamese Communists would be consolidated. A treaty was signed to that effect.

Mendès-France should be given the credit due to him. He evaluated the situation soberly and correctly. The guerrilla fighters in Vietnam had their difficulties, but the French army there had no fewer difficulties. This proved to be a wise step, which put an end to the French war in Vietnam. The French pulled out of the war and evacuated their troops. Everything would have been fine if the Geneva agreements had been carried out. Within two years there were supposed to be elections throughout Vietnam, and we had no doubt that Ho Chi Minh, that is, the Communists and all the progressive forces in the country, would win a victory in that election. But here again the ominous figure of John Foster Dulles made its appearance, and the United States imposed a new, long, and bloody war on Vietnam, which continues to this day [1969].8 I will not talk about that now because it is all dealt with in the press. This history is well known to political people. However, in connection with the news of the death of this genuine Communist and prominent figure in the international Communist movement, Comrade Ho Chi Minh, a loss that is painful to me, I would like to tell about the complicated and difficult position of Vietnam in connection with our conflict with China.

I remember when the conference of Communist and Workers’ parties in Moscow was being held in [November] 1960, China was represented by Liu

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Shaoqi.9 The Chinese spoke out against us. Enver Hoxha of Albania conducted himself especially rabidly as an agent of Mao. After his speech the Spanish Communist Comrade Dolores Ibarruri10 took the floor and responded to Hoxha with indignation. She compared him to a dog biting the hand that feeds it. At the culminating stage of the conference, a joint document was drafted, and the process of consulting and working out agreement on particular points was under way. The Chinese refused to sign the final declaration. Everything had been agreed to, but on one particular point the Chinese became obstinate, and it was a point on which we could not make concessions to them either, because it was a matter of principle.11 Ho came over to me then and said: “Comrade Khrushchev, you ought to concede the point to them.”

I said: “How can we concede? Why, it’s a matter of principle!”

Ho said: “Comrade Khrushchev, China is a huge country; they have a huge Communist Party. The concession should be made to them. A split cannot be permitted. It’s necessary that the Chinese sign the document together with everyone else. This document will have great international significance.”

I said: “Comrade Ho Chi Minh, our delegation and our party have devoted every effort to preserve unity in the Communist movement and to evaluate correctly the significance of the Chinese Communist Party. We have done everything we could so that China could remain together with the other fraternal Communist parties. But you must grasp the fact that on questions of principle we cannot agree with the position held by the Chinese. It is in contradiction with the Communist worldview. And if one is to refer to the fact that China is a huge country and the CCP is a huge party, it can be said that we, too, are not a small country and we don’t have just a small Communist Party. Besides, all the Communist parties are equal and should enjoy equal rights and equal opportunities. Our aspirations should be subordinated to a single goal, the victory of the Communist movement.”

He agreed with this argument, but he said: “For us this is doubly difficult. After all, we are neighbors of the Chinese.” After talking with me he apparently went over to the Chinese. After prolonged negotiations between our representatives and the Chinese, we finally found a common formula, and China agreed to sign the document.

I felt very bitter later when the Chinese decided to make an open break with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal parties. China has powerful influence in Vietnam. A large stratum of the population there is Chinese.12 Pro-Chinese people even hold key positions in the leadership of the Vietnamese Communist Party. They have carried on their work against the Soviet Union and against our policies at the same time that we were doing

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everything we could to help Vietnam. The pro-Chinese elements in Vietnam have done everything they could to start a quarrel, to turn Vietnam away from the Soviet Union, and to set our two parties fighting against each other.

After Beijing broke off all political and business relations with us, de facto, and did everything in its power against us, it began trying to impose its views on Vietnam. Unfortunately the Vietnamese Workers Party took the Chinese bait. This is very bitter for us. We sincerely wanted nothing for ourselves when we gave aid to Vietnam. But then, later on, Vietnam did everything to favor China against us, against its own interests. Why am I now recalling these bitter pills of the past? One may draw the conclusion from reports in the press (and I have no other sources of information) that everything is going along well. Delegations representing the Vietnamese people and the Vietnamese Workers Party come to our country, and delegations of our journalists travel to Vietnam and write about the battle of the Vietnamese people, showing scenes of their heroic struggle on television and in the movies. But some unofficial information that has reached me indicates that in fact not everything is going so smoothly, contrary to the promotional material in the press and on the radio and television.

It is said that the Vietnamese display an unjustifiably reserved attitude toward Soviet citizens. And this in spite of the fact, recognized by the entire world press, and even by the enemies of Communism, that Vietnam is able to put up its resistance against the Americans mainly because it relies on aid from the Soviet Union. It follows from this that in Vietnam and in the Vietnamese Workers Party, in its leadership and in the government, there still exist pro-Chinese forces. Outwardly friendly relations and mutual understanding between us are developing smoothly. But isn’t this perhaps a necessary tribute that the Vietnamese leadership is paying, perhaps even on the advice of China, so as not to be deprived of aid from the Soviet Union?

I admit that this is possible, although I would like it not to be so. I would like to believe something different, but I don’t think China is going to let Vietnam out of its claws, and the pro-Chinese forces there have always been very strong. When I held a position in the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party and government, it was said that the main supporter of China was Le Duan,13 the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Workers Party. Reports that we received both from our ambassador and from people who traveled to Vietnam allowed us to draw the conclusion that Ho Chi Minh had been removed from the leadership de facto on the grounds that he was too old [although officially he was still the leader of the country]. He was accused of nourishing a special attitude toward the Soviet Union, of

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not being capable of realistically analyzing the situation that had now developed, and of underestimating the role of China. In short, even then, having such information, I understood that Comrade Ho actually did not take part in deciding the most important questions of the Communist movement in Vietnam.

Now with his death these bacilli may revive with new force. That would be a poor way of honoring the memory of Ho Chi Minh. How much effort he expended, how much of his mind and thought he invested in the cause of the revolution and in strengthening friendship with the Soviet Union! Victory in Vietnam of course is not yet very close; nevertheless, the light of victory over American imperialism is already visible; it’s already glimmering. And so we cannot relax our efforts, but must mobilize everything for a successful culmination of the struggle of the Vietnamese people. After all, it is a struggle not only of the Vietnamese, who have shed their blood and sacrificed themselves in the interests of the world Communist movement. Only time will tell whether the leaders of Vietnam who have remained there after the death of Ho Chi Minh will display an adequate understanding of this. Today, when the cruelest kind of fighting has blazed up between the Vietnamese and the American aggressors, even the pro-Chinese elements have understood the necessity for friendship with the Soviet Union, and loyalty to the positions of Ho Chi Minh has been more clearly delineated. If after Ho’s death Le Duan continues to pursue the line that he did in the times I have spoken about, great harm will be done to the Communist movement, and above all, irreversible harm to the Vietnamese Communists themselves, to the Vietnamese people, and to its struggle for independence and socialism in Vietnam.

After the death of Ho Chi Minh, many speeches were made, and even more articles were written about him in the newspapers and magazines. Obviously people will continue to write about Ho Chi Minh, people from various political tendencies, with differing world outlooks. For my part, I want to share my impressions about what I have read and heard and try to make some comments regarding the prospects for development of relations between Vietnam and the Soviet Union. What will these relations be like? How will relations be established not only with the capitalist countries but with the Communist parties who differ with the views of Mao? What relations will the leadership of the Vietnamese Workers Party and the Vietnamese people establish with China? Many people are concerned about this now. There’s hardly anyone able to predict how events will develop. Some indications shedding light on this question are evident, but one must be cautious, because everything changes, everything is in flux. At one time relations between the Soviet

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Union and the Chinese People’s Republic were irreproachable, and we had good relations even with Mao himself. And now everything has changed. The same thing can happen with Vietnam. Our relations were good, and if they grew worse later, the blame for that lies not with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In my opinion, it was the result of Mao’s influence.

The main documents that provide an opportunity for making predictions and guesses about the future are the so-called testament of Ho Chi Minh and the speech by Le Duan at Ho’s funeral. I have read both documents over twice. I even forced myself to read especially carefully to try to analyze correctly and understand how relations between the Soviet Union and Vietnam will develop. The so-called testament of Ho does not instill me with hope for good prospects. I don’t know how authentic the document is. Even if it is his genuine testament, I don’t know whether or not it was published in full, without being edited or revised after Ho’s death. Such questions are lost in the murk of lack of information. Why do doubts creep into my mind? Knowing Comrade Ho and his attitude toward the Soviet Union, I was surprised that in his so-called testament he never once mentioned our country. The words “Soviet Union” and “Communist Party of the Soviet Union” do not appear in the document. It appeals abstractly to the peoples of the world and the Communist parties for unity. But Ho was an intelligent man and understood that this kind of abstract appeal, not addressed to anyone in particular, would not contribute to unification and consolidation of the Communist parties. This document is not in his spirit, not in his style. Therefore I think that when this document was written, pressure was put on Ho. I am not saying that they stood over him and cowed his spirit. No, he was taking the existing situation into account. Therefore this document is not so much oriented toward the future as toward the present.

When our relations with China went sour, Vietnam vacillated at first. Ho had always held a friendly position toward our Communist Party and our people. But as a result of the line that Le Duan began to push, there came about the removal of Ho Chi Minh from the leadership, and I am convinced that his position in the political leadership was not subsequently reestablished. For the whole subsequent period, Ho Chi Minh remained something like an icon of the Communist Party, but most of the people did not know the real state of affairs. If this hypothesis is accepted, the content of the so-called testament becomes understandable. It was drafted in a pro-Chinese spirit, although China, too, is not named in the document. It is sufficient to leave the Soviet Union unnamed and not to say anything about the sympathies felt by the Soviet people for the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people.

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The testament says nothing about the enormous, selfless aid the Soviet Union has given to Vietnam. Yet this aid has been decisive, because under conditions of modern warfare, with the kind of war Vietnam is waging against such a wealthy and powerful aggressor as the United States, it would be impossible to fight without our aid. The only way to obtain arms that are more or less equivalent to American ones is by relying on the Soviet Union. The Vietnamese did the right thing when they revised their policies. I say that they revised them. They didn’t change them, but only revised them, taking into account the need to continue the war. In order to achieve victory, the appropriate weapons were needed, and those weapons could be obtained only from the Soviet Union. China couldn’t provide them.

If Ho’s alleged testament is analyzed, taking these circumstances into account, it corresponds to the old saying: “Pray to God, but don’t anger the devil.” That’s why I think the document was drawn up in a pro-Chinese spirit. Perhaps under the influence of Zhou Enlai immediately after the death of Ho Chi Minh, this document was edited, and what was published was not the original but excerpts from it. Such cases are unfortunately known to politics. Le Duan’s speech, which I read carefully, is constructed in the same spirit as Ho’s so-called testament. This confirms my guess even more strongly. Everything is aimed at not being deprived of material aid from the Soviet Union and other Communist parties. But at the same time the intent is, while receiving that aid, not to contradict China. China understands the necessity for Vietnam to pursue a policy of friendship with all the fraternal countries. In this very intense conflict, in the battle that is being waged there now, there is no alternative. But it must be kept in mind, and I’m absolutely convinced of this, that this policy is being pursued more in the interest of China than of Vietnam itself.

How will our relations develop in the future? I repeat that it’s very difficult now to say definitely. Everything changes. But it can be predicted that as long as the war continues between Vietnam and the United States, the policy that was carried out while Ho Chi Minh was alive will be continued. But knowing that Le Duan is pro-Chinese to the marrow of his bones, I don’t think he’s capable of making a 180-degree turn and becoming a pro-Soviet person. This is absolutely ruled out as far as he is concerned. Therefore he will wear the mask of friendship. But it must be remembered that it is a friendship that is forced to take the existing situation into account. As soon as the war ends and the Americans are driven out of Vietnam (and I hope that day comes as soon as possible), the mask will be removed, and Le Duan will be revealed before the Soviet Communist Party in his true pro-Chinese aspect.14

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I would suggest that we will have to put up with very bitter things that will be done in relation to our people and to our party. Vietnam will establish the same kind of relations with the Soviet Union that China did, that is, expel our people with the exception of a small number. We probably still have a small diplomatic staff in Beijing. That’s how it will be with Hanoi, too. I don’t want that to happen, but I also don’t want to be blindly trusting. I have seen their policies [that is, the pro-Chinese elements] and I know them. The death of Ho Chi Minh has untied their hands to carry out an anti-Soviet policy. Having expressed my thoughts, I want to say a good word once again about my friend and comrade in struggle for the Communist cause, the apostle of the Communist movement, a dear and unforgettable friend, Comrade Ho Chi Minh.

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